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PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING: NONCOMBATANT MOBILIZATION FOR PEACE IN AFRICA

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During the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of domestic social actors mobilized for peace in several African countries. They did so under unfavorable political conditions. Some of them went further and pursued their objective for peace at the level of formal negotiations. This particularizing inquiry sought to understand the process leading to their engagement with formal negotiations. To achieve this, inquiry focused on two questions: what about the conditions and contexts prevailing in the 1990s to early 2000s accounted for social actor’s engagement with formal negotiation processes and how civic groups went about doing so. The main argument was that certain opportunities within the unfavorable political conditions and social actors’ understanding of war accounted for the pursuit of peace objectives at the level of formal negotiations. A combination of specific and configurational history strategies were employed to reconstruct the process of engagement and the conditions under which it unfolded. This reconstruction relied on intrinsic and extrinsic analyses of ten peace campaigns led by religious leaders and women organizations that occurred between 1990 and 2005 in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somalia. Data on these campaigns was collected through archival research and face to face interviews. The resulting account suggests that the failure of social actor’s humanitarian activities to mitigate the social and economic suffering caused by the war and the failure of formal negotiations to secure a lasting peace led to social actors’ pursuit for an end to war. However, to engage with political actors with political, military and economic leverage, social actors had to deploy their social resources creatively to pursue their demands for peace.
PEOPLE ARE SUFFERING: NONCOMBATANT MOBILIZATION FOR PEACE IN AFRICA

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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

In 1984, the Council of Churches of Mozambique created a Commission on Peace and Reconciliation. At the time, the government of Mozambique was at war with the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), a group that emerged in the 1970s in opposition to the government’s Leninist-Marxist policies. By the early 1980s, the war had reached a destructive and brutal phase. Vital social infrastructure was destroyed. The economy was devastated. Large numbers of civilians died or were forcefully displaced and enduring harsh conditions. The objective of the Commission on Peace and Reconciliation was to persuade the government and the RENAMO to end the war through peaceful means—internal dialogue. The Mozambican government had started negotiations in 1983 with South Africa a regional ally of the RENAMO, resulting in the Nkomati Accord (1984). South Africa provided military support to the RENAMO as part of its policy of destabilizing neighboring states that were allied with the African National Congress and its struggle against apartheid. Under pressure from the United States, the Mozambican government began talks with the RENAMO. However, these broke down and the RENAMO launched new attacks in the country that were more brutal and predatory.

The Mozambican church leaders’ objective of persuading the government to end the war through dialogue was at odds with a government determined to pursue a military solution and not negotiations with a group it did not recognize as a political party. Yet, this did not seem to deter church leaders. Their main concern was the destructive nature of the war, particularly the great suffering it caused for the people (McVeigh 1999, 183, 189). From 1984 until 1992, the year that the government and RENAMO signed an agreement ending war, the Council of Churches of Mozambique and the Catholic Church leaders who had joined them persisted in calling for an
end to war and its peaceful resolution. The clergy also formed the Contact Group that sought to facilitate communication between the government and RENAMO. In addition, a member of the Contact Group, Catholic Bishop Gonçalves, became a member of the mediation team that brokered the Mozambican peace talks. From the late 1980s onwards, similar initiatives by social actors are evident in a number of African countries affected by war, for example, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Examples of civic groups that sought an end to war through peaceful means include the New Sudan Council of Churches, Inter-Faith Mediation Committee in Liberia, Liberian Women’s Initiative (LWI), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola, and Save Somali Women and Children. In addition to calling for an end to violent political conflict, some of these social actors went further in pursuing this objective at the level of the formal negotiations processes. This study focuses on this aspect of civic groups’ peace activism—the engagement with formal negotiations to end internal wars.

**Background to Social Actors’ Engagement with Formal Negotiations**

The conditions under which social actors sought to engage in formal negotiations are crucial to understanding this engagement. It was a domestic response to the nature of internal conflicts that escalated from the late 1980s and continued into the early 2000s when political transitions in a number of sub-Saharan countries turned violent. Whereas internal conflicts such as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone were outcomes of violent political transitions of the 1990s, those in Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan were a continuation of armed struggles for political power that dated back to the early years of independence and were influenced by Cold War politics. However, the political competition that accompanied political reforms of the 1990s did not resolve these longstanding conflicts. Instead, this triggered new cycles of conflict in a
changed domestic context. With the end of the Cold War and shift in donor aid policy, governments were under international donor pressure to institute political reforms and adopt market-based economies. Whether older or newer, the large scale conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Somalia form the context in which civic groups organized to end war.

Intractable conflicts are persistent, destructive, and resistant to resolution (Coleman 2006, 534). Understanding these features of intractable conflicts and how social actors experience them is important in understanding, as well, social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. The military policies that armed groups and government forces pursued destabilized economic and social life. Acts of economic sabotage by armed groups included the destruction of public infrastructure—water and electricity supply, roads, bridges, and schools and hospitals. Armed groups also destabilized civilians’ livelihoods by looting villagers’ crops and livestock, burning farms and mining areas frequented by civilians. Thousands of civilians fled their homes for safer areas within or outside the country. Government counterinsurgent policies such as forceful evacuation of civilians, their resettlement in villages surrounded by government forces, and burning forests considered rebel bases, disrupted civilian life considerably. These war strategies denied civilians access to basic services, forcing them to abandon their livelihoods. Large-scale displacement, for instance, disrupted agricultural production or led to its demise. The economic destabilization and its disruption of agricultural activities impoverished populations that were economically self-sufficient. It led to mass starvation and famine. The protracted nature of the violent conflicts and their recurring cycles of violence overwhelmed coping mechanisms civilians resorted to in times of distress, such as drought periods. Populations became dependent
on humanitarian relief provided by churches, women’s organizations, and international humanitarian relief organizations.

The fragmentation of armed groups into rival factions, as well as the proliferation of weapons and their unregulated use, created cultures of violence. The traumatic and socially destabilizing consequences of these cultures of violence are visible in the deliberate targeting of civilians and the level of brutality. War repertoire included brutal and violent attacks, massacres, mutilation, and sexual abuse of women. Forceful recruitment of combatants and workers was done through abduction of children and youth. These brutal encounters with armed groups and government forces caused a lot of confusion, fear, hostility, suspicion, and bitter resentment among the affected population. An example is the 1991 “Bor massacre” of Dinka civilians by a faction of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) (Amnesty International [AI] Report 1992, 17).

Similar to economic destabilizing policies, the brutal repertoire of war sparked large-scale displacement of populations, disrupting family and social relations. An example is the Siad Barre government’s brutal repression of the Isaaq Somali suspected of supporting the Somali National Movement (SNM). Over 300,000 Isaaq Somali fled from the north to neighboring Ethiopia due to the intense artillery and aerial bombardment of cities and towns by government forces and attacks by government-sponsored militia (Bradbury 2008, 53–75; Omar 1993). The brutal attacks also provoked armed resistance by civilians who organized militia to protect themselves. In Mozambique, for example, the Naprama religious warriors mobilized to counter the RENAMO (Chingono 1996, 53–54). Similar attempts by civilians have been documented in Sierra Leone and South Sudan. These armed responses from below added to the cycles of violence. They contributed to a militarization of society. Civilians found it difficult to pursue
their livelihoods with the breakdown of social order and increasing conditions of insecurity and uncertainty.

These internal conflicts also altered social relations, including gender and generation relations. Women became heads of households as men either joined the military, were killed, or abandoned the family. Women took on the tasks of providing for the family under very difficult conditions and often without the protection of husbands or male relatives. They were vulnerable to attacks by armed groups and undisciplined government forces. Large numbers of children and youths were orphaned or separated from families. With no adult protection many joined the military for survival (Peters 2004, 30–31). With the breakdown of social order, elders could not discipline the large number of youth with weapons. Few armed groups could discipline their troops or control their activities. The government lacked the capacity to protect civilians from the armed groups and roaming bands of armed youth.

**Intractable Conflict and Intervention.**

The intractable conflicts posed a number of challenges to humanitarian interventions aimed at alleviating the suffering of civilians and to the diplomatic efforts aimed at ending them. These challenges are also crucial to understanding social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. First, there is the humanitarian challenge. The economic and social destabilization caused by the processes of war resulted in complex humanitarian crises—profound social crises induced by war or natural disaster (Binder 2009, 332). People’s strategies for surviving proved very difficult under the conditions of war. Thus complex humanitarian crises attracted international attention as large sections of the population urgently needed assistance. However, international humanitarian actors were confronted with difficult conditions of providing assistance to populations in need.
Briefly, the humanitarian challenge had to do with access to populations in need of assistance, especially those outside urban areas. The destruction of public infrastructure made access very difficult. Also and most importantly, the armed groups’ attacks on, threats toward, and intimidation of international humanitarian relief agencies and looting of relief aid raised the problem of safety and security of humanitarian relief staff. International humanitarian agencies withdrew, as they did in Somalia, or were reluctant to intervene under conditions of insecurity, as in the first Liberian Civil War.

The task of providing humanitarian relief in such situations fell to domestic social actors since governments and armed groups lacked the capacity or will. The churches were one such domestic social actor with a long history of charity and with a national reach that in some cases rivaled that of government social service provision. Women’s self-help groups feature in accounts of domestic social actors’ attempts to address the war at the local level. These two groups of actors relied on social resources acquired through international networks of religious organizations and partnerships with international humanitarian agencies such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) to address the humanitarian needs created by the war. Some of the actors, especially women, mobilized resources locally. Yet, even domestic social actors met similar challenges in providing relief as the international humanitarian organizations. They faced intimidation and had to negotiate access or find ways of bypassing rebel control of communication lines.

With this kind of challenge, humanitarian relief providers could not make the difference actors expected. For actors like the churches, the humanitarian crises created by the violent political conflict needed urgent attention. During one of their early visits to President Samora Machel, the Protestant and Catholic bishops called attention to the immense suffering the war
caused for the people and proposed the pursuit of a peaceful resolution through dialogue. In a public statement to the government and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Angola’s Roman Catholic bishops called the civil war “a twice-deadly organization—it kills with weapons and kills with hunger” (Human Rights Watch 1999). Peace activists in other countries expressed similar views. Liberian women, represented by the Liberian Women’s Initiative, said that they were tired of the war and suffering they endured. Peace activists in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia organized protests, demonstrations, and marches against continued fighting. Addressing the humanitarian crisis—the people’s suffering—effectively required addressing its cause: the violent political conflict and socioeconomically destabilizing conditions it created. Only in this way would humanitarian assistance make a difference. Instead, as Catholic Bishop Parade Taban of the Diocese of Torit (South Sudan) put it, providing humanitarian assistance under such difficult conditions of war was like “fattening a cow for slaughter.”

However, those able to make a difference, the conflicting parties, seemed reluctant or disinterested in the humanitarian impact of war, the suffering of the people. This raised a second political challenge: continuation of war despite several attempts to end it through dialogue, in particular formal negotiations convened by the international community. The formal negotiations seemed unable to end war and resolve the political crises. Mediating agents were not the only ones concerned by this. The proliferation of armed groups in the course of negotiations, each seeking political representation; frequent postponement of talks; frequent violations of cease-fire agreements; and breaches of negotiated agreements frustrated war-weary populations. They also cast doubt on the integrity of negotiation as a tool for ending war despite peace activists calling for its use as a peaceful means. The conflicting parties’ delaying tactics and apparent disregard
for formal negotiations seemed to signal a lack of commitment on their part to negotiate for peace. The long, drawn-out processes stretched the patience of the affected population and the international community. Conflicting parties’ spoiler strategies alienated them from the people they claimed to represent— their political constituency. Thus, for some of the peace activists, it was not enough to demand an end to war. They sought to engage directly in formal negotiations, a form of the dialogue they promoted. Social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations varied. The Liberian Women’s Initiative lobbied to be allowed into the Accra (1994) and Abuja (1995–96) talks. Burundi women peace activists from the Collectif des Associations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) also lobbied to be included in the Arusha negotiations (1998–2000). Other social actors, such as church leaders in Mozambique and Sierra Leone, were invited into the negotiations. In some instances, provisions were made for the participation of civil society actors. The Somali negotiations beginning with the Djibouti talks (2000) is an example.

**Statement of the Problem**

Social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations took place under unfavorable conditions. Civic groups acted during periods of war or unstable peace. The political contexts in which they operated had a history of violent repression of political dissent that created a culture of fear. Their pursuit of an end to war through peaceful means was at odds with governments and armed groups’ preference for a military solution. They faced the problem of being seen as political threats to conflicting parties. In addition, formal negotiations are high-level political processes with participation exclusive to conflicting parties with the political, military, and economic leverage to alter the situation for peace. Social actors such as the Contact Group in Mozambique and the Liberian Women’s Initiative do not qualify as parties to the conflict. They do not have the status of political representative, nor the military and economic leverage
considered necessary for altering the situation for peace. Civic groups thus engaged with the formal negotiations from a weak position. Despite these unfavorable political conditions, some social actors persisted in engaging directly with the formal negotiations. The purpose of this particularizing inquiry is to understand the process of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations to end intractable conflict that escalated in a number of African countries during the 1990s. Social actors’ engagement here refers to civic groups’ pursuit of peace objectives in the formal negotiation process.

**Research Question and Main Argument**

This study sought to find out: What about the context and conditions accounts for civic groups’ engagement with formal negotiation processes? What specific conditions in the broader political context and among the civic groups accounts for this? How did the civic groups go about engaging with the formal negotiations? Two arguments are made in answer to this questions.

First, certain opportunities existed within the risky political conditions of war and in the formal negotiation processes that civic groups used to directly engage with the formal negotiations. These had to do with conditions related to social actors, for example the humanitarian resources they had that allowed them to play an important role locally and among affected populations. Other conditions are external to social actors, such as the international community’s frustration with spoiler strategies conflicting parties used to delay, derail, or abandon talks. This created an opening for social actors to act in support of advancing the negotiation process.

The second argument is that social actors’ understanding of the violent internal conflict as “suffering” and “not the voice of the people” motivated their demand for an end to war and its
peaceful resolution. More importantly, the frustration ordinary people felt over conflicting parties’ failure to end war—“people’s suffering”—led civic groups to pursue their objective for peace by directly engaging with the formal negotiations.

**Research Objectives**

The research tasks of the study were to:

a) identify the conditions that made it possible for social actors to act for a peaceful resolution to the intractable conflicts.

b) reconstruct the sequence of events linking these conditions to civic groups’ different ways of engaging with the formal negotiations.

**Conceptual Framework**

Concepts from the dynamics of contention (DOC) framework (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) were used to organize an overall account of plot development from the conditions that made social actors’ engagement possible to how these led to their engagement with the formal negotiations. The narrative analysis begins with a description of broad social change processes resulting from violent political transitions and war. This description highlights the key transformative moments that had an effect on peace activists such as the complex humanitarian crises that overwhelmed their coping strategies.

The narrative analysis then shifts towards elaborating on the link between these conditions and the process leading to social actors’ engagement. The process begins with social actors’ collective attribution of the social consequences of war and their experience of it to an unbearable “suffering.” This process involves a few individuals doing something to end the suffering. Through mechanisms of encounter and conversations, they lead the process of collective attribution of the war and its resolution. They also disseminate the resulting shared
story or new theory of war to conflicting parties, the public, and external actors (governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations). Dissemination involved the appropriation of existing social bases and their resources, creation of new vehicles of coordination to coordinate their pursuit of an end to war, and later engagement with formal negotiations. In the course of collective contention for peace social actors activated sociocultural or religious identities such as mothers, prophets, or princes of peace to define themselves.

Social actors’ interactions with conflicting parties, the public, and external actors combined with mechanisms of opening their activity into the broader political context led to different forms of engagement. Groups like the Liberia Women’s Initiative and Burundi women members of the Collectif des Associations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) sought entry into formal negotiations. Provisions were made for them to participate in formal negotiation processes, as in the example of the Somali women’s organizations. The religious leaders’ engagement shows they were invited as a result of their roles in brokering communication between conflicting parties.

**Definition of Terms**

Social actors are civic groups that organized to pursue an end to intractable conflicts. In this study these are groups led by religious leaders and women’s organizations. They are also referred to as noncombatant groups. Although they are nonstate actors like the armed groups opposed to the government, unlike the latter, noncombatant groups used nonviolent means to pursue their objectives for an end to violent political conflict.

Social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations refers to civic groups’ pursuit of peace objectives in formal negotiation processes.
Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is limited to the analysis of two groups of social actors, religious leaders and women’s organizations. Ten peace campaigns led by religious leaders and women’s organizations were identified in seven sub-Saharan African countries where intractable wars escalated between 1990 and 2005 when political transitions turned violent (Appendix 1). These countries are Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Since this is a particularizing inquiry employing strategies of specific and configurational history, the findings are limited to the specific contexts and actors studied and are not intended to be generalizable to other periods and contexts.

Significance of the Study

The social actors’ pursuit of their peace objectives at the level of formal negotiations is a fairly recent and under-studied phenomenon. This study tells the little-known story of these noncombatant mobilizations for peace in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1990s and early 2000s. Even less is known about attempts by some of the peace activists to engage directly in formal negotiations. Analyses of formal negotiations to end the wars of the 1990s in countries such as Angola, Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone persistently stress the difficulties mediators faced and the daunting challenges presented by conflicting parties with little interest in pursuing a peaceful resolution or committing to one. The role of civic groups such as noncombatant groups is discussed in terms of their relevance to the mediator or conflicting parties. Thus, civic groups appear as auxiliaries to the mediation or as constituents of one or more of the conflicting parties. Rarely do they exercise agency in the negotiations themselves. Conflicting parties and mediating agents are key actors. Civic groups and ordinary citizens are depicted as having no political agency in the direction the war takes. This study highlights the political agency of civic
groups in peacemaking and what allowed them to exercise this agency despite the odds against them.

Outline of the Study

The study is organized as follows:

Chapter 2 examines how literature on social movements and management of intractable conflict addresses the question of social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. Chapter 3 describes the nature of the study, research process, analytical frame, and constraints encountered. Chapter 4 presents the setting of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. It highlights the conditions leading to social actors’ engagement. Chapters 5 and 6 account for the process leading to social actors’ pursuit of a peaceful resolution to war. Chapter 5 focuses on peace actions led by religious leaders, whereas Chapter 6 focuses on those led by women’s organizations. Chapter 7 focuses on how social actors engaged in formal negotiations. The study ends with conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Why do social actors mobilized against war engage directly in formal negotiations? What are the contexts and conditions that account for this engagement? How do they go about engaging in the formal negotiation process? This chapter discusses how scholarly work on nonviolent social movements, conflict resolution, and conflict management addresses these questions. Analysis focuses first on how the literature accounts for nonviolent civic resistance to war, relating these earlier discussions to social actors’ mobilization to end war in sub-Saharan African countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. This is followed by a consideration of how scholars approach social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. This discussion is directed toward contexts and conditions that make nonviolent resistance to internal war possible.

2.1. Nonviolent Resistance to War

War resistance movements are a type of peace movement. Both are new phenomena in history (Carter 1992, xiii; Cortright 2008, 155–156). Antiwar and peace movements are also classified as well-known forms of social movements. Hence they can be defined as “collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part” (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004, 11). Similarly, a study of African social movements defines these movements as a “broad crystallization of group activity autonomous of the state” (Mamdani 1995, 7). Social actors’ peace campaigns fit these descriptions. They were led by religious leaders’ and/or women’s organizations that coordinated peace action autonomously, outside of political institutional channels. Their actions challenged conflicting parties’ use of military means to settle conflict. They supported a peaceful resolution to the war including the
use of formal negotiations. Mamdani and Wamba argue that their perspective on social movements is reflective of “concrete social processes” on the African continent. First, it captures the diverse organizational forms that make up social movements. They point out that worker movements, as an example, include older groups such as burial societies. In other words, social movements in Africa have both old and new forms of self-organization and so defy new social movement definitions that differentiate between older class-based movements and new community-based movements. Second, this broad perspective focuses on all internal forces, whether elite or popular, that are autonomous of the state. Third, social movements in Africa may include initiatives by apolitical nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as initiatives that are antigovernment and political. Given the realities of the African continent, the new social movement orientation restricts inquiry by imposing Western-based definitions on the African context. These features apply to the peace campaigns led by religious leaders and women’s organizations. They organized in the form of networks bringing together older groups like professional associations, labor organizations, students, elites, ordinary people, traditional organizations, community-based women’s groups, and NGOs.

War resistance movements, according to Cortright, are particular reactions to processes of militarization or “responses to specific, unjust military actions that are deemed unacceptable by large numbers of people.” Antiwar movements are considered examples of pragmatic or conditional pacifism. Activists’ perspectives on violence may range from complete rejection of military violence to acceptance of limited use of force for self-defense, justice, and protecting the innocent (Cortright 2008, 14). Antiwar movements often follow a single objective of preventing or ending war. They oppose particular wars or military policies (Carter 1992, 18). They are thus distinct from those that engage in mutual understanding and transnational cooperation.
Historically they have included “traditional peace organizations,” and people from diverse backgrounds who are committed to ending war. Movement participants are also committed to the use of nonviolent methods to pursue their objectives. An exact differentiation of antiwar movements is difficult. The movements bring together groups and individuals that support an end to war in addition to other objectives such as social change or justice. The campaigns led by religious leaders and women’s organizations qualify as war resistance movements as they were reactions against the unprecedented violence and its traumatic effects in society. They brought together groups and individuals opposed to conflicting parties’ pursuit of a military solution to settle their conflicts. Their main objective was ending war peacefully. Unlike antiwar movements in the West, they did not have “traditional peace organizations,” although they may have been supported by external actors who qualify as such, for instance, Quaker peace organizations.

Social actors did not outrightly reject violence. Although it is difficult to establish conclusively whether social actors completely rejected use of violence or force, some, like the Liberian peace activists, supported international military intervention to prevent escalation of war.

2.1.1 Nonviolent War Resistance in Postcolonial Africa. Unlike the extensive scholarship on violent resistance in postcolonial Africa, very little scholarly work is devoted to nonviolent resistance in the same geographic region. The earliest documented nonviolent antiwar activism in Africa is the transnational protest against French nuclear testing in the Sahara (Carter 1992; Cortright 2008, 136; Herb 2005, 355; Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 36–42). This protest took place during the 1950s and 1960s, the period of the antinuclear movement. Western public fear of the effects of nuclear tests and weapons motivated widespread movements against the production and testing of nuclear weapons. Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah fully supported the 1959 protests against French nuclear testing in the Sahara that were organized by the
Committee for Nonviolent Action (CNVA). The protests were not covered by the French press or other Western media compared to those of Western antinuclear movements. Herb (2005, 355) states that despite this, the Sahara Protests led to the establishment of the World Peace Brigade and to a training center for nonviolent action in Tanzania in 1961. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia requested the World Peace Brigade’s support in training and coordinating mass action for the independence of Northern Rhodesia (present day Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe). Julius Nyerere of Tanzania offered to host the World Peace Brigade Africa headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. Inspired by the Sahara protests, these two nationalists wanted the same nonviolent methods applied to the liberation struggle in their countries and region (Sutherland and Meyer 2000, 62).

Elsewhere in Africa, evidence of peace movements included civic groups in South Africa that mobilized against the militarization of society by the apartheid regime’s violent repression of the black struggle for liberation during the 1980s (Cherry 2011; Conway 2008; Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld 2002, 73–74). Groups like the women’s human rights group Black Sash, Christian-based youth groups, and the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) in South Africa, led by white South African conscientious objectors, pursued a variety of objectives under an overall goal of ending state violence against black South Africans. In the 1990s, civic groups mobilized for a peaceful transition from apartheid to a democratic state. The apartheid government chose to undertake political reforms under great international pressure. Then-president F. W. de Klerk initiated negotiations with resistance movements as part of a political strategy aimed at dismantling the apartheid state and establishing a democratic system. The negotiation process was very difficult. In a number of instances violence seemed to derail the process. Civic groups stepped in to mobilize for peace in society.
African peace movements rarely get mention in studies of peace movements. When they do, the mobilizations for peace in South Africa are often used as an example. Yet, during the 1990s, news reports of public demonstrations, protests, and marches included references to peace. These also mentioned the nonviolent (e.g., peaceful) nature of the demonstrations or marches. During the same period, there were regional and international conferences focusing on peace. In these and other conferences civic groups reported their peace activism. These were responses to the violent political transitions from authoritarian rule that escalated into civil wars in some countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.

Reasons given for the absence of African antiwar protests in the literature on peace movements include problems of action going undocumented or ignored by media or receiving less publicity, western bias in the literature, and African people’s primary interest in social justice and not (nuclear) disarmament (Herb 2005; Sutherland and Meyer 2000). Other reasons, such as those given by Herb (2005), do not reflect the complex reality. For instance, she claims that most current wars in the South are civil wars and that the population is sharply divided along ideological lines. This implies that peace movements are unlikely to emerge in such a context, since an important ingredient is the need for face-to-face contact to establish relationships of trust. This is not always the case. The women’s campaigns in Liberia and Somalia, for instance, emerged despite ideological differences. These differences did not necessarily go away. Women had to face the challenge of how to overcome them.

A second claim is the lack of civilian institutions and democratic structures in many developing countries. This claim assumes peace movements can only emerge in contexts similar to that of the liberal western democratic state, where freedom of assembly and expression are universally granted rights. Again, the reality in Africa challenges this. As Mamdani and Wamba-
dia-Wamba (1995, 7) have argued, Herb seems to apply a western lens to her examination of social or peace movements to the Southern context. With regard to the African social context, this prevents her from noticing the variety of organizational forms, traditional and new, that already exist and that people in Africa often use to make demands on the state or political elite. A group of Somali women, for instance, not only structured their women’s organizations on western NGO models but also relied on traditional self-help forms of organizations and networks of kin ties to make their case for an end to war. Also, during the period of transition from authoritarian regimes, a number of governments repealed laws restricting civil and political rights. This study contributes evidence of peace action in countries other than South Africa so as to fill the gap in the peace movement literature on antiwar action in postcolonial Africa.

2.2 Context and Conditions of Civic Groups Mobilized against War and for Its Peaceful Resolution

Collective action in opposition to war is a political act that places the challengers in a threatening position. It may cost lives and lead to retaliation from the government and from political actors who believe the pursuit of war is a justifiable policy option in the interest of the nation or objectives of political transformation. Civic groups engaged in collective action take a position that could be perceived as a threat by the political actors they challenge. So why would civic groups bother to collectively act for an end to the use of the military in these conflicts and demand that political actors pursue peaceful resolution? What about the contexts and conditions makes this possible?

The peace movement literature focuses on peace actions by social actors in Western Europe, North America, and Japan (Carter 1992; Cortright 2008; Kaltefleiter and Pfaltgraff 1988; Nepstad 2008; Rochon 1988). These antiwar movements were a reaction to World War I,
the antinuclear and nuclear disarmament movements in the late 1950s, early 1960s, and 1980s, and the protests against the US war in Vietnam. They occurred in mostly liberal democratic regimes and in a global context characterized by two major wars (WWI and II) that involved most European countries and a Cold (ideological) War between the United States and the former Soviet Union and their allies.

The predominance of peace activity in Europe (United Kingdom) and the United States is attributed to factors in these countries that enabled the flourishing of peace societies such as Quaker-influenced groups: Protestant Christianity, political liberalism, and the free market economy (Carter 1992, 4). This is a kind of structural argument based on cultural, political, and economic conditions that is often invoked to explain the rise of the western liberal democratic state; in this context, it explains the emergence of peace action and its ability to sustain itself over several years. Some scholars point to social actors’ concern for the “horrors of war,” the brutal nature of Nazi and fascist regimes, the danger of atomic and nuclear bombs, the cost to society of the arms race, and the unjust nature of wars as motivating factors toward organizing against war and militarism. On the other hand, factors that constrain peace action may include a “rigid and intolerant political climate” such as the anticommunist and intolerant political climate in the United States during the 1950s, diviseness and sectarianism within the movement, political backlash created by the movement’s emergence, and the credibility and viability of claims and alternative solutions (Cortright 2008, 127–155). These claims show the drivers of peace action to be factors internal to peace actors and to an environment restrictive for political action. They imply that social actors may act on the basis of beliefs they have about war, yet this action may be constrained by a hostile political environment. Most of these factors could apply beyond western political contexts to non-Western contexts and are of interest to this study. They
combine a structural and agency perspective to accounting for peace action. Other scholars point to features of advanced industrial societies, for instance the crisis in the political system, actors’ accumulation of resources necessary for launching peace actions, and the political openings created by intense competition between rival political elites (Rochon 1988, 16–19). These answers show also that scholars search for conditions that make peace movements possible in these movements’ external or internal environments. Thus, accounts of what leads to peace movements reflect theories of social movements. Social movement research suggests answers that highlight structural factors, agency, and a combination of both.

2.2.1 Structures and Movement Emergence. The dominant structural account of the emergence of collective action is the political process theory and its variants (Goodwin and Jasper 2004, 3–8). The model focuses on three components that account for the emergence of collective action (Morris 2004, 234–237): mobilization structures, political opportunity structures, and cultural framing. Mobilizing structures are the informal and formal vehicles of collective action. These include informal networks, existing institutional structures, and formal organizations. Collective action emerges when organizations engage in recruitment, acquisition of resources, and coordination of collective action.

Political opportunity structures are the dimensions of a given political environment, such as the nature of elite relations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), that allow for the emergence of collective action. Examples include divisions among political elites, the emergence of new external allies, or the opening of political space. Changes in the structure of this political environment create openings that benefit challengers. Challengers exploit these changes to mobilize. Expansion or opening up of opportunities thus leads to collective action. This happens through mechanisms in the environment such as
attribution of opportunities or threats, availability of potential allies, formation of coalitions, and framing of contention (Tarrow 2011, 163).

Collective cultural frames are “action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614–615). Cultural framing processes are interactive in the sense that they involve actors negotiating their shared meanings for a problem they face and how to respond. The task involves identifying the problem and its attributions (“diagnostic framing,” “prognostic framing,” and “motivational framing”). These tasks allow for the consensus necessary for people to engage in collective action to mobilize. In other words people make sense of a problem facing them in terms that suggest a way out and motivate them to do something about the problem.

These political process theories were directly relevant to this study’s questions. First, they shared with this study a focus on political context and conditions of social actors’ pursuit of peace action. Since the political opportunity structure directs attention to political conditions in which social movements mobilize, it was useful for identifying and describing the specific political factors that led to collective action against war and for entry into formal negotiations. Political dimensions of a given peace environment are particularly important in this study. Peace movements’ rejection of war centers them in the political arena because decisions about military policy are considered the sole preserve of the state and not that of civic groups. They may find themselves in the kind of hostile environment describe by Cortright (2008). Second, the political process models focus on mobilizing structures and cultural framing, directing attention toward conditions among social actors that drive them to engage in peace actions. Inquiry in this study is approached from the perspective of social actors’ experiences. Therefore, an important question related to cultural frames and mobilizing structures concerns what these actors had in hand and
whether it allowed them to act despite politically threatening conditions or even resistance from within.

Variants of political process models give different emphases on each of these components and have been critiqued for their “structural bias and determinism.” The dynamics of contention (DOC) framework is an attempt to address this criticism by focusing on relational dynamics between the three components (Kriesi 2004, 77–79). This directs analysis toward the interactive context and accounts for social actors’ peace actions in terms of mechanisms and processes that show how interaction between social movement actors and political actors they oppose contribute to changes in the larger political context. The DOC framework has a conceptual toolkit that emphasizes the dynamic interaction between the three components of political process models. It highlights not only the structural conditions but also agency and action of social actors. Although the DOC has been applied largely in studying Western peace and social movements, proponents have called for its use in systematic analysis of non-Western peace and social movements. This particularizing study does not employ the framework concepts with the aim of testing theory. However, the study used the mechanisms to construct an intrinsic and extrinsic analysis of the politically restrictive conditions for factors that led to social actors’ peace actions.

2.2.2 Agency. Structural variables account in part for what makes social actors’ peace action possible. The other part of the story is concerned with the question of human agency. It arises from observations such as Einwoher’s that collective action is driven not only by environmental factors and conditions external to movement actors. Political openings may exist, and mobilizing structures may be available, or people may have an understanding of the situation, yet no collective action occurs. This means we have to look for conditions within
actors that account for why they bother to do something about their situation. This directs attention to the role of human agency. Whereas Morris (2004, 235–37) acknowledges that structural accounts of political process models do make room for human agency—for example, social movement agency is attributed to a political elite—it is framed as a factor external to movement actors, leaving us with little understanding of their agency. He gives the example of how the political opportunity structure allows for agency by suggesting that groups collectively act if they make use of the favorable conditions created by a new political opening. Even though the political opportunity structure approach centers the interaction between political elite (state agents) and challengers, more emphasis is given to the former. This neglect of social movement actors’ agency prevents us from seeing how challengers are able to generate and sustain movements. This argument is similar to Einwohner’s (2003). Her studies of Jewish resistance in Poland show that civic groups resisted despite severely restricted opportunities for collective action (2003). They went ahead and planned their resistance fully aware that they lacked opportunities or that their situation was hopeless. What made their resistance possible was the way they framed it as a way to display honor and dignity. The appeal to values or moral beliefs is evident in African social actors’ peace actions. South African antiwar activists launched their resistance at the peak of the antiapartheid regime’s repression of black uprisings.

Morris argues that political process theorists’ assumption of a strong relationship between external political opportunities and collective action restricts understanding of how the mobilization capacity of social actors leads to collective action. Political process theorists assume that external political opportunities first become available before challengers take action. This characterizes social actors as merely reacting to their external environment when they have the potential to take action that shapes it. He considers the collective action a result, too, of the
capacity of challenging groups (2004, 236). Therefore, social actors’ peace action happens through a reciprocal interaction between mobilizing capacity of social actors and external political opportunities. He argues that this more closely reflects empirical evidence than political process theories of how external political opportunities make social movements happen.

To fill this gap in the literature on what generates collective action, Morris focuses on “how mobilization capacities generate collective action.” Mobilization capacities refer to challenging groups’ agency-laden institutions and frame lifting, leadership configurations, tactical solutions, protest histories, and transformative events. He notes that these are movement dynamics and not independent triggers of collective action. Agency-laden institutions, such as the African American church, are institutions developed by potential challengers. They are “configurations of cultural beliefs and practices that permeate and shape their social networks.” These institutions contain cultural and organizational resources that potential challengers can use to launch collective action. In frame lifting, leaders shape their collective action to fit an institutional frame. So the collective action fits in with (2004, 236) “cultural, emotional schemata of actors embedded in relevant social networks.”

Morris’s argument about human agency contributes to work on leadership and its role in social movements. Nepstad and Bob (2006) argue that leaders matter at crucial moments such as the emergence of social movements. They possess leadership capital, that is, cultural, social, and symbolic capital. This capital allows them to read and respond to structural conditions and changes in opportunities. Leadership capital is crucial for the emergence of social movements because it compensates for a lack of material resources, political opportunities, and organizational structures. Ganz (2005, 211) explains in a related argument how actors with fewer resources can defeat those with more resources. According to him, strategic capacity—that is, the
conditions of a leadership team that facilitate effective strategy—is a crucial condition for the emergence of collective action.

Einwohner adds to this debate on agency and leadership by showing how authority work matters in the emergence of collective action. Authority work is “those efforts made by leaders to establish their authority in the eyes of potential followers” (2007, 1321). She argues that for collective action to emerge, actions leaders take (authority work) must convince people to obey them voluntarily. The type of authority work leaders choose varies according to settings, existing cultural understandings, and leaders’ perceptions of what resonates with followers. Authority work focuses on leaders establishing their credibility and authority.

Although the recent work on agency centers on the role of movement actors, structural factors are not dismissed. The emerging theme therefore is the reciprocal relationship between structure and agency. Structural accounts tell part of the story of why civic groups collectively act. Collective action requires agency and “conscious awareness” and involves choices about initiating one action and not another (Jasper 2004, 2). Structural conditions may be favorable yet potential challengers can still lack leadership capital or strategic capacity or could fail to do the authority work required to attract followers. These insights on agency resonate with this study’s concern with what social actors had that led to their engagement in formal negotiations. This question not only considers external but also internal conditions. They direct inquiry to leaders of civic groups that organized for peace. This permits a fuller and more balanced account of what makes social actors’ engagement of formal negotiations possible. However, accessing information that would provide a rich description of social actors’ mobilizing capacity toward participating in formal negotiations proved a research challenge. This challenge applies not only to the present study but also to studies relying on such sources of information; systematic inquiry
requires collection of primary data especially for social actors whose actions have not been extensively recorded or are under-studied, such as peace activists in sub-Saharan Africa. This study used DOC framework as a first step to further research that would incorporate the insights of agency social movement literature. The DOC permits for agency of social actors, and concepts from this framework were used to identify specific external conditions and those pertaining to social actors that led to their engagement in formal negotiations and how this happened.

2.3 Structure, Agency, and Civic Groups Mobilized to Seek Entry into Formal Negotiations

There is hardly any mention in peace movement literature of peace activists pursuing their antiwar objectives at the level of formal negotiations. However, Carter notes three tendencies in peace movements’ positions on negotiations based on her observation of Western antinuclear movements. They tend to a) exert pressure on conflicting parties to achieve success or promote a particular negotiating position; b) urge unilateral measures of restraint; and c) call for negotiations. The question of engaging in formal negotiations arises in her claim that “in challenging military policies peace campaigns have raised key questions about the accountability of governments to Parliament and public in this sphere, and about the right of the public defense decisions directly” (1992, 23–24). These have relevance for civic groups’ mobilization in Africa.

Literature on peacebuilding and conflict resolution addresses civic groups’ engagement in formal negotiations. The general consensus is that civil society actors have an important role in building a peaceful society. This is attributed to the complex nature of internal wars in the post-Cold war period. A more comprehensive and broad definition of the internal wars and their resolution expands options for responding to them at the state and societal levels (Jones 2001, 9–10; Sisk 2001). These wars affected ordinary people’s lives and livelihoods in profound ways. The social impact accentuated issues that mattered, such as suffering, survival (e.g., lives and
livelihoods), and values (e.g., predominant use of violence to pursue political goals). These human needs issues at the heart of intractable conflicts became as important as concerns with political stability and security. Since the state and state elite-oriented traditional diplomatic approaches proved inadequate in finding lasting peace, policy makers increasingly relied on the support of international and domestic nonstate actors. This is evident in the dominant role international NGOs and their local partners play in addressing complex humanitarian and social crises created by internal conflicts (Natsios 1997, 338). Similar to the peace activists in this study, a number of international and domestic civil society actors became involved in peace efforts as a result of their humanitarian work (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195).

Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008, 16) note that there is stronger agreement on an important role for civic groups in postconflict than in violent conflict and negotiation phases. Whether civic groups have an important role to play as peace agents throughout conflict and negotiation remains a contested issue mainly because of concerns that the violence severely restricts groups’ options and opportunities. They are vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, or threats to their lives from conflicting parties or from sections of society opposed to their demands for peace. Heightened insecurity and societal tensions keep them from reaching groups across dividing lines or traveling to areas outside their operational bases, thereby preventing peace action from spreading beyond its site of origin. The religious leaders and women’s peace activists in this study faced similar restrictive conditions. Nevertheless, as Nepstad has argued (2008, 5), there are instances where peace activists chose to act regardless of a restrictive war opportunity structure. This study examines what conditions and contexts make them do so.

With regard to the negotiation phase, the contention in conflict management and resolution literature is over whether civic groups can be mediators or direct participants. Some
scholars reject a formal mediator (“track one”) role for civic groups because they lack the
leverage of a political mediator in terms of authority and resources required to see the
negotiation process through to a political settlement and its implementation (Aall 1997, 434;
Dunn and Kriesberg 2002; Westas 1988, 58, 60). Although nongovernmental organizations such
as the Sant’ Egidio (Mozambique), International Alert (Sierra Leone), and the former Tanzanian
president’s Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Burundi) increasingly engaged in political mediation
after the post-Cold War, they relied on the assistance of governments and the international
community to see the processes through to completion. The nearest that a domestic influential
social actor took to a political mediation role is when Mozambican Archbishop Gonçalves joined
the mediation team that included the Sant’ Egidio, a northern nongovernmental organization.
This study is concerned with how this happened. What conditions led to his participation at this
level? One answer that is useful for this study is that civic groups participate in formal
negotiations as a result of their humanitarian work (Dunn and Kriesberg 2002, 195).

A second view considers unofficial intermediary roles as more appropriate for social
actors and within the limits of what they can do. These “track two” roles complement, support,
or link to the official (track one) peace process through a process of transference. They include
informal intermediary efforts such as opening up opportunities for communication, facilitating
communication between conflicting parties and informal mediation, use of good offices, and
supporting proposals and efforts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict. In performing these
informal intermediary roles, domestic civil society actors “set the table” for formal negotiations
(Jessop, Aljets, and Chacko 2008, 94). Their proposals may be adopted by an international
mediator.
As for direct participation in formal peace processes, studies of political negotiation processes conceptualize this peacemaking role as the preserve of incumbent governments’ armed groups and political parties because they have the political, military, and economic leverage to alter the situation (Zartman 1995, 3). Proponents for inclusive political negotiations argue that civil society does have a role to play in formal negotiations (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 18). Their inclusion would permit public ownership of the peace agreements and contribute to sustainable peace (Barnes 2002; Rehn and Sirleaf 2002, 80–82). However, skeptics caution that opening up political negotiations to public participation may jeopardize their integrity and undermine their progress. Conflicting parties would question the participation of ordinary citizens with no clearly identified political constituency (Goulding, 2002). Similar to the traditional formal negotiations approaches, skeptics consider the exclusive participation of governments and armed groups crucial to a negotiated settlement. Nonstate actors may participate as mediators or as constituents of conflicting parties (Pruitt 1981, 201–217; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994, 196–215; Zartman 1995).

In conclusion, social movements literature focuses on peace campaigns in the West. Much is known about these campaigns yet little is known about peace movements in Africa. Not much is known about the political context and conditions driving domestic social actors’ pursuit of peace objectives at formal negotiations. The idea of civic groups’ engagement with formal negotiations still seems new despite acknowledgement of the need for new approaches to mediating or negotiating intractable conflicts that take into consideration concerns other than power interests of belligerents. Human security and welfare needs have gained importance because of the complex humanitarian crises and economic devastation caused by intractable wars. The conflict resolution literature seems more concerned with an appropriate role for social
actors that fit in with traditional approaches to formal negotiations than with learning from what it meant to have social actors at the formal negotiations. Systematic study of the different social actors’ engagement of formal negotiations is crucial yet lacking. It would shed light on how sections of society often conceptualized as constituents of belligerents understand the formal negotiation process. This knowledge is important for mediating agents who have to consider not only facilitating negotiations between belligerents but gauge public support for the final accord and its implementation. It would also shed more light on the challenge of connecting peace action from below with action from above so that negotiated settlements are adhered to by conflicting parties. Studies of formal negotiations pay very little attention to social actors’ engagement and treat it as unimportant. When one mediating agent was asked to give his view of the inclusion of women at a formal negotiation process, he replied that they were doing nothing at the talks. Dismissive remarks or attitudes do not advance learning on a process that is yet to overcome challenges that intractable conflicts present. The examples of Syria, Iraq, Central African Republic, and South Sudan show that these challenges are not lessening or getting easier.

The above analysis of the literature points to gaps in knowledge of social actors’ engagement with peace negotiations in postcolonial Africa. The little research and undocumented peace actions in African countries does not help advance knowledge of African social actors’ agency on matters of peaceful resolution of war. Much needs to be done in recording these actions. Although it is encouraging to read memoirs by peace activists such as Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Leymah Gbowee, these are few compared to numerous activists who engaged in peace action during the 1990s and 2000s. International and domestic NGOs have documented peace actions. However these are oriented toward best practices of mainly peace
building and not the peace action that included direct engagement with political actors as social actors did at negotiation venues.

This study fills the knowledge gap by undertaking a specific history of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. A specific history enabled the reconstruction of conditions in the external environment and among social actors that led to such engagement. This highlighted the structural conditions of their engagement and their peace agency role. Instead of identifying a role for social actors, the study constructed one based on social actors’ understanding of war and their own contribution to its resolution. Intrinsic and extrinsic narrative analyses were employed to connect to account for what made civic groups mobilize to enter into formal negotiations. The dynamics of contention framework, a political process model, was used as a narrative frame to guide plot development connecting conditions to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations.
Chapter 3. METHODS

The purpose of this particularizing inquiry was to understand how specific social actors mobilized for peace came to engage with formal negotiation processes that sought an end to intractable conflicts in specific sub-Saharan African countries during the 1990s and early 2000s. According to Hall (1999, 3, 177), a particularizing inquiry is directed more toward a “comprehensive analysis” of a single phenomenon than the analysis of this phenomenon as a special case of a general theory or law. In light of this explanation, this study sought to reconstruct the sequence of events leading to the different forms of engagement rather than analyze the social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations as cases of a general theory. The aim was not to generalize beyond particular instances of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. The concern was with what social actors in specific contexts of war did to pursue their objectives of peace at formal negotiation processes. Thus the conclusions are limited to the particular time frame and locations of social actors’ engagement: the 1990s and early 2000s, in the political contexts of specific sub-Saharan African countries.

3.1 Nature of the Study

The study examined what made it possible for social actors mobilized for peace to pursue this objective further at formal negotiation processes and how they went about it. These two questions guided inquiry. The questions suggested an approach to examining social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations from their perspective and an analysis of the conditions in which their engagement unfolds. This approach is in line with two particularizing strategies (Hall 1999, 210–220), specific developmental history and configurational history. Practices of these two strategies were used in combination to reconstruct social actors’ engagement with the formal negotiations and conditions that seemed unfavorable to such action. Specific developmental
history seeks to understand a sociohistorical phenomenon, that is, a set of events, sequences, patterns, or outcomes that are meaningful to actors involved. With regard to this study, the strategy of specific history was useful in understanding how social actors went about engaging with the formal negotiation process by analyzing this process in terms meaningful to them. In other words the reconstruction of the process relied on social actors’ invocation of events and what these events meant for them. Configurational history, on the other hand, relies on existing theoretical frame or template to account for how events unfold in historical time. In relation to this study, the overall account of the engagement with formal negotiations follows the Dynamic of Contention (DOC) framework, a political process model that directs attention to the interaction between structural conditions and agency of social actors. The concepts from this framework were useful for describing the key features of the political context and conditions, for breaking these into a series of components that were combined to explain how social actors came to pursue their objectives for peace at formal negotiation processes. Configurational history was employed where there was not enough evidence to construct a specific history. Thus this study’s overall narrative is ordered by theoretical frame of the process of social actors’ contention that accounts for unique events in terms of general processes and mechanisms under specific conditions (Hall 1999, 213).

3.2 Research Process

3.2.1 Sources of Information. The sources of information on social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations and the conditions under which this unfolded were archival material, members of civic groups that engaged with formal negotiations, and individuals who observed civic groups’ actions for peace.
Archival Material. This consisted of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources contain social actors’ firsthand accounts of what they did and what actions they took to pursue their objective for peace at formal negotiations. These were in books, memoirs, narratives, and articles by members of civic groups that engaged in peace activism. Other accounts were in grant proposals and reports to donor organizations. Secondary sources included:

1. Memoirs and published interviews of mediators. Mediating agents’ accounts of their mediation experiences contain information on the presence of noncombatant groups, what they did, and how the mediator regarded them.

2. Organizational documents of nongovernmental and international organizations supporting peace and security initiatives. Organizational newsletters, grant proposals, annual reports, documentation of best practices, and reports of meetings that covered issues of women and peace contain stories of civic groups’ achievements. Examples are the IGAD newsletters and publications by organizations that supported women’s peace efforts, such as Femme Africa Solidarité (FAS) and UNIFEM (now UN Women). Other sources include reports on mediation or negotiation processes by think tanks such as International Crisis Group.

3. Press reports of noncombatant groups’ protests, petitions, claims, speeches, and other activities. I identified two types of sources, mainstream and alternative press. Mainstream press include: news agency reports (e.g., Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Xinhua Agency, and AllAfrica) and transcripts of radio and television news broadcasts (e.g., CNN, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts). I accessed these through the LexisNexis Academic database. I used keywords to search for news reports on peace protests by civic groups in Africa covering the
period 1989–2005. Alternative news sources I relied on include: Africa Focus,¹ PeaceWomen,² United Nations Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), and the Inter-Press Service. These alternative news sources reported on peace activities of nongovernmental organizations and other civic groups in countries affected by war. During the period examined (1990s–2005), they also reported on Northern civic groups that supported the peace activism of African civic groups.

4. Feature articles on domestic actors’ peace efforts. I accessed these through the LexisNexis Academic and other databases.

5. Audiovisual documentaries on social actors’ peace actions.

6. Published research on civic groups mobilized for peace in peer-reviewed journals. I accessed these from Peace Research Abstracts, PAIS, and JSTOR.

Interviews. A second source of information was face-to-face and telephone interviews of members of the peace campaigns, organizations that supported them (e.g., donors, allies), and mediating agents. Semistructured interviews were used to access information unavailable in published accounts. This instrument allows participants to share insights on what they did and focus discussion on variables of interest to the study (Leech 2002). Interviews of peace activists, their allies, and other individuals who witnessed their peace actions were considered important.

¹For online archives of the Peace Monitor, a monthly publication covering peace activism in various African countries during the 1990s (www.africafocus.org).

²A project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom that monitors and shares information on women’s roles in conflict prevention (www.peacewomen.org).
means of verifying information in published accounts, in addition to providing information crucial for tracing the peace mobilization process (Tansey 2007).

Selection of interview participants was done purposefully and on the basis of the following criteria:

a) direct participation in peace actions as leaders or members of civic groups identified in accounts of these actions. These are individuals who were present at and/or participated in formal negotiation processes. They had firsthand knowledge about the campaigns they organized, their organizations’ goals, and their engagement in the formal negotiations to end civil war. This knowledge was gained as a result of organizing and leading the campaigns and participating in the negotiations as delegates, observers, representatives of civil society groups, or intermediaries assisting the mediation team/facilitator. Such individuals (also considered elites) have extensive experience, and the historical and contextual knowledge they have was useful for the study (Berry 2002; Rivera 2002).

b) direct support to peace activists. These participants included donors and other civil society organizations that supported the campaigns.

c) actors who were present at and who participated in the formal negotiations and interacted with civic groups. These were members of the mediation team, representatives of organizations that supported the noncombatant groups’ peace campaigns, and other civic groups mobilized for peace.

Interview participants were identified by reading archival material on peace action by civic groups in Africa. Published accounts of civic groups’ experiences in peace building were especially useful (Tongeren, Brenk, Helema, and Verhoeven 2005). Another method was use of professional networks of contacts from my previous work in peace building and development to
suggest names of potential interview participants. Interview participants were also asked to recommend other leaders of the organization as well as third-party participants who might have information useful to the study (Goldstein 2002, 669–672). Conferences on peace were important venues for identifying interview participants. Of the 24 interview participants invited to participate in the study, eight individuals responded and six were interviewed. Two individuals who observed civic groups’ engagement with a particular peace process agreed to be interviewed at a later stage in the study.

3.2.2 Data Collection and Organization. Data collection took place between 2007 and 2011. Archival sources of information were examined for information on the identity of citizen groups claiming to participate in official negotiations, formation and development of such groups (e.g., date formed, reasons for formation, type of organization, membership, activities, resource base), claims for the use of and support for negotiations, demands to participate in formal negotiations, evidence of participation in specific negotiations, mobilization activities and dates (e.g., peace protests, demonstrations, petitions, speeches, and prayer vigils), mobilization outcomes and reasons they give for seeking participation, and their relationship with other political actors. This information was organized into a catalogue of events listing noncombatant group actions in chronological order from 1989 to 2005. This contained information on specific mobilization activities and the dates (protest, petition, speech, meeting, etc.), identity of the group associated with the mobilization activities, claims made by noncombatant groups, target (who the claim was addressed to), opponents (actors opposed to the mobilization activities and claims), outcome of the act, and claim made (whether it resulted in a specific action on the part of the target, opponent, or other stakeholder). Information on whether or not noncombatant groups gained entry into the formal negotiations and the nature of their participation was also
recorded. The catalogue of events allowed for a process tracing events from engagement with formal negotiations back to political conditions and vice versa.

Information on the domestic political context was gathered from published research, press reports, and published contemporary histories of the countries in which the mobilizations for peace unfolded. Analyses of political transitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s were an important source of information on the prevailing domestic political context in which the civic group actions occurred and on the internal wars that resulted from contentious political transition processes. This information was organized according to the prevailing regime, conflict and negotiation phase, and key political actors involved in each situation. This was repeated for regional and international contexts, since the civic groups’ engagement went beyond the domestic context to subregional arenas of formal negotiation processes. The data was useful for identifying key prevailing domestic and international conditions in which civic groups mobilized to engage with formal negotiation processes. A combination of specific and configuration history procedures were used to select cases, identify the specific conditions of social actors’ peace actions, and elaborate the sequence of events linking initial conditions to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations.

3.3 Case Selection

The construction of historical objects of inquiry (selection of cases), the social actors (civic groups), and their engagement with formal negotiations was done intrinsically (Hall 1999, 210–11, 236). This is a specific history strategy that is based on “an observer’s lifeworldly orientation to historical social actors’ convergent invocation of events,” and on the meanings that events and situations had for historical actors. An events catalogue developed to organize information on social actors’ peace actions was used to identify ten campaigns whose trajectories
I could trace broadly from beginning to end. Also, key social actors were identified with these peace campaigns (see Appendix 1). Religious leaders and women’s organizations featured prominently; thus, this study focuses on them. Although civic groups without a clear religious or gendered identity may have participated in peace actions, there was less information on them in archival sources. It was inadequate for tracing peace actions over time. However, other civic groups seemed to join in with peace actions led by women and religious leaders. The study is therefore focused on social actors identified as religious leaders and women’s organizations that engaged in peace actions.

Selection of social actors’ peace actions was also done through “colligation,” that is, on the basis of “a criterion of relevance that delimits a particular specific history and not another.” For example, the catalogue of events was examined for a time frame beyond which social actors’ peace actions were recorded. This helped identify a cycle of peace actions and its duration in the 1990s and early 2000s. These peace actions by social actors fall within the period after the end of the Cold War (from 1989) and before or around the September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. The study is limited to this period. The wars that escalated during this period were an outcome of political transitions from authoritarian rule that turned violent. They were not influenced directly by the Cold War rivalry as the postcolonial wars of the 1970s had been. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union withdrew military support to African allies.

During this period there was a proliferation of civil society organizations as a result of new legislation providing for their registration and autonomous operation. Many of the civil society actors, especially NGOs and religious institutions, filled the gap in social service and welfare provision created when African governments suddenly implemented economic austerity
measures the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (WB) prescribed to address domestic debt. These measures, implemented in the 1980s, drastically reduced the government public welfare budget. Economic prescriptions were also made conditional on governments implementing political reforms, in particular those concerning democratization of political institutions and participation. Thus, civic groups’ peace actions unfolded in a politically turbulent period of transition to a market economy and democratic political institutions without much preparation within the population.

In general, the intrinsic identification of social actors yielded ten peace campaigns in seven sub-Saharan contexts of war. These campaigns had two dimensions: a) the demand for an end to war and for the use of formal negotiation to settle the conflict peacefully and b) direct engagement with or demands to participate in formal negotiations. This study focuses on the second dimension of the campaign, the engagement with formal negotiation processes. Not all social actors, religious leaders, and women’s organizations identified in the ten peace campaigns listed in Appendix 1 engaged with formal negotiations. Appendix 2 shows formal negotiation processes with which social actors engaged.

For purposes of analysis, concepts from the dynamics of contention (DOC) framework were used to characterize social actors and peace actions as political (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The religious leaders and women’s mobilization to end war were considered a form of contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 202–3). These social actors struggled with armed nonstate actors and incumbent governments over the most suitable strategy to settle political conflict. Accordingly, their campaigns to end war were framed as an example of contentious politics, defined as “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on behalf of shared interests
or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties. Social actors were involved in contention, that is “making claims that bear on someone else’s interest” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 4) when they urged armed groups and the incumbent government to abandon the military option and pursue dialogue to end the war. They acted collectively, coming together as different individuals and organizations and coordinating actions on behalf of a shared interest in ending the war through peaceful means. This placed them squarely in the political arena where they interacted directly with government agents and with armed groups opposed to the state and engaged in activities related to a) government rights, regulations, and interests and b) armed groups’ interests (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5). Thus social actors previously preoccupied with nonpolitical activities became political actors. They were known by collective names they gave themselves—such as Contact Group (Mozambique), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, Inter-Faith Mediation Council or New Sudan Council of Churches, Women in Peacebuilding Network–Liberia, Liberia Women’s Peace Initiative—or labels that other people gave them—such as “Burundi women” or “Somali women” or “Church leaders.” They acted as challengers (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 2, 4, 5, 9).

3.4 Analysis of Social Actors’ Engagement with Formal Negotiations

This study used intrinsic and extrinsic narrative to account for what made social actors’ engagement possible and how this led to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. Narrative is the dominant formative discourse in specific history. As such, narrative orders analysis by balancing theory, contingent explanation, and interpretation (Hall 1999, 212). The first use of narrative was to show the specific conditions that made social actors’ peace actions possible. This description was done intrinsically, using social actors’ invocation of events meaningful to them, and extrinsically, using an objective (theoretical) frame of reference (Hall
1999, 210–211, 219). For instance, in accounting for what about social actors (conditions among them) led to actions for peace, answers were sought in their descriptions of the war and their experiences of it. These definitions of war (e.g., “deadly weapon,” “unbearable,” “suffering”) were connected to traumatic events that occurred about the time they chose to take action (e.g., massacres and mass starvation from war-induced drought).

The resort to extrinsic analysis was due to the fragmented nature of the historical record of social actors’ peace actions in Africa and dearth of systematic research. The shift in narrative to extrinsic analysis reflects a move from specific towards configurational history. Existing archival sources rarely described in detail the specific ways in which campaign initiators came to realize they needed to do something to end the war, how they proceeded from this realization to mobilizing the support of others, or how campaign initiators crossed political, religious, social, and ethnic divides to build widespread support for a peaceful resolution to the war. Social memory was weak since most of the key individuals involved have not recorded their actions and analysis. The few interviews did not generate information that was comprehensive enough to identify events that were critical to social actors’ engagement.

The gap in artifactual evidence and social memory (Hall 1999, 87) was addressed by using concepts from the dynamics of contention framework, Tilly’s ideas of political opportunity structure (conceptual maps of regimes and contentious politics) and trust networks (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 45; Tilly 2005b; Tilly 2006). Tilly’s regime typology (2006, 21–28) was used to describe the regime context of the peace campaigns in terms of the regime’s democracy and capacity to provide for its citizens. These regimes in which the peace campaigns unfolded exhibited features characteristic of nondemocratic, low capacity regimes. They were authoritarian military or civilian governments whose relations with established political actors
and challengers (such as civil society organizations including opposition political parties) were marked by a combination of coercion, capital, and commitment. During the war, both governments’ and armed groups’ relations with some sections of the population were based on strategies of predation.

Tilly’s concept of trust networks (2005b, 12), “ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes, or failures of others,” permitted a theoretically guided (extrinsic) description of relations between conflicting parties and social actors. These relations occurred in the form of particularistic ties, evasive conformity, brokered autonomy, and patronage systems (2005b, 30–36). The idea of the structure of opportunity in low-capacity, low-democracy regimes permitted a description of the room within which social actors collectively acted to end the war. A combination of mechanisms and processes related to the violent political transition, the war, and post-Cold War international political developments created a fluctuating, unstable political structure that yielded “tight corners” (Lonsdale 2000), room for political action that was restricted by conditions of war and potential threats or intimidation from conflicting parties.

The narrative analysis connected political developments and actions (e.g., violent political transition, war, failure of humanitarian and political interventions), social consequences of these events (humanitarian and political crises), actions of domestic political actors (e.g., socially and economically destabilizing war strategies), and social experience of war. The resulting description of extrinsically and intrinsically defined conditions leading to the emergence of social actors mobilized for peace and their engagement with formal negotiations is contained in Chapter 4. It is oriented largely toward what directly concerned social actors. As a
result, the description highlights the social consequences and experiences of violent political transitions and war.

A second use of narrative is to account for how social actors engaged with formal negotiations. The sequence of events linking initial conditions to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations was elaborated using the Dynamics of Contention (DOC) framework as a template that subsumed intrinsic and extrinsic narrative (Hall 1999, 86). Intrinsic narrative made connections between “specific action conduits”—that is, peace actions or events—meaningful to social actors and their observers. For instance, analysis of civic groups’ interpretation of their experience of war, especially severe conditions such as mass starvation, mass displacement, impoverishment, or unprecedented violence, yielded a general interpretation of war as suffering and a particular gendered interpretation of this suffering from the perspective of women peace activists.

Extrinsic narrative analysis invoked concepts from the dynamics of contention framework, a political process model, to account for how social actors came to engage with formal negotiations (Hall 1999, 213). The dynamics of contention framework focuses on the interaction context defined as the level of mechanisms linking structures and configurations (conditions specific to the social actors’ context of action) to agency and action (conditions specific to social actors) (Kriesi 2004, 77–79). Specific mechanisms and processes involving social actors, the targets of their peace actions (conflicting parties, armed groups, and external actors), and third parties like the media and the public are combined in sequences of interaction that drive contention toward engagement with formal negotiations.

The DOC framework provided concepts that I used to construct an account of plot development that highlighted what was common across the different social actors’ peace actions
and what was particular to specific peace activists. For instance, narrative analysis is used to show how similar mechanisms of violent political transition and war combine to a) make social actors want to do something to end the war and b) produce the campaign trajectory. The religious leaders and women’s organizations’ interpretations of war are described in terms of the operation of mechanisms of attribution that produce an alternative theory or story of war and its resolution. However, this alternative story of war differs for women’s organization. Their interpretation of war as suffering is gendered. It is framed in terms of their specific experience as women. Thus, the character of contention varied depending on the prevailing political conditions, the resources social actors had available to them, and the way they use these resources to pursue their peace objectives. This result is a narrative explanation that connects intrinsic and extrinsic accounts and highlights regularities and variations in processes of engagement (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 5, 11, 28). This yields an account that is particular to the social actors studied and is not meant to be generalizable to similar actors in different contexts.

### 3.5 Narrative Frame

Narrative analysis begins in Chapter 4 with the broad social changes generated by violent political transitions and historical developments leading to the emergence of social actors such as the religious women and the peace campaigns they launched. An example is the sudden withdrawal of the state from welfare provision when governments adopted market-based policies in the 1980s. Numerous civil society organizations emerged to provide social welfare services. The intractable conflicts created an overwhelming demand for these services as shown by the complex and challenging nature of humanitarian crises. With regard to social actors’ peace actions, specific socially transformative events in the political transition and wars are identified
that led to their engagement with formal negotiations. These include atrocious acts such as massacres or mass starvation from war-induced famine.

In Chapters 5 and 6, the narrative shifts to elaborating on the process leading to social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations by first accounting for what makes them take action for peace and how. In these chapters, narrative is used to show how the general mechanisms of attribution operate in the specific social actors’ understandings of these key events and the wars. Specifically, the intrinsic reconstruction of social actors’ interpretations of these events and the connection of this interpretation to an extrinsic interpretation process (attribution mechanism) yields social actors’ theorizations of war and its resolution (Tilly 2005b, 64–65, 213). Social actors consider war as a “suffering” and their role as “peace agents.” The religious leaders and women activists disseminated this theory of war and its resolution to build a shared understanding among supporters within their social bases. They also disseminated it to the public and conflicting parties to elicit support for an end to war. Dissemination took place through interaction mechanisms of encounter and conversations (Tilly 2005b, 138–140). Other mechanisms included the creation of new vehicles to coordinate dissemination campaigns at the national level and to engage conflicting parties. With regard to resources, social actors appropriated religious and cultural rituals and practices and their networks of personal relations. These were employed to disseminate their theory of the war and its resolution to conflicting parties, external stakeholders such as mediating agents, and external allies. In deploying their networks of personal relations in pursuit of an end to war, religious leaders and women activists placed their most valuable resources at the risk of mistakes or malfeance of others (Tilly 2005, 12). The demand they were making for an end to war and their theorization of war could be interpreted as politically threatening or even a betrayal at the level of interpersonal relations. My
narrative ends in Chapter 7 with social actors’ different paths to engaging with formal negotiations.

3.6 Research Constraints

3.6.1 Archival Research. A constraint in data collection was the highly fragmented nature of information on civic groups mobilized for peace in Africa. It is scattered across a variety of the sources mentioned earlier. Also, domestic civic groups that acted during the period the study was limited to (1990s to 2000s) rarely documented their activities, as they lacked the resources to do so systematically and keep a public record. In addition, given the conditions of insecurity, civic groups were not sure that their records would be protected. When they did, their reports showcase achievements. There was very little detailed description of actions they took, challenges they faced, failed attempts at acting for peace, and the reasons for these failures.

Access to international nongovernment organization documents was difficult. Requests for access to organization documents were met with silence or promises to call back that were never fulfilled even after seeking support through personal contacts at the organization. One reason could be that organizations do not have the staff, time, and resources to catalogue official documents in a way that is easily accessible to researchers or other interested members of the public. The costs of doing so are high. Also, organizations tend to be cautious, understandably, about giving access to files, especially if they have little control over the final use of research findings or consider information to be confidential.

3.6.2 Interview Process and Outcome. Attempts to secure interview appointments proved difficult in the early phase of the research because of the time and resource constraints. Appointments for face-to-face interviews with participants identified were difficult to secure because they had changed jobs, traveled frequently, or had busy work schedules. Although some
interview participants agreed to participate in the study, finding time to conduct the actual interview was quite a challenge for this group of people who are busy and highly mobile. Others, for instance, three key peace activists, were suffering from age-related illnesses and could not be interviewed. These difficulties in obtaining firsthand accounts from elite interview participants are not new.

3.6.3 Nature of Evidence I Worked With. Due to the difficulty of obtaining firsthand oral accounts of why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized to end war in politically risky conditions, this study relied mostly on archival sources of information on peace activism in sub-Saharan African countries. Accounts of peace actions vary in the level of detail in descriptions of specific events, processes, and social actors leading these campaigns. For instance, there was more information on the religious leaders’ peace actions in Mozambique, South Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone and the women’s campaigns in Liberia, Somaliland, and Sierra Leone than on women’s campaigns in Burundi and South Somalia. Accounts of peace actions by religious leaders varied. There was more information on the religious leaders’ campaigns in Mozambique, South Sudan, Angola, and Sierra Leone compared to the campaign in Liberia. Although Liberian clergy’s peace actions were reported in the media there is little documentation of their actions. Liberian clerics at the center of the campaign have no memoirs of their experience, or if they do, these are not easily available to a wider audience. There was little written about the late Bishop Michael Francis, who was a key participant in social actors’ calls for peace. Unfortunately, he has passed on with a lot of knowledge that would have been valuable in understanding why and how social actors mobilize for peace in situations of war. Fortunately, campaign initiators in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Sierra Leone have written their story. Peace actions by women’s organizations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and North
Somalia (Somaliland) are fairly well documented compared to the South Sudanese and South Somali women’s campaigns. Of these, the Liberian and Burundi accounts offered more insights into the process of engagement. A few key peace activists have written memoirs, including Bishop Sengulane and Gonçalves (Mozambique), Nobel Prize laureate Leymah Gbowee (Liberia), and Alimamy Koroma (Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone).

Peace action by social actors in sub-Saharan Africa is under-studied. Social actors’ peace efforts in South Africa are often cited in references to mobilization for peace in Africa. Yet from the end of the apartheid regime in 1994 and into the 2000s, domestic actors in a number of African countries engaged in nonviolent action against war. Examples are peace action by Liberian women and religious leaders, women’s organizations in Somalia, and religious leaders in Mozambique. There is also little systematic study of the mediation of African civil wars. Existing studies do not consider domestic social actors worth serious attention. In general, studies of peace action in sub-Saharan Africa focus on the peace efforts of northern transnational NGOs and mediating agents. Given the lack of a rich and extensive written record of peace action by domestic social actors, most of the knowledge remains in the memory of key activists. Many of their stories are undocumented. A number have since passed on and with them very important insights and lessons on the role civil society organizations can play in transformation of conflict. Others have moved on to other activities.

For the most part, the accounts offer general descriptions of events and their outcomes. The level of detail in descriptions of a particular event depended on whether that event was important to the narrator. For example, UNIFEM accounts of women’s peace actions highlight these as best practices in line with their organizational interest of promoting women’s participation in peace and security. In descriptions of their peace actions at the 1995 ECOWAS
summits on the Liberian war, members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative detailed what happened when they were at the venue. Descriptions of events leading to their actions at this particular venue were left out or summarized even though they may be important. There was little or no information on the number of requests women made for invitation to the ECOWAS meeting, how they made those requests, who they wrote to, what they wrote (copy of the letter), the series of actions leading to their decision to invite themselves, and how they found their way to the venue of the Heads of State summit. Some of this information was found in news coverage of the negotiations. However, interviews would have been a much better source of information on these questions.
Chapter 4. NONCOMBATANT GROUPS AND THE MOBILIZATION TO END WAR IN AFRICA

This chapter sets the context for the examination of why and how noncombatant groups in Africa mobilized to end war in the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s. An important part of the setting was the violent political transitions of the 1990s. These occurred in the midst of two major developments. The first is the set of economic austerity measures governments and market based approaches adopted in the 1980s to manage their economic crises. The second is the shift in international intervention and development policy resulting from the global economic crisis of the 1980s and the demise of the communist state in Eastern Europe.

The main focus is on the violent turn the political transitions took in African countries, especially the escalation of civil wars. A key part of this violent political transition setting was the social transformation resulting from the wars. This is crucial to understanding social actors’ mobilization for peace. The description of the violent political transition and resulting wars is from the perspective of the influence these developments had on society. I turn to examine the nature of international intervention in relation to the emergence of the noncombatant groups who engaged with formal negotiations.

4.1 Violent Political Transitions

The early- to mid-1990s was a politically turbulent period for states in Africa. A trend analysis of regime types in Africa shows that half of the autocratic regimes in Africa fell between 1990 and 1992 as a result of popular struggles for political change and major foreign policy changes sparked by the end of the Cold War (Marshall and Gurr 2005, 42). Seddon and Zeilig observe that “in a four-year period, from 1990–1994, a total of thirty-five regimes had been
swept away by a combination of street demonstrations, mass strikes and other forms of protest, and by presidential and legislative elections that were often the first held for a generation” (2005, 19).

The nondemocratic regimes in Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan resisted democratization or implemented political reforms in ways that ensured they remained in power. The authoritarian civilian and military ruling elite feared their political fortunes would no longer be certain under new political arrangements that created new opportunities for political opponents and greater autonomy for citizens in determining their political fate. To secure their position, ruling elites pursued strategies of prevention and delayed implementation, including repressing, frustrating, and undermining political opposition parties, delaying elections and constitutional review processes (Ake 2000, 51–52). For instance, leaders such as President Siad Barre in Somalia resisted reforms and rejected consultation with political participants. In some cases, incumbent regimes such as the FRELIMO in Mozambique and the Islamist military regime in Sudan unilaterally defined the terms of political participation. Governments such as those in Liberia and Sudan undermined legislation providing for the registration, freedom of assembly, and association of political parties by restricting registration and activities of political parties considered a threat. Also, sections of ruling elites disregarded outcomes of public consultations, referendums, or elections. They overthrew democratically elected governments, as the military in Burundi and Sierra Leone, or they manipulated the electoral process in their favor, as was the case in Liberia and Sudan (Abrahamsen 2004; Arnold 2008, 249–250; Azevedo, Nnadozie and João 2003, xxxii-xxiii; Fyle 2006, xlviii; Idris 2005, 53–56; James 2004, xxxiii; Lyons 1998, 229; Mohamoud 2000, 126–134; Ofcansky 1998, B369-370).
In general, ruling elites did not tolerate groups they considered a threat such as political parties, armed groups, civic groups calling for political change, and ethnic or religious groups they perceived as opponents. The intimidation and arrests of government critics, violent repression of political opposition, and killing of ethnic communities considered opposition supporters point to a general lack of protection of political participants from arbitrary action by government agents. The autocratic rulers’ strategies of anticipatory and responsive repression undermined public trust and participation in the democratization process. Political actors adopted strategies of predation in the absence of credible processes or institutions for renegotiating the terms of new political and economic arrangements. Armed groups emerged to counter violent repression by ruling elites (Tilly 2005b, 30–35).

For example, in Somalia, Siad Barre’s violent repression of political opponents and members of their clans led to the formation of armed political opposition groups that aimed to remove him from power. In Burundi, the military assassination of the first Hutu president in a failed coup attempt in 1993 sparked a cycle of killings and revenge killings and created a political crisis that ended in a military coup in 1996. It also led to the Hutu rebellion. A section of the Hutu political elite, grieved by the Tutsi military elite’s overthrow of a democratically elected government and assassination of the first Hutu elected President, formed armed movements against the military regime. The emergence of armed groups in society set in motion a cycle of violence that spiraled into widespread civil wars in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia. In Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, rulers’ strategies of repression intensified wars dating back to the Cold War period.

At the beginning of the peace campaigns, the governments in Angola, Burundi, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan had failed to contain the armed groups.
Military victory was not certain anymore. The governments had limited capacity to affect the character and distribution of populations, activities, and resources within their territories. First, they lacked the capital, the economic resources, to do so. Governments were in the midst of an economic crisis when the wars of the 1990s escalated. Most had a weak revenue base and huge national debts and were highly dependent on external aid. To qualify for further external aid, governments implemented austerity measures prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. They also adopt market-based approaches to managing the economy in line with new Western donor development policies aimed at reducing the size of the state and giving a greater role to the private sector and civil society. The new aid policies were contingent on implementation of political reforms providing for multiparty democracy, competitive elections, and respect of human rights. Ruling elites lacked the capital to buy out political opponents or contain the internal rebellion. Furthermore, they could no longer count on the military assistance of Western allies to stamp out internal rebellion. With the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union and United States withdrew military aid to former allies in African countries (Birmingham 2002, 170; Bradbury 1994, 10; Mohamoud 2000, 15, 119–120). Also, the optimistic thinking about an emergent new world order in the 1990s emphasized a greater role for the UN and regional organizations like the Africa Union (then Organization of African Unity) in promoting global peace and security. International actors promoted the resolution of wars through peaceful means.

Second, at the time of political transition, few regimes had functioning civil administrative structures extending throughout the territory and capable of providing services and adequate security to populations. Thus, vast areas with little or no government presence were open to the activities of armed groups. In Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, vast areas were
under the control of armed groups that had emerged to fight the government long before the political and economic transition. Governments could not provide services to populations there. Instead, government revenue was diverted towards military operations against the armed groups. In Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, government capacity to provide services and security was weak or nonexistent outside of capital cities and major towns. Armed groups that emerged in response to failed transitions established themselves in these areas of weak government control. Also, because of the economic destabilizing policies of armed groups and government counterinsurgent policies, government services were limited to cities and major towns. Nonstate actors like churches and international humanitarian relief agencies provided services where government presence was absent or very weak. As in Angola, Mozambique, and Sudan, churches and international humanitarian aid agencies provided health, education, food relief, and other social services that government ceased to offer throughout the wars.

Third, the pre-eminent diversity of shared languages, ethnic/regional ties, religion, and traditional cultural systems over cultural, political, economic, and organizational uniformity posed a challenge to governing through use of mainly commitment. Most governments established control through a combination of mostly coercion, capital, and commitment. For instance, rulers in Angola and Mozambique experimented with coercive integration of a diverse population into a Marxist-Leninist state. In Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, rulers combined coercion, capital, and commitment to build patronage systems and particularistic ties to control the population. When the Nationalist Islamist Front seized power in Sudan, it resorted to coercive integration of the population into an Islamist state (Tilly 2005b, 30–31). The use of government resources to forcefully impose an Islamic state and a policy of Arabization in the South shows the use of capital and coercion to control the population through particularistic ties
of religious and ethnic identity (Ali 2010). The strategy aimed at putting down resistance from secular political parties in the north, the Southern Sudanese Liberation Movement, and organized civic groups in both the north and the south.

By the time the peace campaigns emerged in the 1990s, political conflict over the nature of transition had escalated into violence or gone through some cycles of violence. With external military aid no longer guaranteed, ruling elites looked within for new strategies of countering the armed rebellions. They combined commitment and coercion with capital depending on whether the government had domestic resources. The FRELIMO government in Mozambique resorted to a strategy of *brokered autonomy* with the churches. Government diversion of national resources to the war effort devastated the national economies and livelihoods of people to where the war became unaffordable. Government failure to respond to the economic devastation and mass starvation from the combined effects of the war and the 1990 drought eroded the population’s confidence in its ability to end the war or mitigate war-related social and economic crises.

Restoring religious freedom of worship dealt with the legitimacy problem. Churches provided the much-needed humanitarian relief and social services the government lacked the capacity to supply. More importantly, allying with the church gave the incumbent regime credibility it had lost in the war (Chan and Venâncio 1998, 19–20; Morier-Genoud 1996b, 1–3). In Chapter 5, I show how churches seized openings such as this one to demand a peaceful resolution to the war.

Countries like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan relied on alternative sources of revenue such as minerals (oil and diamonds) and natural resources (timber). Although control of natural resources shifted between government and armed groups, revenue generated was reinvested in countering the armed groups and not in improving the socioeconomic conditions of the people. Groups such as the UNITA in Angola, RUF in Sierra Leone, and Charles Taylor’s
NPFL controlled areas with natural resources that they used to finance their operations (Birmingham 2002, 182–183; Ellis 2007, 164–170; Reno 2000, 326–327). In Somalia, groups vied for control of lucrative trade such as qat, a narcotic leaf popular in Somalia and elsewhere in Eastern Africa (Waal 1996, 11). Like the incumbent governments, these armed groups rebels did not use revenue from these natural resources to establish civilian administration in areas under their control. Just like the governments they opposed, rebel commanders invested the profits in themselves and their armed movements (Orogun 2003, 291). Where government forces lacked the capacity to operate in areas under control of armed groups, they recruited alternative forces to supplement the government army. For instance, the Government of Sierra Leone contracted international mercenaries like the Executive Outcomes. Sudan sponsored militia to fight alongside government forces. Ruling elites in Burundi used this strategy to intimidate opponents. In Somalia, the Siad Barre government armed clans supportive of his regime to fight against clans perceived to be supporters of political opponents. The Sudanese government also took advantage of factional rivalries among the armed groups to win over some of the groups onto its side.

These top-down strategies of coercion and commitment in the form of particularistic ties (shared ethnic or religious ties) and the bottom-up strategies of predation that armed groups used to counter government repression created acute political crises and cycles of violence in Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan the wars threatened to tear countries apart. This eventually happened in Somalia where the central government in Somalia collapsed and no armed group emerged with the capability of gaining a military victory and establishing a central government. The cycles of violence pitting armed groups against the state elite set in motion processes that destroyed lives and livelihoods of the people.
4.2 War and the Transformation of Society

Studies of post-Cold War violent conflict in Africa address in detail the nature, dynamics, and variation among these conflicts in terms of who the armed opponents are, when and how they emerge, political agendas, and how they recruit, conduct war, and mobilize resources to sustain their armed operations (Allen 1999; Clapham 1998; Ellis 2007; Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2001; Mkandawire 2002; Reno 1998; Richards 2005; Weinstein 2007). My concern, however, is with the civilian experience of the conflict between government and armed forces opposed to it, as this is crucial for understanding civic groups’ mobilizations to end war.

The armed groups and government forces pursued war strategies that destabilized economic and social life in the country. Armed groups’ frequent acts of economic destabilization included the destruction of government installations, public facilities (water, gas, and electricity supply), communication lines (roads, bridges, and railways), and social institutions (government and church schools and hospitals). They extended this destabilization policy to the civilian population by looting villagers’ crops and livestock, burning farms, and planting landmines in farms, along paths and roads. Economic sabotage was a common practice of older groups such as the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) in Mozambique and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in Angola, and of newer transition-related armed groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia (Chingono 1996, 50–52; Hayward and Kandeh 2000, B165; Malaquias 2001, 523; Newitt 1995, 564; Waal 1996, 13).

Incumbent governments’ counterinsurgent policies were just as disruptive of economic life as armed groups’ attacks. The forceful evacuation of communities considered rebel sympathizers from areas under government control (Burundi, South Sudan), the forceful
reorganization of civilians into settlements under control of the army to cut rebels’ access to villagers for supplies, scorched earth policies aimed at destroying rebel bases in dense forests, and looting of peasants’ crops and livestock by government forces destabilized populations economically.

The economically destabilizing military policies of the armed groups and government forces impoverished once economically self-sufficient populations by denying the population access to basic services and forcing civilians to abandon their livelihoods (farming, employment, trade, and other economic activities). The large-scale displacement of populations within and outside national borders disrupted agricultural production or led to its demise in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan (IRIN 2003). Large numbers of people fled to cities leading to a sudden increase in urban populations that greatly stressed public facilities and created social crises in Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Those who could not make it into cities or refugee camps in neighboring countries were cut off from the rest of the country and were forced to fend for themselves.

The protracted nature of the wars overwhelmed well-known coping strategies civilians used to survive in drought-prone areas of eastern and southern Africa and in fertile areas where intense fighting prevented agricultural activities for very long periods. Civilians thus suffered twice, first from the direct effects of the war and second from the interaction between the effects of economic destabilization and mass involuntary displacement and the effects of natural disasters (droughts, floods). The combination of drought and sabotage produced mass starvation and diseases in Angola, Mozambique, and Somalia (Chingono 1996, 52–53; Gberie 1995a; 1995b; Hilhorst and Serrano 2010, 186–189; Ofcansky 2000, B396; Roque 2008, 380; Simon 2001, 505–506, 512). It is significant that armed groups seemed unconcerned about the mass
starvation the populations experienced and did little to address it. Also, governments lacked the
capacity to prevent or mitigate starvation even in areas under their control. With no alternative
livelihoods and ineffective coping strategies the population became dependent on humanitarian
relief provided by the churches, women organized at the community level (Somalia), and
international NGOs. Yet, as in the case of Somalia and South Sudan, armed groups extended
their acts of sabotage to the distribution of humanitarian relief by looting or restricting access to
affected populations. This necessitated negotiating access to affected populations even though
this did not guarantee that the delivery of humanitarian relief would be protected.

The violent transition wars destabilized society in addition to the economy. At the social
level, civilian encounters with the fighting forces of the government and opposition armed
groups were violent and brutal. The wars’ frontlines extended into civilian spaces. Indiscriminate
attacks, massacres, and mutilations of civilians, sexual abuse of women, abduction of children,
and the use of civilian populations as human shields characterize these encounters (Chan and
Venâncio 1998, 11–13; Chingono 1996, 51, 57; Ellis 2007, 111–120; Hayward and Kandeh
capacity to protect civilians as their counterinsurgent operations resembled revenge attacks
against populations suspected of being sympathizers or ethnic kin of the armed groups. Civilians
were caught between armed forces. They became tools of war as shown by the sexual abuse of
women, mutilations, and abduction of children and villagers for use as soldiers, workers, and
human shields.
The confusion, fear, hostility, suspicion and bitter resentment resulting from these violent and brutal encounters aggravated social tensions along ethnic, gender, and generation identity lines. In some of the wars, ethnic, religious, and clan tensions triggered cycles of revenge and counterrevenge attacks that polarized previously heterogeneous communities. This process of polarization fixed politicized ethnic identities geographically through a spatial reordering of populations into ethnic enclaves. The large-scale displacement of civilians within and outside national borders split families, friendships, and other relationships that cut across various identities. It also displaced large numbers of people out of their homes to internal camps within the country or refugee camps outside the country (Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999, 47–51; Litherland 1995; Lubabu 1999b, 31; Ofcansky 2000, B396; 2001, B414; Ratnsabapathy 1995). Polarization processes that created ethnic enclaves are evident in all the civil war contexts under study here. They differed only in terms of the combination of ethnic, regional, and religious identities and the extent of polarization along territorial lines.

The indiscriminate nature of the brutal encounters show that armed groups did not necessarily select their targets on the basis of ethnic identity. The armed groups often did not care who they attacked. Women, children, and the elderly fell victim to their brutal attacks. Some villages would be attacked and others left untouched. It seemed like the ultimate decision regarding who would be attacked lay with armed combatants or with roving criminal bands that emerged to profit from the confusion and high level of uncertainty. This created great confusion and anxiety in society. These reprehensible and brutal attacks breached indigenous laws of war. In some instances, civilians resisted these brutal and violent attacks by mobilizing their own militias since government forces lacked the capacity to protect them. The Naprama religious warriors mobilized to resist the RENAMO who were fighting against the Front for the Liberation
of Mozambique (FRELIMO) government in Mozambique (Chingono 1996, 53–54; Newitt 1995, 573). The Kamajor, Tamaboro, Kapras, and Donsos vigilante groups in Sierra Leone emerged to defend local populations against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and sobels renegade soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army who collaborated with the RUF (Hayward and Kandeh 2000, B170–173; Muana 1997). Across these conflicts, the proliferation of weapons and their unregulated use created cultures of violence that had a traumatic effect on family and other social relations. It also led to the militarization of society characterized by local mobilization of civilian militia, fragmentation of armed groups into factions, and the emergence of roaming bands of armed youth, such as the White Army in South Sudan, with no political allegiance to the government or armed opposition (Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011, 65–66, 68–70).

The gender and generation dimensions of the brutal civilian-military encounter merit attention. Concerning gender relations, women became heads of households as men joined the military, were killed in attacks, or abandoned the family. In addition to their traditional household roles, women took on the tasks of providing for the family under very difficult conditions. Doing so required engaging in income-generating activities that took them away from the home. Without the protection of their husbands and other relatives, women also became vulnerable to armed group attacks. The generational effects of the war can be observed in the large numbers of children and teenagers who became orphaned or separated from their parents. Without adult protection, many were vulnerable to recruitment into military for survival, some for protection or revenge (Peters 2004, 30–31). The recruitment of large numbers of youth into armies altered relations between generations. Armed groups forced child soldiers to attack and kill members of their own family and community as part of their initiation. This severed their ties with families and communities who saw these atrocious acts as a great betrayal and ensured that
the child soldiers would remain loyal to the armed group. Also, a large number of children and teenagers possessed arms that they used to threaten or intimidate community members regardless of their gender or seniority. Traditional elders found it difficult or impossible to discipline armed children and youth, as in Sierra Leone and in South Sudan. The powerlessness of elders to control and discipline an increasingly militarized generation of youth eroded the legitimacy of patriarchal traditional authority structures. With traditional authority structures in doubt, discipline at the family and community levels became difficult to maintain. Overall, the governments’ inability to protect its civilians and the traditional authorities’ weakening control of the younger generation resulted in a breakdown of order at national and local levels.

It is difficult to see how the armed groups could have mobilized and sustained widespread popular support by brutal attacks. During initial phases of the war the population may have initially welcomed armed opposition as “liberators” from the regime of the day. However, as the wars stretched on without end, armed oppositions split into rival factions that resorted to indiscriminate, brutal, and predatory methods. Popular support dwindled. Instead, people experienced the destruction of their lives and livelihoods. The deterioration in quality of life created what humanitarian policies and studies refer to as complex political emergencies—profound social crises induced by war or natural disaster (Binder 2009, 332).

4.3 International Intervention

The political and humanitarian crises resulting from these wars and the security threat they posed to neighboring countries compelled regional and international intervention to contain the conflict. The flight of thousands of people to neighboring countries and their settlement in border regions outside of government reach and control created insecurity. Armed groups took advantage of government inability to secure these regions and established bases from which to
attack. Sometimes, neighboring countries became involved as shown by the way the Liberian wars spilled over into Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry, threatening to destabilize the region. Also, when the Khartoum government attacks on South Sudan armed groups extended beyond its border with Uganda, the latter retaliated.

The protracted nature of the wars and the complex humanitarian crises they created posed two main challenges to intervention by domestic civic groups, international nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations. The first challenge concerned how to provide emergency assistance (food, water, medical care) to affected civilians under conditions of insecurity and impaired transport infrastructure. The second challenge involved finding the best means of transforming the lethal conflicts to constructive ones.

4.3.1 Civil War and the Challenge to Humanitarian Intervention. High levels of insecurity and destruction of roads and railways made it very difficult for international humanitarian organizations to locate and access affected populations, adequately assess the humanitarian problems, and ensure timely provision of relief supplies and health services. During the first Liberian civil war (1990–96), humanitarian assistance was confined to cities or regions deemed relatively secure. In South Sudan and Somalia, international humanitarian agencies had to negotiate with armed groups for safe passage although this was not always guaranteed. International aid agencies operating in Burundi, Somalia, and Liberia withdrew because of threats or armed attacks on relief convoys, abductions and killings of international aid workers, and lootings of relief agency premises and property (Stoddard, Harmer, and Haver 2006; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 1997).

In the absence of international humanitarian assistance or limited intervention by external actors, concerned individuals within communities mobilized residents and whatever resources
they could to address the suffering and humanitarian needs. In Liberia, professional women in Monrovia worked with women traders who traveled between the city and the interior, to ensure continued food supplies to the city despite the fighting between armed factions (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 9–14). Zarah Ugas Farah, a Somali woman who lived through the civil war in Mogadishu, recounts how she organized meetings with other women to discuss ways of working together to meet the survival needs of families and victims of war, especially the provision of food and medicine. These discussions led to the formation of the Family Economy and Rehabilitation Organization (FERO) in 1992 (Dyck 2003, 9–13).

A few domestic groups, aware of the importance of collaborating with others inside and outside the country, partnered with international actors such as the UN or nongovernment organizations. The World Food Program–Somali appointed the local women’s organization FERO to lead food distribution (Dyck 2003, 13). Dahabo Isse, a Somali woman in Mogadishu, came together with other women in Mogadishu to provide food for hungry children. She later directed 140 kitchens in south Mogadishu for the International Committee of the Red Cross (Lorch 1992, 1). The Church played an important role in the provision of humanitarian relief. Compared to women and other civil society organizations, churches have a greater outreach and longer history of charitable work in the country. In Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, and Sudan, church infrastructure served as alternative mechanisms for humanitarian relief. The church also addressed the psychological trauma and suffering resulting from the war (Beaudet 2001, 647; Fouke 1991, 853–858).

Humanitarian support to domestic providers of humanitarian relief was intermittent or short-lived. International donors or partners feared the security risks of operating in conditions of
According to Zarah Ugas Farah, founder of a local Somali NGO, the Family Economy Rehabilitation Organization (FERO):

We don’t get much support from donors because some areas in Somalia are not safe. It’s the local NGOs that are working inside Somalia. The international donors, UN agencies, and international organizations mostly have offices in Nairobi [capital city of Kenya] for security reasons and their support to Somalia is limited. The problem is escalating and our needs are so big; the support from the donors, international communities, and UN agencies is very little. (Dyck 2003, 15)

Also, domestic religious organizations, women groups, and other domestic actors carried out their humanitarian relief operations under threat of attack and looting of property and at great risk to their lives. Even though they may have had the advantage of being indigenous to the area, they faced the same security threats as the international organizations. For example, Dahabo Isse’s uncle ordered her at gunpoint to divert food aid from the ICRC kitchens she managed to relatives. She refused to do so (Lorch 1992, 1). Armed groups also attacked, looted, and burned down churches (Fouke 1991, 854).

As with international organizations, churches, women’s organizations, and other civil society organizations faced the challenge of persuading armed groups to allow safe passage of humanitarian supplies and resumption of social services. In Angola and Sudan, the church and other civil society actors called for the creation of humanitarian corridors for safe access to suffering populations (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004; Gidley-Kitchin 1992 Kibble and Vines 2001, 542; Lean 1996). The deteriorating social conditions and cycles of lethal conflict constrained limited domestic efforts to respond to the suffering. Provision of humanitarian assistance, a short-term measure, morphed into a long-term activity due to the
protracted nature of the wars. This was not sustainable. In Chapters 6 and 7 I show how the challenges lethal conflicts posed to local and international humanitarian intervention compelled domestic civil organizations to consider an end to war.

4.3.2 Civil War and the Challenge of Conflict Management. The United Nations, the Commonwealth and Organization of African Unity (now the Africa Union), and subregional organizations (Economic Community of West African States, Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, and the Southern African Development Community) attempted numerous mediation efforts to resolve the wars of the 1990s. International nongovernmental organizations (Negotiations Network, Sant’ Egidio) and African ones (All Africa Conference of Churches, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation) also mediated in a number of the formal negotiation processes. This study focuses on mediation processes that peace networks I study supported and sought to participate in (see Appendix Table 2).

Regional and international mediation of the 1990s civil wars proved a formidable challenge to mediating agents and guarantors of the peace process. Perhaps the biggest challenge was overcoming their intractable nature. The proliferation of armed groups in the course of the negotiations constrained progress on substantive issues or threatened to derail the negotiation process. New entrants required a reformulation of existing terms of negotiations to accommodate them. The resulting stalemates or frequent postponement of talks frustrated hopes civilians had for an end to war. They also sent a signal to civilian populations that armed groups were not necessarily interested in ending war (Burgess and Burgess 2006, 178–180; Elnur 2009, 127; Foaleng 2008; International Crisis Group 2002).

Since armed groups wanted to keep the military option open even as they pursued a negotiated settlement, the talks were often disrupted by displays of military power, for instance,
in the SPLM/A-Garang attack and capture of Torit during the IGAD-led negotiations (Waihenya 2006, 97). Frequent violations of ceasefires such as this frustrated mediators’ efforts to move the negotiation process forward. This cast doubt on the integrity of the negotiations and commitment of parties to the peace process since they seemed keen on pursuing absolute power through war as shown in the Liberian, Burundi, and Somali wars (Aboagye 1999, 63, 127; Bentley and Southall 2005, 6; Mohamoud 2000).

The apparent alienation of the political elite from the civilian population they claimed to represent presented a political problem. In addition to the hostile relations conflicting parties had with civilians whose interests they claimed to represent, both parties lacked political visions that appealed to broader sections of the population. Malaquias observes that:

> new internal wars in Africa are no longer fought at the military level to achieve political objectives. War is no longer viewed as part of a broader contest for political loyalty and legitimacy that involves, first and foremost, winning “the hearts and minds” of the people. In fact, now people are regarded as burdens, if not obstacles, whose removal by military means is justified. By removing people from, say, diamond producing areas, UNITA rebels can enrich themselves without the political and administrative costs of governing. (2001, 531)

Few, if any, of the armed opposition in the 1990s carried out political education campaigns that communicated a clearly understood and unifying political agenda to win the support of the civilian population or even established civilian administrations in liberated areas. This departed radically from the armed resistance model characteristic of the Ugandan, Ethiopian, and Eritrean armed resistances in the late 1980s (Chan and Venâncio 1998, 12; Clapham 1998; Kasfir 2005; Mkandawire 2002; Weinstein 2007). Resolving conflicts of this
kind is a daunting task indeed for any mediator. It was made even more difficult by the reluctance of the international community and limited capacity of regional organizations to enforce peace, as was the case in Liberia, Burundi, and Somalia. In some of the cases, armed groups (e.g., Taylor’s NPFL, Somali warlords) or sections of the ruling elite (Burundi) opposed external intervention.

In sum, the negotiations took place in contexts in which the general population did not necessarily consider the negotiating parties credible leaders, much as they desired an end to war. Indeed, in some cases, civilians rejected the notion of armed factions forming a democratic government. This happened in Sierra Leone where the population rejected the Revolutionary United Front at the polls during the 2002 general elections, marking the end of the transition government. Although the armed group transformed itself into a party, the Revolutionary United Front Party, it received less than 2% of the vote (Gberie 2005, 193–194). Alternatively, civilians were resigned to the expedient even if unacceptable assumption of power by armed groups. This occurred in Liberia where Liberians voted for Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) because they feared he would return the country to war if he lost. Charles Taylor won 75.3% of the vote in the July 1997 postaccord elections (Adebajo 2002, 156, 222–23). Thus the mediator and conflicting parties face the challenge of persuading the general population that a negotiated agreement will guarantee an end to war and ensure a new political dispensation.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter set the context for the noncombatant groups’ mobilization to end the civil wars in the 1990s and early 2000s—the violent political transition to democracy. I highlighted the key domestic and international developments relevant to the emergence of the peace networks and their mobilization for a peaceful resolution of the civil war. The expansion of civil
and political liberties provided the legal openings for the registration and autonomous operation of a variety of civil society organizations, including the peace networks described here. The return to multiparty politics and general elections in some countries provided new opportunities for interaction among civil society organizations, including newly formed political parties.

Unfortunately, elite struggle for power under new political institutions took on a violent turn in countries where leaders reluctantly implemented political reforms or prevented this from happening despite popular demand. Thus the contention for peace took place in adverse and highly risky conditions of war in addition to incomplete or manipulated transitions to democratic rule. The brutal conduct of war and its devastating effect on society is closely associated with initiatives for peace. These domestic conditions alone do not account for the emergence of noncombatant groups identified here. I noted the way external regional and international developments impacted the contention for peace, specifically the limits of international humanitarian intervention in the face of the kind of intractable conflict that unfolded and the challenges external mediating agents faced. Also, the failure of numerous formal negotiations to deliver peace despite the adverse social consequences of war forms the negotiation context in which some of the social actors described here contend to participate in formal negotiations. This setting is crucial to understanding the contemporary historical conditions of the campaigns to end war and the seemingly prominent role of women and religious leaders.
Chapter 5. RELIGIOUS LEADERS’ MOBILIZATION FOR AN END TO WAR THROUGH DIALOGUE

Why and how did the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilize for an end to war through dialogue despite the political risks involved? I argue that certain key moments, sudden transformative events in society caused by the war or the threat of war, compelled a few religious leaders and women leaders to reconsider whether the roles they played in society were relevant. I described these events in Chapter 4 and their impact on society. Here I show that these war-related socially transformative events were not sufficient for collective action. The religious leaders’ and women’s interpretation of war as a threat motivated them to do something to end it through collective action. I show how they did this by reconstructing processes of collective attribution using evidence from accounts of the processes leading to the peace campaign written by religious leaders and women involved, the organizations supporting them, from position statements and pastoral letters.

I sketch the process of attribution as follows: A few individuals (religious leaders and women) proposed the need to address the root causes of the conflict. They constructed an alternative understanding of the wars and their resolution—a shared story about the futility of war and the possibility of its resolution peacefully through the participation of all as peace agents. The story formed the basis for their demand that conflicting parties end the war peacefully through use of dialogue. The story also offered targets (warring parties) and subjects (the public) the promise of peace through inclusive participation that addressed the roots of the conflict. The construction of the story occurred during encounters and conversations with other
religious leaders and women so as to secure widespread participation within religious institutions and among women for collective action to end the war.

In answer to how the religious leaders and women mobilized to end the wars, I argue that they diffused the shared story to the warring parties and the public through a number of mechanisms aimed at changing their thinking and behavior towards war. I reconstruct the process of mobilization by elaborating on the key mechanisms of mobilization across the ten campaigns for an end to war. These include the diffusion of the shared story about war and its resolution to build solidarity and reinforce commitment for the peace campaigns and the joint coordination of action at different sites, i.e., the conflicting parties, the public, and international stakeholders.

I begin my analysis with the key moments in the wars or the political transitions that served as a wake up call to the women and religious leaders to do something about their situations. After this, my analysis shifts to the religious leaders’ and women’s attribution of threat and opportunity, the actual campaign for an end to war, and the outcomes. I present my analysis in two parts. This chapter focuses on the five religious leaders’ campaigns and their outcomes. In the next chapter (Chapter 6), I address the five women’s peace campaigns and their outcomes and conclude with a comparison of the religious leaders’ and women’s campaigns and outcomes.

5.1. Key Moments and the Motivation to Collectively Act for an End to War

Certain key moments, atrocious acts committed by either of the conflicting parties, disturbed a few religious leaders enough to do something to end the war. These include incidents such as the Homoine massacre of 380 peasants (mainly women, children, and the elderly) by the RENAMO in 1987, the Liberian government’s brutal counterinsurgency campaign in 1990
targeting civilians in areas where NPFL launched its attacks, and the vicious interethnic factional fighting accompanying the SPLM/A elite split in 1991 Sudan. Also included are the violence accompanying the political elite’s refusal to submit to electoral processes, for example, the 1997 military coup in Sierra Leone that ousted a democratically elected civilian government and provoked civilian outrage, setting off a new cycle of violence, and the brutal and destructive violence of the 1992 postelections war and the post-Lusaka accords\(^3\) war (1998–2002) between the government and the UNITA in Angola. In all these incidents, the unprecedented violence cost thousands of lives, altered social relations by polarizing communities and families, broke traditional, cultural, and moral values, and made it difficult for churches to operate in the affected areas. Religious leaders were concerned with the insensitivity of fighting forces toward the plight of civilian populations and the heavy moral toll the war had on society.

They were also concerned that the violence impoverished the people and the country. The policies of economic sabotage and destabilization cost the people their livelihoods and devastated the national economy. The loss of livelihoods created conditions of mass starvation in Mozambique (1983–85), famine in Bahr el Ghazal in South Sudan (Bahr el Ghazal 1998–99), and in Angola. Although the churches provided humanitarian relief to internally displaced populations and refuges, they were frustrated by the futility of providing humanitarian relief on a near-permanent basis. The Sudanese Catholic Bishop Parade Taban of the Diocese of Torit likened the provision of humanitarian relief alone to “fattening a cow for slaughter,” and Alimamy Koroma of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone saw it as “simply reacting to the war” (Koroma 2007, 287; NSCC 2002, 12). They and other religious leaders wanted to go

\(^3\) The Angolan government and UNITA signed the Lusaka Protocol on November 1994. After a contentious implementation process, the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi resumed war and called for fresh negotiations.
beyond merely relieving the symptoms of the war (disease, hunger, famine, displacement) to addressing the causes of war.

Within the religious organizations, the process of collective attribution of threat and opportunity began with a few high-ranking clergy who initiated conversations about the need to end the war and the suffering it caused the population. A few church leaders in Southern Sudan, motivated by the need for a better way to serve their people, proposed the establishment of an ecumenical body that would work for unity, justice, and peace as long-term solutions to the civil war (NSCC 2002, 12). Some religious leaders, like the Roman Catholic clergy in Mozambique (D. Jaime Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira, and Bishop Alexandre dos Santos) and Liberia (Archbishop Michael Francis and Lutheran Bishop Ronald Diggs), took individual stands against the war and its excesses. They publicly called on conflicting parties to end it through dialogue. Others, like the Protestant clergy in Mozambique (Anglican Bishop Dinis Sengulane, Bishop of Libombo, Pastor Jeremias Mucache, President of the Christian Council of Mozambique) and Sierra Leone (Alimamy Koroma) and Protestant and Catholic clergy in Angola, initially engaged fellow church leaders and conflicting parties in private conversations before making public calls for dialogue to end the war. Whether outspoken or cautious, these key individuals opened debate on the politically sensitive question of war and its resolution.

The clergy interpreted war as a senseless threat to human dignity and to the moral, social, and economic order. The Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) claimed that the civil war was “devastating,” it benefitted no one, and it caused suffering of the people (McVeigh 1999, 183–185; Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998, 33). In Angola, Catholic Bishops called the war a “twice deadly organization—it kills with weapons and kills with hunger” (Vines et al. 2005, 27). Liberian clerics protested the lack of military discipline among troops. When the civil war
escalated a second time, they claimed, “Liberians cannot withstand another round of warfare” (Agence France Presse, 1999). The religious leaders considered dialogue the only viable option, given the failure of war to secure a permanent peace. They committed to promoting its use by the conflicting parties.

For the religious leaders across the five campaigns, collective action for an end to war and the use of dialogue gave the church an opportunity to play a more relevant role in society. More importantly, it gave the church an opportunity to be recognized as credible peace brokers with the capacity to make a difference in society by facilitating the kind of relationships that would end war peacefully and ensure social stability. According to Bishop Sengulane, when the CCM became involved in the search for peace, it was looking for “an appropriate role for the church in the larger society.” He adds that “we considered reconciliation to be the vocation of the church” and that this role was driven by “gospel tenets” (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 192, 197, 198). For churches in South Sudan, playing an appropriate role meant being “a voice of the voiceless,” a credible facilitator of peace and reconciliation capable of dealing with the root causes of war and poverty and creating a just, stable future for the peoples of Sudan. They regarded their peacemaking role as “an obligation for the Church to be in the midst of and care for the suffering” and believed that it involved bringing together the South Sudanese people, leaders, and members of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and the National Council of Churches (NSCC 2002, 10, 13).

Like the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee in Liberia (IFMC) conceived their role as mediators and advocates of the voiceless (PanAfrican News Agency [PANA], 2 September, 1999). Alimamy Koroma of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone stated that the religious leaders needed to be more proactive in addressing the
causes of the political crisis facing the country in addition to the coordination of social services. In doing so they took on a variety of roles. They brokered communication between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. They bridged relations between the RUF and a public hostile to the armed group. They advocated dialogue, and they acted as a voice for all Sierra Leonians. Koroma notes that in adopting a proactive role, they emulated religious leaders in Liberia (Koroma 2007, 287; Pham 2004, 58; Pomeroy 1999; Turay 2000, 51; Winter 2000). For the churches in Angola, being peace brokers and prophets was an opportunity to restore the credibility, respect, and authority they had lost due to their close affiliation with either the colonial or postcolonial governments (IRIN 2003).

This role of peace broker fit quite well with the peace and reconciliation mission of the church and with society’s expectation of them. The churches’ adoption of their peace-brokering role activated two identities that feature in the biblical tradition: the reconciler and the prophet. As reconcilers, religious institutions would be identified with facilitating social relations that allow for dialogue and an end to war. As prophets, they would be identified with the voiceless, speaking out against the injustices in society. Although the religious leaders do not state this in their accounts, the identities the churches activated were political, as they intended to engage directly with the state and armed groups even as they mobilized support within society. Their prophetic role in particular elicited sharp response from incumbent governments and attacks by armed groups. In Chapter 8, I analyze the political threats the churches faced, especially the threat of violent intimidation and how they navigated the political minefield nonviolently.

The process of eliciting agreement on the churches’ promotion of dialogue as a means to end the war varied. Encounters took place at the level of individual churches and councils of churches within the Protestant churches and at the level of senior bishops within the Roman
Catholic Church. In Mozambique, the first conversation among the Protestant Churches took place in the October 1982 Synod meeting of the Anglican Diocese of Libombo. This Synod decided to request the CCM to meet with the FRELIMO government and discuss abolition of the death penalty. Few churches were willing to do so. In 1984, the CCM created a Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and then wrote a letter in 1985 informing member churches of its formation and its task of peace and reconciliation (McVeigh 1999, 182–83; Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 196; 1998, 28–29). The Protestant churches in Angola endorsed the need to engage politically at the 1984 Conference of the Council of Christian Churches in Angola (CICA) and again at the 1995 first meeting of the Protestant and Evangelical churches in Angola (EDICA). The Roman Catholic Bishops in Angola did so through consensus-building at the level of senior bishops, members of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé (CEAST) (Comerford 2007, 492, 494, 509). In southern Sudan, widespread agreement among Protestant and Catholic leaders led to the formation of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) in 1990. Member churches agreed, at the first General Assembly (1991), that the church would act as an advocate and prophet of southern Sudanese peoples, broker relationships and cooperation between the churches on the basis of ecumenical principles, and build the capacity and programs of churches to fulfill their roles (New Sudan Council of Churches 2002, 12).

The construction and diffusion of the shared story about religious institutions’ role in promoting peace was a difficult process. Accounts of the peace processes provide few details concerning the difficulties in getting widespread agreement. In his own account of the Inter-Religious Leaders Council of Sierra Leone (IRLCS), Alimamy Koroma observes that, while leaders of Christian and Muslim traditions came together and found agreement over issues that united them (no violence, peace and reconciliation), the exercise was not easy (Koroma 2007,
Accounts of the Angolan process indicate that building consensus among Roman Catholic Bishops required overcoming political affiliations and divisions among them that reflected Angolan society (Comerford 2007, 492; Chatham House 2005, 13).

Member churches’ response to the 1982 Synod (Anglican Diocese of Libombo) request to engage the government over the death penalty reveals great reluctance. According to Bishop Sengulane, then Bishop of the Diocese of Libombo:

One church declined to answer, saying the subject was too complex politically. Another replied that it needed more time to consider the proposal. The head of one church reported to the secret police, although this was considered confidential. The CCM never officially dealt with the issue, in spite of requests from the originating synod for a decision.

It took two years of ad hoc committee work on the issue of peace before the CCM established a Commission of Peace and Reconciliation in 1984. Bishop Sengulane also observes that Mozambican churches’ intention to promote use of dialogue to end the war was not well received by churches during their tour of the United States. He notes that, “Our hosts [the National Council of Churches in the USA], who had not been aware of their visitors’ intentions regarding RENAMO, turned out to be adamantly opposed to the idea. Their feeling was so strong that some felt they had been betrayed” (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 196–197; 1998, 29). Bishop Sengulane elaborates further on the nature of resistance they encountered in the United States, “on one side our hosts put so much pressure on us to use non-conciliatory language, condemning one side; while among those who came to hear what we had to say, there were persons who wanted us to condemn the other side” (cited in McViegh 1999, 185). Clearly, church supporters in the United States rejected the Mozambican churches’ decision to adopt a
peacemaking role. This contrasts with the Catholic Church’s support from its networks in Rome and the Vatican.

Accounts of the participation of Muslim clergymen in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean peace campaigns provide little information on how Muslim clergymen participated in the construction of the shared story. Gifford (1995, 282) observes in his analysis of the churches’ role in politics in Liberia that statements on church positions were in a Christian language, and cooperation was on Christian terms with no attempt to draw on Islamic peace tradition or language. This observation is applicable to the dominance of Christian discourse and tradition in the Sierra Leone campaign. Accounts point out the positive participation of the Muslim religious leaders and organizations but are silent on their specific contribution to the framing of the shared definition of peace through dialogue.

Overall, it is not surprising that the construction and diffusion of the religious leaders’ peacemaking role met with resistance within the church. Most churches had been perceived as supporters of either the colonial or oppressive postcolonial regimes. Also, promoting peaceful resolution of the war, especially the prophetic role of engaging the conflicting parties publicly, was political activity. Not all religious leaders were used to this role because it represented a break from previous ones of abstaining from political participation.

5.2 From Suffering to Mobilization: Religious Leaders’ Campaign for Peace

Initially, religious leaders appropriated their churches’ national leadership structures to launch their campaigns for peace separately as Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches and Muslims. For instance, Protestant Churches used the national councils of churches and alliances of evangelical churches. The Roman Catholic Church issued statements through their Episcopal Conferences of Bishops, whereas Muslim clergymen made claims in the name of National Muslim
Councils. Thus, the Council of Churches in Mozambique, the Liberian Council of Churches, the National Muslim Council of Liberia, the Council of Christian Churches in Angola, the Angolan Evangelical Alliance, the Sudan Council of Churches, the New Sudan Council of Churches, and the Conference of Bishops in Mozambique, Liberia, Angola, and Sudan were the initial organizational bases from which religious leaders made their public call for an end to war, pursued dialogue, and mobilized congregations’ support for peace.

Some churches created new vehicles to coordinate activities promoting their claims for the use of dialogue to end the war. The mainstream protestant churches’ Council of Churches in Mozambique established a Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and appointed Bishop Denis Sengulane to lead it (McVeigh 1999, 183). The Roman Catholic Churches in Sudan established diocesan, regional, and national commissions to address peace and justice issues (Diocese of Rumbek 2001, 39). The Roman Catholic Church’s Justice and Peace Commission in Liberia was also actively involved in campaigns for peace in addition to human rights monitoring.

Religious leaders also created organizations to jointly coordinate their separate campaigns for peace nationally and internationally. These ecumenical vehicles varied in membership. The Contact Group/Task Force combined the resources and activities of the CCM/Commission on Peace and Reconciliation and the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique. In Angola, the Episcopal Conference of Angola and Sao Tome, the Council of Christian Churches in Angola, and the Angolan Evangelical Alliance formed the COIEPA. The Liberian Council of Churches, the National Muslim Council of Liberia, and the Roman Catholic Church formed the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC), which later became the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL), a national affiliate of the Religions for Peace (Lampman
Major Christian and Muslim organizations in Sierra Leone, including women’s religious organizations, formed the Interreligious Council of Sierra Leone to advocate for an end to war. This council in turn formed a Sensitization Committee that broadcast messages encouraging the need for conflict resolution over the radio and television and a working group tasked with resolving the conflict (Pomeroy 1999). The Sudan Ecumenical Forum (SEF) brought together Sudanese churches and their international partners, such as the World Council of Churches, the All Africa Conference of Churches, and the Caritas Network, to lobby for peace at the international level (Kur 2008).

The joint coordination of separate activities crucial to mobilization differed among the religious leaders’ campaigns. In Angola, church leaders took longer to combine their efforts and forge an ecumenical vision for peace. In Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the various religious organizations overcame whatever may have divided them to engage in ecumenical initiatives for peace. In Sudan, the ecumenism evident among the Protestant and Roman Catholic Christians was absent among Christians and Muslims. Although other civic groups launched their campaigns and also participated in public campaigns led by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (Liberia), the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, and the COIEPA (Angola), my analysis focuses on the campaigns led by the religious leaders as they (and the women’s networks I examine in Chapter 6) emerged as leading actors in the struggle for peace.

Through churches they appropriated, the new vehicles they created, and alliances with other civic and political actors in society, religious leaders launched peace campaigns that diffused a shared story about the war. They called on conflicting parties, the public, and international actors to promote an end to war through dialogue. This story offered an alternative interpretation of the violent conflict as a threat to social peace, especially to human dignity,
because of its senseless and devastating impact on moral, social, and economic order. Where war had failed to settle political conflict, as in Mozambique and South Sudan, they called for peaceful dialogue and reconciliation in society as alternatives to military victory and intervened to broker communication between fighting parties. Where formal negotiations and agreements failed to end the war, as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola, they called on conflicting parties to adhere to negotiated settlements, attempted to reestablish broken communication lines between conflicting parties, and called on mediating agents and the international community to enforce peace agreements by conflicting parties. Religious leaders communicated these demands through a variety of performances aimed at persuading conflicting parties and the public that dialogue was an opportunity to be agents of peace instead of agents of war. My examination of these performances highlights the key mechanisms of mobilization operating in the religious leaders’ diffusion of their story to conflicting parties and the public.

Ecumenical vehicles were particularly important for coordinating religious leaders’ separate and joint actions to persuade conflicting parties to settle their disputes through negotiations. They portrayed the religious leaders as autonomous nonpartisan actors united in their pursuit of peaceful resolution to the conflict. The religious leaders in the campaigns I examined first established contacts with leaders of conflicting parties through personal networks and written requests for meetings. At these meetings, religious leaders communicated the need for the government and the armed groups to end the war, persuaded both sides to enter talks with the other, and offered to facilitate these talks. In Mozambique and South Sudan, where conflicting parties had not engaged in direct talks, the religious leaders persuaded conflicting parties to see the opportunity that dialogue offered for being agents of peace and unity who ended the suffering of the people. By offering conflicting parties an inclusive way of framing
political identities, as citizens, religious leaders created a face-saving opportunity for both sides to shift the basis of their interactions from mutually exclusive political identity boundaries (whether ideological or ethnic) to inclusive citizenship identity. The Mozambican religious leaders, for instance, argued it was possible for conflicting parties to seek peace and appreciate each other if they saw themselves as Mozambicans. They called on both sides to see dialogue as an opportunity for Mozambicans to be reconcilers, committed to peace and not to winning or defeating the other (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1996, 198). The New Sudan Council of Churches saw dialogue and reconciliation among the armed factions as an opportunity for them to forge the unity and peace required for the development of stable and productive communities and to prevent the Khartoum government’s manipulation of the southern Sudanese people. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola, where the conflicting parties had already entered into talks, religious leaders emphasized the opportunity that dialogue provided for them to be credible agents of peace and reconciliation and concerned about the interests of the people. Members of the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee, especially the outspoken Roman Catholic Archbishop Michael Francis, emphasized the opportunity to be peacemakers committed to protecting the human rights and physical security of the people. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone encouraged the parties to see peacemaking as an opportunity to cooperate in ending violence in the country. Religious leaders in Angola saw in the government’s stronger position the opportunity to be peacemaker and saw peacemaking as an opportunity for leaders of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to create a basis for democratic practice, a culture of peace, and new social and political relations, and for restoring the dignity of Angolans (Kirkwood 2001). In general the
religious leaders appealed to an inclusive national identity and need for national integration when persuading conflicting parties to enter into talks and settle differences peacefully.

The Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Sudan cases show that the religious leaders’ shift to communication brokers depended on positive responses from the armed groups and governments. The Inter-Faith Mediation Committee convened and mediated the first talks in Freetown, Sierra Leone, aimed at preventing a full-scale war between the National Patriotic Liberation Front and the Liberian government under President Doe. After getting agreement from President Chissano, the Contact Group of religious leaders in Mozambique initiated contact with the RENAMO leaders and persuaded them to enter into talks with the FRELIMO government. This led to a series of separate encounters with RENAMO and President Chissano in which the Contact Group acted as emissaries for both sides, passing on positions and responses to them. The Contact Group members also acted as advocates for peace, pressuring both sides to enter into talks as the only viable alternative. The churches’ efforts led to both sides agreeing to face-to-face talks mediated by the Sant’ Egidio community in Rome. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone’s direct engagement with the government and the RUF followed a pattern similar to that of the Contact Group of Mozambique and the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee in Liberia. The council reinitiated face-to-face talks between the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone during the second civil war after receiving agreement from both sides to do so (Pham 2004, 60). At the historic Yei Dialogue between the New Sudan Council of Churches and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in July 1997, the churches resolved differences with the movement and gained the mandate to pursue their peacemaking work among the different political military groupings and the population (NSCC 1997, 10; 2002, 48–51).
The Sudan and Angolan campaigns show religious leaders more active in mobilizing for peace in society than in engaging with political elites, unlike their counterparts in Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, who engaged both conflicting parties and the public. The Angolan government rejected completely the religious leaders’ call for peace through dialogue and their offers to facilitate talks between it and UNITA even though the latter responded positively. The COIEPA campaign focused its efforts on speaking out against the war publicly and mobilizing people’s support for peace and reconciliation. Brokering agreements to negotiate among the military factions proved difficult in South Sudan because some military leaders were reluctant. Yet most did not prevent the New Sudan Council of Churches from mobilizing the people for peace and reconciliation. While the Angolan example shows outright rejection of the churches’ offer to broker peace, in South Sudan the conflicting parties may have rejected the churches’ offers of mediation but did not prevent the same churches from mobilizing the population for peace.

The Mozambican, Liberian, and Sierra Leone religious leaders relied on regional, transnational, and international networks of church organizations for assistance in brokering conflicting parties’ agreements to talk and mobilizing resources for their campaigns. The religious leaders in Mozambique diffused their call for peace during a tour of churches in the United States and used the opportunity to establish contacts with RENAMO representatives in the United States who later put them in contact with representatives in Nairobi. The All Africa Conference of Churches, World Council of Churches, and National Council of Churches in Kenya provided support in facilitating the Contact Group’s meetings with RENAMO representatives in Nairobi and the Kenya government, then an ally of RENAMO. The All Africa Conference of Churches participated in the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee’s brokerage of
peace between Liberian factions and also provided training in conflict resolution skills to religious leaders (Fouke 1991, 851). The Religions for Peace also participated in a similar role in Sierra Leone (PR Newswire 1999). The Church of the Brethren (USA) assigned two of its clergy as Peace Officers to the New Sudan Council of Churches to help build the peace program (NSCC 2002, 47). In all the campaigns, the international relief and development programs of churches (e.g., Lutheran World Relief, Church World Service) and Christian international NGOs (Christian Aid, World Vision, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services) contributed humanitarian assistance through the churches during the war and postwar periods. The religious leaders also went on tours organized by church networks in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe, during which they updated congregations on the situation and raised funds for their peace and humanitarian work. Angolan religious leaders also had secular organizations as allies (Austin 1999; NSCC 2002, 73; Fouke 1991, 854–59; Frerichs and Bowman 2001, 8; Winter 2000).

The religious leaders’ mobilization efforts targeted congregations and the general public. Accounts show that religious leaders borrowed mainly Christian religious practices—prayer, fasting, vigils, bible studies, sermons, ecumenical services, and pastoral letters—to mobilize their congregations’ support for an end to war and for efforts aimed at getting conflicting parties to pursue a negotiated settlement. Evidence of Muslim leaders’ participation in the peace campaigns in Liberia and Sierra Leone and of traditional leaders in Angola and Southern Sudan indicates that these two groups may have emulated Islamic and traditional practices in their peace campaigns. With the exception of the South Sudanese grassroots peace movement, I did not come across documentation detailing the use of Islamic and traditional religious traditions in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola to diffuse the religious leaders’ call for peaceful resolution of the war.

In my view, religious rituals like prayers, songs, bible studies, and fasting provided congregants with the opportunity to express their feelings about the war without fear. Together with sermons and pastoral letters calling for peaceful resolution of the war, the rituals opened public debate on a politically sensitive issue and created a safe space for discussions. Since the rituals emphasized religious teachings on peace, forgiveness, and reconciliation, they also activated new identities and social relations by compelling a change in the way congregants thought about the war and their relations with groups they considered against them. They encouraged a shift in identity among congregants by promoting the new identity of congregants as agents of peace—peacemakers—like their religious leaders. Since participation in church activities is open to the public, it is likely that the religious performances attracted the participation of nonmembers.

Beyond their specific congregations, religious leaders mobilized general public support through pastoral letters, public statements, press conferences, and peace messages published in print media and also broadcast through radio and television. Religious leaders in Liberia and Angola staged peace marches and rallies. Peace marches led by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee in Liberia often ended in prayers. The rallies and peace marches demonstrated public support for peace and the people’s outrage at the continuing war. Liberian and Sierra Leonean clergy also staged stay-home strikes to demonstrate outrage at the unacceptable behavior of armed groups. The nonviolent civil resistance in Sierra Leone protested the military coup in 1997 by officers in the Sierra Leone army and the latter’s inclusion of the RUF in power in breach of the 1996 peace agreements and a popularly elected civilian government.
The Roman Catholic Bishops in Angola, Mozambique, and Liberia wrote pastoral letters expressing their position on the war and need for peaceful resolution. These and statements by Protestant Bishops appealing for peace were read at churches, broadcast through the church radio, and published in the newspapers where there was a relatively independent press like in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, the religious leaders also convened press conferences to communicate their position or what they were doing to the public. The direct diffusion of these letters in church and indirectly through the radio and print media opened public debate on alternative views of the war and its resolution. Accounts of the religious leaders’ campaigns in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia mention use of radio to disseminate messages of peace. The Roman Catholic church-owned radio stations in Angola and Liberia were important mediums of educating the population on human rights, civic education, and other themes of concern. The Angolan people relied on the radio for connecting with members of the family they had been separated from as a result of the war. The radio connected religious leaders to congregations and members of the public beyond their congregations who were scattered by the war. Given widespread illiteracy, the radio was a key tool for diffusing the shared story, in addition to updating the population on community events.

In all the campaigns, religious leaders convened several meetings, like the seminars to prepare people for peace in Mozambique, visioning workshops and training in conflict resolution in South Sudan, and conferences at which influential members of society discussed peace in Angola. At these meetings religious leaders mobilized support for peace through conversations aimed at changing the thinking and behavior of influential individuals and groups in society—civil society group leaders, politicians, parliamentarians, traditional elders and chiefs, professional associations, women, and youth—with regard to the war and its resolution. The
direct diffusion of the religious leaders’ shared story about the war and its peaceful resolution through presentations and discussions compelled participants to see themselves as agents of peace and consider how to end the war. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone convened meetings with the President, parliamentarians, paramount chiefs, traditional leaders, UN officials, and their leaders to mobilize their support for the religious leaders’ efforts at reestablishing dialogue with the RUF leader Foday Sankoh and his ally President Charles Taylor of Liberia. These meetings resulted in a Working Group tasked with developing ways for resolving the conflict and helping the country recover from the war. Different individuals and groups, some from across lines of division, came together through the itinerant brokerage of religious leaders. These face-to-face encounters with each other provided opportunities to forge relationships of trust and confidence required for a united and strong support for peace in society. They had the potential to alter social relations among groups and create coalitions and alliances for peace.

The religious leaders’ campaigns also activated new identities and institutions in a way that elaborated further on the call to the public to be agents of peace. The campaign for disarmament in Liberia led by the Church and in which women peace activists participated included activities aimed at providing teenage combatants with occupations. The South Sudanese peace campaign reached out to youth by training them to be peace monitors. Mozambican religious leaders held symbolic rituals where children brought war toys, such as guns, to church and smashed them to symbolize their rejection of tools of war and demonstrate their commitment to peace and “devotion to the Prince of Peace.” This innovative use of ritual and the activation of new institutions was aimed at promoting new peacemaker identities among teenagers and youths who were key targets for recruitment into the armed forces by conflicting parties. The religious
leaders continued with provision of humanitarian relief even as they engaged in the campaigns for peace because most people were impoverished by the war and unable to produce food. Mozambican religious leaders considered this part of the peace process. In their view, humanitarian assistance demonstrated support for human life and dignity by protecting lives. Yet the provision of humanitarian assistance by Angolan churches is criticized for constraining popular mobilizations for peace, as people were more interested in food and other relief items than in participating in a campaign for peace. The New Sudan Council of Churches seems to have found a way out, by encouraging communities to contribute to supplies required for the several peace meetings even as they received support from international aid agencies.

Other than tours to northern countries to mobilize resources for their church activities, including the peace campaigns, accounts also mention that religious leaders mobilized the support of actors for their peace campaigns at the transnational and international level. Although they do not detail the process of doing so, the regional nature of the conflict in South Sudan and Sierra Leone and the international intervention in the Angolan peace process necessitated engaging key stakeholders at these levels. The Sudan Ecumenical Forum jointly coordinated the peace advocacy activities of the Sudan Churches and their international partners at international fora (Kur 2008, 293). The New Sudan Council of Churches relied on brokerage of regional and international councils of churches (the National Council of Churches of Kenya, All Africa Conference of Churches, and World Council of Churches) to broker talks between fighting factions in the South (Kobia 2008). Angolan churches sent delegations to the United Kingdom to request the latter’s support in convincing the Angolan government to negotiate an end to war. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone sought meetings with President Charles Taylor to get his support for peaceful resolution of the war. Through the brokerage of the Religions for
Peace, the Sierra Leone religious leaders established links with northern governments who could be potential mediators.

Where armed groups refused to adhere to a negotiated agreement even after the religious leaders’ attempts to persuade them to do so, the religious leaders demanded international intervention to enforce peace and save the population from further suffering. The Liberian Council of Churches and the National Muslim Council of Liberia called for an international peacekeeping force to supervise a ceasefire agreement by armed groups (Faul 1992). During the second Liberian civil war, the Roman Catholic Bishop Michael Francis claimed that “the US has a moral duty to intervene in Liberia because it helped found the state” (Agence France Presse 2003). While on an international speaking tour, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bahr al Ghazal (Sudan), Macram Max Gassis, called on the international community to push for peace in Sudan (Nolen 2001). The Sudan Catholic Bishops published a statement in which they appealed to the US government to exert pressure on conflicting parties to accept a negotiated settlement (PANA 2002).

The war imposed a geographic constraint on nationwide mobilization of the public. Campaign activities were more prevalent in cities (Monrovia, Freetown, Luanda) and certain regions in South Sudan. Interaction between groups across regions under control of armed factions was not possible in Angola, South Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In Angola, for instance, the religious leaders organized under COIEPA were more active at the international level and in Luanda, while in the rest of the country individual church denominations or groups took on coordination of campaign because accessing areas under control of UNITA and MPLA in the countryside was very difficult. This was done to avoid intimidation or harassment by the government or UNITA. It is not clear how the individual churches mobilized in their
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communities and whether they did so. The campaigns appear fragmented as connecting local actors required brokers who could cross warfronts. These were in short supply due to the nature of the war and to the paucity of resources available to the religious leaders.

5.3 Conclusion

Overall, the Mozambican religious leaders succeeded in brokering communication between the conflicting parties. This led to formal negotiations and a peace agreement in 1992. The conflicting parties requested that one of the Contact Group members, Archbishop Gonçalves, participate in the mediation of the formal talks. Other religious leaders complemented his role by pressuring parties to continue with talks when they threatened to stall. They also developed a new constituency for peace at the local level in support of the formal negotiations and gained credibility as important agents of peace in society. The South Sudan People-to-People peace process resulted in two peace agreements among communities—the Wunlit Dinka-Nuer covenant (1999) and Liir agreements. The process could not expand to other areas because of heavy fighting and militia inability to provide the security required for a sustained dialogue process. The South-to-South process targeting political and military elites proved difficult because of the SPLM/A leadership split on whether to enter into talks with militia affiliated with the Islamist regime in Khartoum. The Angolan campaign broke the culture of silence and opened debate on politically sensitive issues. Although religious leaders in Sierra Leone and Liberia brokered communications between fighting parties, this did not avert war. It took other factors to bring about some peace. In Liberia, the ECOWAS assumed peace brokerage but relied on the religious leaders’ communication brokerage in the series of negotiations leading to the 1997 general elections that brought Charles Taylor to power despite widespread opposition. Taylor’s resignation in 2003 is a result of a combination of factors—outbreak of war,
formal negotiations, Taylor’s indictment by the Special court in Sierra Leone for crimes against humanity, and the women’s campaign for peace.

There are a few details of changes in members of the international community the religious leaders reached out to, e.g., the subregional organizations mediating formal negotiations like the ECOWAS, the United Nations, and key western donor countries such as the United States. Yet from the accounts, I observed that in general international actors certified the religious leaders’ campaign for peace. These actors contributed significantly to the formal peace process. For the Mozambican religious leaders’ Contact Group, this certification is seen in one of the members participating in the mediation of the formal talks. The ECOWAS worked with the religious leaders in Liberia to move the formal negotiation process forward. They were critical in brokering armed factions and also pressuring them to talk. The United Nations recognized the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone as a crucial actor in brokering peace. In South Sudan, the IGAD invited the religious leaders to participate as observers in the IGAD-led formal negotiations, but accounts do not show they participated actively as communication brokers in the same manner as their counterparts in Sierra Leone and Liberia. They did initiate a parallel process aimed at reconciling the armed factions in the south as a way of securing implementation of the comprehensive agreement.
Chapter 6. WOMEN’S CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE

Why and how did the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilize for an end to war through dialogue despite the political risks involved? In the previous chapter, I argued that the religious leaders’ motivation to collectively act to end war originates in how they interpreted and responded to the sudden transformative events in society generated by the 1990s civil wars. In this chapter I take up this argument in relation to the women’s organizations that campaigned for peace. I draw on findings from four of the five women’s campaigns (Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Liberia). Accounts of these four campaigns describe how women called for an end to war through peaceful means. Although South Sudan women are mentioned as being part of the church led People-to-People peacemaking process, I have left them out because details of the exact nature of their involvement are few or too general to outline the process of their mobilization. Accounts of their campaign for peace provide more details on their demand to participate in formal negotiations. I examine this in Chapter 7 together with the other four campaigns.

My reconstruction of the women’s mobilization for peace begins with the key events that made women aware of their need to collectively act against the war. I begin with the process of collective attribution across the campaigns to show how women moved from this awareness to eliciting support for collective action. Similar to my account of the religious leaders’ collective attribution process, I highlight the framing mechanisms involved in the way women attributed threat to the war and opportunity to their participation in ending it nonviolently. I reconstruct the mobilization process to show how women campaigned for an end to war. Similar to the religious leaders’ campaigns, I focus on the key mechanisms of mobilization. I show that women’s organization diffused the shared story to elicit support. They appropriated social bases and
created new vehicles to coordinate action at different sites (among women, the general public, conflicting parties, and key international stakeholders). I conclude the chapter with a comparison of the religious leaders’ and women’s campaigns to end the war and the outcomes.

6.1 Motivation to Collectively Act for an End to War through Use of Dialogue

Like those of the religious leaders, women’s networks in the ten campaigns I examined realized that the killings and brutal cycles of violence had to stop and a lasting peace was needed for the recovery of livelihoods and moral values required for peaceful relationships. Certain events I refer to as key moments provoked outrage among a few women and led to the need to do something to end the war. For the Burundian women it was the government and political parties’ inability to stop the cycles of revenge and counterrevenge sparked by the 1993 assassination of the newly elected President Ndadaye (Interview, July 2009). Liberian women opposed the July 1993 Cotonou agreement for giving armed factions greater control of the new transitional government than civilians and for letting armed faction leaders assume their positions in the administration before disarming and demobilizing their troops (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 61–62). During the second Liberian war it was then-President Charles Taylor’s refusal to prevent its escalation in Liberia and regionally to Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry.

Women peace activists in Sierra Leone were disappointed in the failure of the military government, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to end the war with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) despite promises it would do so, and the government’s inability to protect citizens from RUF and “sobels” (Femmes Africa Solidarité [FAS] 1997, 22–23). In North Somalia, the outbreak of clan fighting in Burco and Berbera (1992), soon after the region declared independence from the rest of Somalia, angered women who expected a return to
peace and reconstruction of the region (Bennett, Bexley, and Warnock 1996, 53–57). Similarly, women in south Somali were angered by the escalation of clan fighting soon after peace accords because it disrupted their activities in Mudug, Bosaso, Kismayo, and Mogadishu (Bryden and Steiner 1998, 55–56, 58, 70).

I argue that these key moments and the outrage they provoked among individual women and women’s organizations compelled a reconsideration of whether their efforts at ensuring survival of the family and community made a difference with continued cycles of violence. Along lines similar to that in the previous chapter, I reconstruct the process of collective attribution as follows. A few women, outraged by the turns of events in the conflict, proposed the need to address the root causes of the conflict. I suggest that they came up with an alternative interpretation of the war as a moral and social threat to society and women’s participation in ending it as an opportunity for them to be recognized as credible political players with the capacity to make a difference through peaceful means (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 148). They diffused this story during encounters and conversations with others so as to secure women’s widespread participation. The women’s shared story of the war and its resolution formed the basis of their demand that conflicting parties end the war peacefully through the use of dialogue including formal negotiations.

6.2 Women Should Do Something to End this War—Women’s Shared Story

The process of collective attribution of threat and opportunity among the different peace campaigns began with a few women who were concerned that their efforts to rebuild the lives and livelihoods of families and communities seemed pointless with the frequent outbreaks of war, and something more had to be done. They realized that women’s direct political action to end the war would perhaps secure their humanitarian activities. This awareness began with
encounters and conversations where women shared ideas for direct political action. Some of
these encounters and conversations involved individual women like Mary Brownell, Leymah
Gbowaee, and Vaiba Kebeh Flomo (from Liberia), who shared their ideas with a few other
women. Other encounters and conversations involved a much larger group like women in
Burundi and those from different regions in Somalia (Somaliland, Mogadishu, Mudug, Boosaso,
Kismayo, and Puntland), or took place at previously planned meetings like the Sierra Leone
women’s meeting to prepare for the 1995 women’s conference (Africa Women and Peace
Support Group 2004, 17; Bryden and Steiner 1998, 55–56; Burke, Klot, and Bunting 2001, 2;
Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143; Interview, July 2009; Jama 2010, 62–63; Jusu-Sheriff 2000,

The women activists attributed personal, social, and economic problems they experienced
to the wars they deemed “senseless.” The combatants’ humiliating and abusive behavior towards
women posed serious physical threats to women’s dignity. These included rape and other forms
of sexual violence, mutilation, and the indiscriminate killing of women, children, and the elderly
in complete disregard of codes of war. The Burundian women were particularly concerned about
the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS resulting from this. Social threats included the destruction of
families and communities, an increase in child- and women-headed households, mass
displacement, a breakdown of social order, and the militarization of society. According to
women in northern Somalia, the war turned previous relations within and among families,
friends, and neighbors into power struggles that caused great pain (Gardner and el Bushra 2004,
136–137, 162; Warsame 2002, 43). Liberian women activists saw the large number of weapons
in the hands of youth and their use by the latter to intimidate, harass, or kill as a threat to social
order (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 19). Among the economic threats women
mentioned are the collapse of the economy and the disruption of trade and agricultural and livestock production, leading to widespread hunger and famine.

These physical, social, and economic threats made it very difficult, if not impossible, for women to provide for their families and the community. Their capacity to cope was exhausted. Across the campaigns, women complained that they were tired of the war. Soon after war escalated a second time in Liberia, women at a Women’s Peace Network rally said, “Liberian women are fed up. We want immediate peace…We are tired, the women of Liberia say they are tired. Women are sick of seeing our children dying” (Jarkloh 2003a). According to women in Burao, Northern Somalia, “It [intra-clan fighting] serves no purpose” and “adds to the suffering” (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143). They also claimed that “people wanted to rebuild lives.” Women in South Somalia and also the Sudan expressed similar views. Aisha Haaji Elmi, Vice Chair of the Civil Society Committee at the Mbagathi peace process, said that the message from Somali women and children to Inter-Government Authority on Development (IGAD) member states, the international community, and fellow Somalis is that “they [women and children] are sick and tired of the ongoing conflict” (IGAD News 2002c).

Given the wars’ adverse impact on individual, social, and economic life, it is not surprising that women across the five campaigns regarded collective action for an end to war through peaceful means as an opportunity to do something about the unpleasant conditions of women, children, and the society as a whole. Women in Burundi saw in collective action an opportunity to do something about the violence in society sparked by the 1993 assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president. This meant facilitating peace and reconciliation. For the Liberian women it was the opportunity to be advocates of the peace process who drew attention to the plight of women and children and the welfare needs of all Liberians. Women
activists in Sierra Leone saw the opportunity to be a pressure group for peace and key political participants in the return of the country to civilian rule through multiparty elections. According to Jusu-Sheriff (2000, 49), “Women believed that their hard work in the democratization process would be rewarded by places at the negotiating table.” Somali women activists saw in collective action the opportunity to be peace envoys, peace workers, and conciliators with the capacity to diffuse clan tensions, pressure fighting clans to settle peacefully, and communicate their need for a secure environment in which to carry out their humanitarian activities. They also saw the campaigns for peace as an opportunity for women’s organizations to be a platform for women’s contributions to reconciliation and reconstruction (Jama 2010, 63). Although specific political circumstances influenced how women conceived of their agency in ending the war, in all the campaigns, collective action to end the war presented an opportunity for women to be recognized as credible political actors with the capacity to make a difference.

Women appropriated familiar cultural identities and used them for political action when they collectively presented themselves as credible peace activists with the capacity to pressure for an end to war. They appropriated and improvised pacifist roles deriving from sociocultural identities of mother, caregiver, and nurturer, as well as the international discourse on the advancement and empowerment of women in political participation to represent themselves as credible peacemakers. Doing so required encouraging a shift in women’s definitions of their political identities in terms of divisive political ideological, clan, ethnic, and religious identity boundaries to a more inclusive identity that emphasized the unifying elements of sociocultural identities, for instance dual group identity and kin ties (mother and sister), and the gender empowerment discourse premised on women’s discrimination and marginalization (as citizens) from political decision-making processes.
Women in Sierra Leone, for example, conceived of themselves as natural peacemakers, while Liberian women represented themselves as mothers and sisters (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 8, 22; Interview, June 24 2009). In Burundi, women based their credibility and capacity as peace activists on cultural views of mothers as family peacemakers and on the dual clan/ethnic identity of women as wives (FAS 2001a, 28). They argued that as mothers they often diffused tension and mediated disputes between siblings. As wives they could act as brokers between two disputing groups (their husbands’ and their own group). The use of a culturally assigned brokerage role in society for recognition as credible peace brokers is more visible in accounts of the Somali women’s campaigns. Here, in the absence of a central government and structure, the clan structures became the unit of governance and administration. Within this clan structure, women’s dual kinship identity allowed them to act as brokers, opening communication lines between their clan and that of their husbands, delivering messages, and keeping communication open because culturally it is believed that women do not have a single unquestionable loyalty to one clan. Their network of relations cuts across several clans, unlike that of their male kin, whose network is limited to the father’s clan, with weak ties to other clans. They coordinated action aimed at eliciting widespread support from women across clan, class, and other divides through this network of interpersonal relations. The cultural role of interclan broker (communication channel and envoy) is familiar to all women. Women peace activists thus appropriated sociocultural views of women as peacemakers and improvised these sociocultural identities to gain recognition as credible political actors in peacemaking.

Women peace activists also appropriated international policy discourse on women’s advancement and empowerment to collectively conceive of themselves as peacemakers. The discourse emerging from the United Nations International Women’s Decade and the series of
events and conferences associated with it is particularly important. Participation in these processes permitted the diffusion and emulation of thinking and performances of women peacemakers from other countries. The question of women and peace in Africa was first addressed at the 1993 Regional Conference on Women and Peace (Kampala, Uganda), which produced the Kampala Action Plan on Women and Peace. This was followed by a series of regional meetings and conferences convened by the United Nations Development Fund for Women/African Women in Crisis Umbrella Program (UNIFEM/AFWIC), the United Nations Economic Commission/African Centre for Women (UNECA/ACW), and the Organization of African Unity, and by regional networks of African women NGOs. It seems like the most influential conferences in shaping African women’s identity as peace agents and connecting this identity to their political participation in democratization process was the 5th African Regional Conference on Women in 1994 (Dakar, Senegal), which produced a common position on the advancement of women (the 1994 African Platform for Action), and the 1995 UN Women’s Conference (Beijing, China), where the African Women’s common position was presented.

In Sierra Leone, the question of women’s involvement in ending the war and its link to discussions on women’s participation in democratization was first posed at a meeting convened by different women’s organizations to prepare for the 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing. Also through the brokerage of the United States Information Center, women contacted counterparts from other parts of the world and learned from what they were doing (Jusu-Sheriff 2000, 47). Women from Sierra Leone, Somalia, Burundi, and Liberia attended the 1994 Dakar and the 1995 Beijing conferences. They met each other for the first time, shared experiences, built contacts, and got new ideas on how to mobilize and work to end the war. For Zahra Ugas Farah, the 1994 Dakar conference was a good opportunity to meet other African women in
similar situations of war, share experiences, and access a regional network that facilitated her attendance at the 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing. She also discovered new ideas for working with women to support peace (Dyck 2003, 13). Thus the series of regional events and conferences convened by the United Nations and NGOs and the UN Women’s Conference in Beijing were important sites of diffusion and emulation of ideas, learning, and peace mobilization strategies for African women peace activists. They appropriated and improvised on these ideas and practices to campaign for peace in their specific contexts.

The new thinking and policy debate on women’s participation in the peace process emerged and developed in tandem with thinking and debates on how to resolve the violent outcomes of the 1990s movements for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Women peace activists’ understanding of their role in all peace processes evolved through their participation in these two processes and their campaigns for an end to war. Although accounts of the campaigns refer to the 1994 Dakar and 1995 Beijing conferences as significant in advancing their work for peace, the use of women’s empowerment discourse to frame their selfdefinitions as peacemakers was less explicit in this phase of their campaign. Perhaps this has to do with the tensions arising from reconciling the cultural definitions of their political agency in matters to do with security with those emerging from the international feminist discourses of the UN policymaking processes. The reliance on international feminist discourse is more evident in the second phase—women’s campaigns to participate in formal negotiations that gained prominence from the late 1990s. I analyze this further in Chapter 7.

Accounts provide few details of how women peace activists elicited widespread support for the shared story about the threats the war posed to women and their children and the political opportunity for women to collectively end the fighting and violence. Nevertheless I piece these
fragments of evidence to show that this was achieved through cognitive mobilization, creation of emotional energy, and alliance formation. It also involved improvisation. Women learned what to do next while on the job. They adjusted their interaction with conflicting parties, members of the public, and international stakeholders according to the responses of these three groups. The reconstruction of this collective attribution process I present here is retrospective and premised on the idea of creative interaction (Tilly 2002, 211). Women peace activists convened and facilitated meetings, workshops, consultations, and trainings on peace and reconciliation for women. At these meetings they offered new interpretations of the war as a threat to women’s dignity, the family, and society, the attribution of these threats to the dehumanizing behavior of the combatants and actions women could take collectively to end the war. Discussions of these new interpretations of war at meetings, such as the mass meeting Mary Brownell and a few Liberian women convened to reach out to women, the day of reflection Burundi women peace activists held to discuss women’s contribution to restoring peace, the Women’s Forum and the Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Initiative, and the training in women and conflict transformation conducted by the Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET–Liberia) changed the way women thought about the war and their role in ending it. They produced a shared story that emphasized war’s specific impact on women and children and women’s central role in ending this suffering.

Leymah Gbowee describes the content of the training she received from the West Africa Network for Peace/Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET) and that she in turn offered to Liberian women through the Liberian chapter of the network (WIPNET–Liberia). Training combined learning about nonviolence, building skills in communication, negotiation, and mediation skills, understanding gender roles through use of participants’ experiences, and
exercises that built self-confidence. A session she considers particularly powerful, and that highlights the role of demobilizing and mobilizing emotions (Gamson 2011, 261), is one where women shared their painful experience of being abused so as to “shed the weight of this experience.” The training helped Leymah connect the process of facilitating emotional release to political action by overcoming the debilitating emotional pain to access the strength required for action. According to her:

You cannot negotiate lasting peace without bringing women into the effort, but women can’t become peace makers without releasing the pain that keeps them from feeling their own strength. Emotional release isn’t enough in itself to create change, but WIPNET channeled that new energy into political action. This was a way to do it all. (Gbowee 2011, 114, 117–118)

She used her trauma healing experience as a social worker to help women overcome demobilizing emotions resulting from their trauma. The WIPNET training allowed her to connect a gendered analysis of war to this experience. This gave her insights into how to mobilize women traumatized by the war by helping them overcome debilitating emotions and recover the strength and self-confidence required for political action.

While this training is not exactly representative of what happened in meetings across the women’s campaigns I examined, it sheds some light on the cognitive and emotional mechanisms of eliciting women’s participation in the campaign to end war and the importance of strategic action. Mobilization involved appealing to the injustices women experienced, expression of demobilizing emotions (despair, hopelessness, shame, and lack of confidence), building their self-confidence and sense of dignity, and tapping into their moral outrage to mobilize for political action. A group of women from this training, eager to act on what they had learned,
proposed a Peace Outreach Program and became WIPNET–Liberia’s core organizers. They went out to ordinary Liberian women, disseminating their shared story and eliciting their participation in the campaign to end the second Liberian war. Over several weeks, they built a strong grassroots base for the women’s mass action campaign.

The women’s meetings brought together women from diverse backgrounds. They led to formation of alliances across ethnic and religious divides, development of a common vision, and creation of new vehicles for collective action. The Christian Women’s Peace Initiative and the Muslim Women for Peace together launched the WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign. Sierra Leone Christian and Muslim women came together to demonstrate for peace. Women in Burundi from across ethnic and political divides formed the Women for Peace and later the Collectif des Associations Féminines et ONG du Burundi (CAFOB) organizations, whose aim was to promote peace and reconciliation at the local level. Somali women from different clans worked together to stop the clan fighting in different autonomous regions.

Eliciting widespread support of women for the campaign for peace was a difficult process. Many women felt that matters to do with war were a male preserve and feared direct political action. For instance, in Burundi women feared being seen as opposing their husbands. Some thought it better to prevent conflict from within the family sphere (FAS 2001a, 28, 32). This example shows that not all women enthusiastically embraced the story of war as an injustice to women and the idea of women as peace brokers. This story and engaging political actors directly were quite new for some of the women. Jusu-Sheriff, a peace activist, notes in her account of the Sierra Leone women’s peace movement, that “many of the women’s groups were not comfortable in the spotlight” (2000, 49).
A second difficulty had to do with religious, ethnic, generation, and political divisions. Christian women in Liberia objected to joint action with Muslim women. They felt that praying with Muslims would dilute their faith and blamed the Muslims for prolonging the war because members of the new rebel group that had just launched attacks against President Charles Taylor’s government, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), were mostly Muslims (Gbowee 2011, 128; Koenders 2010, 34–36). Burundian women peace activists confronted political and ethnic divisions among some of the women in order to forge a common front. Similarly in Sierra Leone and Liberia women activists faced competition from those who held strongly to positions of their party, armed groups, or ethnic communities. The Liberian women’s peace campaign shows evidence of generational/class tensions between some members of the older Liberian Women’s Initiative and the younger WIPNET–Liberian mass movement (Gbowee 2011, 156). Nevertheless, the formation of new vehicles to launch and coordinate campaigns and joint action with other civic groups in society suggests that women tried to put aside their unresolved differences and pursue the common goal of ending war.

6.3 Women’s Campaign for Peace—Social Appropriation, Creation of New Vehicles

Women activists appropriated existing organizations or created new campaign vehicles to coordinate campaigns targeting the public, conflicting parties, and international actors. Women in Liberia mobilized from within the churches and the mosque before creating new vehicles. In the first Liberian civil war, the Liberia Women’s Initiative was created to lead the women’s campaign for peace and disarmament. It was part of the broader campaign for disarmament that the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee launched. During the second Liberian war, the Christian Women’s Initiative used the Lutheran church and the Muslim Women for Peace used the mosques as bases for coordinating prayers for peace before the formation of a new vehicle, the
Women in Peace Building Network (WIPNET)–Liberia, to coordinate the outreach program and mass action for peace. Members of the Liberian Women’s Initiative joined with women from Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) to coordinate campaigns for peace at the regional level.

The Women’s Forum in Sierra Leone served as the organizational base for the Women’s Movement for Peace in Sierra Leone and later the Sierra Leone chapter of the international NGO Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Burundi women peace activists created new vehicles, the Women for Peace and CAFOB, an umbrella organization that linked member organizations with international allies in addition to coordinating activities of member associations aimed at ending the fighting and the economic sanctions that had a debilitating effect on the lives of ordinary Burundians, especially women and children. In Somalia, women’s organizations providing humanitarian social services were the organizational base for the peace campaigns. Accounts of Somali women’s campaigns mention a variety of organizations mobilizing for peace in the autonomous northern region (e.g., Somaliland Women’s Development Association) and South Somalia (e.g., IIDA,4 Coalition of Grassroots Women, and Save Somali Women and Children). Most accounts describe women from different clans coming together, sometimes under the umbrella of an organization, to call for an end to clan fighting.

Overall, the CAFOB, the WIPNET–Liberia, and Somaliland women’s organizations acted autonomously, unlike the Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement, which was under the umbrella of a national women’s movement. The women also allied with other groups in society. The Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement participated in the broader civic movement for democracy. Women’s organizations in South Somalia (especially Mogadishu) allied with other

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4 Women’s Development Organization.
civic groups to demand an end to war. The Liberian Women’s Initiative, for instance, was part of the civic campaign for disarmament led by the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC). They also participated in the All Liberian National Council meetings to find ways out of the political crisis. The WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign received the support of the religious leaders who came to the sit-in venue. Women’s groups in Mogadishu organized under the Coalition for Grassroots Women’s Organization (COGWO) also mobilized other civic groups under another umbrella organization, the Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN) to coordinate peacemaking activities (United Nations Security Council 2000; Saferworld 2008). Somali women also built alliances with clan elders, moderate Islamists, and members of the business community sympathetic to their cause.

Through the religious and civic organization bases they appropriated, the new vehicles they created, and alliances with other civic and political actors in society, women launched peace campaigns that diffused a shared story about the war, calling on the public, conflicting parties, and international actors to think and respond differently to the war. They offered an alternative interpretation of the violent conflict as a threat to social peace, especially to the lives and livelihoods of ordinary people, safety and dignity of women and children, and peaceful relations between different groups. They called for peaceful dialogue, a return to democratic civilian rule through free and fair elections, and peace and reconciliation in society as alternative ways of settling political conflict instead of violence and the pursuit of military victory. Where formal negotiations failed to end the war, like in Liberia, women attributed this to the failure of the mediating agents and international community to secure a ceasefire agreement from conflicting parties and ensure that they disarmed and demobilized troops before installing a transitional government. Through a variety of performances and mechanisms of mobilization, they
persuaded the public, conflicting parties, and international actors that peaceful resolution of war through dialogue was an opportunity for all to be agents of peace instead of agents of war.

Evidence shows that women peace activists deployed emotional energy creating activities that enabled the collective action of other women and solidarity building based on their new understanding of war’s injustice to them and their children and that was aimed at changing thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and other political leaders. Public demonstrations in Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia tapped into women’s outrage, frustration, and despair at combatants’ refusal to end the war. In the four campaigns examined, women sang songs, carried placards, and chanted slogans calling for peace during the peace protests. Women who participated in the WIPNET–Liberia mass action dressed in white T-shirts as an expression of solidarity while in Somaliland, women tied white headscarves to symbolize their sorrow. These cultural symbols were visual expressions of solidarity with the cause of peace and of sorrow, grief, and anger (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 143; Gbowee 2011, 136; Associated Press, 2003).

News reports of public demonstrations in Burundi, Sierra Leonean, and South Somali campaigns were sporadic yet show evidence of nonviolent protests. For instance, reports of the Burundi women peace activities mention a demonstration for the restoration of peace in December 1993 (Ndikumana 1995) and another in 1995 (Radio France Internationale [Paris], 9 December 1995). A number of news agencies report that Sierra Leone Women’s Peace Movement staged demonstrations between February 1995 and April 1996 (Agence France Presse 15 February 1995; Gberie 1996; Hecht 1996). A United Press International news wire reports that mainly women and children demonstrated against war in Mogadishu and other regions in South Somalia (1 April 2004). The sporadic reporting by international media yields evidence that
is not detailed enough to establish the frequency of public demonstrations. However, I infer from
the prevailing violent conditions that in Burundi and South Somalia staging public
demonstrations may have placed women in grave danger because of the highly tense political
atmosphere, outbreak of violence, and threat of intimidation by incumbent government forces,
opposing armed forces, and youth militia. The violent interactions between extremists from both
sides of the conflict in Bujumbura (Burundi) dominated the political crisis between 1993 and
December 1995 and so closed opportunities for staging public demonstrations without threat of
attack. In South Somalia, civil society organizations and their members lived in fear of attack
from armed factions who interpreted their activities as politically threatening. In 1992, troops
loyal to one United Somali Congress faction opened fire on a peace demonstration in
Mogadishu, staged by Somali youth organized as United Somali Salvation Youth (Human Rights
Watch 1993). In Mudug, women demonstrated publicly in 1994 to protest a likely outbreak of
fighting after a peace accord was threatened when one of the main signatories, the SSDF, split
into two rival wings. However, the 1993 Mudug accord lasted until 1997, when tensions between
factions surfaced and threatened the peace (Bryden and Steiner 1998, 56). The rapidly shifting
structure of opportunity, especially the swing between highly tense and cordial relations with the
armed groups, made regular staging of demonstrations difficult and dangerous. The war’s
fragmentation of society geographically confined most public demonstrations to the city and
constrained their diffusion nationwide. In Chapter 4, I examined these constraints as part of the
political opportunity structure that limited the possible expansion of campaigns.

Yet, in Somaliland and Liberia (second civil war), women staged public demonstrations
protesting an escalation in fighting after ceasefire agreements that continued until the conflicting
parties negotiated an end to the war and a return to peace. Here women combined demonstrations
with the use of more confrontational performances such as venue occupation and sit-ins, especially when previous performances were ignored and failed to get the fighting groups to settle peacefully. For example, women peace activists in Somaliland refused to leave the presidency and parliamentary building after presenting their declaration to end war to the National Council of Elders. They remained until a reconciliation committee was formed to develop a final peace proposal. When this committee failed to act immediately the women organized a demonstration and threatened to force the doors of the meeting hall open and stone the members of the reconciliation committee if they did not agree on a date and pace for the reconciliation meeting (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, p146-147).

The women’s mass action campaign organized by the WIPNET–Liberia bypassed President Taylor’s ban on street marches by resorting to the performances of assembling, occupation of important public places, and sit-ins (Associated Press [Monrovia], 11 April 2003, Jarkloh 2003a, 2003b; The News (Nigeria), 29 May 2003; Paye-Layleh, 2003). They coordinated these activities through use of private independent media. For the first assembly action, the women broadcast a public announcement through the Catholic Radio Veritas calling on residents to assemble on the steps of the Monrovia City Hall, early in the morning and to wear white. Hundreds of women, some religious leaders, Taylor’s soldiers and supporters, and local media turned up. The women assembled gave President Taylor three days to respond to their demands to negotiate an end to the war. They staged a sit-in at a field near the fish market and along Tubman Boulevard, where the president passed daily on his way to and from Capital Hill. On his way to work, women protesters walked to the road and faced the presidential convoy at the risk of being shot. When Taylor did not respond to their demands within the three days they gave him, the women assembled outside Parliament. They returned to the field when he did not
acknowledge them and issued a second ultimatum to respond to their demands in three days. After the three days, the women occupied the Parliament parking lot blocking anyone entering or exiting until the Speaker came out to talk to them. They gave the president a third ultimatum and returned to the field, after which the president agreed to meet with them (Gbowee 2011, 137–139). The WIPNET–Liberia campaign went even further with dramatic performances such as the women’s sex strike to send a strong message to the public that they were serious about ending the war (Gbowee 2011, 147; O’Reilly 2011; Reticker 2008).

Women appropriated and improvised traditional, Islamic, and Christian religious practices of prayers, vigils, songs, traditional poetry, and personal testimonies, using them to express their suffering from the war and to communicate their desire for peace. The improvised appropriation of these practices also deployed emotional energy that built solidarity, elicited support of potential participants from the public, and also aimed at changing the thinking and behavior of political leaders and armed groups about the war. Although some of these practices, especially songs and prayers, were performed during public demonstrations, evidence of the Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Somali women’s campaigns for peace show that they were held as stand alone performances. Christian and Muslim women in Sierra Leone and Liberia held joint prayers. Liberian women held prayers services, prayer chains, fasting, and praying during the first civil war (Caesar 1994, 6). The strong reliance on prayer continued during the second Liberian civil war, as illustrated by the Christian and Muslim women who met three times a week for several months at a Lutheran church. These prayers preceded and continued throughout the Outreach Program and mass action phases of the WIPNET–Liberia campaign. In northern Somalia (Somaliland), young men participated in the Allabiri (traditional Islamic prayer) recitals women held to express their desire for peace. The use of prayers shows the great value women
had for appropriating and improvising on religious practices and beliefs to compel changes in thinking and action on women participants in collective action, elicit support of the public to the women’s cause, and express their desperate need for an end to the fighting.

The Somali women also appropriated and improvised the *Buraanbuur*, a long and well-known tradition of using poetry as a medium of social criticism to express their suffering, pain, and grief from wars that did not make any sense. The *Buraanbuur* performances deployed these emotions to compel a change in the thinking and behavior of the public, clan militia, and clan elders. Warsame states that the poems women composed were “intended to raise the consciousness of the masses” (Warsame 2002, 44). One account shows how the emotive power of the *Buraanbuur* moved the armed militia to stop fighting. The wailing and crying poems women sang as they ran between two fighting clans made the men throw down their weapons (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 144). Also, during the WIPNET–Liberia campaign, the emotional public personal testimonies women told of how they were affected by war provoked public sympathy and support for their cause.

Women peace activists in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somaliland often read petitions, statements, communiqués, and declarations presenting women’s positions, especially the war’s adverse effects on women and children and the need for peace at the end of a protest march, published them in the local papers, or had them broadcast by radio and television. These communicated women’s analysis of the war, their position, and demands for peace in the form of proposals. Together with the public demonstrations and other performances, these aimed to communicate an alternative understanding of war and its resolution to that of the conflicting parties. Women activists in Somaliland petitioned the new government to end the clan fighting (Bradbury 1994, 72). During the first Liberian war, the Liberian Women Initiative presented
petitions and position papers to the representatives of the United Nations, Organization of African Unity, Economic Community of West African States. They also picketed outside the US Embassy, government offices, faction headquarters, UN offices, and embassies of the ECOWAS countries. During the second Liberian war, WIPNET–Liberia presented their position statement to the International Contact Group of Liberia. When armed groups refused to adhere to the negotiated agreement, the Liberian women in particular demanded international intervention to enforce peace and save the population from further suffering. The Liberian Women’s Initiative called for the deployment of African peacekeeping troops throughout Liberia and international enforcement of the 1992 UN arms embargo on the country (Xinhua News Agency 18 May 1995). During the second war, representatives of women’s groups in Liberia (Coalition of Women in Political Parties, Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia, and Mano River Women’s Peace Network) called for an immediate deployment of a UN or US peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire, disarm and demobilize combatants, facilitate safe passage of people trapped between fighting lines, and allow for the distribution of relief aid (Associated Press 2003, The News [Nigeria] 2003; GBC Radio 1, 2003).

In all the campaigns women used media to coordinate action among members of the public. They used radio and television to broadcast messages of peace and reconciliation throughout the country (Anderlini 2007, 34; Dini 2009, 35). This mediated diffusion of their shared story of peace and demand for an end to war allowed women to provoke public debate on their alternative solution to peace and reconciliation. Also, women worked with selected groups in society, specifically women affected by violence and male youths, to change attitudes toward the war and social relations in society. Women’s interactions with these two groups show they
experimented with promoting new identities and institutions through modeling the idea of people as peace agents.

Meetings with women from both sides of the conflict divide were aimed at raising women’s consciousness about the war and its adverse impact on women, the importance of peace, women’s agency in stopping the war, and bringing about peace. These meetings were also aimed at reducing tension in the community by helping women victims develop community projects that allowed them to cope with difficult conditions. These projects focused on providing humanitarian assistance, vocational training, income generation, and trauma healing. They promoted peace by helping women find ways of working together on common issues.

Women activists’ attempts at demobilizing, disarming, and reintegrating teenage boys active in the different militia or armed groups show they experimented with promoting new identities and institutions by offering teenage boys the opportunity to be agents of peace and security and by encouraging them into peaceful occupations. Burundi women talked to the youth in Bujumbura to dissuade them from engaging in armed militia. Somali women in Mogadishu mobilized funds from local businessmen and used these to convince teenage boys serving in militia to hand over their guns and attend school. They later mobilized the boys to be security guards in parts of the capital so as to keep it safe. Liberian women used radio to appeal to combatants to disarm and return home after the 1994 Agreements that formed the Liberian Transitional National Government. They also launched programs to purchase guns from combatants, rehabilitation of female combatants, and vocational training (Anderlini 2007, 34; Caesar 1996, 6; Dyck 2003, 11; Interview July 2009; Menkhaus 1998, 223).

The coordination of action at sites beyond the initial site of contention varied geographically in the campaigns. The Burundi women’s mostly reconciliation and humanitarian
assistance activities were carried out in displaced camps across the country. The Sierra Leone women’s campaign was largely confined in Freetown, the capital city, due to the increasing insecurity in the countryside forcing people to flee to the city. The Liberia Women’s Initiative campaign was also limited to the capital city of Monrovia because of high insecurity. However, during the second Liberian war, the WIPNET–Liberia mass action coordinated sit-ins at nine counties. In Somalia, the women’s campaign remained fragmented. Coordination of activities did not extend beyond the autonomous regions, cities, or towns where activities took place.

Among the women’s campaigns examined, the Liberian women’s campaign to end war is the only one that coordinated direct action at the subregional level. During the second Liberian war, the Liberian Women’s Initiative joined together with women peace activists in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to form the Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET). This was possible with the brokerage of Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS). They relied on interpersonal networks of Guinean and Sierra Leonean members of the network to get audience with Presidents of Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone and present their case for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. They also met with President Taylor and persuaded him to work with the presidents of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry to end war in the region. Once President Charles Taylor and the LURD agreed to talks in April 2003, some of the women initiators of the WIPNET–Liberia mass action campaign traveled to Freetown (Sierra Leone), where the Liberian Council of Churches was meeting with leaders of the LURD movement to resolve the issue of an appropriate negotiating venue. The WIPNET–Liberian activists mobilized women from a Liberian refugee camp to picket at the meeting and call on the LURD leaders to go to Ghana for talks. They traveled to Accra (Ghana) ahead of the scheduled talks between President Taylor and the LURD to mobilize women refugees there. WIPNET members from northern Ghana joined
their sit-in and picketed at the negotiation’s venue. When the talks dragged on and fighting escalated in Monrovia, the women sat outside the entrance to the meeting room where negotiations were taking place and refused to leave until the parties agreed to settle. The women even threatened to strip naked, a traditional practice women in several African societies use to communicate complete outrage, when security officers attempted to remove them from the hall. It took the intervention of the mediator, General Abubakar, to stop the two women leaders from stripping and together find a way out. While the threat did not deliver immediate results, it marked a turning point in the negotiation process. The women’s action generated a lot of local, regional, and international attention and sent a message to the conflicting parties that they could not ignore the women’s demands. President Taylor resigned and went into exile, the talks resumed, the LURD and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) ended their siege of Monrovia, and a peace agreement was signed a month after the women’s threat (Chanda 2003; Dalieh and Fahngon 2003; Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2003; GBC Radio 1, 2003; Gbowee 2011, 143, 161–62; Koenders 2010, 40–42).

6.4 Conclusion

In Chapters 5 and 6 I sought to account for why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized for an end to war in politically risky conditions of violent political transitions. I suggested that they mobilize collectively for an end to war when they interpreted certain transformative events in society caused by the war as a threat to their interests and those of society. I proposed a sketch of the process of attribution based on evidence from accounts written by religious leaders and women involved, organizations supporting them, position statements, pastoral letters, and news reports. Regarding how the religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized for an end to war, I initially argued that they did so by diffusing the shared
story to conflicting parties and the public with the aim of changing the thinking and behavior of these two groups toward war. They diffused their alternative theory of the war in nonviolent ways. I showed this through a reconstruction of the mobilization process highlighting the key mechanisms of mobilization.

Across the ten campaigns, evidence shows that religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized for an end to war for three reasons. First, they saw in the adverse conditions of war an opportunity to do something to end it. Specifically, civilian outrage at atrocious acts committed by combatants and political elite disregard for the electoral process and for the suffering and trauma caused by war provided the occasion for a few individuals, religious clerics and women leaders, to do something to end the violence once and for all. Although unprecedented violent events served as the occasion to do something about the war, compared to the religious leaders’ efforts, the women’s campaigns are concerned with the gendered and generational nature of the violence. Specifically, women were concerned about the combatants’ deliberate targeting of women as part of their war strategy, the plight of children and youths and the cycles of revenge and counter revenge that destroyed family and community relationships. Mass rape, sexual abuse, and other forms of violence against women reveal a breach of customary norms of war and that women lacked protection in the private (family) and public sphere. Also, women were disturbed by the plight of children (dying) and the recruitment of large numbers of youth into the war.

Second, they perceived the war as a threat to society and the humanitarian assistance they provided at the time as a temporary and not permanent relief to war’s impact on the populations they assisted. Also, the war made it increasingly difficult for the religious leaders and women to carry out their social and humanitarian roles. The religious leaders and women’s networks saw
war as a threat to human dignity, social, moral, and economic wellbeing of the people and a threat to the humanitarian relief they provided the population. However, the women emphasized the threat war posed to their dignity as women, to the survival of their children, and to their family and community relationships. The women’s interpretations thus highlighted the suffering war caused at the personal and family level. The spiritual and material support religious leaders provided affected populations, and the women’s care of the sick and the elderly, in addition to providing for the family, all seemed incapable of addressing the consequences of the unprecedented violence. This compelled them to do something more about the deteriorating social conditions, something more relevant and lasting than the humanitarian responses they undertook.

Third, doing something more, that is, acting to end the war peacefully, gave the religious leaders and women’s networks the opportunity to be credible agents of peace and to contribute to the transformation of the value basis of political relations (changing thinking and behavior). The religious leaders framed their peace agent role in terms of the biblical models of the reconciler and prophet. The women, on the other hand, drew on international feminist discourse on equality of women and on cultural conceptions of mothers and wives as social peacemakers and clan envoys/connectors. As peace agents both actors sought to change thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and the population by developing relationships that facilitated dialogue as a means to settle war. The women went further and saw in this an opportunity to gain political recognition in the democratization process.

In answer to how religious leaders and women mobilized to end war, evidence shows they did so by diffusing an alternative understanding of the war aimed at changing thinking and behavior of conflicting parties, congregants, and the population. Diffusion occurred mainly
through encounters and conversations, brokerage, the media, activation of new identities and institutions, and scale shift. Brokerage was the most recurrent of diffusion mechanisms in all ten campaigns. Campaign initiators combined brokerage with personal networks of relations to disseminate their alternative understandings of war and its resolution to conflicting parties, influential members of society, and influential international actors. They also broadcast the new story of war and peace mainly through radio and print media.

The diffusion of the shared story through encounters and conversations was more common within social bases as the religious leaders and women who were campaign initiators promoted the alternative theory so as to gain support of members. Although the spread and adoption of the shared story may have been confined within churches, women movements, and spaces created by both groups, these spaces were open, also, to individuals and groups other than just congregants or women members. For instance, young men participated in the prayer recitals and vigils organized by women in Somaliland, and members of the public and religious leaders expressed solidarity with the Liberian women’s campaigns. Similarly, much as the activation of new identities and institutions among specific social groups (i.e., women, youth, and congregants) indicates that the diffusion of the message was confined to these groups, the South Sudan local peace campaigns in Wunlit and Liir shows that other groups such as traditional religious and political leaders participated. In my view, the activation of new identities and institutions reveals an attempt by peace activists to promote models of new thinking and behavior required of peace agents.

Evidence shows the relative absence of scale shift from the national level to local levels nationwide because of the structure of war and violence, especially its geographical constraints on space and places and demographic upheavals, pushing large numbers of population outside
and within the country. The diffusion of the shared story remained localized in the capital city or main towns. However, transnational diffusion of the story occurred through brokerage of campaign initiators, in particular their encounters and conversations with influential international actors whose support they wanted. The women’s campaigns included encounters and conversations with women in refugee camps in neighboring countries.

My arguments on why and how religious leaders and women’s groups mobilized to end war are based on evidence that varies in terms of detail and event focus across campaigns. Nevertheless, the cases show that civic groups will mobilize when there are individuals who choose to do something about the suffering caused by the war, when the benefits of addressing the root causes of suffering seem more promising than those derived from addressing the symptoms and when the cost of taking action to address the root causes is no more than the cost of inaction. Campaign initiators will mobilize the support of others by proposing and disseminating an alternative understanding of the war and its resolution based on a common experience of war as suffering and of peace as possible through the agency of all (conflicting parties and the public). The cases show that disseminating this understanding across lines of divisions in society depended a great deal on the brokerage of campaign initiators and supporters, creative appropriation and improvisation of cultural resources common to all social groups, and the use of the media. Although the campaigns did not yield peace directly, a major outcome is that they opened public debate on a political issue that governments considered their responsibility and that ordinary citizens avoided because of the political risks involved.

The findings show that instead of merely protesting or criticizing the conflicting parties, campaign leaders and supporters offered a solution that expanded on who was responsible for a peaceful resolution to the war. Although the solution emphasized the responsibility of conflicting
parties, the idea of peace agent was extended to the broader society. In other words, conflicting parties may be the primary agents in promoting peace, but they are not the only actors. Citizens were just as responsible and capable of being agents of peace instead of promoters and pawns of war. This raises the question of what kind of power the religious leaders and women brought to bear in a political arena dominated by actors with military and economic power and keen to protect their control of this power.
Chapter 7. MOBILIZATION TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS

Much as the women and religious leaders’ campaigns endorsed the use of dialogue to peacefully settle the conflict, peace activists soon became disillusioned by the conflicting parties’ inability to secure a lasting peace through formal negotiations. For some of the actors this led to a new phase in their mobilization for peace in which they engaged directly with the formal talks as participants. Why and how they did this is the focus of this chapter. Evidence from accounts of the religious leaders and women’s campaigns shows that while religious leaders’ and women’s motivations for engaging directly with the formal negotiation are similar, they differ in how they become participants. With the exception of Angola where the government rejected the religious leaders’ demand for dialogue, religious leaders’ communication, and peace brokerage opened the way for their participation in negotiations to end war in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. The women’s direct engagement came by way of collective action that pressured mediating agents, key regional and international stakeholders and international allies to include them as official participants. Thus women were uninvited guests at the negotiating table unlike the religious leaders.

Along the same lines of analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, I begin by examining why women mobilized to participate in formal negotiations. I use evidence from accounts of the women’s peace campaigns in Burundi, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan to identify the key moments that make the women consider participating in formal negotiations. These moments are related to developments in the formal negotiation processes and an emerging international discourse on women and peace building during the 1990s. I show how they interpreted these key moments as threats and opportunities, developed a shared story of the need for their participation in formal negotiations and diffused this story to elicit support for their participation in the
negotiations. I argue that women demanded participation in formal negotiations because a) they wanted a peace agreement that reflected the needs of the suffering population, b) they wanted to ensure conflicting parties committed to ending the war. In some instances, women seem to promote the agenda of conflicting parties they affiliate with.

In the second part of the chapter, I analyze how women mobilized to participate in the formal negotiations and the outcomes of their mobilization. I outline the process of mobilization based on the argument that women up-scaled their coordination of action to the regional and international arena to gain entry into formal negotiations. At these levels, women interacted with mediating agents, regional and international actors, at negotiation venues in neighboring countries. To ensure an inclusive negotiation, they coordinated activities between the negotiation venue and in country by reporting back to women’s network members, other women mobilized for peace at local levels and general public.

My analysis shifts to the religious leaders’ engagement with the formal negotiations to end war in Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. I leave out the Angolan religious leaders because they did not participate in formal negotiations and the government rejected their attempts to broker communication between it and UNITA leaders. Since my aim is to show the difference between the two groups’ engagement with the negotiations, I end with a comparison of the women’s and religious leader’s direct engagement of the formal negotiation in terms of how they came to directly participate in formal negotiations.

7.1 Women’s Mobilization to Participate in Formal Negotiations

7.1.1 Motivation for Collective Action. The motivation to campaign for participation in negotiations stems from a number of developments related to the formal negotiations and the emergence of an international discourse on women and peace building. In their campaigns to end
war, women pressured conflicting parties to negotiate an end to the war. However, the twelve peace agreements and ceasefires by Somali fighting factions (1991-1999), the 1995 power-sharing agreement and 1996 Mwanza peace talks involving Burundian political parties, the formation of a Reconciliation Committee to end clan fighting in northern Somalia, the numerous mediations and the ceasefires and agreements to end war by Liberian fighting factions between 1989 and 1994 did not end the fighting. This created the impression in society including women peace activists that conflicting parties did not take the matter of ending war as seriously. This awareness may have led to women peace activists to reconsider whether the nature of their engagement with formal negotiations needed to change in order to achieve their demands for peace. The negotiations had failed to remove the threats that war posed to society and to women in particular.

The women interpreted the conflicting parties’ lack of concern for their interests and those of the wider population as a threat to lasting peace. My examination of claims women made shows three main threats women attributed to the failure of formal negotiations to secure a lasting peace. These are the intransigent positions of the conflicting parties, the dominance of armed and mostly male participants concerned with their own interests and the lack of mechanisms to enforce the disarmament and demobilization of armed groups before establishing new governments. The conflicting parties’ intransigent position of parties was a major source of frustration not only for women peace activists but also religious leaders and the wider society. Women in Burundi blamed the negotiating parties refusal to focus on common problems on this is attitude. It is also evident in the Reconciliation Committee’s tardiness in convening peace talks in Somaliland, the South Sudanese factions’ refusal to negotiate peace with each other and militia affiliated with the Government of Khartoum, the failure of the Somali warlords to secure
a peace agreement and the numerous breaches of ceasefires and agreements by the Liberian armed factions. The delays and breaches turned formal negotiations into a long drawn out process that stretched the people’s patience. This was most evident in Liberia where the breakdown of the Accra negotiations (January 12, 1995) between conflicting parties in the first Liberian civil war provoked mass protests in the capital city Monrovia (Mcall 1995). Angry residents sealed off the airport and almost lynched armed faction leaders returning to the country from the negotiations (Agence France Presse 1995). During the Accra negotiations (July 2003) between Taylor and the LURD armed group, the Deutsche Presse-Agentur reported that twenty women members of the Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia chapter:

laid seige to a room where their compatriots were trying to fine tune a comprehensive peace plan’ to end the war. Women sat outside room and blocked negotiators from coming out of the room. Only the mediator Gen Abubakar would be allowed out. Coordinator Leymah Gbowee threatened to strip naked to protest the effects of the war on them (22 July 2003).

Women in northern Somalia (Somaliland) threatened to force open the meeting hall doors and pelt members of a Reconciliation Committee of government representatives and members of two fighting clans if they did not agree on a meeting date for talks on a final peace proposal. They demanded that the Reconciliation Committee agree on a date and place of meeting and carry out its activities immediately (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 147).

The Somaliland women’s realization that the exclusively male participation in the negotiations cast doubt on whether women’s specific concerns would be given serious attention in the deliberations and spurred their intention to participate in the talks. This awareness of male delegates’ tendency to neglecting or ignoring women’s concerns also underlies the Liberian
Women’s Initiative’s insistence on presenting their perspective and position on the war to the ECOWAS Heads of State Summit in 1995, the Burundian women’s lobbying President Yoweri Museveni and Mwalimu Nyerere for room to present their views, and the lobbying by South Somali women for official status in the Djibouti and Kenyan negotiations so as to voice women’s concerns (Xinhua News Agency, 18 May 1995; Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 26-27; Burke, Klot and Bunting 2001, 7-9; Tongeren et al. 2005, 118-119).

The continued presence of armed groups in society with a history of indiscipline, sexual abuse and violence directed at women children and elderly by armed groups did not guarantee the safety of women and other vulnerable groups in society especially when no other recourse to justice at the local and national levels existed since courts, police and traditional mechanisms were ineffective, weak or destroyed during the war. The Liberian women’s demand to participate in the negotiations, for example, stems from the absence of a strong mechanism for disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants in the post-agreement phase of the peace processes. Women wanted to focus attention on the urgent need to protect them and the children (Africa Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 19). In Chapter 6, I showed how women elicited public support by calling on groups in society to be agents of peace and also created new local institutions aimed at promoting this new identity. I showed how women in Liberia, Somaliland, and Burundi appealed to young men to be agents of peace by creating new institutions to dissuade teenage boys in the community from joining the militia. However these community efforts at building a constituency for peace were unsustainable without political leaders committed to disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating combatants into civilian life and restoring order in society.
The second development that caused women to consider direct participation in formal negotiations is the international discourse on women’s participation in politics and decision-making processes. The Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995) and the subregional and regional preparatory processes preceding it were particularly influential encounters for women peace activists who attended. Through conversations, presentations, and discussions, women peace activists learned from the experience of women peace activists from other countries within and outside the continent. They also gained knowledge of subregional, regional, and international policy instruments acknowledging the important role of women in peacemaking and endorsing the right of women to participate in all level of decision-making including peace negotiations. Additionally, women contributed to the development of a common for agenda for action for the Africa region ahead of the 1995 Beijing Conference. With this new awareness, women made connections between their concerns for peace, women’s rights and social and economic welfare.

The women’s exposure to international discourse on women and peace building and their participation at subregional and regional meetings on women and peace building made them aware of new openings for their participation, new spaces for organizing and support, new possibilities of engaging the formal negotiations. They became more conscious of a new political role. Like the South Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace, the conferences also provided opportunities for visibility and international support for their domestic campaigns for peace in the form of training, funding and invitations to meetings where they presented their work for peace (Hilhorst and van Leeuwen 2005, 547). The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, passed on October 2000, opened the way further for women’s participation in formal negotiations. It gave women an important tool for justifying their participation in formal
negotiations as part of international commitment to empower women’s participation in decision-making.

7.1.2 Why Women Should Participate in Formal Negotiations—The Shared Story of Inclusive and Gender Sensitive Participation. Women’s shared story of participation in formal negotiations and its potential for guaranteeing a lasting peace originated from the same collective attribution processes that launched their campaigns for peace. The story developed in the course of mobilization to end war (see Chapter 6) and the participation of some of the activists in subregional, regional and international women’s conferences. I characterize the collective attribution process that yielded the shared story of their participation in formal negotiations as one involving the following mechanisms: a) re-interpretation of their continued adverse conditions based on an assessment of their expectations of the conflicting parties’ ability to deliver on peace and of whether their mobilization was yielding the kind of results they desired; and b) the adoption of ideas of women as peace agents at regional and international conferences.

The story’s composition involved the same women peace activists who initiated the campaign for peace (initiators) and the same organizations with the exception of Sudan. In the latter country, the development of the shared story did not build on a national campaign for peace jointly coordinated by women from the north and south. This happened through the intervention of an international actor, the Netherlands Embassy and so its mobilization involved brokerage of an external actor. Unlike their counterparts in northern Sudan, South Sudanese women peace activists were actively involved in a grassroots peace process led by the church within Southern Sudan.

The continued violence despite numerous attempts at negotiating an end to war made women aware of the futility of expecting conflicting parties and mediating agents to understand
the unbearable psychological, social and economic toll of the violence on women and children. Women blamed the continued violent brutalization of their bodies, the forceful recruitment of children, their economic deprivation from violent disruption of lives and livelihoods, and the disruption of humanitarian and social service provision on the failure of the mostly male political leaders and leaders of armed factions to bring about the order and security needed for a normal life. In a speech delivered at the Boroma Grand Conference in 1993, on behalf of women in Somaliland, Zeynab Mohamed argued that that the reason women were compelled to do the “traditionally unthinkable,” that is speak out in a male forum, was because the men had failed in their traditional responsibility of protecting women and children and abandoned them to all kinds of social, economic and environmental hazards (Gardner and el Bushra 2004, 149). This realization that “men could not protect them anymore” is implied in the Burundi women’s attribution of women’s economic deprivation resulting from the damage to the economy, agriculture and social service to their political leaders’ refusal to negotiate an end to war. It is also implicit in the connections Liberian women made between continued sexual abuse and widespread violence, and the Liberian armed factions’ refusal to disarm and demobilize; in the connections between the rape, abduction, economic deprivation, forceful recruitment of children and continued fighting between Southern Sudanese factions despite attempts to unite them; and in the connections between constant disruption of women’s attempts to resettle and rebuild their lives and livelihoods and the refusal of failure of warlord centered negotiations to secure peace. In the women’s view, the problem lay not with negotiations as a tool to end war but with the mainly armed groups’ use of it to pursue their own interests rather than the interests of the people. In Liberia, the women also attributed the problem with the negotiated agreements to the international community’s reluctance in enforcing peace. The resulting frustration,
disappointment and disillusionment at the continued violence compelled women to collectively demand their participation in the formal negotiations.

Women considered participation crucial to ensuring that their concerns and those of the wider society received the serious attention they merited from mediating agents and conflicting parties. First, as the Liberian and Burundian women actions show, participation offered women an opportunity to present their experience and understanding of the war. They offered an alternative and gendered understanding of the war to that of the conflicting parties. Secondly, participation would provide an opening for women to focus attention on issues that concerned them. More importantly, participation would allow them to have their ideas and concerns incorporated in the contents of the negotiation agenda and agreements. Women in Burundi demanded that their rights and the priorities of both men and women incorporated in the content of the peace agreement (Burke, et. al 2001, 5.13). Similarly, the Sudanese women hoped to have their ideas and concerns incorporated in the negotiation agenda. They also wanted compliance of the armed groups to human rights and a culture of peace. The Liberian Women’s Initiative also saw their participation as an occasion to argue for disarmament of all armed groups before assuming positions in a new government (Hassan 2009, 3; El-Amin 1999; Kamil 2000, 23; Anderlini 2000, 20). The Burundi women’s demand that the principles of drafting the new constitution reflect their priorities and the Somali’s women’s demands that women be included in future political institutions shows participation offered the chance for the incorporation of women’s rights in legal instruments establishing a new state and secure a leadership role for women in future political institutions established by the peace agreements.
Third, the South Somali women’s demand to be included in the Somali negotiations mediated by the Kenya government (2002–5) show that participation was important for women to secure gains made in previous negotiations. The Somali women wanted to protect gains they made at the Arta (Djibouti) negotiations mediated by the Djibouti government in 2000 and secure more commitments to women’s participation in political leadership. Fourth, participation also gave women the chance to gain official recognition as peacemakers at the national level. In Chapter 6 I showed how the women saw their collective action to end war as an opportunity to gain public recognition as agents of peace. The outcomes show that public recognition did not necessarily mean official recognition. The campaign to participate in formal negotiations thus provided an occasion for official recognition of their contribution to peace. As the Somali women claimed, participation gave women a chance to create a new and enhanced role in politics (Tongeren, et. al. 2005, 119). For Burundi and Liberian women peace activists, direct participation meant breaking or correcting the practice of exclusion and marginalization of women and a chance to raise women’s consciousness of their role in reconstructing the lives and livelihoods of all (Burke, et. al. 2001, 5, 13; Anderlini 2000, 36).

This was the first time the women peace activists interacted directly with the formal negotiation process. The idea of women participating in formal peace processes was new and so for the women peace activists involved, the campaign was an opportunity to inaugurate a new role for women as active participants in decisions about future political institutions and the reconstruction of the country. In Chapter 6, I show that women’s self-constitution as credible peacemakers was premised on the view of women as natural peacemakers and as cultural brokers, by way of marriage, connecting different families, clans or ethnic groups. Like the Burundi women who saw their participation in negotiation as an opportunity to hold the society
together, women peace activists applied these same culturally premised self-definitions to justify their demand for participation in formal negotiations (Burke et. al. 2001, 5). Yet, they also drew on the emerging international discourse on women and peace building to frame their participation in negotiations as women’s right to participate in all areas of political life on equal basis with men. As with the campaign to end war, women framed their peacemaker identity in terms of sociocultural and international policy views of them as social actors. However, international policy discourse on women in peace processes played a greater role in framing justifications for their participation in formal negotiations. This may have to do with the fact that formal negotiations, except for those in Somaliland, were convened at the international level, involved international actors and drew on international intervention policy.

7.1.3 Diffusion of the Shared Story among Women. The generation and diffusion of the shared story about women’s participation in negotiations occurred as part of their efforts to end war. Women used the same organizational bases to mobilize and sustain support of other women for their participation. In Liberia, Burundi, and north Somalia (Somaliland) the same women who initiated the campaigns for peace at the national also initiated the campaign for participation in negotiation. In Sudan new groups of women became initiators. Also campaign initiators faced the same ethnic, religious, and political divisions similar to what they encountered when building support for the campaign to end war. However, evidence from accounts of women’s campaign for negotiations in Burundi, Sudan, and South Somali shows that these divisions became more pronounced in the campaign to participate in negotiations. Women’s demands for participation raised the question of whether they should participate as an autonomous group or through party affiliation. This question touches on the political identity women preferred as the basis of their participation in negotiations. Also unlike the broader campaign for peace, few women could
participate in negotiations because of the way these are structured. They had to agree on who would represent them and whether they represented the diverse backgrounds of women in society. Competition emerged, also, in the process of developing a common agenda. Political party interests, clan leaders’ attempts to undermine women’s campaign and religious, ethnic and political divisions existing in society posed a challenge to addressing these three questions.

This competition played out in different ways. In Burundi, the campaign for participation was led by the group of 7 women who also were responsible for initiating the broader campaign for peace. Competition emerged when the 7 women who spearheaded the campaign for peace went to the negotiation venue, uninvited, and sought the support of the mediator, Mwalimu Nyerere, for women’s participation in negotiations. Despite his intervention on their behalf, the heads of delegations rejected the women’s participation as an autonomous group and suggested that the women do so as members of political parties, civil society and the church as provided by the rules of participation. The Burundi 7 were unable to rally strong enough domestic support of women for a change in the rules to allow autonomous participation. They faced resistance from women aligned with the parties’ position, and from women who feared directly confronting male politicians. The second competition was over building support for a common agenda and finding a way to have this agenda incorporated in the negotiations agenda and agreement. The Burundi 7 did this through meetings with women inside the country, where they reported back on the negotiation process and planned what to do next (Klot et. al. 2001, 28). Accounts do not mention competition with women they reported back to in the city and countryside. However, the Burundi women peace activists lacked strong support of women members of political parties because the latter were not united on issues of common concern to women. The turning point in efforts to build a common agenda came through the collaborative brokerage of the UNIFEM and Mwalimu
Nyerere Foundation, the mediating agent in the Burundi talks. They convened the All Party Burundi Women’s Peace Conference in July 2000, the first time women from different parties met together with the Burundi 7 women, women representing refugees, diaspora, professions and civil society to discuss a common agenda. At this meeting, women addressed issues of concern to them in the draft peace agreement and made recommendations that were incorporated in the final agreement. The meeting relied on the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 1995 UN Women Conference Beijing Platform of Action to guide discussions and recommendations.

Strong political party positions fueled competition between women in the north and south Sudan and prevented them from building a strong national women’s constituency for peace that women could use to leverage their demand for participation in the negotiations. As a result, women’s peace campaigns were fragmented within and between the north and south. The Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum and Nairobi intervened in 1997 through the launch of the Sudanese Women’s Initiative (also referred to as the Dutch Initiative). Through this national level series of encounters, held between 1997 and 2000, the Netherlands Embassy connected Northern and Southern women from all political groups in the conflict to build a common vision for peace (El-Amin 1999, 35). The women formed working committees of members drawn from different parties in the civil war and women’s organizations. The committees were tasked with generating a local understanding of the conflict and women’s possible contribution to peacemaking through meetings with constituents and male leaders. At the same time women members of the Initiative received training in conflict resolution facilitated by the ACCORD. This included a study tour of the Parliament and civil society organizations in South Africa (Kamil 2000, 23-24; ACCORD 2007, 26). The external brokerage of the Netherlands embassy
was crucial in eliciting widespread support for a shared story of the Sudanese women’s participation by guiding women through its interpretation and grounding it in local understandings of constituents, through what was expected of participants in negotiations (conflict resolution skills) and in future political institutions (leadership skills). The aim was to move away from issues that divided them to focusing those common to them as women. Yet, the process was not without its difficulties. Two participants in the process observed that bringing women together was very hard because of the complexity of issues involving strong political actors: members of government, political opposition (NDA, SPLM/A and Nuba mountain groups), and civil society organizations). The women “were all aggressive and quarreling,” they “shouted and screamed at each other” even though they proposed the inclusion of women in the negotiations between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A (O mang and Darvich-Kodjouri 2007 9; Majteny 2003).

The Somali women overcame clan differences at the the Somali National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti (March–October 2000) and united under an autonomous group, the Sixth clan, to leverage their voting power in the negotiations. However, the Sixth clan coalition seems to have demobilized after the Arta talks. In later talks, South Somali women mobilized under separate initiatives to build a common agenda and participate in the next Somali Reconciliation Conference convened in October 2002 by the IGAD and mediated by the Kenya government. The Save Somali Women and Children, one of the groups that formed the Sixth clan, organized a workshop in August 2002, facilitated by the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa to develop a common agenda and build the kind of momentum that resulted in the Sixth clan coalition at the 2000 Arta conference in Djibouti. Another women’s organization that was part of the Sixth clan, IIDA convened a separate meeting of women representatives from five regions in
South Somalia to prepare a common platform for action. The meeting was supported by the United Nations (Timmons 2004, 16). These separate yet similar initiatives show that women peace activists were unable to sustain the Sixth clan coalition and leverage their influences at the Kenyan talks as they did in Arta 2000. In sum, competition among women over the forging of an agenda and the nature of their representation at the talks resulted in the external brokerage of a common agenda by international allies. This allowed some unity among women, despite the different divisions, and some leverage to pursue their campaign for participation.

The campaigns to participate in negotiations were part of women’s broader national campaigns to end war through dialogue. Consequently, women used the same vehicles for coordinating the campaign against war to coordinate collective action aimed at mediating agents, conflicting parties and regional and international actors supporting the negotiation process. They also used new vehicles created to coordinate activities at the regional level, like the Liberian women’s use of the MARWOPENT and Women in Peace Building Network during the second civil war. They relied on external brokers such as UNIFEM and the Dutch Embassy in Sudan for assistance with this coordination.

7.1.4. Uninvited Guests at the Table: Collective Demands for Participation. Civil society participation in formal negotiations depended on the openness of rules providing for who participates. These varied from the mediator’s provision for participation of civil society organizations in the negotiations that the women in Burundi, Sudan, South Somalia and Liberia (second civil war) targeted to mediator exclusion of civil society organizations as participants in the negotiations that ended the First Liberian war and the northern Somali Reconciliation conferences. I examine the negotiation structure of opportunity in Chapter 4. The point I want to emphasize here is that although civil society organizations could participate in some of the
negotiations, no provision was made for the participation of women as an autonomous group alongside conflicting parties and other civil society organizations. Women could participate as members of civil society organizations or as members of political parties. Furthermore civil society organizations had observer status. This allowed them to attend plenary sessions and listen to deliberation. They had no right to vote nor contribute to deliberations.

Women campaigned for official recognition as delegates with full participation, voting rights and as an autonomous group. Like the Liberian and Burundian women, autonomy allowed them to be neutral and not supporters of either side of the war. They began with requests for their inclusion in the negotiations like the Liberian Women’s Initiative peace activists who wrote to the ECOWAS seeking invitations to the Accra Clarifications Talks in December 1994. They sought the support of influential negotiating parties, regional heads of state, and international allies who advocated on their behalf. The women’s campaigns in Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, and South Somalia show this use of influential domestic and external stakeholders as advocates of their inclusion in the negotiations. The Burundi 7 approached President Buyoya and requested his support for the inclusion of women in the ongoing Arusha negotiations. He in turn consulted with the FRODEBU leadership and the government and FRODEBU agreed to appoint three women each to attend the negotiations as observers. Also, through interpersonal networks the Burundi women approached Dr. Specioza Kazibwe, then Vice President of Uganda and also the President of the OAU Women’s Committee on Peace, and the Minister of Gender Affairs in Rwanda. They communicate their concerns with adverse effects of the economic embargo on the population and requested the support of the two senior political leaders in lobbying for its removal and for the participation of Burundi women in the Arusha negotiations. The Ugandan Vice-President convened a peace conference, in Kampala, sponsored by the OAU Women’s
Committee on Peace. This conference provided the occasion for the women to meet with President Museveni whom they asked to lift the economic sanctions and also intervene on their behalf regarding their inclusion in the talks. By accepting to communicate the women’s demands to the facilitator of the Arusha negotiations, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, President Yoweri Museveni acted as their advocate. The conference is an example of the use of strategic scheduling of meetings by external brokers to facilitate an audience with influential political actors (Interview, August 2010).

Women invited themselves to the talks, since they were not recognized as delegates. Having arrived at the negotiation venue by imposition, women proceeded to coordinate action there. They sought audience with regional heads of state, international actors supporting the negotiations and with mediating agents so as to make their case for participation and the incorporation of their concerns in the negotiation agenda and protocols of the agreement. When the ECOWAS did not respond to the Liberian Women’s Initiative request to be invited to the Accra Clarification Conference (December, 1994), the organization mobilized funds from local benefactors, purchased tickets and sent six women to the conference. Once they arrived the women lobbied factional ECOWAS, factional leaders and international actors to give them a hearing at the talks. At the Abuja summit (May 1995), the women sent three women and requested to be placed on the agenda. Their request was denied by the ECOWAS secretariat. Through interpersonal networks they met with the ECOWAS secretary, the President of Gambia, the special assistant to President Rawlings, Nigerian Ambassador to Liberia, and the Nigerian Foreign Minister to plead for an opportunity to present their views at the assembly (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 68, 76). Somali women in Somaliland petitioned the committee convening the Boroma conference to include their participation. When clans excluded
South Somali women from their official delegations to the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (Arta, May 2000), the women activists approached Djibouti President Omer Guelleh, who was the mediating agent and persuaded him to secure a position for them at the talks (Jama 2010, 64).

Women diffused their demands through the media and through joint coordination of action with international organizations keen to support the inclusion of women in the negotiation process. When representatives of the Liberian Women Initiative realized that delegates and the mediating agent were unwilling to give them a hearing at the Accra talks (1994), one of the women used her personal and professional network of media colleagues to access the Ghanian media and international press. They deployed the media to publicize their concerns and exclusion from the talks. The ECOWAS granted the women temporary observer status as a result of the international publicity (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 24). Somali women established a Women’s Resource Center at the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, Mbagathi Kenya (2002-2004) with the support of the IGAD and the UNIFEM. The Center served as a working area for women delegates and a communication hub. The UNIFEM provided two support staff, electronic equipment, and internet services. Through email, women reported to Somalis at home and in the diaspora on the negotiations. They also used the centre to research, access negotiation documents, conduct research, and hold their own meetings. Political leaders also used the centre for informal negotiations with women and among themselves (IGAD 2005, 34–36).

Women partnered with African nongovernmental organizations like Femmes Africa Solidarité (FAS), international organization agencies like the United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM), and subregional organizations the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) Women’s Desk. Through the external brokerage of the Femme Africa Solidarité (FAS), Burundi women met with Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, the facilitator of the Arusha talks. He in turn convened a meeting with leaders of the political parties’ delegations to talks where the women presented their case for participation. From then on, he persuaded the negotiating parties to include women in the talks despite the political parties’ refusal and so acted as an advocate of the women’s cause. The Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa, an African peace resource NGO brokered the Sixth Clan including the Save Somali Women and Children and the Kenyan mediating agent by requesting that the mediator include women in the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (2002–5), presenting their case for official recognition and endorsing the organization’s demand for the incorporation of women’s issues in the agreement.5 The UNIFEM and IGAD women’s desk also advocated for the inclusion of Sudanese women in the Naivasha talks.

Women used their own strategies and appropriated those developed by external allies to demand that negotiating parties and mediating agents incorporate their concerns in the negotiation protocol. Like the Somaliland women at the Boroma conference and the Liberia Women Initiative at the Abuja talks (1995), the women petitioned for space on the agenda to present their views to delegates at negotiations. They lobbied delegates individually at the conference venue and distributed statements expressing their position and recommendations like the Burundi women, South Sudan women, and the Liberian Women Initiative. South Somali women delegates to the Somali National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti (2000) borrowed and improvised on the clan identity when they organized as the Sixth clan coalition. In the

5 NPI-A letter to the Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee, 28 February 2003, seeking observer status for the 12 women members of the Save Somali Women and Children (SSWC) organization.
absence of a central government, clans (community level units) served as the basis for participation in the negotiations (Abdullah 2007, 73). Women realized that they could exercise greater influence if they united their efforts and voted as a bloc and not from within their clans. In this way, women leveraged their numbers, autonomy and unity to pressure male delegates to work towards peace and include women’s concerns in the discussions and agreements. One of the demands women made was for a 10% women’s quota in the future Transitional National Assembly. According to one account of the South Somali women’s campaign (Abdullah 2007, 27), they deployed religious traditions supportive of women by arguing for their right to political participation from within Islam, kept to Islamic codes of conduct and dress and allied with intellectual groups, other civil society activists and the Al-Islah, a moderate Islamic movement that had strong influence at the Arta talks (IGAD 2005, 29). Women used the emotional power of *buraanbur* (traditional poetry) expressing the suffering women and children experienced from war to get male delegates to pay serious attention to negotiating peace (Dyck 2003, 17; Timmons 2004, 18; Tongeren, et. al. 2005, 119).

Most accounts of the campaigns show that women leveraged their partnership with external allies gave them to get their demands incorporated in the negotiations discussions and agreement. The Burundi campaign illustrates the important role of external brokerage in enhancing women’s advantage by giving greater weight to their demands and helping them work with the constraints negotiation rules placed on their participation. In their account of the women’s peace campaign, Klot, Burke, and Bunting (2001, 16) refer to the use of strategic scheduling of meetings by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and the UNIFEM. Some of these, like the All Party Women’s Conference mentioned earlier, served the double purpose of building support among women divided along ethnic and political party interests and of persuading the
delegates to incorporate women’s concerns into the negotiation agenda and agreement. Strategic scheduling of meetings involved convening meetings ahead of key negotiation committee meetings. These pre-negotiation meetings addressed women’s concerns regarding their participation, negotiation agenda and final agreement. They were aimed at the 19 delegations of the negotiating parties. Discussion of these concerns fed into the actual negotiation committee meetings and so influenced the incorporation of gender concerns in the agreement.

At one such meeting, a high level briefing on how women’s rights could be incorporated into the formal accord (June, 2000), women experts from Eritrea, Guatemala, South Africa and Uganda briefed the heads of the 19 delegations, facilitation team, envoys of international and regional organizations, donor agencies, and countries with special ties to Burundi. These women experts drew on their experience of political participation in countries emerging from violent conflict. This briefing took place before the establishment of Committee V on Guarantees on Implementation of Agreements Emanating from the Peace Negotiations and before the Committee II on Democracy and Governance made final amendments. The Committee IV on Reconstruction and Development also held gender sensitive workshops that were open to the participation of the Burundi women peace activists. At a third meeting, the All-Party Women’s conference (July 2000), women representatives from political parties, refugee communities, diaspora, professions, civil society, and women’s peace campaigns discussed gender issues in the protocols of the peace accords. They used the Convention on Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action (1995) to guide their recommendations. Finally, the MNF and UNIFEM facilitated closed door sessions with the mediator, former South African President Nelson Mandela where women presented their recommendations for a gender sensitive peace accord.
The UNIFEM and IGAD Women’s desk also made strategic use of meetings that helped South Somali women have their demands included in the final agreement of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference (2002–4). One such meeting, a Consultative meeting supported by UNIFEM, reviewed the progress made by women from opposing sides of the conflict had made (IGAD 2005, 32). The IGAD Women’s Desk, UNIFEM, and UNDP also organized a workshop to review draft reports produced by the technical committees (IGAD News March-April 2003, 6). Strategic meetings, such as those convened by UNIFEM and MNF in Burundi and by UNIFEM and FAS for the Somali women delegates, helped women assess whether their demands were being incorporated in the agenda, agree on action required to get neglected demands adopted and make recommendations for changes in the drafted documents that reflected women’s concerns. Strategic meetings were also learning opportunities for women delegates who were engaging for the very first time with a political process of this kind. In the Burundi and South Somali meetings experts addressed women on topics addressed in the committee sessions, such as federalism, disarmament, and demobilization, women’s role in conflict resolution and reconciliation and proposals for a women’s quota in parliament and regional government positions (IGAD 2005, 31). These presentations help them understand what was involved and expected of them as delegates. Women also learned about international policy documents on women’s rights and women and peace that they used to frame their demands for inclusion and also for a gender sensitive agenda.

In conclusion, women mobilized support for their demands through use of interpersonal networks at the national, subregional, and regional level and the external brokerage of international allies. The interpersonal networks and external brokerage allowed them direct interaction with mediating agents, conflicting parties and international actors. The external
brokerage also made it possible for women to produce a common agenda despite the difficulties of overcoming political and other differences. They also relied on local and international media to diffuse their demands for participation, for the inclusion of their concerns in the negotiation and to express dissatisfaction with their exclusion by mediating agents, their position on the war and recommendations. The attention this drew put pressure on the mediating agent to include them in the process as in Liberia or in the post-implementation process like in the Sudan.

7.2 Religious Leaders’ Participation in the Negotiations

In the previous chapter I showed how the Contact Group (Mozambique), Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (Liberia), Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, and the New Sudan Council of Churches established contact with fighting groups to persuade them to negotiate an end to war and later initiated face-to-face talks. These initiatives opened the way for formal negotiations between the parties in Mozambique, Liberia, and South Sudan, and the resumption of talks that had failed like in Sierra Leone. Campaign accounts and reports show the religious leaders’ participation in formal negotiations came by way of the credibility they had gained brokering communication between disputing parties. The Contact Group’s brokering of FRELIMO government and RENAMO agreement to talk led to Archbishop Gonçalves’ participation in the mediation team at the Rome talks. The ECOWAS Standing Committee on Mediation called on the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee of Liberia to participate in formal negotiations it convened for the Liberian armed groups. The ECOWAS and UN also requested the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone to participate in the Lome talks. Conflicting parties developed trust in religious leaders and saw them as nonpartisan. Also, international actors convening the mediations, like the ECOWAS, invited them to participate in the formal negotiations because of their brokerage skills.
Participating in formal negotiations allowed religious leaders to be credible agents of peace within the official process by engaging directly with the armed groups and persuading them to commit to the process. Religious leaders’ participation at the talks did not vary much. Except for Archbishop Gonçalves who participated as a mediator in the Mozambican talks, the religious leaders continued with their brokerage role within the negotiations to end war in Mozambique, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. In the north-south Sudan talks, the religious leaders had an observer status with no voting rights. Mediating agents relied on them to break deadlocks by pressuring parties to return to the table and continue with the talks. For example, when the RENAMO leader Alphonse Dhlakama refused to continue negotiations with the FRELIMO government, the Churches’ Contact Group travelled to Nairobi (March 1992) to persuade him to return to the talks. During the meeting with him, they pointed out the need to show mercy to the Mozambican people who were suffering from the drought and famine affecting country at the time (Sengulane and Gonçalves 1998, 28–33). They also rallied the support of influential heads of state in the region, to pressure parties to continue with negotiations they had abandoned. Also, the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone brokered communication between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Charles Taylor (who supported the RUF), and the President of Guinea Conakry (PR Newsire [New York], 15 April 1999) with the aim of persuading the leaders of the two countries to resolve their differences and move the Sierra Leone peace process forward. At the end of a meeting with Charles Taylor, where RUF representatives were present, he expressed to the religious leaders his commitment to helping find a solution to the war in Sierra Leone (Sierra Leone News, 16 and 17 April 1999).
Participation in formal negotiations did not prevent the religious leaders from making public calls for peace. They continued issuing statements, appeals for peace and pastoral letters commenting on the progress of the negotiations. Although religious leaders were careful to remain nonpartisan and avoid making statements that would jeopardize the negotiations, some like the late Archbishop Michael Francis expressed their criticism publicly. Woods observes that during the Cotonou negotiations, the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (IFMC) disagreed sharply with the direction of the negotiations (August-September 1994). The Roman Catholic Archbishop Michael Francis, in particular, argued that the Cotonou agreement was an “appeasement” because it “rewarded crime, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle of violence, and rendering genuine national reconciliation difficult, if not impossible.” The Bishop opposed it on “legal, moral and religious grounds” (Woods 1996, 29–30). This did not endear him to the armed groups and he was a target of their intimidation. Nevertheless, the religious leaders’ overall concern was for a process that included all parties to the conflict and an agenda and agreement that reflected the needs of the suffering population, especially the respect for their human rights.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter focused on a particular phase of the women and religious leaders’ campaigns to end war—their direct engagement with formal talks as participants. I sought to account for why and how religious leaders and women’s networks mobilized to participate in the negotiations. However, my account focuses on the women’s campaigns to participate in the negotiations. Unlike the women, religious leaders’ participated in formal negotiations largely by invitation and because of the credibility gained as communication brokers. Women, on the other hand, were uninvited and had to mobilize collectively to gain entry. Thus my account of the
campaign to engage directly with formal negotiations focuses on the women’s campaigns and briefly mentions religious leaders’ path to engaging directly with the formal negotiations.

In answer to why women mobilized to directly engage with the formal negotiations, I initially argued that: a) they wanted an inclusive peace agreement, b) they wanted to ensure conflicting parties committed to ending the war, and c) in some instances, women seem to promote the agenda of conflicting parties they affiliated with. Similar to what I did in my account of the campaign to end war in Chapters 5 and 6, I proposed a sketch of the process leading to the choice to engage directly with formal negotiations, beginning with the key moments that compel women to consider their participation in formal negotiations. As for how the women collectively acted to engage directly with the formal negotiations, I argued that they did so by scaling their coordination of action to the regional and international arenas where the formal negotiations occurred. Also, they down-scaled action at the regional and international levels to the national level through report-back activities aimed at women and the public.

According to the evidence, frustration with the conflicting parties’ refusal to compromise and to commit to implementing peace accords, and continued violence and insensitivity to the suffering endured by the population compelled the religious leaders and women groups to engage directly with the negotiations. However, three main factors led to the women’s reconsideration of the nature of their engagement with formal negotiations. First, the conflicting parties lack of credible commitment to negotiating an end to war and to implementing the accords ensured continued threats to their physical integrity, such as sexual abuse, and to their economic and welfare activities. Second, women saw in the conflicting parties’ and mediating agents’ apparent lack of concern for their issues, especially their abuse by combatants and their economic deprivation, the need to present their own concerns instead of depending on male
delegates to do so. Third, women saw in the increasing international discourse on women’s empowerment in political decision-making processes a justification for their full participation in formal negotiations. Thus, women saw participation as crucial to ensuring their concerns received the serious attention they deserved from conflicting parties and the mediating agents. They also saw in participation an opportunity to be gain official recognition as peacemakers and so participate in political decision-making on equal terms with male delegates. The women framed their participation role in terms of women’s right to participate in political decision making processes. To break through cultural constraints excluding their participation on gender identity, they appealed to failure of male leaders to fulfill cultural obligations of protecting women, children, and elderly. In pursuing official recognition, women sought to change thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and the public on who participates in decisions regarding the termination of war and on what issues inform the final settlement. Like in the campaign to end war, the women saw their participation as an opportunity to gain recognition as key political actors in the democratization process.

Evidence shows that women mobilized to gain entry into the negotiations by diffusing their alternative theory of inclusive participation in formal negotiations to elicit support of other women, conflicting parties, mediating agents, and regional actors with a stake in the conflict. In reconstructing the diffusion of this story I showed that across the women’s campaigns this occurred mainly through encounters and conversations, the media, brokerage of external actors, and upscaling of coordination as the main mechanisms. The construction of the women’s alternative theory of participation—the gender agenda—built on their alternative theory of war and its resolution and extended it to include the need for women’s representation and equal participation, incorporation of women’s concerns in the negotiation agenda and their rights in
future political institutions including a new constitution. Even though campaign activists built on the support base comprising women’s organizations operating at the grassroots level, the nature of encounters and conversations seemed to limit participation to elite women given that they took place in capital cities, international venues not accessible to nonelite women, and involved deliberations with participants such as international experts that nonelite women would find easy to participate in. This contrasts with the campaigns to end war where processes of forging an alternative theory seemed open to the participation of ordinary women as demonstrated in the WIPNET–Liberia mass campaign for peace and the Somali women’s peace movement.

Also in contrast to the campaign to end war, external brokers played a prominent role in composing the gender agenda. Accounts of meetings to develop the gender agenda are few. However those describing the processes in Burundi, South Somalia, and Sudan peace campaigns show that ethnic divisions, political party interests and fear of breaching cultural requirements informed the competition over the formulation of the gender agenda thus making it difficult to build on women’s shared experience of the war. In these particular campaigns, external brokers also took on the role of facilitating the composition of the alternative theory of inclusive participation by shifting the basis of the gender agenda from subjective experience of war to the objective norms of international women’s rights that applied to all regardless of race, class, and identity.

Although encounters and conversations women had with their support base, conflicting parties, mediating agents and influential regional actors are main diffusion mechanisms, the brokerage of external allies and advocates was crucial to securing adoption of some of the women’s concerns in the final accords, some form of participation in the negotiations and in future political institutions created by the accords. External brokers achieved this through
strategic scheduling of meetings to influence deliberations on the protocols of the accord and also through lobbying mediating agents to allow for participation of women. This indicates the encounters and conversations initiated by women campaign initiators were not sufficient on their own. It was necessary for external brokerage to elicit support for the women’s alternative theory of participation from mediating agents and conflicting parties.

Women’s diffusion of the shared story at regional and international venues of the formal negotiations scaled coordination of their campaign for peace from the national level up to the transnational level. Their report back activities down-scaled action at the regional to level to the national one. Upscaling the coordination of activities to the regional and international level remained a challenge for women who had few if any resources to do so. Again the brokerage of international allies like the Femmes Africa Solidarité and UNIFEM was crucial in mobilizing the required resources for travel to the international venues of formal negotiations. The use of media to diffuse the shared story varies across campaigns. The women made greater use of print and electronic media (radio and television) to publish demands for their inclusive participation and communicate the women’s gender agenda. However, the evidence shows an ad hoc instead of strategic use of the media to diffuse their story to the general public. In only one case, the South Somali women’s participation in the Mbagathi (Kenya) negotiations (2003), did women make use of internet service to communicate progress on developments at the talks to the public in Somalia. The Burundi women relied on encounters and conversations with women in the countryside to report back developments at the talks.

Similar to the campaign to end war, the evidence I used to make my arguments varies in detailed descriptions of the processes leading to women’s mobilization to participate in the formal negotiations. However, the women’s campaigns show that civic groups will mobilize to
participate in formal negotiations when these fail to create the conditions the people require for survival, i.e., recover their livelihoods and lead a normal life. Specifically when conflicting parties refuse to compromise and to demonstrate credible commitment to implementing negotiated settlements by ending violence and restoring order, and instead pursue their own power interests to the exclusion of socioeconomic concerns of the population, civic groups will collectively act for a change in thinking and behavior of conflicting parties and mediating agents, and in the conduct of the negotiations. In answer to how civic groups mobilize to engage directly with the formal negotiations, the women’s campaigns show that they will do so by proposing an alternative understanding that expands on who participates in the negotiations and on the terms of the negotiation by demanding an inclusive agenda and participation. They will depend on imposition, lobbying, the media, and the strategic use of encounters and conversations in which the external brokerage of influential international allies plays a key role. Unlike the campaign to end war, creative appropriation and improvisation of cultural identity is prominent in one case—the Somali women’s campaigns.

The religious leaders’ path shows that in some instances, civic group engagement may come by way of credibility gained through previous communication brokerage roles and success in getting conflicting parties to the negotiating table. Thus, collective mobilization to participate in formal negotiations is not the only way that civic groups may engage with negotiations directly. Similar to the campaigns for peace, the women’s campaign to participate in formal negotiations did not alter the thinking and behavior of conflicting parties. The conflicting parties resisted women’s direct engagement as autonomous actors with the right to make decisions. Negotiating parties sought to exclude women or at best limit their participation to affiliation with political parties, civil society organizations, or within cultural constraints. Nevertheless, through
the influence of external allies, conflicting parties agreed to include gender formulations in some
of the peace accords.

The women’s mobilization to participate in formal negotiations and the religious leaders
involvement in formal negotiations shows that civic groups were not frustrated with the formal
negotiations per se but with the failure of conflicting parties to compromise, commit to ending
war and work together to implement negotiated settlements. This frustration indicates civic
groups’ lack of trust in the capacity of conflicting parties to represent them as leaders, to go
beyond their own interests and address those of the suffering population. It also indicates their
concern with offering an alternative way of negotiating and implementing accords to the highly
polarized, uncompromising, and intransigent one conflicting parties pursued. The women used
the social power I described in Chapter 5, to access formal negotiations that are largely exclusive
and male dominated, especially since they had neither the political and economic power to
fundamentally change the rules of the game. At this level, they faced strong resistance from
conflicting parties who were suspicious of protecting their chances of gaining power.
Chapter 8. CONCLUSION

This study examined an aspect of peace activism by noncombatant groups: social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. The study focused on religious leader- and women-led networks. A number of these groups collectively acted to end war in Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. Some went further and pursued their peace objectives in formal negotiations despite politically adverse conditions. They faced the possibility of being seen as political threats to incumbent governments and armed groups determined to pursue a military option. Compared to conflicting parties, they did not have the military or political leverage to alter the situation for peace. The study sought to find out what about the context and conditions made it possible for them to pursue their peace objectives at negotiations. What specific conditions in the broader political context and among the civic groups accounts for this? How did the civic groups go about engaging with the formal negotiations?

In answer to these questions, two arguments were made. First, certain opportunities existed within the risky political conditions of war and in the formal negotiation processes that civic groups used to directly engage with the formal negotiations. These had to do with conditions related to social actors, such as humanitarian resources, that allowed them to play an important role locally and among affected populations. Other conditions are external to social actors, such as the international community’s frustration with spoiler strategies conflicting parties used to delay, derail, or abandon talks. These made it possible for social actors to act in support of advancing the negotiation process. Second, social actors’ understandings of the violent internal conflict as “suffering” and “not the voice of the people” motivated their demand for an end to war and its peaceful resolution. More importantly, the frustration ordinary people
felt at conflicting parties’ failure to end war—“people’s suffering”—led civic groups to pursue their objectives for peace by directly engaging with the formal negotiations. This argument focused attention on conditions in the broader political environment, conditions specific to the formal negotiation process and conditions specific to social actors’ experiences and understandings of war—that is, cognitive factors.

Peace movement studies do not fully address the question of social actors’ engagement with formal negotiations. However, they do suggest answers to what makes peace movements possible. These studies emphasized factors in the external environment that are favorable to peace action, such as liberal political systems, the free market economy, and Protestant Christianity, or factors that constrained peace movement actors, such as restrictive political conditions. Scholars also suggested factors to do with social actors, such as the unjust nature of wars. Similar to this study’s initial argument, the literature emphasized features of the domestic and international political environment and of social actors. They are close to the arguments that appear in political process theories regarding what makes peace action possible—political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and cultural frames.

Insights from the peace movement literature and the political process were useful for answering the “what” part of my question. However, they did not provide an adequate answer to the “how” part of the question. This focused attention on a process leading to social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. In other words, my argument focused on identifying what factors made engagement possible and suggests this engagement as a result of a process. This required conceptual tools that would allow for a reconstruction of the sequence of events linking the conditions to social actors’ engagement in formal negotiations. The dynamics of contention (DOC) framework, a political process model, provided the conceptual tools that helped achieve
this task. The overall interest in understanding social actors’ peace actions from their perspective and the study’s focus on what happened and how led to the use of a particularizing strategy of specific history. This allows for a reconstruction of events that account for what happened and also for how it happened using this specific inquiry’s intrinsic and extrinsic narrative analysis.

With regard to what happened to make social actors engage with formal negotiations, the findings can be summarized in the following argument: conflicting parties’ war strategies destabilized economic and social life, creating complex humanitarian crises. The population’s inability to cope with these conditions, and humanitarian actors’ inability to mitigate the humanitarian crises, leads them to reconsider their role. This results in a process of attribution, where civic groups “theorize” an alternative understanding of war as suffering and their role as peace agents. Social actors appropriate social resources—social bases, networks of kin, family and other personal relations, humanitarian resources, cultural and religious resources, international networks of influential contacts, international discourse favoring inclusion of women, and civil society actors in peace and other political processes— and use them to disseminate their alternative understandings of war to the public, conflicting parties, and international actors.

Social actors also create new vehicles to coordinate peace action in public sites and among conflicting parties. They engage in contentious interaction—communication brokerage, strategic use of meetings, lobbying, petitions, shaming strategies, emotional displays, prayers, and pastoral letters—targeting conflicting parties, members of the public, and international actors. The failure of conflicting parties to negotiate an end to war and restore order leads to their engagement with formal negotiations. The particular paths to engagement, however, differ across some cases. Religious leaders are invited to negotiations. Some are excluded. Some actors lobby
and demand to be included. Others pursue contentious interaction at negotiation venues aimed at shaming conflicting parties into negotiating an agreement. In other instances, mediating agents provide for the participation of civic groups. In conclusion, a combination of conditions having to do with structure and agency accounts for social actors’ engagement with negotiations. Their engagement points to an opening—the lack of moderate political leaders and a politically moderate space—that peace activists fill. However, their ability to act effectively depends on social resources they have and political agility in using these resources to engage in formal negotiations.

**Theoretical Contributions**

This study’s findings are particular to the specific actors and time period in which they operated. Nevertheless the findings highlight the following contributions to theory.

The study tests the DOC framework on a set of non-Western cases of peace activism.

The study contributes to an understanding of formal negotiations from the perspective of social actors.

The study raises two themes for further consideration. First, peacemaking needs to reconsider the question of legitimacy and not just focus on power and political representation concerns of conflicting parties. The problem is not just one of power or wealth sharing (political and economic power); it is also one of legitimacy (people’s consent to be ruled by conflicting parties). The legitimacy question turns on the degree of commitment conflicting parties or political leaders have in society. Second, it raises the question of creating and expanding a politically moderate space. The findings show that peace activists acted as political moderates in contexts where politics were dominated by political elites with extreme positions. Studies of peacemaking seem to neglect the challenge of expanding politically moderate spaces to counter
the dominance of an extremist political elite, yet moderates are crucial to altering the situation for peace. Local peacebuilding interventions are creating moderate spaces below. Creation of moderate spaces above needs to happen alongside these.

Studies of peacemaking in postcolonial Africa focus on the contributions made by external mediating agents. They ignore the difficult groundbreaking work by domestic actors that facilitates formal negotiations. This involves breaking the culture of silence and fear, mobilizing public opinion for an alternative peaceful end to war, developing constituencies for peace, and all this without a critical mass of politically moderate elites willing to do the same at the political level. This groundbreaking activity needs to be accounted for in mediation analyses.

**Policy and Practice Contributions**

The findings of this study show that:

Mediation interventions should be informed by social reality and not just the political and economic state of affairs. Concerns regarding political power and wealth sharing are important. Addressing them well leads to greater political stability and an environment conducive for long-term economic development. However, these should be balanced with social concerns resulting from war’s destructive consequences on people’s lives and livelihoods.

Mediation agents, their sponsors, or guarantors of the peace process should consider, seriously, the value domestic actors bring to the negotiation process instead of being preoccupied with the integrity of a process designed originally for interstate and not intrastate wars. Analysts of mediation and negotiations have recommended the need to redesign the process so that what it addresses and how it is consistent with social, political, and economic reality and closer to people’s aspirations for peace. A redesigned mediation process may need to include social actors as direct participants in some way. Unless negotiation agreements secure a lasting peace, social
actors are likely to make demands for inclusion. Mediators may have to draw on their knowledge and expertise.

Domestic peace activists and practitioners need to be prepared for the level of political sophistication required to engage directly with peace negotiations. This allows them to gain credibility and sustain action. Problems mediators face, for instance, stalling and delaying tactics and intransigence would best be addressed by politically astute domestic actors at this level.
### Appendix 1. PEACE CAMPAIGNS AND KEY ACTORS IN AFRICA: 1990-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace Campaigns</th>
<th>Key Actor(s) and Members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace and reconciliation in Mozambique</td>
<td>Mozambican Churches Task Force/Contact Group (<em>Commission on Peace and Reconciliation of the Mozambican Council of Churches, Catholic Episcopal Conference</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Liberia I</td>
<td>Inter-Faith Mediation Committee (<em>Roman Catholic Church, Liberian Council of Churches, National Moslem Council of Liberia</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Liberia II</td>
<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET); Women in Peace building Network–Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Northern Somalia (Somaliland)</td>
<td>Liberia Women’s Peace Initiative (<em>Various women’s organizations and individuals</em>)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Sierra Leone I</td>
<td>Women’s organizations and individuals in Somaliland</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Sierra Leone II</td>
<td>Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (<em>Protestant, Evangelical, Catholic and Muslim councils of churches</em>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Burundi</td>
<td>The <em>Collectif des Associations Féminines et ONG du Burundi</em> (CAFOB) and Group of Six Women leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in South Sudan</td>
<td>New Sudan Council of Churches (<em>Southern Sudanese Protestant and Evangelical Churches, Roman Catholic church</em>); Sudan Ecumenical Forum (<em>Sudan churches and their International Partners e.g., WCC, AACC, Caritas Network</em>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in South Somalia</td>
<td>Sudan Women’s Peace Initiative; Southern Women Group (<em>Sudan Women Voice for Peace, Sudanese Women Association</em>).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The campaign for peace in Liberia I</td>
<td>Save Somali Women and Children – Sixth Clan; IIDA; COGWO; Family Economy and Rehabilitation Organization (FERO);</td>
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## Appendix 2. FORMAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TARGETED BY THE NONCOMBATANT PEACE CAMPAIGNS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal Peace Negotiation</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Conflicting Parties</th>
<th>Mediator (s)</th>
<th>Engagement Type</th>
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<td>Formal Peace Negotiation</td>
<td>Duration</td>
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<td>Engagement Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola Peace Negotiations</td>
<td>1993–2002</td>
<td>MPLA government and UNITA</td>
<td>UN/UNAVEM</td>
<td>Support</td>
<td>Lusaka accords implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Somali Peace Negotiations</td>
<td>2000–2005</td>
<td>Transitional National Government, SRRC, armed groups, clan leaders, civil society groups, representatives of Somali diaspora</td>
<td>Djibouti and IGAD (technical committee: Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, later facilitation committee with members of all IGAD states represented) – Kiplagat.</td>
<td>Support and Participation</td>
<td>Arta, Djibouti and the Kenya (Eldoret, Nairobi) talks (14th round of talks, and 15th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 3. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEA</td>
<td>Associação de evangélicos de Angola (Angolan Evangelical Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFELL</td>
<td>Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia (AFELL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALSAA</td>
<td>Associação Lenoardo Sikufundo – Shalom – Angola association that advocates for peasants’ land rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJPD</td>
<td>Associação Justiça, Paz e Democracia Association for Justice, Peace and Democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Africa Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFOB</td>
<td>Collectif des Associations Féminines et ONG du Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Christian Council of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAST</td>
<td>Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé (Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CICA</td>
<td>Conselho de Igrejas Cristãs em Angola—Council of Christian Churches in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNDD</td>
<td>National Council for the Defence of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COGWO</td>
<td>Coalition for Grassroots Women Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIEPA</td>
<td>Comitê Inter-Eclesial para Paz em Angola (The Inter-Church Committee for Peace in Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWI</td>
<td>Christian Women’s Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECGLC</td>
<td>Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAA</td>
<td>Forças Armadas de Angolanas Armed Forces of Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAAT</td>
<td>Forum das autoridades tradicionais Forum for traditional authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Femmes Africa Solidarité</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDD</td>
<td>Forces for the Defence of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONGA</td>
<td>Forum das ONGs de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRODEBU</td>
<td>Front for Democracy in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FROLINA</td>
<td>Front for National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARP</td>
<td>Grupo Angolano de reflexão para a paz—Angolan Group for the Reflection of Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGNU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIDA</td>
<td>IIDA Women’s Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LWI</td>
<td>Liberia Women’s Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARWOPNET</td>
<td>Mano River Women’s Peace Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRU</td>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPRC</td>
<td>National Provisional Ruling Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALIPEHUTU</td>
<td>Party for the Liberation of Hutu People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHRN</td>
<td>Peace and Human Rights Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENAMO</td>
<td>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambique National Resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRA</td>
<td>Rahawein Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF/SL</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Alliance (Gadabursi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM - Mayo</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement (Digil/Rahanweyn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM-Aliyou</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement (Aliyou)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM - Noor</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement (Ogadeni)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM - Jess</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement (Jess)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front (Merjertein clan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSWC</td>
<td>Save Somali Women and Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front (Siad Barre - Marehan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement (Issaq)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNU</td>
<td>Somali National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWDA</td>
<td>Somaliland Women’s Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWO</td>
<td>Somaliland Women’s Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (Union for the Total Independence of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPRONA</td>
<td>Union Pour le Progrès National (Union for National Progress)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC - Aideed</td>
<td>United Somali Congress – Aideed faction (Hawiye/Habar Gidir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USC - Mahdi</td>
<td>United Somali Congress – Mahdi faction (Hawiye/Abgal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USF</td>
<td>United Somali Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USP</td>
<td>United Somali Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIPNET–Liberia</td>
<td>Women in Peace Building Network–Liberia</td>
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</table>
REFERENCE LIST


Kaldor, Mary. 24 February 2010. Reconceptualising War.


(September 28 2009).


http://praythedevilbacktohell.com


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