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Kemalism: A Revolutionary Ideology and its Islamist Opposition

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Kemalism: A Revolutionary Ideology and its Islamist Opposition

A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at Syracuse University

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Abstract

“Kemalism: A Revolutionary Ideology and its Islamist Opposition” seeks to define the Kemalist reform period as a revolutionary movement. During the 1920s and 1930s, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his authoritarian government undertook a series of sweeping social and political reforms. This paper seeks to establish these reforms and the underlying Kemalist ideology as a revolutionary ideology. Using a functionalist perspective, the essay illustrates the various crises that faced the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A number of reform efforts failed to effectively address the entirety of Ottoman societal ills.

The rise of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People’s Party can be explained through the use of the functionalist theoretical perspective which allows one to view Turkish governance and society as a system. The system remains in balance when the government provides the four functions of society: legitimacy, public welfare, private interests, and coercion. The Ottoman Empire failed to provide for each of these functions leading to disorder and chaos in society. The Charismatic Leadership Theory can be applied to Atatürk’s rise to political prominence at this particular juncture.

The years between 1923 and 1945 represented a period of single-party authoritarian rule under Atatürk and the Republican People’s Party (RPP). During this time the government initiated a series of sweeping social, cultural, and political reforms. Taken as a whole, these reforms represent a cultural revolution that dramatically altered Turkish society.

There have been three phases of Islamist counter-revolution in response to the Kemalist revolution. These phases are demonstrated by the rule of the Democrat Party (1950-1960), the Welfare Party (mid-1990s), and the current Justice and Development Party. Although each movement coalesced in a different historical context, there are some similarities between them including the creation of a populist ideology, emphasis on social justice, and the mobilization of discontented and marginalized citizens. By studying the Kemalist revolution and its opposition, scholars will not only be able to more clearly understand the historical trends of secularism and Islamism in Turkey, they may be able to more accurately predict future social and political changes in Turkey.
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Chapter 1

Functionalism and Revolutionary Theory

The Kemalist revolution was a cultural revolution that occurred in the early twentieth century. Revolutionary leader and first president of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk introduced a period of dramatic political, religious, social, and cultural reform. This revolutionary movement represents a significant part of the transition between the decline and failure of the Ottoman Empire through the establishment of the Turkish Republic and early attempts at democratization. However, before one can begin to analyze the causes, progression, and impacts of the Kemalist movement in early twentieth century Turkish society, it is obligatory to explore the various theoretical frameworks which attempt to explain the larger phenomenon of revolution. The field of stasiology seeks to examine sedition, instability, and uprising--key elements of revolution. Stasiology emphasizes four aspects of revolutionary theory. Taxonomy discusses the multiple classifications or types of revolutions that can occur including the origin of revolution and degree of violence of both government and opposition forces. Etiology considers the causes and characteristics of revolution. Morphology studies the progression of revolutionary phases and its general processes. Lastly, teleology discusses the possible consequences of revolution. It also strives to demonstrate relationships between revolutions and various outcomes like dictatorship, democracy, or
economic development. Consideration of each aspect of stasiology allows for a more complete discourse on the nature of revolutions and revolutionary movements. Despite its importance in the field of stasiology, teleology, or the relationship between revolutions and long-term consequences, will not be specifically addressed in this paper as the long-term consequences of the Kemalist Revolution have not yet been fully consolidated.

Taxonomy, or classification of revolutions, is critical in beginning to analyze revolutions. Revolutions are classified based on the scale of change and the origins of change. The scale of change begins with a change in personnel or a change in policies. These policies can include economic or social policies. In both of these cases, the ruling structure remains intact. A constitutional revolution represents a more significant political change. The term constitutional revolution most often refers to the transition from a monarchy to a republic. Constitutional revolutions may affect the structure of the ruling political regime but may fail to have a profound impact on the larger societal structure. Removal or replacement of the ruling group and the dominant class is a strong indicator of a social revolution in which the structure of society is altered. A change in the economic system includes a shift in the relations between the owners of the means of production and the workers. Karl Marx further developed the theories of economic revolution in his 1867 work *Das Kapital* (Cohan, 1975, p. 57). However, a cultural revolution represents the most extensive revolution. The development of a new psychology or ideology fosters the realization of the final aim of a cultural revolution.
The second category of revolutions is determined through the origin of change. Change may originate from elites or the masses. Change may also be achieved through either peaceful or violent means. Peaceful reforms coming from the elite, also referred to as revolutions from above, tend to be extremely nationalistic and focus primarily on state-building (Hagopian, 1974, p. 8). Their purpose is to approximate more developed nations. Successful peaceful elite revolutions replace the need for a revolution from below, or from the masses. However, unsuccessful revolutions will often be met with opposition from the masses and the landed aristocracy. In contrast, violent revolutions by elite groups result in a transfer of political power. Also known as coups, palace revolutions, or factional revolutions, violent revolutions from above are instigated by a part of the ruling elite (Hagopian, 1974, p. 6). They can be radical with far-reaching socio-economic and political consequences or more conservative consisting only of a simple change of personnel in the ruling class (Hagopian, 1974, p. 7).

Revolutions can also originate from the masses. Peaceful revolutions from below are generally referred to as color revolutions, flower revolutions, and civil society revolutions. Student groups and civil society organizations are generally the main actors in these cases. Objectives are achieved through negotiation rather than violence. Violent revolutions are further divided between vertical and horizontal revolutions. Vertical revolutions, or collapse model, take place within a sovereign state and lead to the fall of the entire political system. Political scientist Samuel Huntington describes civil war type revolutions or “Eastern Type” which are planned revolutions that begin on the peripheries of
society and eventually lead to the fall of the central government (Dix, 1983, p. 281). Pre-modern revolutions in the Middle East including the Mohammedan, Abbasid, and Wahhabi Revolutions are illustrative of the civil war type (Saunders, 1978, p. 95). Popular or “Western Type” revolutions are not planned and originate in the capital or large cities (Dix, 1983, p. 281). Horizontal revolutions, also referred to as succession type, precipitate the succession of part of an empire (Hagopian, 1974, p. 33). They can either be nationalist revolutions like the American Revolution or imported revolutions like those in Soviet Eastern Europe.

The study of etiology seeks to examine the main characteristics of causes of revolutions. Five characteristics are central in differentiating between revolutions and revolts, rebellions, coups, or uprisings. Revolutions are vastly more complex and take a much longer time to unfold than coups or rebellions. For example, the French Revolution extended from 1788 to 1799; the Russian Revolution took place between 1917 until Stalin’s death in 1953. Whole populations are mobilized during a revolution. It is nearly impossible to remain neutral in a revolutionary situation. Additionally, revolutions require a total transformation including various aspects of society, culture, ruling group, and governing system. In order to implement these dramatic political and societal changes, revolutionary groups introduce a grand political ideology or philosophy. The French Revolution was influenced by principles of the Enlightenment while the Russian Revolution was influenced by Marxist ideals. Revolutions generally also include the idea of an expansion or export of the revolution. This idea can be
manifested through policies of expansionism, imperialism, or general foreign war and conflict.

Etiology also seeks to classify causes of revolutionary movements. Scholars in the field debate the merits of numerous arguments including ultimate or distant and proximate or immediate causes. They discuss whether revolutionary influences are linear or cyclical and whether they can be measured through objective means or are completely subjective. They also weigh long term, necessary, and short term, sufficient, causes as fostering more revolutionary impetus. They also seek to establish revolutionary analogies. The Marxist argument of substructure and superstructure represents an architectural model in which the inherent structure of society makes revolution inevitable (Cohan, 1975, p. 67). The mechanical or mechanical systems model views society as working like a machine, requiring every part to function in order to ensure the performance of the whole. The organic model, instead, looks to living bodies as the model for political systems. Proper governance acts as circulating blood does in a body. Similarly, a balance of every element or force indicates health in bodies and governments,

The field of morphology studies the process of revolution. In his “Anatomy of Revolution,” Crane Brinton proposed the English, French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions as four cases of full revolution and the basis of revolution (Brinton, 1965). From these revolutions, Brinton asserted a four-step model of revolution. Liberals or moderates come to power early in a revolution. Moderates represent respectable opposition and are comprised of a group of
lawyers, teachers, artisans, and doctors. Moderates seek to mobilize the public for the purpose of political revolution but aim to deactivate public participation once goals are reached (Hagopian, 1974, p. 195). However, masses generally demand rapid change and more extensive social revolution. Liberal regimes are often caught between institutions like the army and courts and the institutions of a new regime, creating a situation of dual sovereignty and constant conflict (Hagopian, 1974, p. 197).

As revolutionary institutions come to gradually dominate old institutions, a new phase of rule by extremists begins. Extremists originate from the lower classes and represent the mass of people. During this phase, mass mobilization is accelerated while the ruling regime is ready to radicalize the masses of people (Hagopian, 1974, p. 201). Various aspects of social revolution are introduced including a public sector economy, rationing, and austerity. Full radicalization begins during the period known as the reign of terror (Hagopian, 1974, p. 200). The reign of terror marks an unprecedented degree of violence. Both supporters of the old and liberal regimes are eliminated. The use of the guillotine during the French Revolution marked the height of the reign of terror with between 18,000 and 40,000 people being killed in the span of one year. Oliver Cromwell’s massacres of the Irish and the Moscow Trials serve as other prominent examples of reign of terror (Hagopian, 1974, p. 201). Two theories attempt to explain the inevitable rise of a reign of terror during revolution. One proposes that it is a tool aiding in a calculated and rational approach to quelling and suppressing opposition. It can also help to ensure the establishment of a dictatorship
(Hagopian, 1974, p. 206). The second theory asserts that humans resort to baser and more animalistic tendencies during the process of revolution (Hagopian, 1974, p. 205). The reign of terror is also accompanied by a reign of virtue. The ruling regime introduces a new national psychology and ideology. The regime seeks to create a pious and sin free society based on the ideals of the revolution (Hagopian, 1974, p. 201).

After a period of rule through the reign of terror, a period of Thermidorian reaction begins in response to the various failures and inefficiencies of the extremist regime. Despite their ability to mobilize the masses through the national ideologies and propaganda, extremist regimes eventually prove unable to deliver on the grandiose promises made to the public during earlier stages of revolution. The public may also face revolutionary fatigue in which a society tires of political violence and economic hardship (Hagopian, 1974, p. 227). The French Revolution represents the most notable example of Thermidor in which a period of White Terror was begun, targeting the perpetrators of Robespierre’s Red Terror. This period represented a cleansing of extremists and radicals within the government and began a period of progressive normalization (Hagopian, 1974, p. 229). The Thermidorian period serves as the transitional period between revolution and the establishment of a stable government.

The analytical framework based on functionalism will be the most advantageous in considering the Kemalist revolution. Functionalism is based on the mechanical etiological approach. Compared to other analytical frameworks like Marxism, functionalism allows for consideration of more factors, resulting in
a broader interpretation (Cohan, 1975, p. 118). Chalmers Johnson was a particularly strong proponent of functionalism and systems theory (Cohan, 1975, p. 119). This analytical framework is dependent on an understanding of the principles of function and dysfunction. Systems are made up of multiple organs, each with its own purpose. The whole will function if all of the individual parts function. Similarly, a condition of health, balance, and equilibrium among all parts is a condition of homeostasis. Failure of the organs is dysfunction. One dysfunction leads to chaos while multiple dysfunctions lead to revolution (Cohan, 1975, p. 127).

Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell were two political scientists who first applied the theories of equilibrium and dysfunction to political systems. A political regime will be stable if it can sufficiently perform four essential functions. The first function is legitimation. Legitimation is the ability of a government to legitimize or validate its own rule in the eyes of the public (Cohan, 1975, p. 134). Traditional modes of legitimacy include monarchy, divinity, and gerontocracy. However, modern legitimacy rests more in constitutionalism, referenda, and popular consent. The legitimacy function aids in instilling obedience out of belief rather than fear. Legitimacy can be eroded through a number of means. The first is the introduction of a foreign ideology. Local groups may become unhappy or discontented when comparing their political system with that of other nations. A gap between official ideology and elite lifestyle and a gap between official ideology and public life may also serve to erode legitimacy.
The second function of a government is to provide for the public welfare. This includes providing for economic growth through capital accumulation, encouraging economic stability by preventing inflation and ensuring price stability. Government must also strive to provide full employment. Lastly, it must promote social justice. Social justice is measured by the Genie Index which analyzes the degree of economic inequalities within countries. While the government must provide for the general economic well being, it must also placate the interests of private individuals. Private interests have the ability to organize the upper classes and cause disunity and factionalism within the government while disorganizing lower classes. (Cohan, 1975, p. 135).

Coercion is the final function of governments. It constitutes the basic element of realists including Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Pareto. According to Pareto, “Politics is the use of force to maintain power” (Sözen, 2011). Coercion can be instrumental, structural, or ideological. In instrumental coercion, governments use weapons to suppress opposition (Dahl, 2000). The legal system is instrumental in enforcing structural coercion. In ideological coercion, the government creates a system of ideological indoctrination through propaganda, especially in the educational system. Those who are coerced do not believe that they are being influenced; they believe they are acting out of self-interest.

Robert Dahl further explores the idea of coercive function by describing the various levels of government compulsion. Governments use an official ideology to create a rational argument. They may also manipulate and distort facts and events to create a desired illusion. Regimes may introduce a policy of
inducement in which a system of rewards and punishment is implemented (Dahl, 2000). Coercive powers may collapse in a number of situations. Weakness in the government’s army may hinder effective use of force. Factionalism or division among the ruling elite can serve to slow coercion. Paramilitary forces may counter governmental force and can threaten the very existence of the ruling regime (Hagopian, 1974, p. 9). Failures in the use of power may also serve to erode coercive capabilities. Violent force may incite further opposition movements.

Functionalism will provide the strongest and most adaptable framework in which to analyze the Kemalist Revolution. It allows for the discussion of the numerous failures and deficiencies of the declining Ottoman Empire. These failures include gradual economic capitulation to foreign powers, substantial loss of imperial territory, and governmental and bureaucratic disorganization and inefficiency, among others. Functionalism also aids in explaining the rise of constitutionalist movements, military modernization, and the eventual rise of Mustafa Kemal as a charismatic leader and the head of the nationalist Young Turk movement in the face of corresponding political and social crises.
Chapter 2
Ottoman Reforms and Decline

In order to discuss the changes instituted during the Kemalist Revolution, it is important to briefly explore the history and structure of the Ottoman Empire up to that point. Mehmed the Conqueror laid siege to Constantinople, the capital of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire, in 1453. The conquest of the city cemented Ottoman naval and military preeminence in southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean. Acquisition of European territory continued as Suleiman the Magnificent pushed westward and acquired the Kingdom of Hungary. Other sultans established dominion within Egypt and other areas of the Middle East. At its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the empire stretched to contain much of southeastern Europe, western Asia, and North Africa. Ottoman conquests were not without defeat, however. Suleiman the Magnificent threatened Vienna and unsuccessfully besieged the city twice. The Spanish defeat of Ottoman forces at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 proved surprising. Gradually European nations advanced in the fields of science, technology, and military capabilities while the Ottomans were limited by religious and cultural conservatism (Quataert, 2005, p. 24). European powers would continue to advance and by the nineteenth century would eventually threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Empire was organized based on three overarching principles: militarism, dynastic succession, and Islam. Early nomadic tribes formed a centralized and highly autocratic government. As the empire expanded further into Christian Europe, the army became increasingly centralized. Christian rulers within Europe remained divided, providing a critical advantage to Ottoman armies and governance. Orthodox states, in particular, felt it more advantageous to be ruled by Ottoman Muslims than to be ruled by Christians from other sects. At the head of the army and government was the sultan who became almost a deified figure. The office of the sultanate was inherited through dynastic succession and thus maintained through one royal lineage. The sultan is considered to have held more power than a king because of his control of nearly every aspect of society, especially religion. The sultan was intended to be seen as God’s agent, placed on earth to obtain three goals. These goals included the preservation and expansion of Islam, the preservation and expansion of the sultan as the agent of Allah, as well as the assurance of justice and security for the sultan’s peoples. The sultan acted as a shepherd to his flock, the imperial subjects (Quataert, 2005, pp. 93-99). As the empire continued to expand, the imperial subjects not only included Muslims, but also Jews, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics.

The maintenance of empire requires the successful management of multi-religious and multiethnic diversity. No empire succeeded in organizing and managing minority populations as well as the Ottomans with the millet system (Barkey, 2008). The millet system effectively protected minority populations
while enriching the state and reaffirming state autonomy (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p. 18). The millet system ultimately failed when faced with new intellectual ideas exported from Europe and the French Revolution in particular.

The Ottoman millet system was one based on a mutually beneficial relationship between religious minorities and the sultanate. The millet system strove to achieve three main functions: to ensure the loyalty of the Christian community with valuable economic skills, to increase legitimacy and order, and to smoothly run administrative tasks through a regular flow of taxes. In exchange for allegiance to the sultan, demonstrated through various “non-believer taxes,” the Ottoman government allowed Jewish, Catholic, and Orthodox groups to practice their religion and customs with relative autonomy. Unlike in Christian Europe where Jews faced considerable persecution and were even expelled in 1492, the Ottoman Empire offered safety in return for allegiance to the Sultan and tax money. However, these groups were designated as second-class citizens and relegated to various economic and financial sectors unfavorable to Muslims. They were also distinguished publicly by different colored costumes assigned based on religious affiliation. The millet system and the management of ethnic and religious minorities would eventually come into question by European powers, Ottoman officials, and new political movements (Quataert, 2005, pp. 175-176).

By the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire faced a series of challenges. The empire was geographically over-extended with a ruling presence in the Middle East, including Syria and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the Saudi desert, and North African provinces including Libya and Egypt. The
empire’s reach also extended into Europe including the Balkans and the Caucasus regions. Similarly, the Ottoman Empire represented a sprawling pre-modern state. The government had difficulty in exerting central control over its vast territory. Compared to its geographical expanse, the size of the Ottoman bureaucracy was disproportionate. Between one thousand and fifteen hundred people served in a bureaucratic capacity (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). Furthermore, a lack of government centralization made collecting taxes difficult. The bureaucracy proved to be increasingly inefficient and impotent while provincial governments exploited local populations and shrank the imperial tax base. The Ottoman Empire was also significantly under-populated. Approximately twenty-five million people lived under Ottoman rule. However, eighty-five percent of those lived in the countryside (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). This distinct lack of urban population hindered economic and military advancement due to a shortage of manpower.

The empire also faced a significant weakening of the military capacity. Janissaries had once served as provincial hired militias. Janissary forces now proved to be both expensive and no longer trustworthy. Power was often abused as they held both the state and local populations subject to violent tactics. In the Timar system, military officials were granted land deeds from the Ottoman government when a new land was conquered. The new landholders were known as sipahis. The granting of land as a reward for military service ensured adequate compensation. It also helped to ensure loyalty in newly conquered areas (Quataert, 2005, p. 29). However, by the end of the eighteenth century, the
Ottoman army was unable to acquire new land and was instead hemorrhaging significant expanses of land through military defeat (Quataert, 2005, p. 44).

The Ottoman government held an increasingly weak position in international politics. Over the previous two centuries, European states surpassed it in terms of economic output, technological innovation, and military ability. Russia emerged as a new and powerful enemy. A series of wars with both external powers and internal groups resulted in serious defeats and substantial loss of territory. Although the millet system provided protection from persecution and some degree of autonomy for religious minorities to govern their own affairs within the Ottoman Empire, a growing dissatisfaction became apparent within these communities. The importation of European intellectual movements and ideas like freedom, liberty, equality, and nationalism sparked a rejection of the millet system of organization. The French Revolution, in particular, and the values it espoused--liberty, equality, and fraternity--can be traced back as one of the most significant root causes for the eventual collapse and abolishment of the millet system following the Crimean War (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p.18). The French Revolution, stemming from Enlightenment ideals of humanism, equality, freedom, and progress, had a significant impact on the Balkan region and Greek intellectuals especially. As secondary citizens, millet groups were guaranteed certain rights within the system. After having witnessed other peoples in the Balkan region fighting for and achieving independence, partial autonomy and limited freedom were not enough for millet community members. Beginning in 1821, a Greek community in Morea mobilized and revolted against the Ottoman
state (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). The Sultan viewed these rebellions and other efforts toward independence as disloyal and treasonous, and the government responded to the movements accordingly. In 1826, Sultan Mahmud II reacted against the Greek rebellions by having Greek Patriarch Gregorious V hanged. This event, referred to as the “Blessed Event,” illustrates the strength with which the Ottoman government responded to independence movements (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011).

Initial attempts to salvage and reinvigorate the Ottoman Empire were undertaken by Sultan Selim III, who ruled from 1789 until 1807. The government began to look westward for ideas to combat both external and internal enemies. The early reforms focused on centralization. Selim III attempted to reform the system of governance through traditional methods including fighting corruption by forcing people into traditional roles. However, he also adopted the use of European advisors and expanded the channels through which new ideas could permeate society (Mango, 1999, p. 6). Sultan Mahmud II, who ruled from 1808 until 1839, continued and expanded the reforms of Selim II. Mahmud II sought to modernize the imperial military forces. The most profound reform was to abolish the Timar system eliminating cavalry and landholder recruits. In 1826, he successfully abolished the janissaries and instituted a European-style conscription army. These changes increased the central control of the Ottoman government over local provincial governments (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011).

Further reform was required of both the Ottoman bureaucracy and military. The loss of Greece and rising ethnic nationalisms led to insecurity about the possible division of the empire. Widespread reforms were undertaken
between 1839 and 1876 as an attempt to counter internal and external threats. This period of reform is known as the Tanzimat, or reorganization (Quataert, 2005, p. 66). This period saw the introduction of the first Ottoman constitution and parliament aimed at the objectives of modernization and securing territory. In the eyes of Ottoman reformers, modernization implied westernization. The West had surpassed the Ottomans in nearly all capacities. The western model was viewed as providing the best opportunity for a reinvigorated empire. A number of changes were made in order to achieve westernization. The army was further reorganized when universal conscription including that of non-Muslims was introduced in 1856. Military uniforms were westernized to change both the mindset of soldiers and that of enemy states. Civil and criminal codes were made to reflect the French legal system. The first modern universities and academies reflected a new receptivity to European ideas. Railroad networks and factories advanced the Ottoman industrial productivity.

In terms of the goal of securing vulnerable territory, the Ottoman government made few concrete reforms, but it adopted a new grand ideology that radically transformed how the empire interacted with and governed minority groups. Ottomanism was an ideology that was promoted for the purpose of creating a shared identity among diverse ethnic groups. In contrast to the policies of religious and ethnic segregation of previous centuries, Ottomanism sought to actively incorporate all groups living under Ottoman rule into a shared society. Most radically, in 1839, the sultanate proclaimed the equality of law for all Ottomans, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Equality for all citizens of a multi-
The Tanzimat reforms addressing ethnic and religious minorities prompted significant responses from members both inside and outside of the empire. Christians in the Balkans, whose latent nationalist feelings were awakened in earlier decades, strongly dissented against their Ottoman overlords. Government sponsored equality proved to be insignificant as populations moved for autonomy and independence (Özbudun, 1984, p.27). The Great Powers of England, France, and now Russia fostered nationalist movements, particularly within the Balkans, in order to weaken the Ottoman state and to gain more substantial economic influence in the region. The Ottoman Empire was increasingly subject to frequent intervention on behalf of minority populations. European powers, particularly Russia and France respectively, sought to represent and protect the interests of Orthodox Christians and Catholics within the Ottoman Empire (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p.21). Diplomatic or military intervention from one state caused the other Great Powers to react to re-establish a balance of power. The Ottomans were often able to play the great powers off against each other to their benefit. However, their ability to leverage some power decreased throughout the nineteenth century (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). Crete was subject to European intervention in 1866. The Ottoman Empire did not lose Crete as a territory but lost influence within the province.
Not only was the Ottoman Empire vulnerable to diplomatic and military arbitration from European powers, but also historic economic concessions began to limit Ottoman policymaking. Beginning in 1810, Mehmet Ali of Egypt pushed for more power and autonomy for the region. He initiated multiple military conflicts aimed directly and indirectly at challenging the rule of the sultanate. Western intervention contained Mehmet Ali’s ambitions in favor of maintaining the integrity of the empire (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). In exchange, the British and Ottoman governments signed the Balta-Limon Trade Treaty in 1838. Balta-Limon was essentially a free trade agreement between the two states which dropped trade barriers and removed monopolies (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). The treaty increased Ottoman integration into the capitalist economy but as a peripheral rather than central country. The treaty also increased Ottoman economic dependency on European exports rather than allowing domestic protectionism in order to foster the development of internal industries. From 1850 onwards, the government borrowed from international banks on a major scale leading to a debt crisis. Muslims in the empire became increasingly antagonized as socio-economic stratification increased. Greeks, Armenians, and Jews prospered disproportionately from increased trade with Europe because of their historical role of serving as merchants, traders, and bankers within the empire (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011).

The national debt was compounded by drought and flooding in different parts of the empire. A depression in Europe prevented the government from borrowing funds. Instead, the Ottomans increased levels of taxation leading to
civil and political unrest particularly in the Balkans (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p.18).
Both Bulgaria and Romania were host to open rebellions against the government. Under substantial pressure, Sultan Abdullhamid II announced the establishment of the first Ottoman constitution and parliament in 1876. However, this period of constitutional government was brief as it was suspended in 1878 following the disastrous loss in the Russo-Turkish War (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p.16). As a result of the military defeat, the Ottoman Empire lost approximately thirty percent of its territory, including some of its most agriculturally productive lands (Sözen, 2010, p. 65).

Abdullhamid II ruled from 1876 until 1909 and was the last Ottoman Sultan to rule with absolute power, as evidenced by his indefinite suspension of the constitution with the possibility of future reinstitution. Abdullhamid’s agenda mirrored that of the Tanzimat era. He continued policies of westernization, modernization, and centralization. Railway lines were expanded along with communications capabilities with the telegraph. He also strengthened bureaucratic control and reforms (Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p.16). However, the national ideology shifted from Ottomanism to Islamism. Islamism emphasized religion as the common identity among Ottoman subjects and appealed to pan-Islamism as a source for leverage in the international community. Islamism arose from the inability to stop minority nationalisms and the loss of substantial amounts of European territory within the empire. The loss of European territory led to a higher proportion of Muslim subjects in the Empire. Sultan Abdullhamid II was the first sultan to appeal to the Muslim religion as a source for Ottoman
identity. Unlike Tanzimat policies which increased rights for ethnic and religious minorities, rights for minorities under Islamism still existed but were not emphasized. Minority rights were supplanted by the need for a unifying ideology based on religious identity. This shift from a multicultural policy to Islamism is demonstrated in the Hijaz railroad project which sought to connect different parts of the Ottoman Empire to the holy Muslim cities of Mecca and Medina (Mango, 1999, p. 17).

New and substantial political opposition rose against the sultanate in the first years of the twentieth century. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was established as an underground opposition party to the Ottoman regime. Members of CUP represented a new generation of bureaucrats and military officers who were educated in western schools or in the European manner. They were ideologically liberal and were influenced by the ideals of the French Revolution. Constitutionalism and nationalism were two of the most cogent themes CUP members identified. The Committee of Union and Progress also promoted a secular agenda despite its Muslim composition. The group was disposed to positivism and the views of Auguste Comte, who believed that science and rationality should be the basis of governance and decision-making rather than religion (Mango, 1999, p. 69). Similarly, members concluded that the ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism had failed to unite and protect the empire. Instead, Westernism and Turkish nationalism were adopted as central to CUP ideology.
The sultan attempted to suppress the Committee of Union and Progress by exiling various top members. However, CUP members established a vast network of party affiliations led by numerous high-ranking Ottoman military officials. CUP’s headquarters were located in Salonica, a primarily Greek province of the empire (Mango, 1999, p.80). In 1908, members of CUP, also known as the “Young Turks,” forced Sultan Abdulhamid II to reinstate the constitution and reestablish parliament (Mango, 1999, p. 80). Initially CUP rule was weak and limited by the military bureaucracy and military mindset of its leading officials. However, the Balkan wars of 1911 and 1912 gave more power to CUP. The Balkan Wars resulted in the near loss of all European territory. In response to the devastating loss, the sultan was subject to a vote of no confidence (Mango, 1999, p. 88). From 1913 onwards, the Committee of Union and Progress was able to consolidate and centralize political power, and it formed a monopoly of domestic power. Education and judicial systems were secularized as a way of reducing the power of the religious *ulema*, Islamic clerics. Similarly, the status of middle and upper class women was gradually liberalized.

The 1908 Young Turk Revolution, more appropriately described as a palace coup, achieved one of its objectives in forcing the sultan to adopt a constitution and parliament, thus limiting his powers. On the other hand, the Young Turks failed to address the issue of securing territory. They were unable to rectify the fundamental causes of decay destroying the Ottoman Empire. The Young Turk Revolution succeeded in introducing the first mark of democracy within the governing system. It also began more concentrated modernization and
westernization efforts. However, additional numerous and dramatic changes
would have to be made in order to protect the integrity of remaining Ottoman
territory. In the midst of Balkan nationalist uprisings and on the eve of World
War I, the Committee of Union and Progress fostered the organization and
mobilization of some of the most brilliant political and military leaders at the
time. Among these was the young and ambitious military general, Mustafa
Kemal.
Chapter 3
Mustafa Kemal: Charismatic Leader

Mustafa Kemal grew up in a time of great social and political turmoil in the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman military defeat and ethnic, religious, and cultural struggles helped to shape his eventual role as leader of the nationalist resistance and as the first president of a newly established Turkish Republic. Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonica in 1881 to parents Ali Riza and Zubeyde. Ali Riza served as a junior civil servant for the local government. The family was generally considered to be middle class (Mango, 1999, pp. 25-28). Although Mustafa Kemal was raised in a Muslim Turkish-speaking household, Salonica was a diverse community (Mango, 1999, p. 10). At the time of Mustafa Kemal’s birth, Jews formed the largest community and about half of the population (Mango, 1999, p. 8). Greeks also comprised a significant proportion of the population. The area prospered as rail lines linked it to Serbia, Vienna, and Istanbul.

Mustafa Kemal’s early life was marked by a struggle between conservative and progressive ideas. His mother was deeply religious and held traditional Islamic values while his father who served in the Ottoman civil service believed in more European and progressive ideals. After completing his first few years of schooling at a Quranic school, Mustafa Kemal was determined to enter
the local military preparatory school. He later commented on how he did not like wearing traditional oriental clothes but preferred to wear a western-style uniform. He reflected, “It was when I entered the military preparatory school and put on its uniform, that a feeling of strength came to me, as if I had become master of my own identity” (Mango, 1999, p. 53). This quote demonstrates Mustafa Kemal’s early interest in the military. It also demonstrates his preference for Western dress, an important reform he would make many years later as the president of the newly founded Turkish Republic.

Mustafa Kemal completed military preparatory school among the top students in 1898. It was also in preparatory school where he earned the second name of Kemal. *Kemal* means perfection in Ottoman Turkish. Mustafa excelled in mathematics and was given the second name by an influential mathematics professor (Mango, 1999, p. 36). After completing military preparatory school, Mustafa Kemal matriculated into the War College in Istanbul. He soon distinguished himself through his hard work and his hard drinking habits. While at War College, he often conversed with his professors and fellow students about the various failures of the Ottoman government. He developed a strong nationalist ideal while exploring venues for the possible overthrow of ineffective Ottoman bureaucrats. Students at the nearby Military Medical College formed a secret organization called the Ottoman Union which was particularly influenced by the progressive ideals of the French Revolution (Sözen, 2010, p. 72). This organization eventually became Union and Progress, a precursor to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Expressing anti-government sentiment
in any form did not come without potential risks. Numerous members of secret organizations, like the Ottoman Union, had their careers ruined and were subject to exile.

Following his formal military training, Mustafa Kemal served as a low-level military officer and was stationed in Bulgaria at the start of the Balkan War. Mustafa Kemal and other officials were appalled by the state of the Ottoman military and bureaucracy, brought to light by the eventual defeat. In response, the government introduced a number of German military advisors for the purpose of organizing and modernizing the Ottoman army. The Ottoman government held three goals it wished to achieve. It hoped to secure a guarantee of Ottoman sovereignty, to win back the Aegean Islands lost to Greece in the Balkan Wars, and to abolish the system of economic capitulations to European powers (Mango, 1999, p. 132). World War I served as a critical opportunity for the Ottoman Empire to achieve its aims. It also provided an opportunity for the Ottoman Empire to forgo payments accrued over time to the Allied powers. Alliance with the Central Powers appeared to be the most viable means of success.

Mustafa Kemal first gained fame in World War I as a military commander during the Dardanelles and Gallipoli campaigns in 1915 and 1916. Allied Forces, particularly the British and French, attempted to capture the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Despite brutal conditions and massive losses of life on both sides, the Gallipoli campaign proved to be one of the most significant defensive successes for the Ottomans. The victory at Gallipoli became a formative moment for the idea of Turkish nationalism. Similarly, the victory served to increase morale
among ill-equipped and malnourished Ottoman soldiers. It also represented Mustafa Kemal’s shining moment and the beginning of his rise to military and political prominence. Mustafa Kemal’s strategic brilliance and bravery were both demonstrated during the defense of the Gallipoli peninsula. There are two different accounts of a message Mustafa Kemal delivered to his troops before one particular assault on the enemy’s flank. Mustafa Kemal later recalled that he proclaimed, “I don’t order you to attack. I order you to die. By the time we are dead, other units and commanders will have come up to take our place.” However, an order found on the body of a dead Ottoman soldier read, “I do not expect that any of us would rather not die than repeat the shameful story of the Balkan War. But if there are such men among us, we should at once lay hands upon them and set them up in line to be shot!” (Mango, 1999, p. 147). Mustafa Kemal demonstrated his powerful nationalist oratory at this early stage of his career.

Despite the significant defensive successes of the Ottoman Empire, the Central Powers were unable to defeat the Allies on the Western Front. An alliance with the Central Powers made the Ottoman Empire subject to the will of the Allies. The 1918 Armistice of Moudros represented an Ottoman capitulation to crippling foreign occupation by the Allies, particularly Britain, France, and Greece. Each of the Allies held separate plans for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. During the war, Britain and France had signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a secret treaty in which they agreed to the division of the Ottoman Empire for national gain. The French clamored for possession of Syria while the
British demanded control of Palestine and the surrounding area of Transjordan. The Allies continued to hold competing territorial claims during the Paris Peace Conference where the Allies established the peace terms for each of the defeated nations. The Paris Peace Conference was remarkable because it completely remade the international system. The old system of territorial gain as spoil of war was combined with a new form of international diplomacy under the influence of American President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points (Mango, 1999, pp. 245-246). The Allies dismantled historical powers like the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empires. They sought to divide the spoils of war without upsetting the balance of power according to the old system of diplomacy. However, they also created new nations like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Syria, and Iraq, among others. The creation of new nations was guided by Woodrow Wilson’s Article V which outlined the principle of self-determination for all peoples. Wilson believed that all peoples should have the ability to rule themselves under a representative form of government. Territories that were deemed not ready to govern themselves would be designated as a mandate in which an Allied power would help groom them for the responsibilities of democratic governance (Mango, 1999, pp. 245-246).

Members of the Istanbul government and the rival nationalist parties appealed to the Americans and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points for guidance after the defeat in World War I. Article XII appealed to nationalist sentiments in that it called for, “The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty” (Sözen, 2011). However, the Wilson plan upheld
the principle of self-determination in stating, “The other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development” (Sözen, 2011).

The Allies and the Americans in particular were horrified by the Armenian deportations and massacres that occurred between 1914 and 1916. Before the war, there were approximately 1.5 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, or approximately ten percent of the population of Anatolia (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). Armenian nationalism was furthered by Russian propaganda. The Ottoman government became increasingly distrustful of the minority population and introduced a policy of mass deportation. Deaths due to executions and poor conditions in forced marches and refugee camps were common. Estimates of the number of deaths vary between 200,000 and 2 million, depending on the source of the data. A distinct lack of accurate population data makes an accurate death total difficult. However, most unbiased experts agree that between 600,000 and 800,000 were killed (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). The Allies reacted to what they deemed genocide by ensuring the existence of an independent Armenian state. Woodrow Wilson and other Allied leaders also sought the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. However, various political difficulties made this goal an impossibility.

The Treaty of Sevres, signed in August of 1920, made the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire as well as the existence of a Turkish state a legal reality. Another provision of the treaty guaranteed, “The Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce under
international guarantees” (Mango, 1999, pp. 284-285). Massive public
demonstrations against the Treaty indicated the necessity of Allied soldiers for the
purpose of enforcement. War fatigue and death tolls prevented Britain and France
from participating in enforcement of the Treaty. Instead, the Allied countries
authorized Greece to enter into sovereign Turkish territory for this purpose.
During the Paris Peace Conference, Greek President Eleutherios Venizelos sought
control of the west coast of Turkey and control of the Aegean (Mango, 1999, pp.
284-295). His claims were initially denied by the Allies especially Italy, Greece’s
primary rival in the Mediterranean (Wilkens-Sözen, 2011). The invasion of Izmir
in 1919 marked the start of the Greek-Turkish War. It was soon clear that the
Greeks were seeking territorial expansion rather than enforcement of the Treaty.

As the Greeks prepared to occupy further inland expanses, Mustafa Kemal
was busy organizing and rallying nationalist forces. Following the Young Turk
Revolution in 1908 and consolidation of rule by the Committee of Union and
Progress (CUP) between 1913 and 1918, the loss in World War I significantly
undermined CUP’s power. Mustafa Kemal also had a falling out with important
members of the organization with whom he used to collaborate. Mustafa Kemal
was central to the establishment of a new Turkish nationalist organization that
supported the sultan’s execution or exile of prominent CUP members. This new
organization was called the Group for the National Defense of National Rights.
This group sought the creation of a new national assembly inside of Anatolia
(Mango, 1999, p. 272). Many nationalists including Mustafa Kemal believed a
new capital free from foreign occupation and ideology must be established in
Ankara. The new assembly called the Turkish Grand National Assembly elected him President and gave him the dual powers of president and legislative speaker.

The establishment of the Grand National Assembly was significant in the revolutionary process because it created a system of dual sovereignty. The nationalist assembly initially mirrored the sultan’s assembly in Istanbul but gradually came to overshadow the sultan’s legislature. The Grand National Assembly eventually gained the right to negotiate with Allied governments about the Greek occupation and the terms of the Treaty of Sevres. Mustafa Kemal’s leadership as executive, speaker, and commander-in-chief in the Turkish Grand National Assembly indicated the continuation of his upward political trajectory. However, Mustafa Kemal needed to help orchestrate a defeat of the Greek forces in order to ensure his continued leadership of the nationalist government.

It was the military victory over the Greeks that cemented Mustafa Kemal’s leadership in the Ankara government and provided the opportunity for him to enact the first reforms of the Kemalist revolution. Although the nationalists were outnumbered and outgunned, material support from the Soviet government aided in a successful defense of Turkish territory. Private French and Italian firms also provided armaments (Mango, 1999, p. 335). The Battle of Sakarya proved to be a turning point for nationalist forces. Greek morale continued to collapse in the face of difficult foreign occupation. The nationalists defeated the Greeks on August 27, 1922 at a battle near Afyon in Anatolia. A Greek retreat was imminent. However, the British representative in Izmir Sir Harry Lamb warned, “The Greeks have realized that they have got to go, but they have decided to leave
a desert behind them, no matter whose interests suffer thereby” (Mango, 1999, p. 343). In their retreat, the Greek armies set alight hundreds of villages and towns. Western Anatolia was largely destroyed with its population uprooted. For example, only 1,400 of 14,000 homes remained in the town of Manisa (Mango, 1999, p. 343). Overall, after three years of warfare, 13,000 Turkish officers and soldiers were killed, with 35,000 wounded. Greek deaths reached 70,000, including 35,000 prisoners (Mango, 1999, p. 345).

As a result of the war, the Turks guaranteed the immediate withdrawal of Greek troops from Turkish territory. They also secured the sovereign rights to the territory allotted by the 1918 armistice including all of Anatolia and Istanbul. The Treaty of Lausanne negated any proposals that compromised Turkish sovereignty. The Independence War also marked the end of Turkish multiculturalism. Ethnic conflict raged almost without interruption since 1912 (Mango, 1999, p. 346). Tensions between Greek and Armenian Christians and Muslims increased during the war and made the possibility of a post-conflict multicultural society nearly impossible. Furthermore, the nationalists located in Ankara used the Independence War to solidify their legitimacy as the Turkish governing authority. The nationalists and Mustafa Kemal used this legitimacy to redefine Turkish governance, culture, and identity.
Chapter Four

The Kemalist Revolution

Mustafa Kemal inspired and led the revolutionary political and social revolution, later referred to as Kemalism. Kemalism adhered to the main characteristics of a revolution. Mustafa Kemal helped to establish a grand political ideology which aided in the mobilization of the Turkish population. It also served as the pretense for the total transformation of society. This process of revolutionary transformation occurred over decades rather than months or years.

Kemalism served as Turkey’s official ideology from the time of the establishment of the Republic in 1923 until the early 2000s. The ideology remains the official ideology of the state; however, it is no longer the hegemonic ideology. For the purpose of this essay, an ideology can be described as a set of ideas that belong together with a level of coherence.

Many opponents of Kemalism hold the position that Kemalism is not an ideology. They assert that the ideas presented in Kemalism are too flexible, too incoherent, and/or too pragmatic. Anti-Kemalists who are also pro-ideology assert that the two elements are incompatible. Many Kemalists themselves consider Kemalism not to be an ideology. They believe it to be too realistic to be considered an ideology. Kemalism is flexible in issues of the economy and of foreign policy. In the words of one of the early Kemalists, Recep Peker, “The
cardinal plan, the source and the starting point of all our programs is the insight
concentrated in the brain and soul of spiritual leaders” (Sözen, 2010, p. 59). Peker
and other politicans asserted that Kemalism received inspirations directly and
entirely from life (Özbudun, 1981, p. 87). In the minds of Peker and others,
actions should be taken first followed by analysis later. Kemalism’s ability to
adapt to changing political circumstances was central to the maintenance of
sovereignty, the ultimate goal of Kemalism.

One reason Kemalists denied their philosophy as an ideology was the
international political climate of the era. Kemalists sought to differentiate
themselves from the dominant ideologies of the time. These included fascism,
communism, and Nazism. Political leaders wanted to create a plan specifically
for Turkey that would not be confused with these ideologies. They also deemed it
necessary to indicate the difference between authoritarianism and totalitarianism
(Özbudun, 2000, p. 5). In totalitarian regimes, the leadership constantly tries to
mobilize society behind the regime. They also tend to be more brutal. A coherent
ideology is central to totalitarian regimes in helping to mobilize public support.
Authoritarian regimes, however, lack a strong ideology and do not attempt to
mobilize society behind the ruling regime. There is generally more freedom as
individual allegiance is not required as long as it does not compromise the
security of the state apparatus. The Turks also stood against Western liberalism
because of its emphasis on individualism and class interests. The Turks instead
wanted to promote the plurality of political interests.
Despite the arguments promoting Kemalism as a series of practical policies, Kemalism is, in fact, an ideology. The emphasis placed on flexibility and pragmatism helps to establish it as an ideology (Demirel, 2005, p. 347). More importantly, the Six Arrows of Kemalism provide an ideological framework for the structure of modern Turkish society. These arrows include republicanism, nationalism, populism, laicism, revolutionism, and statism. Although Kemalism began as a set of principles for good governance, they solidified as an ideology when combined with the cult of leadership surrounding Mustafa Kemal.

The principle of republicanism indicates the emphasis Kemalists placed on democracy. They stood against dynastic control and theological forms of governance. Instead, Kemalists believed that a republic was the most modern form of state government. Nationalism as proposed by the Kemalists included two semi-contradictory assumptions. Civic nationalism was to define nation not by race but rather culture and ideals. Their hope was to subsume a variety of identities into one supra-identity. Turkish identity was to be defined also by a common language, history, and a shared future. Geographic location also played a part in defining identity. However, the Kemalist ideal also promoted a form of ethnic nationalism. Turkish identity was exalted resulting in the exclusion of non-absorbable elements or identities. Kemalist ethnic nationalism did not constitute racism but was strongly ethnicist (Sözen, 2010, p. 136). Mustafa Kemal’s statement, “Happy is he who can call himself a Turk,” continues to cause controversy (Sözen, 2011). It is ambiguous whether he was promoting civic or ethnic nationalism as the foundation of Turkish identity.
The principle of populism, also referred to as “popularism,” does not relate to the populist form of democracy. Rather, popularism relates to the shared national will of the Turkish citizenry. Popularism emphasized equality of law for all groups. It also pledged that no privileges would be granted to any individual or group. Kemalists also sought to establish a cohesive society that did not face issues relating to class conflict associated with Marxism. Most importantly, popularism proclaimed Turkish citizens and the “national will” as the primary source of legitimacy for the government (Sözen, 2010, p. 138). The Kemalists asserted that their elite revolution best reflected the interests of the people and was encouraged by the national will.

The principle of laicism sought to eliminate religious influence in the process of governance. In contrast to secularism, which promotes the separation of the institutions of church and state, laicism allows for the government to actively limit the public role of religion. Laicism relates to republicanism in that it guaranteed that religion would not be the source of the political and legal systems (Sözen, 2010, p. 142). It also denied the possibility of religion as a base of authority. In support of the principle, Kemalists mandated that the majority religion, Islam, would be controlled by the state and relegated exclusively to the private sphere (Parla & Davison, 2004, pp. 273-275).

Revolutionism or transformationism supports the argument that Kemalism was indeed a revolutionary ideology. Kemalists intended transformationism to represent the replacement of traditional institutions with modern Western institutions. Institutions including government and religion would be transformed
through permanent reforms sponsored by the government (Sözen, 2010, p. 144). Statism or the etatist principle provided for a mixed Turkish economy. The state would hold regulatory powers over the economy. Kemalists believed the state had an inherent role in protecting and promoting the development of internal industries. They also asserted that protectionism worked in the name of national economic and political interests (Sözen, 2010, p. 140). One member of Mustafa Kemal’s government stressed, “We are not enemies of capital, but the capital will be Turkish” (Sözen, 2011). Among these principles, or arrows, each supported the meta-principle of maintaining independence and sovereignty as a state.

Another characteristic of revolutions is the mobilization of the masses. The mobilization of Turkish society occurred most prominently during the War of Independence, also referred to as the Greek-Turkish War. The Turks were outnumbered in both soldiers and arms. Mustafa Kemal and other nationalist leaders appealed to the new Bolshevik government in Russia for aid. Russia responded to nationalist calls for support by supplying arms and ammunition to Turkish forces. Shipments of arms and supplies were often rushed to the frontlines in oxcarts by peasant women. These women have become integral to the larger epic of the War of Independence (Mango, 1999, p. 317). After he was named commander-in-chief by the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal issued multiple orders to requisition supplies from the general population. According to these orders, every household was required to provide one set of underclothes and boots for the army. Forty percent of all stocks of cloth, leather, flour, soap, and candles were required. All weapons needed to be surrendered to
the army as well as one fifth of all horses, carts, and carriages. Owners of transport were ordered to move army supplies over one hundred kilometers per month without payment (Mango, 1999, p. 318). On September 13, 1918, Mustafa Kemal ordered the general mobilization of Turkish military forces. He believed that mobilization was necessary in order to end the occupation and the presence of foreign troops on Turkish soil. Mobilization, however, faced some public criticism. For many, the term mobilization inspired memories of the tremendous losses suffered during World War I. Similarly, the population had to make significant sacrifices in order to fulfill the requisition orders. The country had been engaged in war for nearly ten years and had lost most of its agriculturally productive lands to foreign military victories.

The Kemalist ideology and its supporting principles of the Six Arrows formed the framework for the total transformation of society. A period of radical transformationism was instituted by the national government between 1925 and 1935. Because the Independence War legitimized the rule of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the assembly used its increased power to abolish the sultanate. It sought to retain the religious symbolism of the office of the caliphate while removing its political power. The National Assembly aimed to disarm opponents of political change while retaining the advantages of supporting a legitimate and revered authority. On October 29, 1923, the Assembly proclaimed the establishment of the Turkish Republic. A new constitution was also adopted in 1924. Mustafa Kemal was selected as president of the new republic. Mustafa Kemal was to spearhead republican reforms as well as other societal changes.
Leadership by the nationalist elite was believed to best represent the interests of the people. This enlightened leadership acted based on the “national will” (Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 280).

In terms of nationalist principle, Mustafa Kemal and other leaders crafted a “Turkish Historical Thesis” which sought to create a national cohesive identity. Scholars placed an emphasis on Turkish and Anatolian heritage as being separate from Middle Eastern and Islamic identities of other portions of the former Ottoman Empire (Mango, 1999, p. 493). Ancient empires like the Hittite, Trojan, and Sumerian empires were identified as the roots of Turkish society. The Historical Thesis also imbued the population with a strong feeling of national identity and pride. Indoctrinating children was especially important in the creation of a strongly nationalist country (Mango, 1999, p. 493).

The new Kemalist government instituted significant laicist reforms which sought to limit the role of religion in the public sphere. The republic formally abolished the Caliphate in 1924. The caliph had served as the symbol of Islamic unity across the world for centuries. The removal of the office of the caliphate indicated an attack on traditional strongholds of institutionalized Islam. The republic secularized the family by banning religious marriages and the practice of polygamy. In 1928, the clause stating that Islam is the state religion was removed from the constitution. Furthermore, religious education was subject to the purview of the government, specifically the Ministry of Education, rather than traditional bodies (Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 274). In 1935, a decree made Sunday the official day of rest rather than Friday. The government also
suppressed a variety of Dervish orders. The government sought to create a state-sanctioned form of Islam that was free from superstition and backward beliefs. The government extended its secularization to the vital elements of popular religion. This included regulation of dress, holy sheiks, saints, shrines, pilgrimages, and festivals (Parla & Davison, 2004, p. 274). This authoritarian suppression of popular religious practice was successful in many respects but failed by pushing unauthorized practices underground. The Kemalists politicized Islam and turned it into both a vehicle for support and a tool for political opposition.

The complete transformation of society continued with an extensive series of modernizing and westernizing reforms. In 1925, the turban and fez were banned in favor of Western-style hats. Mustafa Kemal preferred Western dress and hats since his early years in military preparatory school. Other reforms to social life included the adoption of the Western clock and Julian calendar in 1926. Western numerals were introduced in 1928 followed by weights and measures in 1931. These reforms were intended to make business and government more efficient as well as calibrated with western systems of measures. More significantly, Mustafa Kemal pushed for the promotion of new roles for women. Women’s suffrage was granted in 1930, and women were allowed to stand for election beginning in 1934 (Sözen, 2010, p. 108). In that same year, the government mandated the adoption of family names, previously unknown in the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal was granted the surname “Atatürk,” literally meaning “Father of the Turks.” Subsequent laws made it illegal to give a child
that name either as a first or last name (Mango, 1999, p. 498). Latin script formally replaced the former Arabic/Persian alphabet that was previously in place. The Arabic alphabet was insufficient for the vowel-rich Turkish language, and it had proved a hindrance in written communications. The change of alphabet created a new illiteracy among mid-level government elites. However, the shift also represented another way in which to sever ties with the country’s Middle Eastern and Ottoman origins and reorient it towards the West (Mango, 1999, pp. 495-497). Overall, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms sought to separate his country from the Orientalist image of the Middle East. Furthermore, he hoped to introduce the Turkish Republic into the community of “civilized” or Western nations. Atatürk believed that acceptance into the community of Western nations would help secure the ultimate goal of retaining Turkish independence and territorial sovereignty. The Six Arrows--republicanism, nationalism, popularism, laicism, revolutionism, and statism--provided a framework through which the necessary state-building reforms could be undertaken.

During his political life, Mustafa Kemal transitioned from a conservative constitutionalist to a social revolutionary. Mustafa Kemal’s early involvement with the CUP and the Young Turk Revolution represented a limited revolution. Mustafa Kemal and other officials engaged in a military coup to reinstate a constitutional monarchy in 1908. However, his leadership in the Turkish Grand National Assembly and later as president of the Turkish Republic gave him the opportunity to introduce the military, governmental, religious, and societal
reforms that he believed his country so desperately needed. These reforms can also be referred to as the Kemalist Revolution.

The Kemalist political ideal struggled for full realization for several decades. Furthermore, its realization was hindered by significant political and religious opposition. This opposition was made manifest in three stages of counter-revolution from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until today.
Chapter 5

Kemalism and the Military

The Turkish military served as a bastion of the Kemalist legacy from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 through the first several years of the twenty-first century. The armed forces played an active role in politics and government policies. Mustafa Kemal used the military as a tool to consolidate his rule and eliminate opposition during the single party period between 1923 and 1950. Within that time, the military came to represent and actively promote the nationalist and secularist ideals of Atatürk. Over time, the military intervened in national politics on multiple occasions by staging coups against opposition and failed governments. This occurred in 1960, 1971, and 1980. The military also promoted its Kemalist ideals by aiding in drafting the 1924, 1960, and 1982 constitutions. The military ensured its influence in political affairs with the inclusion of various constitutional provisions including tutelary powers and reserved domains, among others. These provisions and other government policies made future military interventions into the political system easier.

Although military support aided his career and the advancement of his principles, Mustafa Kemal did not initially view military involvement in politics to be proper. Early in his military career, Mustafa Kemal believed that military operations and politics should be kept separate. During his involvement with the
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, Mustafa Kemal repeatedly insisted on the importance of limiting the role of army officers in organizational politics. He proposed that military officers should be banned from participating in any political organization. He encouraged officers who would be of help to the nationalist movement to resign from the Ottoman armed forces (Mango, 1999, p. 92). As President of the Assembly, he later proposed a resolution that would prevent active service officers from serving as deputies in the assembly while allowing current commanders to finish their current term (Mango, 1999, p. 400). While active officers could not become members of the Assembly, Mustafa Kemal ensured that his loyal deputies who were still members of the armed services could participate in parliament as they did not personally hold direct military command (Mango, 1999, p. 400). This differentiation was applied to his prime minister and defense minister among other loyal followers (Mango, 1999, p. 400).

Mustafa Kemal used the army to consolidate his power as president of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Although he was highly qualified in terms of both political and military experience, Mustafa Kemal continued to face opposition and critics of his rule. The military emerged as an agent of revolutionary tradition during the Single-Party Period between 1923 and 1950. This was a time of political domination by Atatürk’s Republican People’s Party. Turkey was ruled by a non-democratic regime in this era. However, scholars continue to debate the non-democratic nature of the Kemalist period. In a totalitarian regime, the leadership constantly tries to mobilize society in support of
the regime. Totalitarian regimes have a strong ideological basis, like Nazism and communism. Similarly, totalitarian regimes tend to be more brutal, and individuals must demonstrate allegiance to the regime to ensure personal security. Authoritarian regimes, in contrast, lack a strong ideology and do not attempt to mobilize society in support of the regime. There tends to be more room for freedom, and individual allegiance is not necessarily required as much to ensure security or safety (Özbudun, 2000, p. 5). The debate surrounding totalitarianism and authoritarianism during the Single Party Period mirrors the discussion of Kemalism as an ideology, as seen in Chapter 4. The most significant difference between totalitarianism and authoritarianism is the role of ideology in the ruling regime. Kemalists deny their beliefs as an ideology because they would prefer to avoid comparisons with totalitarian regimes like the Nazis or the Bolsheviks. Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, allow some degree of freedom and lack a strong ideology (Özbudun, 2000, p. 5).

The military cemented its influence in the political sphere through the inclusion of a number of constitutional provisions. The 1924 constitution established a majoritarian institutional framework. Parliamentary systems feature a fusion of executive and legislative powers as the head of government is also the head of the parliamentary majority. However, the 1924 constitution established a fusion of executive, legislative, and judicial control for the majority party. The judiciary held no independence, and parliament had the right to replace members of the judiciary at will. Furthermore, the constitution did not create a system of
institutional checks for the executive branch. This lack of checks heightened the sharp contrast between those with power and those without.

The 1960 coup and 1961 constitution were in reaction to the rise of the Democrat Party which came to dominate the Republican People’s Party in the political arena. After the establishment of free elections by President Ismet İnönü in 1950, the Democrat Party won three successive elections. The majoritarian institutional framework established by the 1924 constitution allowed for the formation of overwhelming majorities and supermajorities of the new party in parliament. The discontent and motivation, ideology, leadership, and organization of the Democrat Party will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.

The 1961 constitution reacted against the majoritarian system of the 1924 constitution. The coup was completed outside of the military hierarchy. Foremost military officials stood against the actions of colonels who initiated the conflict (Hale, 2006, p. 313). Although the coup occurred outside the chain of command, the 1961 constitution aided in the establishment of a praetorian regime (Hale, 2006, p. 313). The constitution ensured that the military held political power. Their power was exercised through force or the threat of force. The document included policies that made future political intervention easier for the military. The constitution now included the foundation of secularist Kemalist military ideals. The ideals of the military were engrained in the preamble of the constitution which helped shape some of the decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court used the preamble as the
parameter for interpreting the constitution as a legal document. The constitution also presented the framework for a National Security Council (NSC). The 1961 document established NSC as a body comprised of military representatives with a civilian majority. This body was designed to assist the chamber of ministers and to present its views (Özbudun, 2000, p. 108). With successive revisions of the constitution, the purview of the body increased significantly over time. In 1971, the National Security Council was comprised of the chiefs of the military branches. The body now submitted, rather than presented, its views to the chamber of ministers (Özbudun, 2000, p. 111). The document also supported military influence in politics with the Document of National Security Policy (DNSP). The DNSP defined national security as the “provision of peace and security,” protection of constitutional order, unity, and interests, as well as, protecting against “internal and external threats.” (Özbudun, 2000, p. 111). The DNSP was reviewed and reissued every five years. According to some Turkish constitutional scholars, the DNSP allowed for the reinterpretation of the political environment based on the interests of the military. The renewal of the DNSP every five years concretized the role of the military. Accordingly, scholars have deemed the DNSP as the hidden constitution of Turkey.

The second kind of military guarantee was establishment of reserved domains. The 1961 constitution established a framework with limited exit guarantees for military influence. The most significant reserve domain was the manipulation of the electoral process. General Cemal Gürsel, the commander of the 1960 coup, assured his election to the presidency (Özbudun, 2000, p. 112).
Gürsel also guaranteed his right to appoint members to various governmental bodies. Of the twenty-three members that made-up the National Union Committe, Gürsel appointed fifteen (Özbudun, 2000, p. 113). A number of leaders of the coup were also guaranteed lifetime seats in the senate.

Unlike the 1960 coup and its corresponding constitution, the 1980 coup and 1982 constitution were less a response to Islamic opposition and more a measure against political violence and civil strife that had paralyzed the country. The country suffered from societal and political polarization. Violence and acts of terrorism between members of the left and conservative nationalists left five thousand people dead (Sözen, 2011). Central political parties were pulled apart by nationalist and Islamic parties. Despite the introduction of martial law, order could not be restored or maintained as the police force was also divided along ideological and political lines. The political system also faced a general decay. Parliament failed to elect a president with only nominal powers in one hundred and twenty-four sessions. Political parties lost legitimacy as they engaged in electoral manipulation. Parties sought to protect their interests at the expense of the political system as a whole (Sözen, 2011).

The 1960 coup had reacted against the established majoritarian system and the political dominance of the Democrat Party. In contrast, the 1980 coup targeted the entire existing political establishment. Unlike the 1960 coup, the 1980 coup was carried out within the formal military hierarchy. The coup was generated within the National Security Council while the Chief of Military, Kenan Evran, also served as the leader of the coup. The 1982 constitution strengthened
both the tutelary powers and the reserved domains initially established by the 1960 constitution (Özbudun, 2000, p. 112). The 1971 revisions to the constitution served as both a temporal and substantial midpoint between the 1960 and 1982 constitutions. Among the tutelary powers granted to the military by the 1982 constitution, one of the most significant was strengthening the National Security Council. The NSC now contained more military members than civilian. The concept of security was very broadly defined in the constitution and allowed the NSC to intervene in matters of “integrity and indivisibility,” “peace and security,” and “independence and existence of state” (Özbudun, 2000, p. 108).

The 1982 constitution further strengthened the reserved domains guaranteed to the military from previous constitutions and their revisions. In 1960, the military judiciary gained autonomy from the civilian judicial system. By 1971, the military had become increasingly independent. The military became exempt from the Court of Accounts. Supreme Military Advisory Courts were established that determined military judgment. The 1982 constitution further isolated the military judiciary from political interference. The internal structure of the military courts was to be determined by the Military Council (Özbudun, 2000, p. 112). Furthermore, a shifting of accountability made the Chief of General Staff responsible only to the Prime Minister. The successive constitutions established an increasing independence of the military judiciary from the civilian judicial system. They also allowed for the creation of an insulated military society exempt from civilian influence (Özbudun, 2000, p. 112).
The manipulation of the electoral process was another important component of military power. Due to the collapse of the political system, the military government only approved three parties to run in the civilian elections. Influential politicians from opposition forces including Necmettin Erbakan, Turkeş, and Suleyman Demirel were banned from participating in politics for ten years (Özbudun, 2000, p.113). These politicians, among others, would be influential in leading the second wave of anti-Kemalist counter-revolution in the mid-1990s.

Irreversibility of the military regime and amnesty laws ensured the continuity of laws passed by the military regime. Military generals were now exempt from ex-post facto prosecution from constitutional courts (Özbudun, 2000, p. 115). Amnesty was especially important in 1982 because the military government had passed over six-hundred laws which regulated every sector of society (Özbudun, 2000, p. 115). Kenan Evran, one of the central architects of the 1980 coup, maintained strict control of the legislative capabilities of the civilian government. As President, Evran held veto power which required a three-fourth majority of parliament to override. This provision ensured that the six-hundred laws would remain in place until the end of Evran’s term, at the very least.

The military served not only as the bastion of Kemalist ideology, it also symbolized the successful implementation of a strong and capable coercive force. One of the most significant crises facing the late Ottoman Empire was that of the military. The Ottoman army was weak and had faced several crippling and
demoralizing defeats during the Balkan War and World War I. As a military student and young soldier, Mustafa Kemal actively campaigned for military reform and modernization. Throughout his military and political career, he continued his military reform program through introduction of European uniforms, reorganization of the army under loyal nationalist generals, as well as ensuring the continued strength of the armed forces as the protector of the newly established Turkish Republic.

Mustafa Kemal imbued the military with the responsibility for protecting the sovereignty and integrity of the Turkish Republic. During his rule, Mustafa Kemal used government institutions including the military to exercise three levels of coercive power. The military was used in structural campaigns of limited terror against those deemed to be enemies of the state. Enemies included leaders of religious opposition like Sheikh Said, a Kurdish religious scholar who had attempted to lead an active rebellion against Turkish control in the East. In response to this rebellion, the Republican People’s Party declared martial law in the eastern region of the country (Sözen, 2010, p. 68). In 1926, the government discovered a plot through which opponents of Mustafa Kemal in the Grand National Assembly would assassinate the president. This plot is often referred to as the “Izmir Conspiracy.” Although the conspirators were promptly executed, Mustafa Kemal viewed the assassination attempt as an advantageous opportunity to eliminate his political opposition (Mango, 1999, p. 453). The trials relating to the plot extended beyond the perpetrators and resulted in the eradication of any former CUP opposition and the delegitimization of many generals who had fought
in the Turkish independence movement whom Mustafa Kemal viewed as potential threats to his leadership (Mango, 1999, p. 449). In 1927, Mustafa Kemal delivered a speech to the Grand National Assembly which lasted thirty-six hours. In it, he justified the purges by emphasizing the danger of opposition (Mango, 1999, p. 449). Through his oratory, he was also able to capitalize on the nationalist movement and sentiments as support for his authoritarian vision for the state.

Mustafa Kemal and the RPP engaged in instrumental or legal coercion primarily with the official adoption of the Law on Maintenance and Order. This law banned any organization or publication which might cause a disturbance to law and order (Mango, 1999, p. 424). Those who violated the ban were subject to the jurisdiction of Independence Tribunals which were comprised of nationalist military officials who were strongly allied to the president (Mango, 2002, p. 297). The Independence Tribunals often targeted Istanbul periodicals as many held views critical of Atatürk’s personal rule, nationalist reforms, or RPP ideology.

Ideological coercion was also undertaken. The creation of the Turkish Historical Thesis and the nationalization of a shared historic past aided in imbuing citizens with strongly nationalist feelings (Mango, 1999, p.493). The revision of the education system also inculcated followers into the Kemalist ideology. General education became secular and Westernized while religious activities were now proscribed and monitored by the government. Textbooks were revised to reflect the new Turkish Historical Thesis and general Kemalist discourse. The process of adopting the Latin script and “purification” of the Turkish language
through the exclusion of Arabic and Persian words indicated a fundamental shift in accepted systems of thought (Mango, 1999, p. 495).

Ideological coercion was only strengthened by laws resulting from the 1980 coup. Institutions like universities and mass media, which had been made independent from the government in 1960, were now subject to government control and regulation. The Higher Education Council was responsible for overseeing university curriculum. Both of these measures, among others, were intended to increase military control and Kemalist supremacy in society. While the military did not necessarily engage in every government institution or every reform, the armed forces were central to the continued preeminence of Mustafa Kemal and the Republican People’s Party as well as their ability to impel a cultural revolution.
Chapter Six
The Democrat Party

The Turkish one-party authoritarian period existed from the establishment of the Republic until 1945. In 1945, the Republican People’s Party (RPP), under the leadership of Ismet Inönü since the death of Atatürk in 1937, initiated the first transition to democracy. Inönü reasserted the importance of an authoritarian regime in grooming the Turkish people to be ready for democracy. He and Atatürk believed that Western modernizing and secularizing reforms had to occur in order to make democracy a viable political system in Turkey.

Ismet Inönü emphasized the need for the creation of an opposition party to initiate the country’s transition to democracy. The opposition party was named the Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi) and consisted of former long-term RPP members. This affiliation is significant because it indicates the ideological similarity between the RPP and DP. Democrat Party members, although members of the opposition, were still ideological Kemalists. The leader of the Democrat Party, Celel Bayar, initially worked closely with Inönü to form the opposition party.

The 1946 general election was the first competitive election held in Turkey. The Republican People’s Party won the election with a large majority. The Democrat Party won sixty-two seats in Parliament. However, the Democrat
Party made claims of large-scale election fraud. Although two parties were allowed to run, the 1946 elections were not free or fair. The RPP and DP were very similar ideologically and in their programs. The most significant difference was that the Democrat Party called for the establishment of free and fair elections. Despite the victory, the RPP was shaken from the elections. Political divisions emerged between top RPP officials. Recep Peker and other hard-liners wished to suppress opposition and continue single-party rule. İsmet İnönü and the moderate liberalizers sought to continue to strengthen the competitive election process.

The 1950 general election represented the first free and fair election in the Republic. As a result of the 1950 election, İsmet İnönü and the RPP lost a significant amount of power in the government. Although the RPP controlled the democratization process, they did not instate exit guarantees in case of losing the election (Sözen, 2010, p. 366). The 1950 elections produced stunning results. The RPP never expected to lose since existing authoritarian rulers from the RPP controlled the process of democratization. The RPP voluntarily gave up power, and there was no violence in the transition between parties.

There are three main factors that help to explain the transition to democracy at this particular historical juncture. The international factors included countering the Soviet threat and increased cooperation with the United States. Turkish democracy is a product of the second wave of democratization from 1943 until 1968 in which democracy became fashionable (Özbudun, 2000, p.1). The end of World War II was partly responsible for initiating this trend. Although leaders may have considered the importance of cooperation between the US and
Turkey as democratic countries, this factor was not particularly determinate in Turkey’s democratic transition (Sözen, 2010, p. 373).

The modernization theory uses social, cultural, and economic change to explain democratization initiatives. Industrialization created a growing middle class which pushed for the representation of their interests in the government. While the middle class was growing, it still represented a small proportion of the Turkish population. Furthermore, business interests were more concerned with economic liberalization rather than political democratization (Sözen, 2010, p. 374).

The nature of the Kemalist regime played the most significant role in motivating the democratic transition. As discussed previously, the central tenets of Kemalism are represented by six arrows of Turkish political principles. One of the six arrows of Kemalism is republicanism. Although Kemalism did not explicitly state what kind of political system Turkey was to become, this principle recognized a republic as the most modern state form (Sözen, 2010, p. 134). Kemalists sought to establish state structures in the form of a modern republic by abolishing the Ottoman sultanate and caliphate. The principle of popularism recognized the importance of equality of law for all citizens. More importantly, it recognized the Turkish people as the source of legitimacy. Turkish citizens represented the “national will” and, therefore, a worldly or secular source of power (Sözen, 2010, p. 138). This secular source of power stood diametrically opposed to the monarchical and theocratic source of legitimacy as synthesized in the office of the caliphate.
Furthermore, Kemalism as an ideology had more in common with the Western liberal model than other contemporary ideologies including communism and fascism. Kemalists sought to dissociate themselves from absolutism. Kemalism held the Western ideals of positivism and rationalism as central to its ideology (Sözen, 2010, p. 376). The modernizing and Westernizing reforms of the Kemalist period including language reform, new sartorial laws, and the adoption of Western calendars and systems facilitated exchange with Europe and the United States. According to Kemalists, the authoritarian one-party period was necessary to create the social conditions required for democracy (Sözen, 2010, p. 368).

During the ten years between 1950 and 1960, the Democrat Party won three elections in a row in 1950, 1954, and 1957. They established overwhelming majorities in parliament. The Democrat Party established extreme executive stability, but by 1960, the regime broke down. One central reason for the breakdown of the Democrat Party was the majoritarian framework of the 1924 constitution (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005, p. 67). Parliament had the power to replace the judiciary resulting in a political system without judicial independence. As is common in normal parliamentary systems, there is a degree of fusion of executive and legislative functions. In addition, the Turkish system fused the judicial with the executive and legislative functions. The constitutional framework led to the establishment of a majoritarian electoral system. A lack of institutional checks on the executive branch created a sharp contrast between the powerful and the powerless. For example, in 1957, the Democrat Party earned fifty-seven percent
of the national vote and received ninety-three percent of the seats in Parliament. In comparison, the Republican People’s Party received thirty-three percent of the vote but only six percent of parliamentary seats (Hale, 2006, p. 234).

In addition to the constitutional framework, the nature of the Democrat Party itself led to the intensification of political discourse. As discussed earlier, the Democrat Party consisted of a collection of anti-RPP forces. The Democrat Party was a loose organization with little ideological coherence. However, the Democrat Party created a unique populist ideology which mobilized political supporters but also marginalized political opposition.

The political transition to democracy in Turkey occurred at an important period in their history. Democratization occurred “after the bureaucratization of the state, but before the industrialization of society” (Sunar, 2004, p. 121). In other words, under the rule of Atatürk, the state established a very developed national bureaucratic system while the rest of Turkey outside of the large cities had not benefited or experienced economic modernization. In this view, two populations existed: the modernist Kemalist ruling classes in large cities and traditional non-industrial citizens primarily living in Anatolia (Sunar, 2004, p. 121). The Turkish Republic can be described as a “dual society in which the non-producer, modernist bureaucrats were the rulers and the traditional petty producers the ruled” (Sunar, 2004, p. 122). The Democrat Party built a populist ideology around the numerous groups that were marginalized by Kemalist ideology and reforms. The most important groups included those who were opposed to cultural westernization and modernization and those who had not
benefited economically from Kemalist reforms. Therefore, the main strategies of the Democrat Party included undermining cultural modernization and economic development and harnessing the political will of politically marginalized citizens (Sunar, 2004, p. 123).

A key strategy of the Democrat Party was to undermine the Kemalist secular and modernizing reforms. They sought to “de-emphasize secularism and to emphasize private initiative in a popular discourse that was designed to appeal to the everyday demands and values of ‘the people’” (Sunar, 2004, p. 125). In the party view, cultural change would occur as an outgrowth of economic development. Party leaders disagreed with the Kemalist top-down authoritarian enforcement of cultural change. The Democrat Party promoted the idea that economic development and cultural change would complement and enhance each other (Sunar, 2004, p. 125).

The Democrat Party sought to undermine Kemalist cultural and social reforms while actively promoting a resurgence of Islam. Anti-Kemalist counter-revolutionary reforms included the reinstitution of the call to prayer in Arabic. Religious programs were now allowed as a part of radio broadcasts. Some political scientists believe the Democrat Party encouraged religious activity as a distraction from the economic downturn in the mid-1950s (Metz, 1995). The economic conditions of the Islamic resurgence are discussed below. The weakening of secularist social reforms generally facilitated a resurgence of Islam especially at the popular level.
Economic development was an important party platform goal. The end of World War II initiated a period of economic recovery assisted by recovery programs, grants and loans, and the United States as the new international dominant economic power (Sunar, 2004, p. 123). The new economic arrangement was based around capitalism and market competition, two aspects that Turkey lacked. One of the Six Arrows of Kemalism was statism, meaning the Turkish state was involved in controlling the economy. State intervention in the economy was particularly prevalent in the industrial and financial sectors (Sunar, 2004, p. 124). At the same time, the agricultural sector remained underdeveloped (Sunar, 2004, p. 124).

The Democrat Party courted the middle peasantry, dominant in rural areas, as the heart of their constituency (Sunar, 2004, p. 124). The party sought to support the middle peasantry and urban commercialists with patronage and a state-assisted capitalist growth (Sunar, 2004, p. 126). With government development, the agricultural sector grew substantially in the early 1950s with the “reclamation of land, mechanization of agriculture, infrastructural investment, favorable world prices for foreign agricultural exports, foreign aid, and good weather conditions (Sunar, 2004, p. 126). “Unfavorable changes in international markets and local weather conditions made these policies unsustainable and required the DP to adopt protectionist economic policies in the 1950s. To avoid alienating a core base of political support, the DP continued their agricultural development projects through inflationary financing (Sunar, 2004, p. 127). As a result, prices doubled between 1955 and 1959 (Sunar, 2004, p. 127).
Urban commercialists were also a crucial constituency for the party. The Democrat Party sought to represent and incorporate small business owners in the political system. This group was particularly influential in other counter-revolutionary movements, manifested in the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party. The increasing economic and political role of Anatolian business interests will be discussed in depth in the following two chapters.

Along with undermining cultural modernization and increasing rural economic development, the Democrat Party developed a corresponding populist ideology to harness the will of marginalized groups. The Democrat Party portrayed itself as being representative of the national will. Obstruction of bureaucracy was seen as standing against national will. Any obstruction to the will of the DP was interpreted as an obstruction to national or popular will. Furthermore, the party did not distinguish between opposition and treason (Sözen, 2010, p. 380).

The Democrat Party suppressed opposition through a number of means. The DP gradually tightened restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The state began to jail journalists for expressing discontent with government policies. State radio came under the control of the party (Sözen, 2010, p. 386). In 1960, newspapers often featured large white blocks in which an unacceptable story would have been published. This example is one of the most striking visual manifestations of government censorship. The Democrat Party also reduced the freedom of organization. The government banned political meetings and organizations.
The Democrat Party also abrogated and violated the rule of law in Turkey. Civil servants were stripped of their right to judicial review. In 1959 and 1960, the government established the Assembly Investigative Committee in which the government investigated oppositional actions that were deemed subversive. This committee served a similar function as the American Alien Sedition Acts under John Adams. The ultimate violation of the rule of law occurred as Democrat Party members became the judicial bodies in order to try members of opposition parties (Sözen, 2010, p. 386).

While the Democrat Party instituted increased measures against opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party began to look outside the democratic system. Former Prime Minister Ismet Inönü warned, “It is dangerous to change a democratic system into an authoritarian one. If you continue on this path, even I will not be able to save you” (Sözen, 2011). This quote indicates the intense politics that occurred between the DP and the RPP. Intense politics also became the context for the 1960 military coup against the Democrat Party.

In 1960, the military carried out a coup d’état against the Democrat Party government. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was executed along with other top party officials. Unlike the 1980 military coup, the 1960 intervention was against a part of the government rather than against the entire political system. Military leaders sought to insulate urban political organizations from rural religious and populist pressures (Sunar, 2004, p. 127). Political parties at the village level were made illegal. A constitutional court and second parliamentary chamber were created to act as a counterweight to ideological populism and party
majoritarianism (Sunar, 2004, p. 127). Similarly, universities and the Turkish 
Radio and Television Corporation no longer fell under the purview of the 
government and were made autonomous (Sunar, 2004, p. 127).

Unlike the original 1950 transition to democracy, the military included a 
number of institutional traces and exit guarantees to ensure their continued 
influence after the transition to a civilian government. The constitutional 
framework was adjusted to prevent the build-up of majoritarian parliamentary 
power. Amendments were included to guarantee judicial independence and 
supervision. In terms of exit guarantees, military officials granted themselves 
immunity against possible prosecution under the civilian government. They also 
granted themselves a number of seats as lifetime senators (Özbudun, 2000, p. 
113).

The rule of the Democrat Party from 1950 until 1960 represented the first 
wave of Islamic opposition to Kemalism. The party courted followers through 
policies that undermined secularism and promoted popular Islam. The party also 
emphasized growth of the agricultural sector and small urban commercialism as 
central party goals. Furthermore, the Democrat Party crafted a populist ideology 
which appealed to groups marginalized under the Kemalist regime. The 
secondary and tertiary waves of Islamic opposition under the Welfare Party and 
the Justice and Development Party adopted similar populist ideology in order to 
solidify party identification and ant-Kemalist opposition.
Chapter Seven
The Welfare Party

Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Islamism in Turkey has undergone a number of phases and transformations. One of the most important manifestations of political Islam was the Welfare Party. A combination of economic, social, and political factors in the periphery contributed to the growth of Islamism in Turkey. Two of the most important factors that specifically facilitated the preeminence of the Welfare Party in the 1980s and 1990s were globalization and neo-liberal economic policies. The introduction of these policies highlighted the ongoing tensions between the urban Kemalist secular elite and the provincial religious economic establishment. Similarly, neo-liberal economic policies and a burgeoning immigrant population in cities precipitated the growth of the Welfare Party as a party representing Islamic social justice.

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kemalist political faction, manifested in the Republican People’s Party, placed a high emphasis on developing heavy industry. Thriving domestic industry would limit Turkey’s reliance on other countries, particularly Western countries, in its economic development. Kemalist policy-makers and bureaucrats developed close relationships with industrial entrepreneurs (Gülalp, 2002, p. 438). Companies benefited from tax breaks and other favorable government policies that helped
them grow into hugely profitable industries. Kemalist government leaders continued to influence economic policy, engineering it to benefit large industrial corporations centered primarily in Istanbul. A system of clientalistic relationships between the state and businessmen has existed throughout the twentieth century. Because of these clientalistic relationships, the “state has retained its central position for the business elite” (Gülalp, 2002, p. 438). These state-aligned industrial businesses became “the core” of the Turkish economy (Gülalp, 2002, p. 434).

In contrast, the Turkish economic “periphery” was represented by small and medium-sized businesses located primarily in provincial Anatolia. Anatolian businessmen tended to associate much more with Islam and displayed more religious conservatism than in Istanbul industries. This economic sector did not enjoy the same benefits and support from the Kemalist secular government as large industrial corporations based in Istanbul. A lack of government support created a sense of dissatisfaction and dejection among Anatolian businessmen. While they lacked political-capital from Kemalist government institutions, Anatolian businessmen created their own system of cultural and symbolic capital (Tugal, 2005, p. 8). This cultural and social capital exploited strong organic relationships present in Anatolian communities. These relationships included “religious orders, rural networks of extended kin, and fellow countrymen” (Tugal, 2005, p. 9). Necemeten Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, promoted the creation of a bourgeoisie class. However, businessmen in this class would
represent the interests and values of the larger Turkish society. Similarly, religion and moral responsibility would unite and guide entrepreneurs (Tugal, 2005, p. 8).

Globalization and its accompanying shift from heavy industry to export-based manufacturing provided an opportunity for provincial Anatolian businesses to gain prominence in the Turkish economy. Neo-liberal trade policies beginning in the 1980s promoted an export-oriented economy (Gülalp, 2002, p. 437). Small and medium-sized businesses grew significantly in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the changing economic focus (Gülalp, 2002, p. 437). Their growth was so significant that over time these businesses came to be known as “Anatolian tigers,” inspired by the Asian tigers (Tugal, 2005, p. 9). One observer characterized this trend by stating, “Political Islam in Turkey has found particularly fertile ground in the decline of traditional working-class politics and the rise of petty entrepreneurship” (Gülalp, 2002, p. 437).

The role of religion was significant in Anatolian business associations in that it prevented class conflict between businessmen and workers. Religion served to smooth class tensions between the two groups because of shared religiosity and belief (Tugal, 2005, p. 10). Similarly, the Welfare Party adopted the policy of a “just economic order” in its economic programming (Tugal, 2005, p. 11). The idea of “just economic order” was influenced by Islamic ideals and contemporary social conditions.

The on-going tension between the Kemalist-aligned big business elite and smaller provincial business that supports political Islam is best illustrated through two business and trade associations. TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialist and
Businessmen’s Association) was founded in the early 1970s to represent the corporate interests of industrialists based primarily in Istanbul. One of the central goals of TÜSIAD is to extend their enterprises based on shared connections with politicians and bureaucrats. MÜSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) was founded in the 1990s in opposition to these interests. MÜSIAD seeks to unite and support small and medium-sized businesses that are unable to find support among traditionally Kemalist government institutions (Gülalp, 2002, p. 439). This organization promotes its Islamic identity to facilitate trade among Muslims both domestically and internationally. A shared Islamic identity fosters a sense of solidarity among members. More importantly, it also creates broad market networks and sources of investment (Gülalp, 2002, p. 439). MÜSIAD also aids in the economic competitiveness of businesses by providing important member services like language training, international fairs, and trade periodicals (Gülalp, 2002, p. 439). Like the Welfare Party, MÜSIAD attempts to “turn ‘peripheral’ status into a network of solidarity” (Gülalp, 2002, p. 439).

Globalization and neo-liberal policies served as important social factors that contributed to the rise of the Welfare Party and political Islam in Turkey from 1982 until 1997. Globalization empowered small and middle-sized businesses that took root in provincial towns primarily in Anatolia. The Welfare Party was able to mobilize “political Islam as a movement of ‘counter-elites’ who are aiming for upward mobility in opposition to the secularist social actors privileged by their proximity to the Kemalist state and ideology” (Gülalp, 2002, p. 434).
Conservative Anatolian businessmen and counter-elites continue to play an important political role. They currently represent the backbone of support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government.

While the Welfare Party had a significant base of support from Anatolian businessmen, they also gained support from conservative rural-to-urban immigrants. The Welfare Party appealed to this group largely because of the use of religious rhetoric and provisions for social welfare programs. Religious rhetoric reinforced the importance of social justice and welfare programs and inspired the Welfare Party in the creation of a “Just Order” (Tugal, 2005, p. 7).

The 1980s and 1990s were marked by rapid urbanization largely fueled by rural-to-urban immigration. In 1960, urban population represented only thirty-two percent of the Turkish population. By 1990, this population reached fifty-nine percent of the country (Gülalp, 2002, p. 441). Similarly, the rate of urban growth between 1980 and 1990 was seventy percent (Gülalp, 2002, p. 441). The increased urbanization did not necessarily reflect growing wealth for immigrant populations. Recent immigrants often participated in informal sectors of the economy as well as in manufacturing by way of subcontracted work (Gülalp, 2002, p. 441). These sectors often had very little regulation in terms of wages and working conditions. Furthermore, the neo-liberal economic policies implemented in the early 1980s contributed to a decline in real wages and a dramatic increase in income inequality (Gülalp, 2002, p. 441). These problems occurred in the context of Turkish society after the failures of previous social welfare governments (Özbudun, 2000, p. 141). In the 1980s, local Islamic institutions
took up the social services that had been provided by the welfare state. These services included education and health care and were most prevalent in poor, urban neighborhoods (Gülalp, 2002, p. 442). The provision of these and other social services contributed to the popularity of the political Islamist movement and proved critical in mobilizing support for the Welfare Party in local elections (Gülalp, 2002, p. 442).

In response to various socio-economic conditions and the growth of local Islamist movements, the Welfare Party adopted a policy of “just economic order.” The party also endorsed a populist discourse of socio-economic justice and equality. Leaders in the Welfare Party envisioned an economic system in which morality dominated the market (Tugal, 2005, p. 7). This economic system would allow for the growth of capitalist enterprises in a free market system. However, a “just economic order” and the principles of Islam would prevent the oppression or abuse of the lower classes (Tugal, 2005, p. 7). These lower classes would also be protected by the state. Following success in the 1994 municipal elections, the Welfare Party redistributed urban resources especially to poor urban areas. Municipal governments allocated free coal, clothes, and food to the poor (Tugal, 2005, p. 13). They also mollified the effects of local corruption and thus improved the quality and efficiency of urban services (Tugal, 2005, p. 13). “Just Order” emphasized themes of labor, oppression, and class inequalities (Tugal, 2005, p. 11). Although these themes appear to be influenced by socialist and Marxist ideologies, Islamists related them to the issue of equality, a central tenet in Islam (Tugal, 2005, p. 11).
Also, the 1980 military coup made the promotion of socialist ideologies or policies a political impossibility. Terrorism and fighting between leftist elements and ultranationalists precipitated the 1980 military intervention. Military rule during this period was anti-politics and opposed the structure of the political system. All political parties were banned as well as trade unions. The use of socialist rhetoric in the post-coup context would have led to the swift abolishment of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court.

The growing economic prominence of conservative Anatolian businessmen and the influence of Islamist movements among disenfranchised urban poor led to the success of the Welfare Party in the mid-1990s. However, a changing intellectual and political environment also contributed to the party’s success. For much of the country’s history, the terms “intellectual” and “Westernized” were considered to be synonymous (Gülalp, 2002, p. 442). In the 1980s, an increasing number of intellectuals who supported political Islam challenged the notion that the concept of “Islamist intellectual” was an oxymoron (Gülalp, 2002, p. 443). Just as conservative Anatolian businessmen had been marginalized by the Kemalist secular elite, acceptance of the Kemalist ideology and corresponding Western lifestyle divided the professional middle class (Gülalp, 2002, p. 443). The continued hegemony of the Kemalist discourse maintained status rather than socio-economic stratification among the intellectual elite (Gülalp, 2002, p. 443). This group of professional middle class and increasing numbers of university students represented a third peripheral group and second counter-elite to Kemalist doctrine. This group used Islamist symbols and
ideology as a way of distinguishing themselves from traditional secularist scholars. These symbols, including the headscarf, were seen as tools of upward mobility within this intellectual niche (Gülalp, 2002, p. 434). The views of the growing Islamist intelligentsia were propagated through political publications in the 1980s and 1990s. The proliferation of published materials flourished during this period and served as an important vehicle for the spread of Islamist ideology.

The rise of the Welfare Party in the mid-1990s can be attributed to a number of economic, social, and political factors. Globalization and neo-liberal economic policies created new opportunities for Anatolian businesses to participate and compete in both domestic and global markets. The increased rates of urbanization and immigration necessitated the provision of a broad base of social services after the failure of previous social democratic governments. Additionally, the rise of a new generation of intellectuals and the spread of political publications allowed Muslims to challenge the preeminence of the Kemalist ideology and Kemalist ideologues in Turkish society.

Although the Welfare Party was suspended by the Constitutional Court in 1998, the relevance of various Welfare Party supporters has remained. Constituencies of Anatolian businessmen, poor urban immigrants, and Islamic intelligentsia each represent a unique but consistent base of support for the ruling Justice and Development Party. Each of these groups sought to reconfigure the center-periphery relationship maintained by the Kemalist ruling bodies. Interestingly, one of the ways these groups sought to achieve this goal was made manifest in Turkey’s turn towards the European Union. The EU provided
Islamists the opportunity to escape decades of Kemalist elitism and repression under the guidelines of universal human rights and democracy (Tugal, 2005, p. 18). EU reforms and the impact on political Islamism, including the Justice and Development Party, will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter.
Chapter Eight

The Justice and Development Party

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) maintains its roots in earlier Turkish political Islamist parties, including the Democrat Party and the Welfare Party, as previously discussed. Generally, Turkish Islamist parties have become less radical over time. However, the Justice and Development Party still embodies many of the principles central to previous populist Islamist parties. The AKP government’s sense of populism has helped to enfranchise religious conservatives and to include them in the Turkish electoral process. More significantly, this form of populism seeks to include them in the larger Turkish identity, at the expense of Kemalist secular elite. The European Union accession process and the Helsinki Agreements have provided the impetus for many Westernizing reforms. These reforms include significant improvements to human rights, the criminal justice system, and control of the military.

The rise of AKP began in the first years of the twenty-first century in the context of several significant political and economic transitions. The rise of the politics of anti-politics, the collapse of the party system, a shifting economic base, and a financial crisis helped facilitate the ascendance of the Justice and Development Party. During the 1990s, the political system was run by a series of weak coalition governments. Parties suffered a high degree of volatility and did
not have a stable base of support. Parties also held a low degree of legitimacy, and the public did not believe that parties could help solve issues (Özbudun, 2006, p. 129). Generally, political parties during the 1990s had failed to translate popular will (Özbudun, 2006, p. 129). In 2002, the party system in Turkey collapsed. The Justice and Development Party was viewed as an alternative to the inefficient and ineffectual parties that had been in government during the 1990s. The party was also viewed as a source of power for anti-Kemalist counter elites. The idea of AKP as a party of counter-elites will be discussed in depth.

The failure of the social democratic parties and suspension of the Welfare Party and its other manifestations in the Virtue Party and the Salvation Party left a gap in terms of the state providing social services for the urban poor. AKP’s populist vision and rhetoric of social justice sought to fill the void left by these previous parties (Taşkin, 2008, p. 53). Furthermore, a significant shift in class power occurred. The Justice and Development Party has greatly benefited from economic policies and social associations that developed during the Welfare Party period. The adoption of liberal economic policies in the 1980s initiated a shift toward export-oriented production. Economic growth moved from Istanbul and large-scale industrial capitalists to small export-based businesses centered in Anatolia. Business associations like TÜSİAD represented the interests of these medium to small scale business. They also provided much-needed support systems and resources that were denied by the state apparatus.

Turkey faced a severe economic crisis in 2001. The Turkish economy suffered during the 1990s due to weak coalition governments. By 2001, the
economy collapsed. The country adopted severe fiscal and financial reforms in accordance with International Monetary Fund requirements. In 2005, the New Turkish Lira was introduced. The New Lira ended an era in which banknotes were denominated in millions (Knight, 2011). AKP benefited from the economic reforms as the country’s economy began to grow after the necessary financial and fiscal reforms. These reforms also helped shield the country from being deeply affected by the 2008 global financial crisis (Knight, 2011). Continued economic growth has helped to solidify the Justice and Development Party’s rule.

While the political and economic contexts of the AKP’s political ascendance are important, it is also necessary to analyze party ideology and rhetoric. The Justice and Development Party and its policies can be assessed as a form of populism. This form is not based on economic policies, but rather it is based on a view of people as a political actor (Sözen, 2008, p. 80). AKP’s populism displays three characteristics central in the populist political ideology: the extent of internal societal boundaries, the homogeneity of social groups, and the process of removing political opposition.

AKP and populism in general assert that there is a conflictual relationship between “the people” and “the elite” (Taşkin, 2008, p. 55). This relationship is the basis of internal societal boundaries. The populists’ conception of the people asserts that virtue resides in “the simple people” and their collective traditions. “The simple people” are seen to embody the cultural treasure of the virtue of sacrifice. Similarly, populists believe that the instinctual lives of ordinary people
are more precious than the sophisticated knowledge of the “cultured man.” AKP and populism place the highest value on the people as political actors.

The views of “the people” are manifested through its leader. The leader is intended to be an ordinary person who displays extraordinary capabilities. In the case of Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan represents the perfection of the ordinary man. Erdoğan grew up as an Anatolian immigrant in a lower class neighborhood in Istanbul. He faced a number of significant obstacles in order to become the mayor of Istanbul and eventually the president of the Republic. He represents a reachable utopia for the lower classes. He demonstrates that religious Muslims from the lower classes can succeed in society. Furthermore, as a religious Muslim, his views are consistent with those of the people (Özbudun, 2006, p. 132). The views of the people constitute the national will. Thus, the Justice and Development Party has crafted a political system in which the views of the leader, Erdoğan, are presented as the national will (Özbudun, 2006, p. 132). Opposition to Erdoğan is construed as an obstruction to the national will of the people (Sözen, 2008, p. 82).

Societies define the abstraction of “the people” in a variety of ways. In terms of Turkish populism, AKP defines “the people” as religious Sunnis that are primarily Turkish in ethnicity. In economic terms, both factory owner and worker are equally worthy. Religion rather than ethnicity or nationality determines belonging (Taşkin, 2008, p. 62). In contrast, the anti-people are those who are schooled in the Western laicist traditions. The anti-people hold values foreign and intrinsically opposed to those of the people. The Justice and Development
Party defines real democracy as the rule of religious conservatives (Taşkin, 2008, p. 55). Rule by anyone else is a distortion of true democracy. This form of populism denies society heterogeneity. The idea of “the people” and “the elite” presents a dichotomy. The people and the elite are considered in homogeneous groups: the “pure” people and the “purely corrupt” elite (Taşkin, 2008, p. 55).

The creation of internal societal boundaries represents an enlargement of democracy in one regard. The leadership of the Justice and Development Party gives dignity and validation to groups that were once marginalized in society (Özbudun, 2006, p. 134). In a Kemalist secular society, a number of groups were denied adequate political expression. Religious Sunnis were particularly marginalized with Atatürk’s religious reforms including the original abolition of the caliphate, mandatory secular education, and the control of religious affairs by the state government. These policies have largely continued into the twenty-first century. However, the Justice and Development Party is slowly repealing some of these Kemalist reforms. More importantly, the party is redefining the hegemonic perception of an acceptable Turkish citizen. Political enfranchisement has become possible for more people. Because the primary definition of “the people” relies more on religion than on ethnicity, a larger proportion of the Kurdish population is able to participate in the political process. The Kemalist nationalist policies had excluded Kurds entirely from the national discourse. Atatürk had even refused to acknowledge the existence of Kurds within Turkish territory. AKP’s refocus on religion rather than ethnicity has served to calm Kurdish terrorist activity and to attract votes to the party (Taşkin, 2008, p. 61).
The Justice and Development Party’s interpretation of populism and religious rhetoric can lead observers and scholars to view the party as the third wave of Islamist counterrevolution to the Kemalist hegemonic discourse. The most significant counterrevolutionary change instituted by AKP is the role of the military in society. The AKP has been able to use the European Union accession process as a means to delegitimize military influence in society. In 1999, Turkey was promised European Union candidacy on the condition that Turkey complied with the Helsinki Requirements. The Helsinki Requirements necessitated the inclusion of liberal democratic processes into the operations of the Turkish government. The European Union stated a number of reservations regarding Turkey’s democratic systems. These reservations included increased legal protection of social, cultural, and political rights of all Turkish citizens irrespective of religious or ethnic origin, freedom of expression in Turkey, and the role of the military in Turkish politics (Baç, 2005, p. 22).

In the first years of their rule, the Justice and Development Party initiated a number of remarkable constitutional reforms in response EU concerns. These reforms addressed issues of legal protection for all Turkish citizens, increased political freedoms, and civilian control of the military (Baç, 2005, p. 22). In 2001, the government adopted thirty-four amendments to the 1982 constitution (Baç, 2005, p. 22). Central to these amendments was equal legal rights for Turkish citizens, regardless of religious belief or ethnicity. Freedom of expression was also increased with the new amendments. The government passed a law in 2002 that allowed for broadcasting in languages other than Turkish (Baç,
This legal change is significant because it highlights the increased political freedoms for ethnic minorities in accordance with EU requirements. These reforms were most significant for the Kurdish population that had been marginalized under Kemalist-influenced governments. A set of constitutional amendments which were passed in 2004 guaranteed the right to freedom of the press (Baç, 2005, p. 27). The Turkish Censure Board lost a significant amount of power in the governmental bureaucracy, and its control of Turkish broadcasting steadily decreased (Baç, 2005, p. 27). The Turkish justice system and penal code were reformed in order to comply with EU standards. The government revised the penal code to reduce torture (Baç, 2005, p. 26). Turkey also adopted a policy that abolished the death penalty in times of peace. It also converted death sentences to terms of life imprisonment (Baç, 2005, p. 26).

One of the most significant reforms initiated was placement of the Turkish military under civilian rule. A constitutional amendment increased civilian membership on the National Security Council from five members to nine (Baç, 2005, p. 27). Additional amendments limited the body to meeting once every two months rather than every month. Amendments now provided for the Secretary General of the NSC to be a civilian. This position traditionally had been reserved for a member of the military elite (Baç, 2005, p. 27). Although the power of the NSC had declined over time and was now relegated to a consultative position, these reforms were extremely significant symbolically. The military had been the traditional bastion and enforcer of Kemalist ideology in Turkish government and society. By bringing one of the central military organs under civilian control, the
Justice and Development Party effectively weakened the larger role of the military in society.

The Justice and Development Party government and their populist ideology have helped to enfranchise traditionally marginalized groups in Turkish society. Most prominent of these groups include religious Sunnis and the Kurdish population. However, this increased enfranchisement has not made for a more equitable Turkish society. Political dominance has shifted from the Kemalist secular establishment to a more religiously conservative base. While AKP’s populism has broadened the political opportunities for a number of groups, the party also employs a number of non-democratic tactics to remove political opposition.

The party has used a number of tactics to subjugate oppositional media. These tactics include charges of corruption and illegal conduct. Media outlets are also portrayed as being against popular will and critical of Islamic charity culture (Sözen, 2008, p. 84). These tactics highlight the ability of populist ideologies and governments to exhibit some authoritarian tendencies. The Ergenekon investigation further reduced the influence of the Turkish military. In 2007, the government discovered a stockpile of weapons and munitions that belonged to former military officials and neo-nationalists who were suspected of attempting to organize a coup against the AKP government. However, the government used the pretext of Ergenekon to broaden its investigation to include neo-nationalist journalists, academics, civil society leaders, and former military officials (Sözen,
2008, p. 84). The Ergenekon trials illustrate the AKP’s consolidation of political power and the military’s increased inability to intervene in the political sphere.

The Justice and Development Party benefited from a number of political and economic contexts that created a favorable environment for their rise to power. These contexts include the collapse of the political party system, failure of social democratic parties, growth of the Anatolian business elite, and the 2001 fiscal crisis. However, ideology and rhetoric have contributed to the party’s success. Justice and Development Party populism has enfranchised religious Sunnis and Kurds, traditionally marginalized groups. This interpretation of populism creates a dichotomy between “authentic Turks” and “corrupt elite.” The accompanying rhetoric echoes that of previous waves of Kemalist oppositional movements including the Democrat Party and the Welfare Party. Reforms including increased ethnic and religious freedoms and the modernization of the penal and justice systems have helped Turkey to further its completion of European Union accession requirements. However, requirements for civilian control of the military have allowed AKP to marginalize the bastion of Kemalist ideology. The Ergenekon Trials and suppression of opposition media further indicate the Party’s consolidation of power.
Chapter Nine

Conclusion

“Kemalism: A Revolutionary Ideology and its Islamist Opposition” seeks to define the secularist reform movement in Turkish history as a cultural revolution. This paper places the Kemalist reform period at a critical juncture in history. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman Empire faced a number of crises of ideology, leadership, and coercion. As described by functionalist revolutionary theory, a government that cannot provide the four functions of governance is in a state of disorder. The extent of political, social, and religious change that occurred under the umbrella of Kemalist reforms constitutes a cultural revolution. Three waves of Islamist counter-revolution have occurred and have challenged the social predominance of the Kemalist ideology.

Although there is significant debate within the academic community, for the purpose of this paper, Kemalism is identified as an ideology. By definition, an ideology is a set of ideas that belong together with some degree of coherence. Originally, Kemalism was developed as a set of principles of good governance. These principles were represented by the Six Arrows of republicanism, nationalism, revolutionism, popularism, statism, and secularism. Although these principles were largely pragmatic, they became ideological when combined with the cult of leadership surrounding Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Instead of merely standing as political principles, the Six Arrows more broadly represented the
ideological goals and aspirations of Atatürk and the early Republican People’s Party.

By establishing Kemalism as an ideology, Kemalism can be further described as a revolutionary ideology through a study of revolutions or stasiology. Stasiology encompasses four main subfields including etiology, taxonomy, morphology, and teleology. Etiology, the classification of causes in revolutionary situations, helps to establish the framework for analyzing the various weaknesses and failed reforms of the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Functionalist theory is particularly helpful in this regard. Although functionalism has partially fallen out of favor within the academic community, functionalism is the most applicable framework for understanding the various social and governmental ills existing in the Ottoman Empire. These ills represented the failure of the Ottoman government to provide the four critical functions of legitimation, public welfare, private interests, and coercion. The failure to provide the four functions resulted in a state of societal disorder and a number of severe crises including defeat in the Balkan Wars and World War I, substantial loss of territory, and enemy occupation by Greek forces.

It was in this context that Mustafa Kemal first rose to prominence as a successful military commander and leader. Under his leadership, the Turkish Republic was first established in 1923. The establishment of the Republic also marked the beginning of the single-party authoritarian period which lasted until democratization in 1945. By studying the cultural, religious, and political forms
initiated during this era, it is possible to assess the larger scale of revolutionary change, also known as taxonomy.

During the Kemalist period, one of the most significant reforms was a general secularization of Turkish society. The Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished in 1922 and 1924, respectively. Islam came under the purview and regulation of the state. The Turkish Historical Thesis underplayed Arab and other Islamic influences in Turkish culture in favor of pre-Islamic Anatolian civilizations. The Turkish language was reformed by replacing the Arabic/Persian alphabet with the Latin script. Similarly, a general process of Westernization occurred at the same time as secularization. Religious symbols like turbans and fezzes were replaced with Western-style hats. The Western calendar and clock were introduced. In terms of women’s rights, substantial gains were made during the Republican People’s Party period. Women gained the right to vote and had increasing professional opportunities. These and other reforms had a broad and sweeping impact on Turkish society. In terms of the taxonomy of revolutions, the Kemalist reforms represented a cultural revolution in which the leaders and style of government were changed, but the national psyche was radically altered.

While Kemalism represents a cultural revolution, three phases of Islamic counter-revolution have occurred in Turkey, indicating the larger course of the revolution, or morphology. The Democrat Party emerged out of the 1945 democratization process, originally initiated by the Republican People’s Party under the leadership of Ismet Inönü. The Democrat Party consisted of a loose
coalition of anti-Kemalists. However, once in power, the party developed a strong sense of populist ideology. Leaders of the Democrat Party consolidated power through a variety of means of suppression including media censorship and the legal prosecution of opposition leaders and parties.

Neo-liberal economic policies and a new emphasis on export-based industries in the 1970s and 1980s significantly changed the Turkish economic structure. Rural to urban immigration led to an increase in urban poverty. These new immigrants depended on social services provided by earlier social democratic parties. However, neo-liberal government policies resulted in the shift of the provision of social services to Islamic organizations. Along with providing social services to the urban poor, the Welfare Party also provided critical economic resources to Anatolian businessmen. Anatolian business had not benefited from state support and assistance programs provided by the Kemalist bureaucracy to large-scale urban companies. The Welfare Party and economic interest group MÜSİAD helped to foster economic cooperation and growth among conservative Anatolian businesses.

The 1990s saw a failure of the political party system in Turkey. Party identification and loyalty decreased significantly under a series of weak multi-party coalition governments. The economic crisis in 2001 severely crippled the economy and increased a reliance on Islamic social services. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained popularity under these conditions of political and economic collapse. AKP crafted a populist ideology that fundamentally changed the definition of a Turk. The new definition includes traditionally
marginalized groups including religious Sunni Muslims and Kurds. AKP has also garnered support from Anatolian business elites that are central to the country’s export-based economy. The European Union accession process inspired a number of significant legal, social, and political reforms. Most significantly, EU military requirements have provided an opportunity for the AKP government to eliminate some of the remaining vestiges of Kemalist military influence. The Ergenekon trials have given the Justice and Development Party further reason for the suppression of oppositional parties and media.

The Justice and Development Party appears to be successful in maintaining political power and implementing a variety of anti-Kemalist legislation. However, it is not yet possible to address the etiology of the Kemalist revolution. The long-term effects of Kemalism and Islamic reaction have not been consolidated in Turkish society. More time will have to pass before scholars will be able to analyze the ultimate successes or failures of the Kemalist revolutionary movement.

Regardless, Turkey’s important role in the international community cannot be denied. Turkey has been an active member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since 1952. Turkey has also been a European Union accession candidate since 2004. Following the 2001 economic collapse and restructuring, the country’s economy continues to grow yearly, particularly in industrial and manufacturing sectors. Turkish policy plays a crucial role in the Middle East and has largely avoided any internal civil unrest during the “Arab Spring.” The Turkish government remains the most secular government in the Middle East,
despite the on-going tensions between secularism and Islamism. In spite of his intermittent detractors, none of these reforms and achievements would have been possible without the transformational foundation laid down by Atatürk.
References


Summary of Capstone Project

Kemalism: A Revolutionary Ideology and its Islamist Opposition seeks to define the Kemalist reform period as a revolutionary movement. During the 1920s and 1930s, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his authoritarian government undertook a series of sweeping social and political reforms. This paper seeks to establish these reforms and the underlying Kemalist ideology as a revolutionary ideology. Using a functionalist perspective, the essay illustrates the various crises that faced the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A number of reform efforts failed to effectively address the entirety of Ottoman societal ills. The failures of the Ottoman Empire culminated in its loss in World War I. The country faced substantial loss of territory and Greek occupation.

The use of Max Weber’s charismatic leadership theory aids in the description of the rapid rise of Mustafa Kemal as a prominent military leader, military hero, then political leader. A distinct cult of personality formed around him and allowed him to advance his political and revolutionary goals. His political and social goals aimed to advance the new Republic in terms of modernization and Westernization. Atatürk believed that a country more closely resembling the West would not fall victim to imperialist intervention. A main tool for Westernization was undermining the social bases of support for Islam throughout Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s reforms were largely successful and represented not only a political revolution but a more expansive cultural revolution. Since the end of the single-party authoritarian period in 1945, three waves of counter-
revolutionary opposition have challenged the Kemalist hegemonic discourse. These movements included the Democrat Party (Demokrat Partisi) from 1950 until 1960, the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) in the mid-1990s, and the current Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). Each of these political parties represents one wave of a larger anti-Kemalist and anti-secular movement in Turkish society. Although the structure, leadership, and goals of these parties have differed over time, the continuation of the use of Islamist rhetoric and social programs by all three parties is significant. It is critically important to understand the roots of Turkish Islamist movements in order to better understand current movements and predict future ones.

In seeking to establish Kemalism as a revolutionary ideology, one must first address revolutionary theory and stasiology. Stasiology refers to the study of sedition and instability, indicating factionalism, uprising, and stasis. Stasiology includes four main subfields including taxonomy, etiology, morphology, and teleology. Taxonomy refers to the classification of revolutionary movements including the origins of change, its proclivity toward violence, and the scale or extent of the change. Etiology addresses the classification of causes in revolutionary situations. Several analogies are used to describe the causes of revolution. The first analogy is architectural and uses the conflict between the Marxist substructure and superstructure as the main cause of conflict. The mechanical model uses mechanical systems such as clocks as a metaphor to describe the functioning of society. In contrast, the organic model uses body systems, particularly the circulation of blood, to illustrate the healthy functioning
of society. A balance of forces indicates health while an imbalance leads to deterioration and chaos in society. Morphology describes the phases and transitions in revolutions. This branch of stasiology is important because it allows one to describe waves of counter-revolutionary opposition from a theoretical perspective. Teleology discusses the long-term effects of a revolution. This paper does not discuss teleology because the effects of the Kemalist revolution have not yet been fully consolidated.

A functionalist perspective provides the main framework in establishing the central argument. Functionalism most directly relates to the mechanical analogy in etiology. Governments must be able to perform four central functions in society in order to maintain power. A balance between all four functions indicates a situation of equilibrium in which there is a condition of health and balance within society. The four functions include the ability to legitimate one’s rule, perform public welfare projects, support private interests, and coerce the public through a variety of means.

In relationship to the Ottoman Empire, the ruling regime was unable to execute all four of its functions equally. Crises of legitimacy occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due in part to an influx of foreign ideologies. Many Ottomans were educated in Europe or in the European style. Officials and intellectuals were exposed to the ideologies of nationalism, republicanism, and constitutionalism among others. These foreign ideologies made it increasingly difficult for Ottoman leaders to legitimate their traditional form of government based on monarchy and divinity.
European nations and their support of ethnic, primarily Christian, minorities in the Ottoman Empire weakened the government’s control of a multi-ethnic empire. Similarly, European sponsorship encouraged discontent and rebellion among groups, including the Armenians. The capability of the Ottoman army eroded over time as the traditional military service system could no longer be supported. European weaponry and military techniques proliferated and caused significant difficulties for the Ottomans. Unequal training and weaponization was apparent in several significant battles during World War I.

Following the conclusion of World War I, the victorious British and French were too weak to impose the terms of defeat on what was left of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, they supported a Greek occupation of the nation.

According to Max Weber’s charismatic leadership theory, charisma is the eruption of the unique human ability during a certain time in history. Leaders are able to save tradition through a new interpretation. Mustafa Kemal rose out of World War I and the Independence War as a war hero and capable leader. Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal instituted a series of wide-ranging social, religious, political, and economic reforms.

These reforms included an attack on traditional strongholds of institutionalized Islam like the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922 and the Caliphate in 1924. The state abolished religious marriages and polygamy. Religious education became incorporated into the state apparatus rather than acting autonomously. Religious symbols were replaced with those of European
civilization. The turban and the fez were replaced with Western hats. The Western calendar and clock were introduced, and Sunday was declared the national day of rest rather than Friday. The new government promoted women’s suffrage and increased professional opportunities for women. The 1934 Family Names Law required families to adopt official surnames. Mustafa Kemal chose Atatürk, literally meaning “Father of the Turks.”

The government also sponsored the creation of a “Turkish Historical Thesis” which sought to promote Turkish national identity and cohesion. The thesis emphasized Turkic and Anatolian heritage and sought to separate the country’s past from the Middle East and the Islamic heritage of the Ottoman Empire. In an effort to further reduce the influence of the country’s Middle Eastern and Islamic origins and to reorient it to the West, the country adopted the Latin alphabet instead of the Arabic/Persian alphabet.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People’s Party (RPP) initiated these and many other reforms during the single-party authoritarian period which lasted from 1923 until 1945. The underlying revolutionary ideology of these reforms is referred to as Kemalism. Kemalism includes six central principles that shaped the ideology and policies of the RPP government. These principles include republicanism, populism, secularism, transformationism, nationalism, and statism. These principles will be discussed in depth in Chapter 3. According to stasiology, Kemalism and its six central principles represent not only a revolutionary ideology; the Kemalist reforms also led to a wide-spread cultural revolution.
In addressing the morphology of revolutionary movements, there are often periods of reaction or counter-revolutionary opposition. Since the founding of the Republic, Turkish society has undergone three stages of counter-revolutionary opposition. The first stage is the rule of the Democrat Party from 1950 until 1960. The second stage was the rise of the Welfare Party in the mid 1990s while the third stage is the current rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government since 2002. These opposition movements are considerably different from one another, but each centers around opposition to the Kemalist principle of secularism. Although the influence of Islamism has decreased in opposition parties over time, each stage of counter-revolutionary movement prominently featured Islamist rhetoric and social programs and attempted to address, to varying levels of success, the hegemony of the Kemalist discourse in society.

This study is significant because many scholars have studied the Kemalist reforms in Turkish history, but few have used revolutionary theory and terminology to refer to this period. Functionalism and other theories provide an analytical framework from which to describe both Kemalist revolutionary actions and Islamic reaction. Scholars may study the contemporary structure and ideology of the Justice and Development Party government; however, there is little scholarship that relates the themes of the AKP government with those of previous Islamist parties, like the Democrat Party and Welfare Party. Furthermore, there is little scholarship illustrating the AKP government as a third wave of counter-revolutionary opposition to Kemalist hegemony. Although opposition has become increasingly secular in its outlook, its social bases and
ideology have continued to a certain extent over time. The continuation of
Islamist rhetoric illustrates the connection between the three parties as part of a
larger anti-Kemalist counter-revolutionary movement. Analyzing the roots of
anti-Kemalism and Islamism allows scholars and the public to better understand
the actions and ideology of the Justice and Development Party. It allows officials
to more accurately predict future Turkish governmental action, including
increased involvement in regional Middle Eastern politics.