In the mind of Stalin, the problem of the Ukrainian peasants who resisted collectivization was linked with the problem of Ukrainian nationalism. Collectivization was imposed on the Ukraine much faster than it was on other parts of the Soviet Union. The resulting hardship in the Ukraine was deliberately intensified by a policy of unrelenting grain procurement. It was this procurement policy that transformed hardship into catastrophe. Famine by itself is not genocide, but the consequences of the policy were known and remedies were available. The evidence is quite powerful that the famine could have been avoided, hence the argument turns on Stalin’s intentions.

Chapter 6

THE UKRAINIAN FAMINE

by Lyman H. Legters

On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, European Social Democrats, including their Russian branch, held generally to two items of received doctrinal wisdom that would bear ultimately on the calamity of the early 1930s in the Ukraine. One of these was the belief that the rural agricultural economy, along with its associated social order, was to undergo capitalist kinds of development as a necessary prelude to the introduction of socialism in the countryside. That expectation could be traced directly back to Marx and Engels. The other belief had been fashioned more recently in the multinational empires of Habsburg and Romanov and taught that ethnic diversity, presumed to be a vestigial social fact that would eventually disappear, might be accommodated in a centralized political system by permitting, perhaps even encouraging, cultural autonomy.¹

In the Russian case, the first of these propositions was confounded initially in two ways. Capitalist development had not occurred to any significant degree in rural areas, so a socialist program could only be premature at the time of the Bolshevik seizure of power. And, more decisively, Lenin’s revolutionary strategy was based in part on appealing to the immediate interests of the peasantry, and the peasants for their part responded by simply seizing the land, making in effect a smallholder’s revolution. Consequently, the Bolsheviks in power, at least as soon as initial socializing fervor had abated, could contemplate socialism in the countryside only as a long-term development.

The matter of ethnic diversity, the nationality problem, was also complicated by tension between the proclaimed principle of self-determination and the
ambition to retain as much of Russian territory as possible for the impending socialist experiment. The result, which was attained only with Bolshevik success in the Civil War of the post-revolutionary period, was that self-determination gave way to territorial expansion. The urge to secure the greatest possible terrain for the socialist cause was thwarted in such places as Poland and Finland, but not so in other peripheral lands of the USSR such as the Ukraine. Once the boundaries were secure and the party apparatus in place throughout the federation, however, policy could revert to a less contentious approach to nationality, except of course in places where active resistance continued.

**Lenin's New Economic Policy**

Broadly speaking, then, most of the decade of the 1920s, characterized by Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP), featured a comparatively permissive attitude on the part of the Bolshevik leadership toward both peasants and the nationalities in their respective republics. As between these two strands of thinking and policy, the nationalities problem seemed the more settled in this period. The Ukraine, for example, enjoyed a veritable flowering of its national culture under the program of "Ukrainization" led by party leader Mykola Skrypnyk from 1927 to 1933. On the other hand, there was a more or less continuous debate about economic policy, notably between those favoring the abandonment of NEP for the sake of socialization of the countryside and the defenders of a very gradual departure from NEP, thereby making it clear that the respite of NEP for the peasantry would be reversed sooner or later. At the same time, some party leaders, Stalin prominent among them, regarded the two issues as indissolubly linked, suggesting that measures designed to cope with the peasantry and agricultural sector would address the nationality question also.

Even the defenders of NEP could not deny the continuing problem of grain procurement in the countryside, a problem the intensity of which varied with success or failure of harvest and with the uncertain tractability of the peasants. A downward trend in procurements in 1927-28, sufficiently drastic to threaten supplies to the cities and to other sectors of the economy, set in motion a campaign to extract the needed agricultural products, employing techniques that were reminiscent in their severity of the Civil War period. Peasants found to be withholding surplus grain were treated as speculators and their supplies subject to confiscation. The rhetoric accompanying the campaign tended to be couched in the terms of class struggle, focusing on allegations that the more favored agricultural producers were profiting at the expense of poorer peasants and of urban workers. This made the procurement struggle a kind of preview of, and dress rehearsal for, the collectivization drive that Stalin launched the following year.

"Primitive Accumulation"

The argument for proceeding with measures of socialization in the countryside had so far come mainly from elements of the party usually referred to as the Left and associated with opposition to Stalin’s increasing control over the party. Preobrazhensky in particular had advocated a deliberate exploitation of the peasantry, what in Marxist terms would be called "primitive accumulation," as the best way to finance economic development in general. His ideas had been renounced by the party officially, and Stalin was supposed to be among those rejecting such measures. By the time of the procurement crisis, Stalin’s dominance within the party had been secured, as demonstrated by the reluctance of party leaders to do or say anything that might identify them as defenders of the kulaks, the more prosperous peasants who now figured as the enemy in this phase of class struggle. And Stalin’s shift in position by 1928-29 was perhaps less abrupt than it seemed.

That shift revealed itself as a sudden adoption of the Preobrazhensky line, whereby peasants would be underpaid for their output while paying excessive prices for the purchases they had to make, the whole enterprise masked as an attack on the kulaks for their exploitation of less favored segments of the peasant population. The emergency measures of 1928 produced a deepening division within the party, Bukharin joined by Tomsky, Rykov, and others in advocating moderation while Molotov and Kaganovich supported Stalin in his draconian approach to procurement. The split became more evident toward the end of the year and early in 1929 as Stalin took an increasingly explicit stand on rapid industrialization at the expense of agriculture, as reflected in the upward movement of the targets stipulated in the Five Year Plan, drafted in 1927 and intended to run through 1931-32. At the same time, he intensified his effort to isolate the opposition and mobilize the party behind his program. Yet as late as April 1929, the crucial Sixteenth Party Conference appeared to maintain the essence of NEP with respect to agriculture. Though the socialized sector, state and collective farms, was to be developed further, ninety percent of agricultural production was still expected from individual farmers. Given the renewed emphasis on industrial development, this cautious outlook for agriculture contained a serious contradiction.
Collectivization

The contradiction began to be resolved late in 1929 as the party moved to a more coercive campaign of collectivization. Until then, although collectivization had been favored officially, it had been largely voluntary and involved mostly the poorer peasants. But as the campaign of dekulakization intensified, larger numbers joined the collective farms out of fear that they might be labeled *kulaks* and become subject to dispossession. At this stage, too, the "encouragement" of collectivization fell increasingly to police organs and to the brigades of militant workers sent out to the countryside from the cities. The result, in which political motives and perceived economic requirements can scarcely be disentangled, was a massive overfulfillment of Five Year Plan goals for collectivization and the effective destruction of the NEP orientation of agricultural policy. Stalin appeared to acknowledge the shortcomings of the campaign with his "Dizzy with Success" article of March 1930, in which he deplored certain excesses and, in effect, introduced a pause in the process of collectivization. In the confusion that followed for most of 1930, and in the face of uncertainty among the agents of collectivization who had not been warned of Stalin's shift, Stalin's admissions were confirmed as to the shallowness of peasant "conversion" by the movement of vast numbers out of the kolkhozes. Nevertheless, after this interlude the drive for further collectivization resumed.

Peasantry and Nationality

From the Ukrainian point of view, there was much to confirm Stalin's linkage of peasantry and nationality as problems to be addressed. Indeed, despite the autonomy that the Ukraine continued to enjoy in the cultural realm, it was very possible to view the policies pronounced in Moscow as twin onslaughts on Ukrainian nationality and peasantry. The percentage of Ukrainian farms collectivized rose from 8.6 in December 1929 to 65.0 in March 1930 to 70.0 in mid-1932; corresponding percentages for Russia were 7.4, 59.0, and 59.3. The 90 percent mark was reached by 1935 in the Ukraine, not until late 1937 in Russia. Moreover, the urban workers sent forth to implement collectivization introduced an ethnic issue; many came from outside the Ukraine, and even in Ukrainian cities many workers were Russian, or at any rate non-Ukrainian. With collectivization taking priority over Ukrainization, the Ukrainian party organization was profoundly affected. Skrypnyk's regime was undermined, and lower party echelons were transformed as party secretaries were purged, often for real or imagined opposition to collectivization. At the same time, Ukrainian resistance seems to have been exceptionally strong, as indicated by numbers of punishable offenses.

Questionable as the forced collectivization program may have been from an economic point of view, by itself it would not necessarily have led to famine. Enormous hardship was inflicted on the peasantry in the course of it, especially in the winter of 1929-1930, and of course not only in the Ukraine. Enormous losses were also recorded as the peasants responded with sabotage, destruction of grain and livestock. Furthermore, the impact was by no means restricted to the *kulaks*, for the sheer scale and recklessness of the drive inflicted severe damage on whole regions, including many middle and even poor peasants who were caught up in the "dizziness" of unchecked coercion. Nevertheless, famine was not inevitable.

Unrelenting Grain Procurement

A policy of unrelenting grain procurement made the critical difference between hardship and catastrophe. The Ukrainian harvest of 1930 was exceptionally good and could meet the quota (of about one-third) imposed by Moscow with no great difficulty. The same 7.7 million ton quota for 1931 could not be met, however, because of the poorer harvest, and central authorities, while applying great pressure, began to attribute the shortfall to deliberate withholding of grain. The 1932 harvest was poorer still but, even with a modest reduction in the quota, Moscow demanded nearly half of the total—which by itself would have met bare requirements in the Ukraine for people and livestock. Ukrainian party officials issued numerous warnings about the dire consequences to be expected if Moscow did not relent, recounting stories of villages where nothing had been left for the populace to eat, and this at a time when the Soviet Union was exporting grain.

The official response to all warnings was indifference or disbelief, coupled with new regulations imposing stern penalties for withholding or pilfering. In November 1932 the Ukrainian Soviet regime prohibited the distribution of food and the creation of reserves (seed grain) until quotas were met. Even so, effective control over the Ukraine was transferred to Stalin's non-Ukrainian lieutenant, Pavel Postyshev, who ruled against the provision of aid to the starving countryside and sent brigades to collect what little was left of grain distributed to collective farm members. At the same time, Postyshev brought the nationality issue into play by blaming shortfalls in collections on Skrypnyk and other Ukrainian "nationalist wreckers."77
Terror-Famine

Memoir literature and interviews conducted long after provide a grim picture of the consequences: corpses in the streets of the villages, deliberate cruelty by enforcement authorities, starving children, cannibalism, in short, all of the accompaniments of deep and prolonged famine. Demographic evidence yields less graphic but no less startling demonstration of the terrible outcome of Stalin's policies. One estimate, by Maksudov, arrives at a figure of 4.5 million deaths in the Ukraine as a result of famine, a bit over half of the premature deaths he estimates for the Soviet Union as a whole. Noting that this estimate disregards the resettlement of depopulated villages by non-Ukrainians, Mace suggests the higher figure of 7.5 million. Demographic evidence also helps to locate the areas of greatest suffering, the Ukraine ranking first according to most accounts. Also telling is a comparison of two districts facing each other across the Russian-Ukrainian boundary, the Ukrainian side showing extreme devastation and the Russian side roughly normal mortality.

"Terror-famine" is the term Robert Conquest uses for the whole episode, suggesting not just the nature of the events but also the deliberate intent that pushed the misery associated with collectivization across the line to outright devastation. Famine by itself is of course not a genocide, nor is massive loss of life. But by demonstrating that the consequences of policy were known and remedies available, the argument turns on the intentions of those responsible. The evidence is quite powerful that the famine could have been avoided; it is overwhelming that the worst consequences could have been ameliorated at least. It is equally hard to disregard the evidence, not least from the statements of Stalin and other party leaders, that the entire policy had a nationality dimension as well as an economic one. The Ukraine would have suffered terribly, by its very nature as an agricultural stronghold, from collectivization and the manner of its imposition. But there is no adequate explanation, apart from the nationality question, for the singling out of the Ukraine for exceptionally dire consequences.

The UN Definition of Genocide

It can be argued that the UN definition of genocide is deficient in its failure to allow for murderous onslaughts on strata—such as the kulaks—of a given population, whether real or invented. Were this extension to be admitted, then the program of dekulakization, given the extreme loss of life that its implementation entailed, would count as a genocide. In any event, what is beyond doubt is that the Ukrainian famine does fall within the UN definition as an attempt to destroy the basis for continued existence of a nationality. The Ukraine survives as a self-conscious ethnic community, but a genocidal policy does not have to succeed in its final aim before it can be counted as a genocide.

NOTES

1. In the Marxian tradition the classic treatment of the subject is Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie (Wien: I. Brand, 1907); Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National-Colonial Question (New York: International Publishers, 1935) is a theoretically inferior effort, partly derived from and partly at odds with Bauer; for a modern study, see Ian Cummins, Marx, Engels and National Movements (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980).


8. For example, Miron Dolot, Execution by Hunger (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987).


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Chapter 6: Annotated Bibliography

* 6.1 *

The nine papers that make up this volume were originally presented to the Seminar on Soviet Nationality Problems, which was held at Columbia University during the academic year of 1968-1969. In the context of understanding Ukrainian nationalism, Marc Raeff’s paper, "Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy Toward the Nationalities," is both the most illuminating and the least dated by recent events in the Soviet Union.

The traditional methods of Imperial territorial expansion were 1) conquest or acquisition of non-Russian territories; 2) incorporation; and 3) assimilation. This three-fold process is unexceptionably applicable to the Ukraine. In 1654 Ukrainian leaders turned to Petersburg in an appeal for protection against the aggressive designs of Poland. Thus at first the Ukraine was a protectorate of Imperial Russia. In one hundred-twenty-one years, Russia was able to consummate the Ukraine’s incorporation into the Czardom of Muscovy. Raeff sets forth the steps which led to eventual incorporation:

...[I]n the Ukraine the Cossack Host managed to preserve its autonomy and organization at least until 1709, and it even lingered on in a limited way until 1775. In 1709, as a consequence of Hetman’s Mazeppa’s siding with Charles XII [of Sweden] at Poltava, the autonomy of the Dnieper Cossack Host was drastically curtailed. In 1775—following the Pugachev rebellion—Catherine II abolished the Zaporozhian Sich altogether.

The Czars sought to assimilate the Ukraine through policies of Russification. Of primary importance for Russification was the imposition of the Russian language on the Ukrainians, along with the prohibition of the Ukrainian language as a publishing vehicle. Russians have persisted in what is a delusion, namely, that the Ukrainian language is only a peasant dialect. In the 1820s, folklorists and poets, among others, mounted a successful effort to transform the "peasant dialect" into a fully developed literary language, a language that could claim equality with Russian in all respects. It will be recalled that in the late 1920s, Strypnyk, the Ukrainian commissar of education, called a conference to rid the Ukrainian language of Russianisms. This is a measure of the extent to which Ukrainian was not a mere peasant dialect.

* 6.2 *

In Chapter 10 of this revised edition of his 1968 publication, Conquest designates the era of the Great Terror as "a holocaust of the things of the spirit." By "things of the spirit," he refers to the cultural and scientific institutions, and their representatives, that flourished in pre-1917 Ukraine. The Stalinist purpose was to purge and then to destroy the Ukrainian intelligentsia, universities, and publishers. The Stalinist method consisted of widespread arrests, interrogations, and torture. Conquest also examines the horror of labor camps as ideological re-education centers for ideologically unsound peasants and intellectuals.

* 6.3 *

Conquest makes use of a wide range of evidence to substantiate claims, including testimonies from survivors and primary demographic data. He identifies two distinct Stalinist policies that, being merged, resulted in the decision to impose famine and ethnocide on the Ukraine in 1932-33. Dekulakization and collectivization from 1929-1932 was a policy in agricultural production designed to achieve socialism in the countryside in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine; the second policy was put in place to reverse Stalin’s previous leniency toward the renewal and revitalization of Ukrainian nationalism. The famine, preceded by the conspiracy trial in 1931, was imposed to destroy the

The Ukrainian Famine 111
independence and viability of the Ukrainian language, culture, intelligentsia, and autocephalous church.

Ukrainian nationalism has had a long history. The birth of the Ukrainian people, as distinct from the Russian people, can be dated from 1240 when Kiev, the capital of all the East Slavs, fell to the advancing Mongols. Those of the east Slavs who were pushed west became Ukrainians while those who lived North of Kiev became the great Russians.

Stalin succeeded in his designs to crush Ukrainian nationalism, but only temporarily. "With the extirpation of so many of its natural leaders and adherents at every level," national feeling was numbed during the remaining years of the 1930s. Yet ultimately the Stalinist drive failed, as events in 1990 and 1991 have unmistakably revealed.

* 6.4 *


*Execution by Hunger* is his horrifying memoir of the Ukrainian famine. Dolot, a survivor of the famine, strongly suggests that it was artificially induced as a special Stalinist measure to eradicate Ukrainian national aspirations.

* 6.5 *


Kingston-Mann offers a scholarly and theoretically sophisticated examination of the relationship between Leninist and Bolshevik thought and the role and status of the peasantry. The book is useful background for the collectivization strategy Stalin adopted at a later stage.

* 6.6 *


Koestler was in Kharkov during the winter of 1932-33, as he tells us in "Soviet Myth and Reality." He was appalled to discover the grotesque incongruity that existed between anyone’s observation of mass starvation in the streets and what the local newspapers were reporting about life in the Ukraine. Koestler notes that Stalin’s control of the press was total, in contrast to Hitler’s, which was only partial. Hence the local newspapers were boasting of over-fulfillment of economic plans. They were filled with pictures of smiling, happy peasants who praised Comrade Stalin on his accomplishments. Koestler contrasts this pretty fantasy with the unspeakably ugly truth:

> Travelling through the countryside was like running the gauntlet: the stations were lined with begging peasants with swollen hands and feet, the women holding up to the carriage windows horrible infants with enormous wobbling heads, sticklike limbs, swollen, pointed bellies.

* 6.7 *


Kravchenko was a young communist official in the Ukraine at the time of the famine. In Chapter 10, "Harvest in Hell," he explains the decision to deploy trusted communist cadres in the Ukrainian countryside to safeguard the new harvest:

> Everything depended on the new harvest. Would the starving peasantry have the strength and the will to reap and to thresh in the midst of millionfold death. To make sure the crops would be harvested, to prevent the desperate collective farmers from eating the green shoots, to save the *kolkhozes* from breaking down under mismanagement, to fight against enemies of collectivization, special Political Departments were set up in the villages, manned by trusted communists—military men, officials, professionals, N.K.V.D. men, students. An army of more than a hundred thousand stalwarts, selected by the Central Committee of the Party, was thus deployed through the collectivized areas, charged with the duty of safeguarding the new harvest.

He then describes the consequences of "safeguarding the harvest" as they affected the most vulnerable part of the Ukrainian population:

> The most terrifying sights were little children with skeleton limbs dangling from balloon-like abdomens. Starvation had wiped every trace of youth from their faces, turning them into tortured gargoyles; only in their eyes still lingered the reminder of childhood. Everywhere we found men and women lying prone, their faces and bellies bloated, their eyes utterly expressionless.
In 1943, Kravchenko was assigned to duty in the United States as a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In 1944, he defected while on a trip to New York. He says that he began to lose faith in the Party when he was ordered to safeguard "the harvest in hell."

* 6.8 *

Legters argues that the Gulag meets the UN definition of genocide by reason of its disproportionate involvement of national minority groups, but also that the UN definition is deficient when applied to a society that uses class categories, such as kulaks, as a basis for differential, murderous treatment of citizens:

If an allegedly socialist society, whose primary form of classification is that of class, either targets or invents a class with extermination in prospect, that program must count as genocide lest the term lose its continuing pertinence for the contemporary world in all of its variety.

* 6.9 *

Based to a considerable extent on Soviet sources, Lewin's careful and highly detailed study examines the decision for collectivization and the process of its execution in 1928-1929. Despite the fact that he does not single out the Ukraine and though he ends the treatment before the onset of famine, this is an essential text for the prelude to the famine.

* 6.10 *

Mace's book is the fundamental scholarly investigation of the Ukrainian problem in the Soviet Union. He lays the groundwork for an assessment of the genocidal implications of collectivization and the ensuing famine.

* 6.11 *

Mace argues that Stalin had singled out the Ukraine for especially harsh treatment because of the secessionist threat it posed for the Soviet Union. Mace reminds us that during the 1918 German occupation of the Ukraine:

Even Mennonite German communities welcomed their co-nationals and provided volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks, despite old pacifist traditions....The Ukrainians not only formed their own nation-state but after their military defeat and incorporation into the USSR, became what Poland would become in the Soviet bloc after World War II: that part of the larger entity that was most conscious of its national distinctiveness, most assertive of its prerogatives, and least willing to follow Moscow's model in arranging its own affairs.

In 1923, Moscow permitted a certain limited Ukrainianization, a policy designed to give the Soviet Ukrainian state a veneer of national legitimacy. Still later in the 1920s Mykola Skrypnyk became the Ukrainian party leader, he being a strong advocate of his Republic's national interests. With respect to the national language, "one of his first acts as education commissar was to chair an orthography conference." He brought experts from Europe, Russia, and the Ukraine together "to standardize Ukrainian spelling and purge the language of Russianisms."

Evidently the movement toward Ukrainian nationalist legitimacy went far beyond what Stalin had ever intended or authorized; it also went far beyond what he would tolerate. The "terror-famine" of 1932-33 was the result of Stalin's decision to reverse his previous policies favoring limited Ukrainization.

* 6.12 *

Mace depicts the Ukrainian famine in which five to seven million perished as a deliberate Stalinist assault on the Ukraine as a center of nationalism and as a potential threat to Moscow's centralizing authority. To document this charge, Mace describes the indictments made in a conspiracy trial held in the Ukraine in 1930:
the consequences of collectivization and famine for the famine to be 4.5 million. This estimate is low. Maksudov estimates the number of deaths caused by Mace places the number of deaths at 7.5 million.

In commenting on Stalin's performance as a dictator, Medvedev writes as a reform-minded communist. He constantly juxtaposes Stalin's "mistakes" and Stalin's "crimes," with mistakes being construed as errors of calculation or reasoning. In the example given above, Medvedev does not say that Stalin's views on nationalities were wrong, but only that one particular speech on the subject was poorly expressed and inadequately argued. Stalin's crime in this instance was to vengefully crush Strypnyk, his critic, rather than to refute him in open debate. Thus Medvedev sees the criminality of the Stalinist period as arising not from the communist system, not from an absolute dictatorship, but from the deep character flaws of Stalin the man.


Mitrany examines the position of nationalities in traditional Marxian thought, setting Soviet policies, including collectivization, within that context. He suggests that the revolutionary wave of the twentieth century has been primarily agrarian and that Marxism has been both hostile to and exploitative of it.


Although Pipes examines nationalisms in the Ukraine and Belorussia, the Moslem Borderlands, and the Caucasus, his elucidation of the nationalist movement in the Ukraine during the period of 1917 to 1923 is what concerns us here. From February 1917 to early 1920 when the Soviet conquest was complete, the Ukrainian national movement entered into, and withdrew from, a succession of tentative alliances with the Kerensky government, with the military rule of the White armies, and even, during 1918, with the German and Austro-Hungarian armies that occupied the country. Over these three years, as Pipes says, "no fewer than nine governments attempted to assert their authority over the land." None was successful in a struggle in which the main protagonists were the Ukrainian nationalists and the Russian communists.

The Ukrainian nationalists were strong in the villages but weak in the cities, like Kiev and Kharkov, which meant that they were dependent on the "politically disorganized, ineffective, and unreliable village." Moreover they were politically immature and inexperienced, not having had any practice in the art of administration. The fate of the Ukraine, therefore, was decided in the cities where the culture was predominant.
ly Russian and where there was an active hostility to Ukrainian nationalism. Nonetheless the Ukrainian movement which emerged in the course of the Russian Revolution was, despite its ultimate failure, a political expression of genuine interests and loyalties. Its roots were manifold; a specific Ukrainian culture, resting on peculiarities of language and folklore; a historic tradition dating from the seventeenth-century Cossack communities; an identity of interests among the members of the large and powerful group of well-to-do peasants of the Dnieper region; and a numerically small but active group of nationally conscious intellectuals, with a century-old heritage of cultural nationalism behind them.

**Briefly Annotated Works**

* 6.17 *

Bellis provides background on Soviet Marxism and its theoretical and ideological justifications for economic measures and policies, including the policy of collectivization.

* 6.18 *

Applying Marxian categories critically to the Soviet experience of the later 1920s, Bettelheim offers a trenchant analysis of the prelude to, and processes of, collectivization which he views as a species of appropriation.

* 6.19 *

The continuation of the monumental history begun by Carr alone, this is the history of the period immediately preceding collectivization; it details the circumstances that led up to Stalin’s decision to collectivize the rural economy.

* 6.20 *

An important examination of relations between Soviet central authority and the constituent republics in the post-Stalinist era, this book treats the Ukraine alongside the other republics. The focus is not only on discontent and other centrifugal factors but also on the implications of contemporary demographic trends.

* 6.21 *

The British Foreign Office documents in this collection afford a useful external perspective on the character of the famine.

* 6.22 *

By means of comparison and synthesis, Chalk and Jonassohn seek to refine the definition of genocide and our understanding of the phenomenon.

* 6.23 *

The author’s continuation of Carr’s *History of Soviet Russia,* these books trace the drive for collectivization, in the Ukraine and elsewhere, in the framework of shifting policies and with the status of the collective farm that resulted.

* 6.24 *

Dmytryshyn offers a general history of relations between the Soviet center and the Ukrainian periphery. He includes the shifting policies designed to address the nationality problem.

* 6.25 *

Ellison examines the decision of the Fifteenth Party Congress of 1927 to collectivize agriculture, emphasizing the interplay of forces within the party that conditioned the decision.
* 6.26 *

In Chapter 5 of their history, two Soviet-trained scholars deal extensively with collectivization and the ensuing famine, including a summary of estimated population losses. They do not single out the Ukraine or address the question of genocide.

* 6.27 *

Millar offers an economist’s examination of the performance of the agricultural sector during the collectivization that was a salient part of the First Five Year Plan.

* 6.28 *

Solomon details the debate among Marxist and non-Marxist economists concerning appropriate policies to be pursued in the countryside to promote agricultural production. The debate led up to, and was terminated by, the decision to collectivize rapidly and, in the event, brutally.

* 6.29 *

Viola examines the employment of workers as militant agents of collectivization in the period leading up to the resulting famine in the Ukraine and elsewhere.