Africans have rioted against Asians in South Africa and Kenya. The Asians were expelled from Uganda. Chinese have been persecuted throughout Southeast Asia and expelled from Vietnam. Japanese Americans in the United States were interned in 1942. Armenians by the hundreds of thousands and Jews by the millions were slaughtered in this century. All of these events have given rise to the connection between middleman minorities and the victims of genocide. "Middleman" or "trading" minorities are ethnic groups which are disproportionately represented in occupations related to commerce, especially in the small business sector. As minorities, they are not part of the ruling elite, although many may become quite affluent. It is this lack of power which makes them vulnerable to violence. The connection is certainly present in the last two cases, although the other cases, while reporting inter-ethnic conflict and violence, do not refer to genocide per se.

Genocide is defined legally in terms of the intentional physical annihilation of all or part of a group of people on racial, religious, or ethnic lines. This definition approximates what Helen Fein, following Vahakn Dadrian, has called "optimal genocide" and the manner in which Yehuda Bauer has distinguished the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews from most other "genocides." Genocide is a species of the more general category of "massacre," which involves "the intentional killing by political actors of a significant number of relatively defenseless people." Genocide, however, differs from ordinary massacres, because of its scope and aims. In the case of genocide, the aim is to transform a social field by removing a whole group of actors, not merely to terrorize the
group's survivors. It also differs from another favored form of population elimination, namely, expulsion or enforced emigration.³

Genocide by this definition has been directed at a wide variety of peoples. Probably the largest number of ethnic groups in recent times subject to genocide, although usually involving small numbers of individuals, have been peoples subsisting by hunting, gathering, and shifting horticulture (see Chapter 12). Other groups have also been subjected to genocide and various other forms of liquidation, such as the kulaks (or so-called wealthy peasants) in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or the Communists of Indonesia after the attempted coup of 1965, or the Muslims of Hamah (Syria) in 1982. None of these events points to a connection between middleman minorities and genocide. Still, the fact that two large-scale genocides were committed against groups generally identified as middleman minorities means that the link cannot be ignored. Indeed, the international convention against genocide was formulated in the wake of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, which can be seen as the prototype for the concept of genocide itself.

In this essay, those theories which have examined the middleman minority phenomenon will be examined in terms of what they say about the victimization of these ethnic groups in general and with regard to genocide in particular. This will be followed by a brief comparison of middleman minorities which have or have not been subjected to various forms of persecution.

MIDDLEMANISHNESS AS A PRECONDITION FOR VICTIMIZATION⁴

Middleman minority theories in modern social science began with theories which strove to explain the special position of the Jew in medieval and modern Europe. Several of these theories, particularly those of Werner Sombart and Max Weber, debated the role of the Jew in the creation of modern capitalist economies, not in understanding the reasons for hostility toward the Jew. Indirectly, both sociologists suggest that Jewish culture is responsible for hostility against Jews. Sombart was generally hostile to the bourgeois-capitalist form of enterprise, for which the Jews as well as other ethnic groups were responsible. Weber saw traditional Jewish forms of capitalism as being quite different from the rational capitalism that arose out of Puritanism. Unlike the Puritans, according to Weber, the Jews practiced a double standard of economic ethics, treating out-group members differently from members of their own group and not viewing work and business as a sacred vocation. While Sombart and Weber differed in their views on the roles of Judaism and Puritanism and in their politics, neither dealt with the victimization of the Jews per se.⁵
Wilhelm Roscher, Georg Simmel, and Ferdinand Toennies saw the Jewish problem in terms of intergroup relations. Roscher, the earliest of these three, analyzed the Jewish role in the medieval economic European economy, although he compared Jews with other groups as well. Roscher, based on then available historical data, found that the Jews controlled commerce in the early Middle Ages, only to be displaced by Christian merchants in the latter part of that period. In the early period the Jews were dominant, because they, as strangers, introduced monetary commerce into a feudal economy. They occupied a niche in the society as traders. As the society grew, Christians aspired to the position which Jews occupied, and through use of their power they displaced the Jews.

Simmel and Toennies considered the role of the trader as an intermediary between different groups of people, as one who is simultaneously within a society and outside it, as one who is distant even when physically nearby. The marginality of the intermediary makes him more objective, thus serving his success as a trader (and in other roles), but causing ambivalence on the part of others. They suggest a dialectical relationship between the intermediary who may or may not be a member of an out-group and members of a particular community.

An important part of the "stranger-intermediary" involves credit. In borrowing, the debtor reveals much of himself to the borrower. One may prefer to borrow from a stranger, who has little power over other aspects of one's life, but the high cost of such credit also breeds resentment. The ambivalence toward credit from a "stranger," even a familiar alien, lies at the heart of commercial arrangements involving minority middlemen and their majority clients. Even though the role of intermediary may be a necessary one, it may produce deep-seated hostility.

The elements of "middlemanishness" stressed by these five authors continue to be the ones which form the basis for middleman minority theory. The term "middleman minority" comes from Howard P. Becker, but the theories, which increasingly have been concerned with Asian immigrants and others rather than with Jews, have continued to make use of ideas formulated in an earlier time. The minority's ethnic specialization, in the first instance, is created by a status gap. The societies need people to do certain jobs in commerce and crafts; this is especially true of feudal and colonial societies, but such gaps may appear in modern industrial societies as well. The minority which occupies this niche is generally of foreign origin or otherwise distinguished from the rest of the population. Its success in occupying this niche is enhanced by its ethnic solidarity and by certain attributes such as frugality and a double standard of economic ethics. Hostility toward the minority is the result of the tensions between the minority as successful traders and entrepreneurs against majority group members who are their clients, employees, and
competitors. As more and more majority group members compete with the minority, hostility against the minority increases. The minority is also a convenient scapegoat, because of its frequent association with the ruling classes, who were their initial patrons. 7

Edna Bonacich's revision of middleman minority theory by applying it to immigrant groups in contemporary capitalist societies has renewed interest and debate. She has connected the middleman minorities to other ethnic groups by showing the similarities between the split-labor market and the situation of immigrant small businessmen. Both pertain to sectors of the economy which are shunned by natives because of the paltry rewards for hard labor, but, at the same time, both the immigrant laborer and the alien small businessman are seen as unfair competitors. While pointing to empty niches in the economy which minority middlemen fill, she did not see the necessity of positing a status gap in these societies. 8

From the debates of Weber and Sombart on, those explaining the connection between ethnicity and commerce have often disagreed with each other quite sharply. Rather than thinking of a single theory of middleman minorities, it is more appropriate to see middleman minority theory as a subset of hypotheses and propositions which deal with the meeting of economics and ethnicity.

One issue in the discussion of middleman minorities and victimization is determining situations in which these minorities escape persecution. Among the factors which appear to cause such reactions are competition with the out-group (or groups), visibility as strangers, and visibility as a separate ethnic group.

The first of these involves objective features of the economic scene. In the ideal model of the Indian caste system, there is a caste division of labor into which foreign groups could be incorporated. Each group contributes to the whole, and the society is permeated by an ideology recognizing the role of each without challenge. Indeed, we find that the Parsis, a fairly typical middleman minority in western India, and the Jews of India, who served in various occupational roles, did not suffer from persecution. 9 In the ideal status gap setting, such as in early medieval Germany or even in eastern Poland during the inter-World War period, the situation is similar. Again, various authorities suggest that persecution of Jews in pre-Crusades Germany, pre-World War II Volhynia, and the Belorussian areas was not as severe as in other times and places. 10

Another objective feature is that minority members are more likely to be seen as non-threatening in an open society with a growing economy. Then they may be seen as individuals, not group members, and their contributions are welcome. The openness to innovation may be limited to certain sectors or regions of a country or may encompass the whole society. Thus, in frontier areas minority members will be welcomed
more than in old areas, while they may find opportunities in either abandoned sectors of the economy, such as urban slums, or in new lines, such as the film industry in the early 1900s. Thus, such niches will be filled by disproportionate numbers of minority members.\textsuperscript{11} Contrariwise, a shrinking economic base with growing impoverishment is likely to result in anti-minority sentiment. This is especially true if the minority is growing and if its share of the societal wealth is growing. Perception of such growth, even if only apparent, may be sufficient to cause a rise in xenophobia.\textsuperscript{12}

The perception of the minority by the majority is important when theorists speak about such variables as visibility and ethnic solidarity. Bonacich, who isolated ethnic solidarity as a factor in both the success of the minority and in their persecution, has also pointed to the fact that such minority communities are frequently rent by intense factionalism and other rivalries.\textsuperscript{13} If there is much solidarity, it is most frequently found at an interpersonal familial level or in friendships formed in the community of origin. Yet, to outsiders, the minority is often seen as more united than it is: the famous psychological principle that all outgroupers look alike.

The effects of discrimination and persecution are twofold. On the one hand, they may induce group members to seek assimilation into the majority, especially its elite. On the other, they may react defensively and thus such action may reinforce group solidarity. These two reactions may come simultaneously, affecting different segments of a single minority. Thus we find that European Jewry during the late nineteenth century spawned assimilationists, Christian converts, and universalistic revolutionaries on the one hand, and Zionists and fervent Orthodox Jews on the other.

While most middleman minority theories see ethnic solidarity as reinforcing the xenophobia of the majority, assimilatory trends may have a similar effect. Minority members attempting to assimilate compete even more directly with majority members for places in universities, the army, the civil service, and other niches in the society. Since the majority tends to perceive all members of the minority as being part of a unified whole, it is easy to see how they may come to see all members of the minority, whether assimilationist, radical, conservative, or religious, as playing different roles in a single conspiracy against the majority.\textsuperscript{14}

The proportion of the minority to the majority may play a role in the way it is perceived by the majority. Stanislav Andreski has argued that if the minority is 10 percent or more of the population, it has reached a critical point of conspicuousness.\textsuperscript{15} The only exception he claims to a high proportion leading to such molestation is in New York City, where the position of the Jews has made it possible to fend off persecution. He sees the importance of numbers in that it leads to points of friction be-
between majority and minority members. On the other hand, he does not claim that smaller numbers inevitably lead to freedom from discrimination.

Numbers and proportions, however, are tricky indeed. Germany in 1933 gave rise to the movement which caused the Holocaust par excellence. The proportion of Jews was less than one percent of the total population. Yet the total "war against the Jews" was initiated and organized by a German, not a Polish, government. Again, perception is important. The proportion of Jews in prominent social positions and in the major German-speaking cities, including Vienna, was higher than in the country as a whole. There also were Jews throughout the country, including many in rural areas. This made the Jew in early twentieth-century Germany loom larger than percentages would suggest.

An important part of a perception is whether one is seen as a "native" or as a "stranger." (Alternatively, a minority member may wish to be seen as an individual on one's own account, rather than as a representative of a collectivity.) Entrepreneurs in early nineteenth-century Britain might be primarily Scots or Dissenters, like Quakers—i.e., members of distinctive groups within the society, but natives. The businessmen of Casablanca include Berbers from the Sous region and Arabs from the city of Fes, both groups of Moroccan Muslims, albeit distinctive ones. In addition, there are Jews, who are Moroccans but not Muslims, and Frenchmen who are neither. Thus there are degrees of "nativity" and "strangerhood."

Urbanization and other forms of internal migration may upset the feelings of neighborliness which may have come to mark relations in rural areas. In the older cities or in the countryside, an equilibrium based on complementarity and toleration may have been established. With massive urbanization, however, all out-groupers may be seen as hostile strangers, and competitiveness and envy of successful minority members may be the new order of the day. Large-scale international migrations would amplify such a perception. The mass emigration of Jews from Russia and the Polish provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the late nineteenth century upset relations between the small Jewish populations of Western Europe and the United States and their Gentile neighbors. The large-scale emigration of Chinese to Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century had similar effects for the more acculturated Chinese in those countries.

Visibility of the minority is heightened by its own characteristics, such as concentration in certain occupations, a special religion or religious practices, racial signs, and speaking a separate language. This occurs most obviously when the minority consists of recent immigrants, but in multilingual or multi-religious areas, members of several ethnic groups may have shared a single region for generations, such as in much of Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
For these elements of estrangement to result in conflict, other elements must be added. Political mobilization which may utilize the minority as a target is an important one. In such a case, the members of the minority are seen as representatives of a group. Usually such a political mobilization is connected with an ideology. Two elements combine in anti-middleman ideology. One is to view commerce, especially that engaged in by stranger-middlemen, as evil and as violating the rights of natives. In its extreme form, moneymaking is seen as diabolical. The second is to view the minority middlemen as foreign agents who are enemies of the nation, whether this is the Bolsheviks, the Pope, or the Japanese Empire. Both serve to dehumanize the minority middlemen; when combined they form a potent weapon to use against them, and this helps exacerbate the normal frictions between businessmen, their competitors, and their clients.

While those opposed to particular minorities follow strategies to convince the majority and the ruling classes of the minorities' estrangement, the minorities follow various strategies with an opposite intention. They may seek to lower their profile and to be less conspicuous. Thus they may refrain from open political activity as an ethnic group and may give up their language, religion, and the like. They may strive to convince their fellows that while they maintain a separate identity, they are full members of the nation. Thus they may stress their participation in the struggle for independence by the nation-state. They may try to change the ethnic group's occupational structure and otherwise reform themselves so as to answer their critics. Finally, they may stress a political ideology that gives them full rights of citizenship as individuals.

In post-World War II North America, several ethnic groups once labeled middleman minorities have made considerable progress along these lines, including the Jews and the Japanese.

Middleman minority status thus seems to cause victimization when the friction derived from trade relationships is compounded by ethnocentrism and by ideologies which dehumanize all alien-traders. Even if the minority, however, is in some ways victimized, the types of victimization range from mild discrimination to optimal genocide. Middleman minorities have a special vulnerability to attack because their social position is one with some wealth but with little authority or power. Even if most members of the minority are extremely poor, there are usually some who are affluent and excite envy. The minority is usually dependent on the ruling class, which sacrifices the minority as a scapegoat. The minority is generally unarmed. Because of its business connections, it must be essentially sedentary.

Some of these qualities may under some circumstances be a strength. The weak, unarmed nature of the minority may make it possible for the majority to tolerate the minority. Such was indeed the position of the Jews under Islam, where for centuries they were outside the power
struggle. Jewish officials might serve as scapegoats, and mobs might attack Jews as a whole when they fell, but they were also to be tolerated if they showed proper deference for the majority. The occasional attacks can be seen as a ritual to restore the proper deference.20

Middleman minorities as groups may have some protection through their dispersion, in that one place may be a refuge when another is perilous, although if the net used against them is wide enough this is of little avail. Since such minorities are often recent immigrants, their former homeland may offer protection and/or refuge. This, however, has often proven hazardous, especially if the homeland is the enemy of their present place of residence and makes the sense of threat seen by their hosts realistic, as in the cases of the Jews of Syria after 1948 and the Japanese Americans during World War II.

PROBLEMS IN THE COMPARISON OF GENOCIDES

Certain problems of comparison can be found throughout the social sciences. First, no two situations, events, or other units of analysis are identical. When taken to the extreme, realization of this fact would make any comparison impossible, but it should be kept in mind. Two, studying more than one case often necessitates spending less time and effort on each case than if one were devoting all of one's attention to a single instance. While several examples will bring out crucial features which need to be compared, the presentation of each case becomes more superficial as the number of cases increases. Where a great many cases are used, as in cross-cultural or cross-national correlational studies, complex patterns must be reduced to relatively simple abstractions. Three, the definition of the units of analysis is always a difficult task. Four, studies on particular cases are often quite different in quality.

These problems are acute in the study of genocides. Uniqueness has, of course, been argued with regard to the Jewish Holocaust of 1941-1945, although in the process both Bauer and Dawidowicz have compared these events to others. Bauer comes close to admitting that the Holocaust does have some resemblance to the Armenian genocide during World War I.21 The second problem is one endemic to comparison and not particular to this area. Problems of unit definition are, however, important. Social scientists are accustomed to dealing with nation-states as units; yet problems spill over national frontiers. This is especially true in times of armed conflict. The Jewish Holocaust and attendant genocides of other groups during World War II took place at a time when Germany rapidly spread its control over most of the European continent and then retreated. Thus the nation-state approach has had to be modified considerably.22 The Armenian genocide was contained within the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in the East African cases of
Asian expulsions possible demonstration effects of the Kenyan partial expulsion on Uganda must be taken into account. In addition, the reaction of receiving countries, particularly Great Britain, depended on internal factors. This was also relevant with regard to other expulsions, as we shall see, such as the role of Malaysia and Indonesia at the time of the 1978-1979 refugee crisis involving ethnic Chinese. In defining the unit of analysis, attention must be paid to temporal dimensions as well as spatial ones. In considering European Jewry, does one begin the Holocaust in 1933 with the rise of the Nazis to power or in 1939 with the invasion of Poland? Does one consider the 1894 massacres under Abdul Hamid II as forerunners of the 1916 genocide or as part of it? When one concentrates on the preconditions, this question is less crucial than in dealing with other aspects of the genocidal events, but the question is still relevant. Scale also plays a role in our consideration since some ethnic groups discussed here are much smaller than others.

A problem faced by comparativists is that of the differing bodies of literature on each group or crisis. There is an immense and growing literature on the Holocaust and a smaller but substantial body of material on the Armenian massacres and genocide. Those dealing with Asians in East Africa and Chinese from Vietnam are much smaller, especially since these are events which occurred much closer to the present. The former two literatures are dominated by participants and historians, while the latter two are dominated by social scientists. The richness of the work on European Jewry, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust is overwhelming, compared with the much thinner data available on the other communities.

In this essay, I will compare a number of middleman minorities, beginning with those who were not subjected to extreme harassment. They will be compared to those persecuted and expelled, as well as to those subjected to "optimal genocide." The comparison made here is suggestive and not definitive; the units used are not strictly comparable. For our cases of non-persecution or only minor harassment, the Parsis of western India and the Jews of Morocco will be used. In dealing with expulsions, recent cases from Africa and Asia are cited. One such example, that of the Chinese in Vietnam, is considered in greater detail. This particular instance was quite recent and, at the same time, suggested many parallels to one phase of Nazi persecution which preceded genocide proper, namely, the refugee crisis of 1938-1939. It is important that we understand what differentiates such forms of population elimination from the full-scale Holocaust.

There is some agreement that total or near-total murder of peoples occurred in only two cases of persecution of middleman minorities—that of the Jews by the Nazis and that of the Armenians by the Young Turk regime. The material on these two cases is better formulated than that on the others. Dadrian and Robert Melson, in particular, have analyzed the events which led up to the deportations and liquidation of Armenians in
1915 in social scientific terms, which makes comparison easier. The work done on the Nazi "war against the Jews" is huge; various authorities, such as Bauer, Dawidowicz, and Fein, have addressed themselves to a number of issues of interpretation in which they have summarized the literature available. Rather than summarizing the history of the Armenian and Jewish holocausts again, I will refer to these events, assuming some knowledge on the part of the reader. In all cases, descriptions will be brief, and those interested are referred to the sources listed in the notes.

All of the minorities in question are concentrated occupationally in commercial and related occupations. While the ramifications of this vary from place to place, this is not gone into here. Among the points to be compared are the following:

a. recency of foreign origin;
b. visibility of the group;
c. degree to which the minority is separated from the majority on cultural, racial, religious, and linguistic lines (nativity and strangerhood);
d. degree of impoverishment of the society at large at the time of conflict;
e. the minority's proportion of the population at large;
f. the minority's perceived share of the national wealth (separate occupational role);
g. extent of complementarity and/or competition with the majority;
h. the absence of common foes and the relationship of the internal ethnic conflict to external relations of the nation.

These points of comparison suggest that the occupational specialization of the minority is but one aspect influencing its ultimate fate.

EXAMPLES OF MIDDLEMAN MINORITIES

Just as middleman minorities are not the only victims of genocide, so they are not inevitably the subjects of persecution. One example is that of the Parsis of western India, who were neither persecuted in pre-modern times nor in the twentieth century when India was the scene of much inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict. Previously, the Indian Parsi and Jewish cases were explained in terms of the complementarity implicit in the traditional caste system, but this does not explain why no persecution (apart from two minor instances of riots) took place when other conflicts and massacres engulfed India. Here structural explanations have some cogency. The Parsis are neither Hindu nor Muslim;
rather, they belong to the ancient Persian religion of Zoroastrianism. They have been in western India for a thousand years and they speak Gujarati, the local language. While the Parsis were clearly demarcated as an ethno-religious group which was concentrated in certain sectors of the economy and were more prosperous than the general populace in an impoverished nation, they were a small and declining group. In 1971, there were approximately 91,000 Parsis in India, approximately 70 percent living in Bombay. This was fewer than in 1941, in a country where the population was over 400 million and growing. Even within Bombay their proportion of the population was declining and their once great local political power had vanished. Until very recently Bombay had prided itself on its inter-religious harmony, and the Parsis benefited from that as well. Although the Parsi community as a whole had favored a conservative pro-British course, enough Parsis, including Indira Gandhi's husband, had been proponents of independence to give them a place in the national constellation. Many of the Parsis who feared the consequences of independence emigrated quietly, thus contributing to the community's decline. Intermarriage was increasing. Despite their coolness to Indian nationalism, the Parsis were not identified with either China or Pakistan, the main enemies of the Indian Republic since independence.26

Another case where no major persecution took place in a potentially threatening situation is that of the Jews in Morocco. Again we have the instance of a middleman minority which (although containing numerous poor people) is more prosperous in the aggregate than the majority in a Third World nation. Like the Parsis and the Jews of Europe, the Moroccan Jews had lived in the country for many centuries; they were not recent immigrants. They spoke the local Arabic dialects. Later, many adopted French as a domestic language. As in India, the Moroccan Jews occupied specific economic niches in a traditional pre-industrial economy, although there also was some competition in commerce between Jews and Muslims. Jewish occupations ranged from craftsmen and rural peddlers to international traders.

The Jews were clearly subordinated to the Muslims in traditional Islamic fashion. While this resembles the hierarchy of the Indian caste system, there is a difference. The Jewish and Christian religions are viewed as past and potential rivals of Islam. The Jews could also convert to Islam. Moroccan history contains instances of pogroms against Jews, especially when Jewish officials were deprived of office, and scholars dealing with North Africa dispute the degree to which Jewish-Muslim relations were marked by subordination and persecution or by peaceful symbiosis, based on patron-client relations.27 There is little dispute, however, that these relations were never marked by such massive upheavals as the Rhineland massacres during the Crusades, the
medieval expulsions from England, France, Portugal, and Spain, or the Cossack depredations of the seventeenth century.

Like the Parsis in British India, the Jews in both Spanish and French Morocco welcomed the protection offered by European colonialists. They were perceived as being collaborators. At the same time, they were subjected to French anti-Semitism, but when this came to a head during World War II under the Vichy regime, the Moroccan Sultan, Mohammed V, protected them as his subjects. The postwar period was marked by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Moroccan struggle for independence. While some Moroccan Jews identified with Moroccan nationalism, others stood aside, preferring the continuation of French rule or emigration to Israel, France, or Canada. Although far to the west of the Levant, Morocco is a member of the Arab League and contributed troops to various countries fighting Israel in 1967 and 1973. The potential for large-scale violence and/or government sponsored restriction and harassment has been present, but it has not occurred. Indeed, in April 1984, Morocco was the scene of a public meeting between Moroccan and non-Moroccan Jews and the King of Morocco in Rabat. The Jewish leaders included members of the Israeli Parliament. This was an unprecedented event, especially since Morocco is a member in good standing of the Arab League.

Several structural features may explain why Morocco has not been the scene of such persecution. One is that the patron-client relationships which were marked by dyadic contracts between an individual Jew and his family on the one hand, and a powerful Muslim and his family on the other, characterized intergroup relations in many parts of the country. The patron would consider an attack on his Jewish client as an attack on himself. While such patronage was primarily found in rural areas, it could be extended to urban areas, and the present king and his father have considered the Jews as their clients. This serves as a deterrent to persecution, although such patronage has not been unknown elsewhere in countries where pogroms have occurred.

The rapid and unimpeded emigration of Jews since 1950 has made the Jews less vulnerable. Anticipating trouble, the Jewish community has declined from over 200,000 to less than 20,000 today. This is a much more rapid decline in numbers than that of the Parsis. While it has increased the perception of the Jews as a foreign and unassimilable minority, it also makes them less and less of a threat and a scapegoat. Few Jews are prominent in politics.

In post-independence Africa, Southeast Asian and various middleman minorities have been affected by legal discrimination and expulsions, involving either the whole community or particular segments of it. The groups involved have generally been of recent immigrant origin and, for the most part, bearers of foreign nationality. Victims of persecution have included civil servants and labor migrants as well as those involved in
commerce. In West and East Africa, for instance, victims of forced repatriation have included both Africans from neighboring countries and Asians.\textsuperscript{31} Many of the migrants entered these countries during the colonial period to serve in the newly expanding economy, crossing what were basically provincial boundaries between colonies of the same metropolitan power. There were some exceptions to this, such as the Chinese and Lebanese. Many Indians from British India migrated into French-controlled areas. While the expulsions of this variety which have drawn the greatest world attention have been those of Asians from Kenya and Uganda and of Chinese from Vietnam, equally large expulsions have occurred involving labor migrants from neighboring countries. For instance, Idi Amin's actions against the Indians and Pakistanis in Uganda in 1971 were preceded by the expulsion of the Kenyan migrant workers, especially members of the Luo ethnic group, by his predecessor, Milton Obote.\textsuperscript{32} This earlier event was less publicized outside of Africa because the expellees were repatriated to a neighboring country, requiring little action on the part of European countries. The Asians, however, attracted greater world attention because many had claims as British subjects; but Britain was reluctant to accept non-white commonwealth subjects as immigrants. On the other hand, India and Pakistan, the lands of origin of these expellees, felt that those who claimed British nationality were the responsibility of Britain, which at the time of Ugandan independence had promised them protection.\textsuperscript{33} While there have been massacres, pogroms, and other genocidal actions in Africa since independence, they have generally not been directed primarily against middleman minorities. One possible exception is that of the massacres directed at the Ibo in northern Nigeria in 1966, which led to the attempted secession of Biafra and a hard-fought civil war. These massacres, however, had been preceded by a military coup in which Ibo officers had overthrown a government dominated by northerners and in which northern officials had been assassinated. Subsequently the Ibo-dominated junta was violently overthrown and pogroms were conducted against Ibo outside of their region in Nigeria. Dadrian (1975) sees the anti-Ibo pogroms as retributive genocide.\textsuperscript{34}

The separateness of the groups considered here varies. As recent immigrants to the various countries where they live, they are generally separated by culture and social structure. In some cases, they are racially similar, as in the case of Nigerians in Ghana or Thais in Malaysia. The degree of linguistic separation also varies, as does willingness to intermarry with the local populace. Most separated from the local populace were probably the Indians and Pakistanis in East Africa. In addition to their linguistic and racial distinctiveness, most South Asian groups also maintained rigid caste and sectarian boundaries and did not even intermarry with other Asians. This was more true for Hindus than for Muslims.
Some of the instances of expulsion from African and Asian nations have evoked images which remind many in the West of events related to the Holocaust. The massacres in northern Nigeria were very effectively used by proponents of Biafran independence. The homelessness of Asian refugees from East Africa and the "boat people" from Indochina reminded many of the refugee ships of the World War II era which went from port to port with unwanted people, sometimes sinking under the weight of their overcrowded passengers in a hostile sea. It is clear, however, that these middleman minorities have not suffered the "optimal genocide" which constituted the holocausts of the Armenians and the Jews. One instance of this variety will be examined in some detail before considering the similarities and differences between that case (as representative of such expulsions) and that of the holocausts.

THE CHINESE OF VIETNAM AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN CONTEXT

The vast majority of Chinese immigrants in the world, especially prior to the revolution, came from the southeastern provinces of China. Prior to the nineteenth century, junk trade between China and Southeast Asia was carried on through these provinces. The vast labor migrations to both Southeast Asia and the Americas were primarily from this region during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. While most of the migrants were farmers by origin, commerce and moneymaking were familiar to countryfolk there, and commerce carried greater prestige in the southeast than in other parts of China.

The initial migration as part of a traditional trade diaspora, and later migrations of single men unaccompanied by families, produced a situation in which Chinese men frequently formed liaisons with or married local women. In many places, their offspring assimilated into the local population, although in some places, such as Java, they formed a distinctive part of the local Chinese community. Through such intermarriages and unions Chinese communities had kinship links with the non-Chinese population. However, a large immigration of Chinese families during the twentieth century changed this and led to greater isolation of the Chinese from the local population. Coupled with rising Chinese and local nationalisms and fears of the "Yellow Peril," conflict between the Chinese and host populations increased. The immigration into Vietnam and other parts of French Indochina followed this pattern. In fact, the high point of Chinese immigration was reached during the civil unrest and the Sino-Japanese war of the 1930s.

Chinese participation in the economies of the various Southeast Asian countries followed two patterns. One was labor migration. During the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, Europeans recruited
many Chinese to work in mines and on plantations throughout Southeast Asia, as well as in other areas of the world. Such laborers were indentured or otherwise indebted to their employers. The vast majority were single males, often leaving spouses and children behind in China. The second pattern was for Chinese migrants to open enterprises of their own, ranging from small mining operations and truck farms to large rice mills and rubber-trading corporations. While many laborers returned home, others went into business for themselves or worked for Chinese employers.

The situation of the Chinese in Vietnam was fairly typical of such populations throughout Southeast Asia, with some special conditions stemming from Vietnam's proximity to China itself. The history of Sino-Vietnamese relations prior to the French conquest in the nineteenth century was marked by trade, tribute, and occasional warfare. Although not expansionary in the Western sense, Chinese civilization did incorporate areas south of its original heartland, some of which are seen by modern Vietnamese as part of their own homeland. In premodern times, Vietnam was seen by the Middle Kingdom as a tributary state, even when it was independent. Struggles for independence from Chinese domination are part of Vietnamese history; at the same time, Vietnam absorbed important cultural complexes from China. This history has ramifications for contemporary Sino-Vietnamese relations.

During the early Ching or Manchu period (seventeenth-eighteenth centuries), Chinese fleeing from Manchu rule were settled in Cochin China (what is now the southern part of Vietnam, including Saigon/Ho Chi Minh City). The Vietnamese rulers of the time encouraged such immigration. Under French rule (1859-1954), Chinese immigration increased. By the end of the French administration, the majority of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam were either immigrants themselves or the descendants of recent immigrants, many of the earlier migrants having been assimilated. In 1978, there were approximately 1.5 million Chinese in Vietnam, only 300,000 of whom lived north of the 17th Parallel, which divided the two Vietnamese states from 1954 until 1975. The Chinese were approximately 10 percent of South Vietnam's population and under 5 percent of Vietnam's population as a whole.

The Chinese practiced a wide range of occupations, although they were, to a large extent, involved in trade. In northern Vietnam (especially Tonkin), there were Chinese factory workers, fishermen, and miners. Prior to independence, certain avenues to economic mobility were reserved by the French for themselves, including mining, forestry, and large plantations. Most Chinese business firms were small in terms of their capital and simple in their organization. The most important industry in which the Chinese were predominant was rice-milling, crucial in a rice-exporting country. At one time, this industry appears to have been monopolized by the Chinese. In 1958, 60 percent of the rice-mills
in the Saigon area were still owned by Chinese. The Chinese also invested in spinning and weaving shops, generally small in size. Chinese also owned groceries, medicine shops, rice shops, second-hand goods stalls, export and import firms, inland and maritime transportation, banks, and insurance companies. Some Chinese, especially those originally from the island of Hainan, specialized in the cultivation of specific crops, such as pepper. In general, the Chinese in South Vietnam in particular played central roles in the commercial economy.36

As with other minorities, the political status of the Chinese throughout Southeast Asia and in Vietnam was problematical. This status was further complicated by the continuing struggle for international recognition and for the sympathies and loyalties of overseas Chinese by the rival governments of Peking and Taipei during most of the post-1949 period. The Peking government in particular varied between policies encouraging overseas Chinese to assimilate and measures to recruit these people for its cause and for their protection. On the one hand, the Peking government would tell overseas Chinese to be good citizens in their host countries. On the other hand, overseas Chinese students would be encouraged to study in the homeland. When governments persecuted their Chinese residents, Peking sometimes sent a ship to repatriate overseas Chinese from that country.37

The nationality of the Chinese in Indochina was complicated by various arrangements which the French had established for the control of Chinese populations in their colonies. During the colonial period, the French administration ruled the Chinese indirectly through "chiefs" whom they appointed to maintain law and order. The chiefs ruled the Chinese "congregations," which thus helped segregate the Chinese from other Indochinese. This system was abolished by both the Communists in the north and by the Diem regime in the south. The Chinese in Indochina remained Chinese nationals but were granted rights combining those given to the natives and those granted to French nationals. They were technically under the protection of the Chinese government. The status of Chinese in Vietnam was thus comparable to that of Europeans who had been granted extra-territoriality in various Asian and African countries, although as nationals of a weak power the ability of China to help them effectively was limited.38

After the partition of Vietnam the situation became more complicated, since there were two Vietnams, each of which had diplomatic ties with a different Chinese government. In the north, there was a partial maintenance of the status quo ante but with encouragement for the Chinese in Vietnam to become naturalized. In 1961, the People's Republic of China recognized North Vietnamese jurisdiction over its Chinese residents and ceased issuing Chinese passports to such residents of Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the Diem government followed a policy of forced naturalization
by which many Chinese residents became citizens in order to remain in business there. Their importance for the economy of the region remained intact. After the fall of Saigon, the Vietnamese government viewed the Diem measures as valid, but the Chinese government contended that they were invalid as the products of an illegitimate government. 39

The dispute over the citizenship of the South Vietnamese Chinese was entangled with other issues. There were some unresolved territorial disputes and trouble over Cambodia, in which China sided with the Pol Pot regime. 40 In addition, Hanoi's decision to nationalize the South Vietnamese economy and to integrate South Vietnam with North Vietnam impinged on the Chinese large and small businessmen of the Saigon area. By May 1978, Hanoi had decided to clamp down on the Chinese businessmen of South Vietnam, and China reacted by announcing an intention to send two ships to Vietnam to evacuate Chinese residents. As relations between Hanoi and Peking worsened, negotiations over this and other issues broke down. By the summer of 1978, ethnic Chinese residents of both former North and South Vietnam were encouraged to leave, and refugees began flowing over the Sino-Vietnamese border and into the seas off Vietnam.

While this precipitated the refugee crisis of 1978-1979, the exodus was initially illegal. Extortion and departure taxes were demanded from potential refugees. Often Chinese businessmen acquired a boat and fares were paid in cash and gold, half of which would go to the government and for bribes to officials. In this way, it was similar to the departure of ethnic Vietnamese, who were the majority of "boat people" during the other refugee waves out of Vietnam since 1975. By July 1979, nearly 300,000 ethnic Chinese had fled from Vietnam.

What made this refugee crisis comparable to the pre-World War II crises was the attitudes engendered in other nations, especially those of Southeast Asia and the West. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan did accept refugees who arrived by land or sea. In the case of the PRC, however, refugees in some cases had to undergo re-education, much like that which they were trying to avoid in the New Economic Zones of Vietnam. This was less of a problem for proletarian refugees from northern Vietnam than for those from Saigon. 41

Vicissitudes of travel by sea in an open boat were many. The ships and boats were often barely seaworthy. The passengers faced storms, but also pirates. Many of the pirates were Thai fishermen who found that robbing refugees was a lucrative occupation. At the height of the refugee crisis, many ships avoided seaways where there were refugees. If landfall was achieved, there was no certainty that one would be allowed to land. Even the predominantly Chinese "city-states" of Singapore and Hong Kong were reluctant to accept refugees. Other neighbor-
ing countries, particularly Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, were unwilling to accept ethnic Chinese refugees because each had its own "Chinese" problem.

In Indonesia and in the Philippines, the Chinese constitute a small percentage of the population (in both cases less than 5 percent). In these countries, conflict between local "native" populations and the Chinese, who are seen as controlling certain sectors of the economy, has been acute for the past century. In both, dual nationality of the Chinese has been an issue, with alternate policies of exclusion or forcible assimilation of Chinese having been followed. In both, one also finds high degrees of assimilation by certain segments of the Chinese population. "Mestizos" of partial Chinese ancestry have played an important role in Philippine life; Jose Rizal, the father of Philippine nationalism, was such a mestizo. In Indonesia, many people of mixed Chinese and Indonesian ancestry speak the local language. However unwilling they were to accept Chinese refugees, these countries played a less prominent role during this crisis than did Malaysia.42

The government of Malaysia was quite vocal during this period. In the summer of 1978 it threatened to tow refugee boats back into the sea if they reached land in its territorial waters, and at times it backed up its threat. The Chinese constitute 35 percent of Malaysia's total population. Thus an ethnic Chinese wave of settlers would threaten a delicate ethnic balance. Malaysia had quietly resettled Muslim refugees from Indochina in 1970. The balance between Chinese and Muslim Malays can, in fact, be seen as crucial to the formation of the present Malaysian federation. Singapore was expected to be part of this federation, but was excluded, in part because it would have made a Chinese majority in the federation possible. The Chinese had come to Malaysia as laborers to work in the mines and the plantations, and many have continued to do so. The range of Chinese occupations is broader in western Malaysia than in other Southeast Asian countries. While the Chinese in Malaysia cannot be seen exclusively as a middleman minority, they are prominent in commerce, and Singapore, with a Chinese majority, is the financial center of the region. In general, the politically dominant Malays have felt that they were weak economically relative to the Chinese and that the latter would take over their country. The present Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohammed, expressed this fear in a controversial book published in 1970.43

The dramatic events of 1978 and 1979 filtered to the West with reports that the South China Sea was full of refugees who were being cynically allowed to leave Vietnam after paying extortionate taxes and bribes; robbed, raped, and killed by pirates; and refused permission to land by various governments, especially that of Malaysia. This aroused memories of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and a wave of sympathy
swept over certain Western countries. An international conference was called. Pressure was put on Vietnam to control the flow of refugees and on Malaysia to allow them to stay until other arrangements could be made. Certain countries, especially France and the United States, accepted substantial numbers of these refugees. This relieved the transit camps in various Southeast Asian countries, though large numbers continue to live in such camps and continue to leave the Communist nations of Indochina through a variety of means. It is my impression that the "boat people" of 1978 and 1979 were viewed by most Americans in a manner similar to previous and subsequent groups of Southeast Asian émigrés and not as ethnic Chinese. While all of the Indochinese refugees in the United States have encountered anti-alien racist prejudices and opposition, no specifically anti-Sinic current differentiated the 1978-1979 wave from the others.

The Sino-Vietnamese case shares many features with other such instances, although it resulted in a rather brutal expulsion rather than an optimal genocide. In Vietnam proper, especially southern Vietnam, the minority was visible and conspicuous. Poverty was general and aggravated by many decades of war, both domestic and foreign. The minority was apparently more prosperous than the majority, and the occupation of the south by the north increased poverty. While the minority was probably not increasing relative to the majority, it did control more wealth than did the majority Vietnamese population. The minority's economic role was resented, and the Chinese were blamed for economic problems in South Vietnam as early as 1957. This was also the case under the Hanoi occupation. Clients and competitors, as well as the officials of a nationalistic and socialistic government, all resented the role of the Chinese. After 1975, the Chinese in Vietnam were no longer related to a fraternal socialist government on the one side or to an anti-Communist ally (Taiwan) on the other, but to the enemies of Vietnam, i.e., the Chinese to the north and the Americans. They did have wealth to plunder, through taxation and extortion.

So far, the preconditions for expulsion and genocide coincide. Why, then, did the Vietnamese government carry out the former program rather than the latter? There may be several reasons. One, the Vietnamese government at this time was justifying its invasion of Cambodia on the basis of the brutality of the Pol Pot government. While governments are not particularly consistent in this regard, some form of legitimation plays a role in political actions. Two, at least some of the Chinese were accepted by China proper. Three, the Vietnamese were themselves vulnerable to attack by China and the United States, although neither was in a strong military position in 1978-1979. Still, some retaliation was possible. Four, the creation of a refugee crisis by expelling or encouraging emigration is useful in embarrassing one's neighbors and foes. This
crisis did do this, although not as effectively as the Mariel refugee flow from Cuba in 1980. Five, the Vietnamese were not ideologically prepared for an optimal genocide.45

COMPARISONS WITH HOLOCAUSTS

Looking at a number of examples is instructive. The two holocausts of middleman minorities were committed on groups who were long-standing residents in the regions where they were murdered, not relatively recent immigrants. In this way, the Jews of Germany and Eastern Europe and the Armenians of Anatolia, the main bodies of victims, resembled the Parsis and the Moroccan Jews more than they did the Indians in East Africa or even the Chinese in Vietnam.

In Europe, however, the Holocaust had been preceded by a period of great migrations and urbanization. The Jews, in particular, were part of these migrations, especially after the pogroms and May Laws in Russia in the early 1880s. While the anti-Semitic movement in Germany began well before that period and anti-Semitic ideas were commonly held at an earlier time, large numbers of East European Jewish immigrants in Germany and throughout Western Europe and North America certainly reinforced the view that Jews were essentially an alien people. The growing numbers of foreign Jews similarly lent credence to fears of Jewish domination.

The recentness of migration is also relevant to the degree to which the minority is visible as a separate group, although both the Jews in Eastern Europe and the Armenians in Anatolia remained loyal to a separate language for a long period of time. Such language loyalty, however, was breaking down in Eastern Europe during the interwar period, and many Armenians spoke either Turkish or a mixture of Turkish and Armenian. Genetic markers are also blurred with durable co-territoriality, since sexual relations between members of the various groups take place, whether in the form of marriage or of illicit seduction, rape, and concubinage. While linguistic, genetic, or sumptuary markers may persist as ideals or as stereotypes, their breakdown may give anxiety about assimilation and/or infiltration on the part of both groups in contact.

The fact of being old-timers in the region should also mean that a minority is viewed as "native." At the very least, one would expect them to reinvest resources in the country of their residence rather than sending them abroad. Yet in most of the cases discussed here, such an expectation was upset for both old and recent residents. The major exception was probably pre-1914 Germany. One cause of such foreign investment was the general impoverishment of the country. In most cases, this was strengthened by moves of discrimination coupled with fears of escalating persecution. To a lesser extent this was found among
the Parsis of India, but it is certainly true of the other cases. While it is hard to describe economic trends simply, most of the countries under consideration have had economic difficulties during the period preceding persecution (or expected harassment). Population growth in many developing areas, depression, and inflation all contributed to a sense of impoverishment in the countries under consideration. The other part of the economic picture is the relationship of different classes with the minority, which had characteristics of a class in itself. In India and Morocco, there were a variety of mercantile groups competing with reasonable success. In Vietnam, East Africa, and Poland, the minority was perceived as having some kind of monopoly on trade and was particularly resented. In the Ottoman Empire, the Armenians were one of several non-Muslim minorities who were perceived as controlling commercial enterprise; the degree to which Muslim Turks desired to compete is not indicated in the literature. Germany, of course, has been studied and dissected, and yet the results are inconclusive. It should also be pointed out that those who were most integrated into the society, whether in Poland or Germany, often competed most directly with members of the majority ethnic group. It was the German-speaking or Polish-speaking Jew who sought to enter the university, become a professional or civil servant, or pursue success as an artist. When positions of this kind are limited, competition is often intense. While anti-Semitism was central to the Nazi ideology, it is still unclear whether anti-Semitism itself was part of the core of its appeal to those who became Nazis or voted for the Nazi party. Andreski, when offering his economic interpretation of anti-Semitism, explicitly argued that anti-Semitism in Germany was weaker than in Poland and Hungary, roughly corresponding to the relatively small percentage of the population which was Jewish. Lately even the thesis that it was the lower middle class that was most in competition with Jews and in the forefront of German Fascism has been called into question. Istvan Deak agrees with Andreski's argument that anti-Semitism was secondary to other factors in drawing Germans to the Nazi movement and in leading them to comply with the systematic genocide which followed. Still, the Nazis incorporated the stereotype of the Jew as an alien middleman into their propaganda.

Where does this leave middleman minority theory in its relationship to genocide and ethnic conflict in general? As indicated early on, middleman minority theory is primarily applicable to the preconditions for inter-ethnic conflict and genocide as a manifestation of such conflict. Like most sets of theory, it provides us with questions to ask. Unquestionably, economic conflict between competing merchants, workers and employers, and buyers and sellers takes on an ethnic dimension when those on one side tend to be members of a different ethnic group from those on the other side. There is a wide range of options for the
end results of majority-middleman minority relations, including substantial assimilation, occupational integration, or the development of complementarity, all with minimal conflict, as well as the conflicts resulting in voluntary emigration, harassment, expulsion, and genocide. There is thus no necessary connection between middleman minority status and victimization. In a period which has seen the mass murder of Indians in Brazil, Paraguay, and Guatemala; Communists in Indonesia; large segments of the total population in East Timor and Cambodia; landowners and others in China; the ruling Afro-Shirazis in Zanzibar; the dominant Tutsis in Rwanda; Hutu in Burundi; and dissident members of ruling groups in the Soviet Union, it is difficult to say that any group is not subject to genocide. Still, the vulnerability of middleman minorities is related to their economic position and has been demonstrated dramatically in this century. In all cases of victimization, other factors were present, but the images of minority middlemen as economic parasites and collaborators with alien enemies of the nation were intertwined and served to justify their liquidation from the body social.

As noted earlier, middleman minority theory's historical roots are shared with the ideologies used to justify anti-minority actions. The denigration of trade and moneylending and the ideal of a national economy controlled by members of the national community, excluding strangers, were important in the foundation of the social sciences as well as in the formulation of both socialist and nationalist ideology. Jacob Katz in his study of modern anti-Semitism concluded that many of the observations of anti-Semites on the Jewish position in Europe were empirically based, but the conclusions which they drew were colored by extremely negative attitudes toward the Judaic heritage and the Jews themselves. This observation can be extended to attitudes toward middleman minorities elsewhere and to social scientists studying these groups. As social scientists and scholars, we must pursue the economic reasons for inter-ethnic conflict, even though our writings may be used to justify oppression and persecution. With this awareness, however, we might paraphrase Avtalyon: Beware scholars of your words, for evil may follow from your speech.

NOTES

1. This chapter is a product of a long research project in which I examined theories dealing with middleman minorities, for the purpose of comparing Jewish and non-Jewish communities globally. In that work, however, I was only partially concerned with genocide as one form of "host-hostility" and anti-minority actions.
In recent years, the term "genocide" has been applied to a variety of events. The term "cultural genocide," for instance, has been used to describe the Soviet campaign against Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. Raphael Lemkin, who first introduced the concept of genocide in 1944, also injected a measure of ambiguity into it. While defining genocide as "the extermination of nations and ethnic groups," he wrote that genocide is carried out through a variety of attacks on the peoples affected.

These include destroying institutions of self-government; colonization by the invaders; killing and removing national elites (e.g., the intelligentsia); disrupting social cohesion; prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and activities; prohibiting higher education; shifting wealth to the invaders; extermination; and moral debasement (through promotion of pornography and alcohol). Lemkin introduced this concept during World War II, when the full extent of the Nazi program and the fine distinctions made by the National Socialists themselves were not fully comprehended, although the basic outlines had been revealed. See Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), pp. xi-xii.


Middleman Minorities and Genocide


10. Stanislav Andreski, "An Economic Interpretation of Anti-Semitism," Jewish Journal of Sociology 5 (1963), pp. 201-13. Bauer, Holocaust in Historical Perspective, pp. 55-58. As for Poland, one finds that during World War II Jews were assisted much more in these areas, especially Belorussia, than elsewhere in the former Polish Republic.


12. Andreski, "Economic Interpretation."


15. Andreski, "Economic Interpretation."


19. Some of these attributes are paradoxical. In the ultimate case of optimal genocide or total expulsion, the scapegoat is permanently eliminated and can never serve that purpose again. This has been pointed out by writers who reject the scapegoat theory with regard to the Holocaust. Yet, since many leaders think in the short term, it is sufficient to make the sacrifice once. Similarly, the strangers may be sojourners or recent immigrants, but relative to true itinerants, they are sedentary.

20. Ralph Austen (personal communication) has suggested that some reports of attacks on Jews in Moroccan Muslim historiography are fabricated, because each new dynasty begins by "overthrowing the Jews," whether they actually do this or not. Of course, for such a ritual to occur, there must be Jews in the society. The situation was similar to that of the popes who saw the Jews as witnesses to Christ, even if they rejected them. See Norman Stillman, "Muslims and Jews in Morocco," The Jerusalem Quarterly 1 (1977), pp. 76-83, and Allan R. Meyers, "Patronage and Protection: The Status of Jews in Pre-colonial Morocco," in Jewish Societies in the Middle


24. Bauer, Holocaust in Historical Perspective; Dawidowicz, Holocaust and the Historians; Fein, Accounting.

The controversy over whether the Armenian massacres in Anatolia were a state-sponsored genocide or the product of an extremely bloody civil war continues. The latter viewpoint is presented in a volume using demographic data by Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire (New York: New York University Press, 1983). Nevertheless, my own reading of the historical record is that the deportations of 1915, which were ordered by the Ottoman government, were genocidal. A full-scale comparison dealing with both the differences and similarities between the Nazi "war against the Jews" and the deportation and massacres of Armenians is sorely needed. It is beyond the scope of this already lengthy chapter.

25. These points are largely based on Andreski, "Economic Interpretation."


30. But why has anti-Semitism been so potent in postwar Poland, where the numerical decline of Jews was even more precipitous? Ideological anti-Semitism was much more of a force in Poland during the twentieth century, and Jews were more prominent in the ruling Communist elite during the early phases of post-World War II Poland than was the case with regard to anti-Semitism or Jews in the governments of post-independence Morocco.


34. See Dadrian, "Typology." A problem in any typology is that various factors may contribute to a complex event such as a genocide. Officially, *Kristallnacht*, when the Nazis broke into Jewish homes, burnt synagogues, and sent large numbers of Jewish men to concentration camps in November 1938, was an act of retribution for the assassination of a German embassy official in Paris. In Nigeria in 1966, the massacres were associated with a realistically based interpretation of an open power struggle for control of the government, not with a minor "provocation" linked to a mythical conspiracy.


40. Hung, "Sino Vietnamese-Conflict," points out that the Chinese government never protested the treatment, often extremely harsh, which the Chinese in Cambodia received from the Pol Pot government alongside other urban populations.


47. Whether such a status is the product of deliberate action on the part of the minority or the lack of success in being accepted on the part of minority members as it was in Germany and much of East Europe makes no difference.


49. Abot I:11. The original is "Beware sages of your words lest you incur the penalty of exile and be exiled to a place of evil waters, and the disciples who come after you drink thereof and die and the Name (of God) be profaned." In a secular context, taking ethical consequences into account is the equivalent.