INTRODUCTION

Exterminations of families, tribes, and ethnic or religious groups have been known to occur since the dawn of history. The particular heinousness of mass death, however, has brought the gradual recognition of such acts as crimes against humanity. Planned and systematic genocides have even acquired a wider scope, while technology has increased their efficiency. Given the technological advances in military and biological hardware, the degrees to which many groups depend on governmental policies for their survival, the abrupt changes which traditional societies undergo when facing the challenge of modernization, and the increase in tensions between nations due to the diminishing resources available for distribution, one can expect governments to have recourse to radical solutions such as genocide to solve real or imaginary problems. Genocide thus may become merely another manifestation of what differentiates a state from other institutions: its monopoly of the right to kill enemies of society and to ask its citizens to kill enemies of the state or to be killed doing it.

A corollary to the above hypothesis is that certain groups that seek change in a system, particularly a traditional one, are more likely to be victims of genocide. This is especially true when the ideology of the state characterizes a potential victim as both an enemy of society (of the internal order) and of the state.¹

The genocide of the Armenian people during World War I is the earliest case of a documented modern day extermination of a nation. Planned and carried out by the Ittihadist (İttihad ve Terakke Jemiyeti, or the Committee of Union and Progress) government of the Ottoman
Empire, this first genocide of the twentieth century may also be a paradigm for a type of "political" genocide likely to become the pattern of twentieth-century genocides.

The purpose here is to suggest the possibility that twentieth-century genocides may have become radical means used by governments to resolve political problems. This chapter will briefly present the facts and impact of the Armenian genocide, discuss the generally accepted explanations of the holocaust as the final solution to a thorny national problem, introduce some newly discovered evidence on the relations between Armenian and Turkish leaders preceding the genocide, and suggest that the Ittihadist government perceived Armenians not only as an unwelcome ethnic group but also as a social group which threatened the traditional authoritarian order of Ottoman society.

The events between 1915 and 1917, the worst years of the genocide, are quite clear and documented in gruesome detail. In early 1913, the Young Turk government was taken over by its militaristic and chauvinistic wing led by Enver, Talaat, and Jemal Pashas. This triumvirate led the country into World War I on the side of Germany. Sometime in early 1915 that same government developed and put into effect a plan for the extermination of its Armenian population, variously placed at between 2 and 3 million subjects. Most Armenians lived in the rural and small-town environment of historic Western Armenia, a part of the Ottoman Empire since the sixteenth century.

The plan was carried out in phases. In April 1915, the religious, political, educational, and intellectual leadership of the Armenian people, close to 1,000 individuals, most educated in the Western tradition, were taken into custody throughout the Empire and killed within a few days. Then Armenian draftees of the Ottoman army, estimated at 200,000, were liquidated through mass burials, burnings, executions, and sheer exhaustion in labor battalions. Finally, the remainder of the population, now composed largely of elderly people, women, and children, was given orders for deportation in all parts of the Empire (except the capital and a few cities with European presences). While a few cities and districts resisted the orders, most followed them, with the faint hope that they might be given a chance to come back.

The fate of the deportees was usually death. Caravans of women and children, ostensibly being led to southern parts of the Empire, became death marches. Within six months of the deportations half of the deportees were killed, buried alive, or thrown into the sea or the rivers. Few reached relatively safe cities such as Aleppo. Most survivors ended up in the deserts of Northern Mesopotamia, where starvation, dehydration, and outright murder awaited them. Subsequent sweeps of cities ensured the elimination of the Armenian people from the western and largest portion of their historic homeland.
The extermination was accomplished under the supervision of a secretive organization which functioned as part of the government, the *Teshkilat-i Mahsusa* or Special Organization, run by the highest government officials, manned by convicts released from jail, and acting under the immediate supervision of select members of the Ittihad Party. The release of the vilest, unbridled animal passions served well the government's purpose of ensuring extermination in the most humiliating, dehumanizing fashion. The torture of thousands of women and children became a source of satisfaction for hundreds who sought and found official sanction from government officials as well as Muslim clergymen, since the murder of Armenians was characterized, like the war against the Entente, as a *jihad* or holy war. Human imagination labored to devise new ways of mutilating, burning, and killing. The suicide of hundreds of women and children attests to the particular brutality of the methods used.

The carnage took place in full view of the military and diplomatic representatives of governments allied with the Ottoman state, such as Germany, and neutral ones, such as the United States (until 1917). In addition, Western missionaries, journalists, travellers, and even sympathetic officers of the Ottoman army described the death marches and atrocities in daily letters and accounts. Reports of the extermination and its methods forwarded to Washington, Berlin, and other capitals by eyewitnesses confirm the stories told by thousands of survivors in subsequent memoirs and oral history interviews.

The methods used to bring about the extermination of the Armenians are very significant, since they attest to the participation of an important segment of the general population. The acquiescence of Turkish, Kurdish, and, to a limited extent, Arab civilians was made easier by the promise of loot, of appropriation of children and women, and of an afterlife in heaven. A governmental decree making it illegal to assist refugees or orphans might ultimately have been responsible, however, for the absence of wholesale assistance from Turks to their former neighbors and friends. The penalty for such assistance was death by hanging in front of one's own house and the burning of that house. This did not stop some, nonetheless, from resisting orders. A number of Turkish governors and sub-governors were removed from office for their unwillingness to follow orders. Many Turks and Kurds, especially in the Dersim region, risked their lives to save straggling Armenians, and Arabs throughout the Empire's southern provinces accepted and helped the survivors.

It is not clear whether it was the absence of technologically viable means to exterminate swiftly or the desire to keep the appearance of "deportations" that led the government to achieve extermination through such methods. The Ottoman government had a record of massacres, some against Armenians. Of these, the 1894-1896 and 1909 are the best
known. But this was the first time such a wholesale operation was conducted, ending in the uprooting of a whole nation.

The impact of the genocide was devastating. Of the 2 to 3 million Western Armenians, 1.5 million perished during the holocaust. Up to 150,000 of those who had accepted Islam or had been kept, stolen, or protected by Turks and Kurds survived in Western Armenia without, however, any possibility of preserving a sense of religious or national identity. Close to 400,000 survived by fleeing to Russian Armenia and the Caucasus (where many more died as a consequence of disease and starvation) or Iran; perhaps 400,000 survived by reaching the southern or Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

In addition to the death of some 50 to 70 percent of Armenians living under Ottoman Turkish rule, Armenians lost the right to live as a community in the lands of their ancestors; they lost their personal property and belongings. They left behind the schools, churches, community centers, ancient fortresses, and medieval cathedrals, witnesses to a long history. Survivors were forced to begin a new life truncated, deprived of a link with their past, subject to upheavals in the new lands where they suddenly found themselves as foreigners. The remnants of the largely peasant and rural population were now a wretched group of squatters on the outskirts of cities poorly equipped to handle an increase in population.

The genocide constituted a radical break with the past for Western Armenians. The normal transmission of ethical and cultural values was cut off. The traditional ways of explaining tragedies could not accommodate the final solution. Orphans grew to remember and tell the stories of childhood years; they did not know what to think of their Turkish neighbors and found it difficult to imagine that they had once lived together in relative peace.

ENEMIES BY DEFINITION

The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide—the Jews, the Gypsies, the Armenians—were murdered in order to fulfill the state's design for a new order. . . . War was used in both cases (an opportunity anticipated and planned for by Germany but simply seized by Turkey after World War I began) to transform the nation to correspond to the ruling elite's formula by eliminating groups conceived of as alien, enemies by definition.

So argues Helen Fein in *Accounting for Genocide*. This provides a basic and adequate explanation for the dynamics of the Armenian genocide. Whatever political, sociological, and other explanations one may end up accepting as part of the causal process, only such an encompassing, exclusive characteristic of the human mind can account for the radical nature of the "solution," for the act of genocide. It is when man
plays God and wants to recreate the world in his own image—however perverted man or the image—that the *other* can be reduced to a nuisance, to an enemy that by definition must be destroyed regardless of his or her actions and policies.

Explanations of the Armenian genocide have generally agreed with Fein's conclusion. The "formula" which historians have ascribed to the Ittihadist elite may vary; some stress a Pan-Islamist vision at work, others a Pan-Turanian one. Most have focused on the rise of an exclusive Turkish nationalism underlying or in the service of Pan-Turanian and/or Pan-Islamic dreams. This nationalism was tied to Anatolia, the "birthplace" of Turkism, a last bastion after the loss of European Turkey. In some cases, as if to moderate the burden of the crime, some have argued that the genocide was the violent manifestation of an otherwise predictable and historically natural clash of two nationalisms in conflict, Armenian against Turkish; this explanation allows for the equation of the motivations of the two groups, with a difference only in the means used by each to achieve their goal.

Evolving Turkish nationalism was, in fact, the major factor which determined the course of Ottoman history during the first two decades of this century. Whatever subjective satisfaction Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian dreams gave to its adherents, whether under Sultan Abdul Hamid II or the Young Turks who replaced him, these ideologies remained vehicles by which energies outside Turkish nationalism could be harnessed to its service. The Young Turk-Ittihadist elite cared not under what ideology it continued its domination. Religion worked for a while, in some places. It was particularly potent in moving the ignorant masses, in ensuring the support of the *mollahs* (priests) and the *softas* (students of religion) for the Holy War. The idea of unification of Turkish groups across Asia had some success as well; but Pan-Turanism too remained an abstraction for most of the people it was supposed to inspire.

By the time the Ittihadist triumvirate decided to sign an alliance with Germany, its members had determined that whatever ideology emerged, and regardless of who won the war, drastic measures were needed if the Turkish elite were to continue to rule over the remains of the Empire. Long before the war, the Ittihadists were already pursuing a policy of Turkification which went beyond Pan-Islamism. Arabs and Albanians were to speak Turkish; it was not sufficient that they were largely Muslim. The problem with the Ittihadists was that they had not as yet given up on the idea of an empire, which required an ideology and a basis of legitimation wider than Turkish nationalism or dynastic allegiance.

Conditions were ripe for genocide to occur during a period of transition from the concept of an empire based on dynastic allegiance to that of a nation-state. Pan-Turanian and Pan-Islamic ideologies were stages that
helped the Ottomans accept the break from a tradition of conquest. One of the vehicles for the building of Turkish nationalism was the identification of "enemies" of the yet to be born nation; a second vehicle was its resistance to the loss of territory and dignity to Western imperialism. The self-definition in relation to the Armenian enemy was convenient, since Armenians were neither Turks nor Muslims; and the long history of the Armenian Question as an integral part of the Eastern Question made identification with outside enemies, in this case France, Great Britain, and Russia, easy.17

The Ottoman government had used wholesale massacres before against "enemies" of the state. Wartime conditions provided justification for extraordinary measures. Western governments, traditionally the only ones interested in and capable of intervention, were already at war, on the wrong side, as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned. Germany, the Ottoman Empire's major ally, was capable of making a difference but opted not to.18 Armenians, based on their history of past victimization, could easily be perceived as enemies of society or the state, given the paranoia of Ittihadist leaders.19

It is possible to paraphrase Helen Fein, then, and reconstruct a Turkish "design for a new order." This would be based, on the one hand, on the assertion of sovereignty vis-à-vis the West by reversing the series of losses of territories; on the other hand, this design would insist on the establishment of "order" within the country, an order which was threatened by elements for whom the symbols of Turkism, Islamism, or Turanism could not mean much and who were seeking an alternate framework for identification with the state. In addition, these elements, i.e., Armenians, could be charged with collusion with the traditional enemy, Russia.20

The basic explanation provided by Fein, however, does not preclude the further elaboration of the vision of the criminal state in its specific and more complex historical context. Many scholars have contributed to the understanding of genocide and to the identification of factors leading to genocide. Leo Kuper and Irving L. Horowitz have developed new perspectives on genocide as a political weapon in the twentieth century and argued for its study as a new category in social research.21 Vahakn Dadrian, a sociologist pioneering in studies on the Armenian genocide, has concentrated on the victimization theory and has pointed out sociological factors involved in the process of dehumanization leading to genocide resulting from the search for power.22

The Kurdish historian Siyamend Othman, in his doctoral dissertation and a subsequent article, attempted to explain the reasons why Kurds played such a prominent role in the deportations and massacres. His argument is that for Kurds within a feudal structure the tribe provided group identity and therefore allegiance was to the chief, who was manipulated by the Ottoman government. Othman also points out that the
common Kurd may have been harboring some resentment toward Armenians, who tended to be the usurers and capitalists in the marketplace.\textsuperscript{23}

In a recent paper Ronald Suny attempted an analysis of the sociological makeup of both Turks and Armenians and suggested that the existence of an Armenian upper class in control of many critical sectors of the economy might in fact have accentuated antagonisms.\textsuperscript{24}

Of major importance is the analysis provided by Robert Melson. Melson has recently argued that one must go beyond victimization theories that generally point to victims of genocide as scapegoats or as provocateurs. He found instead that groups that have social mobility and adaptability to modernization, and thus tend to disturb the traditional orders, may tend to become victims in times of crisis. Melson has called for a somewhat more complex model within which the paranoia of the victimizer is as important in understanding—and foreseeing—genocide as the "success" of the victim.\textsuperscript{25}

These recent points of view can be seen as suggestive and important efforts that provide specificity to the case of the Armenian genocide and help shed light on the "formula" operative in the minds of the Turkish leaders that made possible the dehumanization and, eventually, the extermination of Armenians.

### A Populist Agenda and the Alienation of the State

To the extent that the Ittihad decision to exterminate Armenians in the Ottoman Empire can be explained by the history of relations between the two, the period from 1908 to 1914 is obviously the most important. Armenian political parties, the revolutionary Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, had opposed the Sultan's government until 1908, as had the various Turkish groups known as the Young Turks, of which the Ittihad ve Terakke was the most important. When the Young Turks took over the government in 1908 and restored the Constitution that had been promulgated in 1876 and prorogued in 1878, Armenian revolutionaries ended their armed struggle and pledged allegiance to the new regime and kept their pledge until the beginning of the genocide.

Thus, the first point to be made regarding the pre-genocide period is that Armenian political parties functioned as legitimate Ottoman institutions, whose goals and bylaws were recognized by the Ottoman government. While they differed in their assessment of the chances for successful reforms under the Ittihad government, there was and there could have been nothing in their programs or actions which could have been considered illegitimate or detrimental to the Constitution.

The second important fact with regard to these relations is that, along with a change in the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire, the 1908 Constitution also produced a change in the representation of the Armenians. To negotiate Armenian demands for reform the Ottoman Turkish govern-
mendid to deal with Armenian leaders of the revolutionary and guerrilla movement. The new spokesmen for the Armenians had won the right to represent Armenians by waging an armed struggle on behalf of economic and political rights; their religion had been Enlightenment. These new leaders supplanted the largely conservative clergymen of the Patriarchate who were bound by the dictates of the millet system which defined Armenians as a religious community and denied them an essentially political character.

A third important characteristic of the pre-genocide Armeno-Turkish relations is that they evolved between 1908 and 1914. The major factor which determined this change was the gradual elimination of the liberal program which some Young Turks had advocated prior to and immediately after the 1908 takeover. As a whole, the Young Turks had linked the imperative of preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire with the need to introduce general reforms. This willingness to recognize the importance of domestic social, economic, and political policies affecting the larger population had satisfied Armenians in their struggle to improve their situation, particularly the lot of the peasant and rural populations. Generally speaking, the Ittihad government discarded its liberal democratic ideals; it moved toward despotism and began relying, as its predecessor had done, on the reactionary classes, repressive measures, and symbols to secure its position in power.

Based on documents being studied for the first time, it is possible to argue that the critical period when the fundamental change occurred was between 1909 and 1911. By 1909, the excitement of the first days was over. Elections for the first Parliament were completed. The Ittihad Party had run on a platform with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) or Dashnaktsutiune, and won. Furthermore, following the massacre of Adana, the government promised to take concrete steps to introduce long promised reforms, consolidate the constitutional regime, and resolve domestic issues which caused hardship to Armenians.

An agreement signed between the Ittihad and the Turkish Section of the Western Bureau (highest executive body) of the Dashnaktsutiune seemed a secure path toward the realization of reforms throughout the Empire. In 1911 the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune reached the conclusion that the party could no longer hope that the Ittihad would realize the reforms and consequently it could no longer remain in an alliance with the Ittihad.

According to the agreement, the two parties were to develop a joint committee, above and beyond formal contacts and parliamentary negotiations. This committee would be composed of high-level officials whose task it was to find ways to strengthen the Constitution, educate the public on political issues and against the reaction, educate the Turkish masses on anti-Armenian prejudices, and increase political rights for all. In addition to the main committee in Constantinople, regional and district
joint committees were also to be organized. The agreement was reached at a meeting between representatives of the Turkish Section of the ARF Bureau and the Central Committee of the Ittihad held in Salonika in August 1909, four months after the massacres of Adana. These negotiations may have been the price paid by the Ittihad in return for the willingness of the Dashnaktsutiune to ascribe the massacres to the reaction, when in fact at least local Ittihad members were implicated.

The institutionalization of contacts at all levels appeared a good way to avoid future misunderstandings, to decrease tensions, and to open the way to important reforms. However, from the beginning, the Dashnaktsutiune had difficulties in ensuring the functioning of the committee. The first and most important committee, to be established in the capital, did not get its Turkish appointees until early 1910. In addition, the Ittihad avoided regular meetings from March to June 1910, and none of the important issues, foreign or domestic, was placed on the agenda by the Ittihad.

The Dashnaktsutiune had its own agenda, which constituted basically its minimum and practical program. The party demanded:

1. The end of feudal structures, laws, and practices in Anatolia.
2. A change in the government's policy of total indifference toward social and economic development and the concomitant crises affecting all segments of society; economic development was necessary to provide opportunities for the improvement in the standard of living.
3. The solution of the most critical issue, the agrarian crisis, which resulted both from inherent inequities and the feudal system as well as from the conscious policies of officials to expel Armenians from their farms, expropriate their lands, and give them to **muhajirs** or Muslim immigrants. The latter, often coming from the formerly Ottoman Balkan districts, were systematically directed into Armenian districts for resettlement, which would then take place at the expense of Armenian farmers.
4. The end of regressive, extralegal, and illegal taxes, which particularly affected Christians, but generally had a negative impact on all subjects.
5. The end of insecurity of life, honor, and property, particularly for Armenians whose communal existence was threatened by continuing pillaging, lawlessness, and renewed overt aggression and discrimination.

These issues, and especially the agrarian crisis and the tax laws, were pointed to as threatening the economic foundation of the Armenian community.

The Dashnaktsutiune placed these and other, more specific, items on the agenda on many occasions. None of the issues, however, received
satisfactory solutions. A second trip was needed to Salonika to determine why there was no action. In March 1911 two party plenipotentiaries went to meet again with the Ittihad Central Committee. The result was renewed promises for reform, once a new study was completed by two Ittihad leaders who were sent on a tour of the provinces. The Ittihad leaders seem to have agreed with the Dashnaktsutiune representatives that the problem was not between Armenians and Turks or Kurds but between the poor and the rich, and that Turkish and Kurdish peasants often suffered as much as Armenians. Despite the agreement in principle and the promise to seriously confront the problem, the tour by the two dignitaries produced no changes in government policies. Reporting from Van, a member of the Dashnaktsutiune's local Central Committee echoed the observation of many Armenians when he wrote: "[The two representatives] are here now and, frankly, we cannot understand what they are doing. They have shied away from all contacts with the popular masses and the rural folk; they are constantly surrounded by the local notables and government officials."30

Following two years of intense efforts and accommodation to an Ittihad agenda which seemed to be lacking focus, the Dashnaktsutiune came to the conclusion that it no longer could expect basic changes to come from the Ittihad. A Memorandum accompanying the Report to the Congress listed a number of reasons for the inability of the Ittihad to respond:

1. Feudalism was still not such an abhorrence to the Ittihad; at any rate, its leaders did not wish to alienate the Kurdish chieftains and local landlords, whose support they ultimately considered more important, and safer—since they demanded nothing in return—than that of the Armenians.

2. The Ittihad allowed reactionary elements, such as great landowners and mollahs, to become members of the local Ittihad clubs, changing the liberal character of the organization; it was gradually taken over by those forces which constituted the backbone of the previous regime and which had opposed constitutional change and parliamentary government.

3. The fear ascribed by Ittihad leaders to Kurds but in fact shared by some Turks that should Armenians have an equal chance in the system they would overwhelm others by their numbers and achievements.

4. The Ittihad did not wish to see the Dashnaktsutiune or any other Armenian party strengthened.

5. The Dashnaktsutiune's unqualified support of the Ittihad allowed them to take that support for granted; the Ittihad did not need to return any favors for the support.

6. The Ittihad did not wish to see an element in Asia Minor strengthened which might be favored by the Russians, particularly
The Genocide of the Armenians

when the more important friend, Germany, had other plans for Asia Minor.

7. The disagreement between two Dashnaktsutiune members of the Ottoman Parliament on the best methods to develop the proposed railroad in Eastern Anatolia.

8. Instability in the cabinet and its inability to make decisions.

In addition to the absence of reforms and the Ittihad's disregard for its own pledges, the authors of the Memorandum listed the following governmental actions to support their conclusions:

1. The Ittihad government had stopped prosecuting Kurdish chieftains accused of crimes against Armenians; one prominent criminal, Huseyin Pasha, had in fact been invited back into the country with a pardon.

2. The Ittihad had favored the Bagdad railway line which, in the view of the Dashnaktsutiune, would only enrich foreign capitalists; the party had recommended instead the Anatolian railway, which would help the economic development of this poor region.

3. No concrete steps were taken to return to Armenian peasants and farmers their lands, their principal means of livelihood. Such a distribution would hardly have affected the Kurdish or Turkish peasant, but it would have hurt the large landowners and muhajirs. The Dashnaktsutiune's proposal to achieve such a return through administrative decisions was frustrated by the Ittihad's recommendation that the regular courts be used for that purpose; pleas that the courts had not yet been reformed since the revolution and that peasants did not even have money to go to court or to bribe the corrupt officials were hardly heeded.

4. Where joint committees had been formed, the CUP representatives had on occasion made unreasonable and suspicious demands, such as assimilation of the Dashnaktsutiune into the Ittihad ve Terakke or turning over the lists of party members to the Committee of Union and Progress.31

The Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune determined that the party could no longer be in alliance with the Ittihad, and that it would continue its efforts as a party in friendly opposition in Parliament.

Thus, during the period of intense relations following the revolution, when the two groups were able to know each other and act on this knowledge, Armenian leaders discussed security of life, land reform, economic development, and political equality, rather than autonomy or independence. Their disagreements and ultimate break were over bread and butter issues rather than over boundaries. Simon Zavarian, one of the founders of the party and a member of the Buro's Turkish Section,
argued in 1912 that of all the elements in the Ottoman Empire, Armenians had been the most supportive of the Constitution:

This sympathy was not the consequence of [the Armenians'] high morals, [their] pro-Turkish inclination, or [their] political maturity. Rather, it is a question of geo-political realities and the current situation. Dispersed all over Asia Minor and mixed with Turks and other nationalities over the centuries, Armenians could not seek their future in a territorial autonomy, to lead an even more isolated political life. Armenians have tried to create [favorable] conditions for all Ottomans by supporting reform for the Ottoman state, [and to change] for the better the status of Armenians and Armenia.32

He observed, however, that Ottoman subjects had very little to show for the four years they had lived under a Constitution: "End of the internal identification cards, a few students to Europe, and some road projects. . . . But what do peasants and craftsmen have to show? . . . One also cannot hope much from the new Parliament, since most new deputies have titles such as beys, zades, pashas and mutties."33 The alienation of the Armenians from the state was most dramatically illustrated in the final defense statement of the Hunchakian Paramaz in 1915, who after having been accused of plotting against the government, was hanged along with twenty other Hunchakian leaders. "I am not a separatist," said Paramaz. "It is this state which is separating itself from me, unable to come to terms with the ideas which inspire me."34

It seems, then, that long before the beginning of World War I the Ittihad, as well as the Armenian parties, had concluded that the Young Turk revolution had failed. Jemal Pasha, one of the triumvirate, argued in his memoirs that the Ittihad failed to take root.35 In 1912 Zavarian had been more explicit in his explanation of the failure of the Ittihad:

Instead of waging a struggle, of establishing a popular militia, of creating a democratic party, a party with [political] principles, [the Ittihadists] went the way of their predecessors: they chose "the easy path." They kissed and allied with all the dignitaries and created a "union" of coreligionists.36

Armenian political parties wavered between clear signs that the liberal era had ended and the hope that they were mistaken. Meeting in Constanza in September 1913 for its Seventh World Conference, the Hunchakian Party had perceived the dangers inherent in Ittihad mentality. A new party policy was based, among other arguments, on

the fact that the fundamental principles [of the Ittihad] call for the preservation of a Turkish bureaucracy and that they do not allow for the emergence of a new state, and that it is the [Ittihad's] obvious goal not only to assimilate but also to eliminate, and if need be, exterminate, constituent nationalities.37
The Hunchakians concluded that Armenians should at least be ready for self-defense. Nonetheless, they, along with others, were determined to pursue the search for peaceful solutions. The Dashnaktsutiune continued to advocate reform, whatever the source. In 1914 the Dashnaktsutiune was still insisting on the need for reforms advocated in a June 1912 editorial published in the party organ, Droshak. That editorial had listed six critical issues, in addition to land reform:

1. Better administration throughout the Empire;
2. Decrease in taxes on the poor and implementation of progressive taxation;
3. Abolition of all feudal taxes;
4. Balanced budget by decreasing the number of officials and building up an economic infrastructure;
5. End to acts and policies which create fear of Turkification and Islamization of minorities;
6. Safeguarding of freedoms.38

After 1912, Armenians welcomed the renewed Western, and especially Russian, interest in pressuring the Ottoman government for reforms in the Armenian provinces of the Empire, reforms which would be realized under the supervision of European governors.39 This, however, did not change the fundamental relationship between the leaderships of the Ittihad government and Armenians and the political program each represented for the other.

LIMITATIONS OF THE NATIONALIST PERSPECTIVE

While the issues raised by Armenians were in the area of social and economic development and political equality, general interpretation of the genocide which followed this period remains mired in the limited and limiting perspective of Turkish and Armenian nationalisms.

The nationalist perspective creates many obstacles to an understanding of the full and real picture of Armeno-Turkish relations and mutual perceptions during the period preceding the genocide. It is true that the nature of the crime and its inhumanity are such that it is difficult to imagine that the Armenians and Turks were able to have a relationship other than that of victim and victimizer; it seems that it was always in the nature of the relations of these two peoples to massacre and to be massacred; that it was in the spirit of the times for both peoples to develop traditions of modern nationalism; that these two nationalisms were bound to clash as they did; and that it was natural for the Turks to be the killers and for the Armenians to be the victims. Moreover, the current domination of the
theme of genocide in Armenian life, the bitterness and resentment in the absence of international recognition, and the increasing intensity of the Turkish denial of the genocide strengthen the misleading impression that all events preceding the genocide led to the genocide, and all events succeeding the genocide have been caused by it.

Turkish historiography has had particular difficulties with the Young Turk period, which remains little studied. While critical of the Ittihat ve Terakki on many grounds, Turkish historians have followed the policy of recent Turkish governments in either denying the genocide or justifying "deportations" during which "unfortunate" deaths occurred. More so than is the case with Armenian writers, Turkish historians have denied Armenians any role in Ottoman politics except to assign them dreams of "independence," of which pre-genocide Armenians had to be disabused. Charges of separatism have become convenient vehicles to avoid discussion of the real problems then facing Ottoman society and the failure of the Young Turk government to solve them by means other than war and genocide.

The absence of Armenian life in Western Armenia (now Eastern Turkey), the success of the genocide, and the depoliticized existence of a contemporary Armenian community denied its memory in Istanbul make it easier for some Turkish historians to characterize Armenians and their aspirations as they do the Balkan peoples: once happy Ottoman subjects who were carried away by romantic nationalism. Turkish historians treat Armenians as an important political factor only in the context of a separatist threat that had to be dealt with.

In other words, students of the period have difficulty imagining that Armenians were an integral part of Ottoman society for many centuries. This integrality was based on more than the physical occupation of lands under Ottoman dominion. It involved parallel developments in folk cultures, integration through a single economy, and mutual adjustments of social mores and values between Armenian and Turkish as well as Kurdish societies. Thus Armenians constituted an integral part of the political life of the Ottoman Empire, whether defined as a millet or as an ethnic group with parliamentary representation under the Young Turks.

Yet terms such as nationalism and independence have re-created a reality which places Armenians outside Ottoman history, just as the genocide placed Armenians outside Ottoman society; and analysis revolving around conflicts over irreducible categories such as race and religion turn history into a field where, instead of human beings interacting, abstract concepts do battle. It is as if hordes of individuals think and act as prescribed by ideologies of nationalism, religion, or race. Terminology then comes to reconfirm the view imposed by the genocide that, ultimately, one need not account for real Armenians leading real lives whose disappearance from their homes and from history must be accounted for; one is comforted by the thought that Armenians can be
reduced to a corollary of a concept. The politician dehumanizes a nation in order to get rid of it; the historian does so to explain it away. Genocide becomes its own explanation; ultimately, it becomes its own justification.

The Young Turks, including the Ittihad ve Terakke, evolved in opposition to the despotic, reactionary, and corrupt rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid II as well as in reaction to his ineptness in protecting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire against separatist tendencies and Western imperialistic encroachments. The latter were often justified in the name of persecuted minorities in the Empire. Therefore there evolved a linkage between domestic reforms, particularly those that might affect non-Muslims and non-Turks, and the defense of the territorial integrity of the Empire.

While all Young Turks agreed that the Sultan must go and that the prorogued Constitution of 1876 must be reestablished, it was obvious from the start that not everyone agreed on the best possible solution to the problem of territorial disintegration. One group, led by Prince Sabaheddine, promoted the idea of a multinational empire, with not only equal rights to the non-dominant groups, such as Armenians, but also a decentralized government which recognized a degree of regional autonomy to these groups. Ahmed Riza, on the other hand, whose views became the more dominant after the revolution, believed in an Ottomanism which minimized differences, in a centralized state which, while recognizing the equality of all under the law, would promote the evolution of a homogeneous, corporate body politic. According to one historian:

[Ahmed Riza] used the word "Ottoman" freely in connection with individual inhabitants of the Empire, Muslim and Christian, as did Sabaheddine, but in Riza's vocabulary the word did not connote so much an individual with supra-national citizenship as a person who, if he was not already a Turk, must be hammered into a reasonable likeness to one.

In 1908 the Young Turks took over the government and restored the 1876 Constitution. An era of brotherhood and renovation was thought to have begun; there was popular support for the move, and all problems were expected to be resolved soon with a new parliament. Parliamentary elections were held twice during this period, in 1909 and 1912. These parliaments included representatives of various religious and ethnic groups, including Armenians, although there seems to have been constant haggling over the number of deputies each group was allotted, the Turks always retaining a comfortable majority.

But the Ittihad government, already weak in its commitment to democratization, was frustrated in its attempts to implement significant reforms. Between 1908 and 1914 the Ottoman Empire had to fight two
wars against Balkan states during which it lost the remainder of its European holdings; the Ottomans also lost Libya to Italy. Thus, their revolution had not guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Empire. The Young Turks were particularly irritated by France and England, the two bastions of liberalism and the principal external sources pressuring for internal reform, who stood by while more and more Ottoman lands were taken away. The Ittihad ve Terakke was also naive in its belief that a parliament in and by itself constituted reform and could change a society. Impatient about criticism and unwilling to undertake reforms which they thought would weaken the authority of the state, the Ittihad ve Terakke itself moved toward despotism, just as Abdul Hamid II had done over three decades earlier. The Ittihad leadership gradually eliminated not only opposition parties but also elements within the Ittihad who still linked the salvation of Ottoman society to domestic reforms and a vigorous constitutional life. The coup d'état in 1913 led by Enver, Talaat, and Jemal Pashas came as the logical conclusion of the evolution of the Ittihad toward a dictatorship. The three continued to believe that they embodied all the wisdom necessary to lead the Empire toward salvation; and the salvation of the Empire was couched in terms of molding the character and thoughts of the citizens of the Empire in the image of some ideal Ottoman.

From the promise of reform and equality and political rejuvenation springing from the dedication to the ideal of a state which provided equality under the law, the Ittihadids had moved to the position of a corporate state within which not only non-Turks would be designated "enemies" by definition, but also all liberals who insisted on a different vision than the one articulated by the Ittihad, however vague and shifting that may have been. Liberalism, which sought to reject the use of ethnic, religious, or national identity as the basis for legitimation of power, was seen as a weakness, as the lot of the forces of particularism and dissent, as a source of chaos and further disintegration, unworthy of the various visions of greatness that were motivating the Ittihad—the "true" successor of the once powerful sultans.

The Ittihad distaste for liberalism is critical for the understanding of their policies before and during the war. In the Ottoman Empire liberalism and ethnic issues had been intertwined since the nineteenth century. Western pressures for reform always focused on the status of Christians. The Turkish and Kurdish masses in the Empire had been denied a systematic exposure to the need for reform from their own revolutionaries. They consequently viewed the Ottoman Constitution as a privilege only for Christians. Moreover, the Turkish people felt a false sense of power through identification with the ruling dynasty and ruling elite. Ramsaur, who tends to see all minorities as budding nationalists, nonetheless recognizes that
the Moslem minorities, such as those Albanians who professed Islam, were beginning to feel the sweep of nationalism as well, but they were somewhat weakened in their aspirations by the fact that they enjoyed better treatment than did the Christian minorities and because they had a religious bond with the dynasty that the latter did not possess.51

Naturally, non-Turks found it easier to understand and appreciate reforms. Being more affected by the corrupt and decrepit taxation and legal systems than others, Armenians had long developed a tradition of political thought of their own in reaction to Ottoman misgovernment, Turkish superiority, and despotic rule.

Nonetheless, these non-Turkish parties constitute as much a part of Ottoman history as those founded by Turks. The Armenian focus of their parties, for example, is a reflection of the religious/ethnic structure created by the Ottoman government, not a natural result of Armenian nationalism.52

By 1914 the idea of liberal reforms had been eliminated from the agenda of the Ittihad. By 1914 as well, Armenians were the only significant non-Muslim people left in the Empire, the only non-Turkish political element in Anatolia capable of measuring the actions of the government beyond the rhetoric of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism—a rhetoric which certainly could not inspire Armenians. Armenians were also the only segment of the electorate still supporting the parliamentary system and the Constitution. While the promise of Russian-sponsored reforms may have diminished the need to see political reform for the majority in the Armenian vilayets (administrative divisions) of the Empire, Armenians in central Anatolia, Cilicia, and the western provinces had no other hope.

A CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT

Armenian liberalism was the legacy of the revolutionary movement which developed following the failure of the signatories of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to deliver on their promise of reforms for Ottoman Armenia. Armenians developed a liberation movement which, while having as an inspiration the Balkan movements, grew in reaction to Ottoman policies and Armenian realities and needs. Armenian groups were motivated much more by the socioeconomic disintegration of their society than by dreams of a renewed Armenian dynasty.53 Even the Hunchakian Party, the first revolutionary party and the only one to advocate independence when founded in 1887, did so because it argued that since there were no positive results to be seen decades after the promise of internal reforms and almost a decade after the Congress of Berlin, Armenians could no longer hope to see reforms general enough
to bring a change in their status. The Dashnaktsutiune, founded in 1890, which in 1892 advocated a degree of autonomy and the opportunity to create "political and economic freedom," made clear that their purpose was not the replacement of a Turkish sultan with an Armenian one. It was not surprising, therefore, that neither the Church nor the wealthy classes in Armenian society supported the revolutionaries; both remained very much part of the millet mentality fostered by the Ottoman government and, ultimately, were manipulated by it.

The liberation movement among Armenians, which turned into an armed struggle in the 1890s, acquired depth and an inter-ethnic scope in the 1900s. This included prodding Young and liberal Turkish groups into action against despotism and cooperation among the anti-sultan forces. One of the issues raised by the Armenian political parties during these early years was the need for Turkish liberalism to acquire a popular basis by addressing social and economic issues and by being ready to engage in an armed struggle to achieve the goal of a democratic and parliamentary regime. They also urged Turks to provide for a popular defense mechanism against any possible reaction following a revolution. In other words, the Young Turks were urged to make a revolution rather than a coup d'etat. These positions were articulated clearly over a decade of relations between Armenian revolutionaries and Turkish liberals in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire. The last time the Dashnaktsutiune had insisted on the need for an Ottoman revolution was in 1907, during the second congress of Ottoman opposition forces, which had been convened on its initiative. Armenians did not have much faith in revolutions from above.

Although in 1908 it was the Ottoman army and not the people that toppled the Sultan, the move was radical enough to invite the support of many segments of Ottoman society, and particularly Armenians for whom liberalism and reform had become political solutions as well as ideological tenets. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 produced important changes in the Armenian political scene. The oldest of the political parties, the quasi-Marxist and revolutionary Hunchakians, met in 1909 for their Sixth General Convention and decided to discard the party's demand for political independence for Armenia and voted to realize their ultimate goal, socialism, within the Ottoman context. Nonetheless, the Hunchakians registered their distrust of Ittihadist nationalism and absence of commitment to reforms. The Dashnaktsutiune put into place a mechanism for realizing the federal structure it had envisioned in its Fourth World Congress in 1907, in collaboration with the Young Turks. Finally, the Armenian bourgeoisie and well-to-do, who had never felt comfortable with the armed struggle and socialistic rhetoric of the two existing parties, created a third party, the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan or Democratic-Constitutional Party, which rejected violence and adopted capitalism as the proper form of economic development for
the Ottoman Empire and the appropriate way to solve Armenian socio-economic problems.59

All three parties worked within the bounds of the Constitution to achieve gains and to realize their goals. The coalition of the Dashnaktsutiune and the Ittihad produced parliamentary victories for both. The Hunchakians formed an alliance with the Ittilaf Party of Prince Sabaheddine. More important, all three Armenian political parties shared a vision of the society which they wanted to see evolve in the Ottoman Empire. This vision was based primarily on the need to address the problems facing a disintegrating Armenian rural society and a frustrated middle class. Equality, reform, and progress were slogans which everyone used and no one found to be against the interests of the state in 1908.60 They were inspired by what educated Armenians considered the universal values of the Enlightenment. Armenians believed in progress and in change at the expense of the traditional because, to paraphrase what has been said of German Jews, these attitudes facilitated emancipation from the political and social disabilities that had oppressed them for centuries; the Enlightenment gave them optimism, faith in themselves and in humanity. It was this general belief that led the Armenians, but especially the Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, not only to participate vigorously in the first Russian revolutionary movement in 1905 but also to play a role in the Persian Constitutional movement before World War I. This role was critical enough for one of the leaders of the Dashnaktsutiune, Yeprem, who had led his guerrilla fighters into many battles, to end up with the responsibility for the security of Tehran until his death in 1912.61

Among the Turks, enlightenment and progress were adopted by Prince Sabaheddine and the Liberal Party. However, they were small in number and lacked a popular base. Even the nascent Turkish bourgeoisie supported the Ittihad policies of economic nationalism and placed their hopes on a strong central government which might find it easier to make room for the growth of Turkish capital, as opposed to the traditional Ottoman capital that had been accumulated in trade by Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. The masses were more easily swayed by the rhetoric of glory, whether of the imperial or religious variety. When faced with the Western challenge, the Turkish reformers, whose liberalism was "ill digested," were more likely to be impressed by the technological and military advances—advances which, when borrowed, could have resolved the Ottoman problem as seen by Turks: military weakness against European powers and humiliation at the hands of former subjects.62 Some also internalized Social Darwinism, which made it possible for them to rationalize their insistence on the primacy of Turks in the Empire, their internal imperialism.63

Even in 1908, therefore, there were two visions of society at work, both in opposition to the Sultan, both favoring the Constitution, both
based on the dual principles of internal reforms and territorial integrity of the Empire. It was the first time since the articulation of Armenian political demands that so much common ground existed and that there was an opportunity for the solution of both problems. Yet for those in the Ittihad who had believed in some degree of equality and justice, the promise of reforms may have been the price to be paid in return for territorial integrity, and possibly aggrandizement. With the continued loss of territories in the Balkans and the threatened loss of the Arab provinces, the Ittihad lost even its weak interest in limited reforms and sought its aggrandizement elsewhere.

Armenian political parties, meanwhile, had been willing to make all the necessary adjustments to strengthen the Constitution: it was a welcome alternative to an otherwise difficult position. Armenians, particularly the Hunchakians and Dashnaktsutiune, made serious compromises on the degree of socioeconomic reform needed in order to provide the best possible support to the liberal elements in Turkish politics. And while among the Young Turks they had always associated with Saba-heddine, the Dashnaktsutiune agreed to run joint election campaigns with the Ittihad, which, as the party in power, the Dashnaktsutiune thought needed the largest dose of liberal presence.

The Armenian parties made it clear, however, that their commitment to the Ottoman fatherland, their willingness to defend its territorial integrity and the search for Armenian reforms in the context of the empire-wide changes, were contingent upon one condition: the Ottoman Empire had to be a "democratic and parliamentary state." This feeling was shared by the larger Armenian population as well. A letter to the editor of the Droshak stated it clearly:

For citizens states are not goals. They are means to develop, to progress, to become strong. If a means to reach a goal is inappropriate, inadequate or weak, it becomes necessary to exchange it for a better and more appropriate form. . . . The issue is not separation or inclusion in the Ottoman state, since these are fundamentally related to the larger purpose—our welfare. We, Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, Kurds and other citizens like to remain and live and even, yes, sacrifice and be sacrificed, in a state where our welfare is [considered]. We shall shed our blood only for the flag which knows how to keep our heads up. Flags which are miserable, shameful, often defeated, subject to derision and mockery do not deserve our blood.

The Hunchakians in 1913 reaffirmed their intention not to seek a separate homeland; but they also made it clear that they did not intend to accept a regime where any group dominated the others. In October 1913 all Armenian parties functioning in the Ottoman Empire signed a joint statement which, in addition to promising an end to internal conflicts, also reasserted their dedication to the Ottoman Parliament and Constitution.
In other words, for Armenians allegiance was to basic forms of political association or organization rather than to a dynasty, a nationalism, a religion, or a race. They were ready to support a political system which allowed for the equitable and just solution to ethnic and religious as well as social and economic problems. This was a form of social contract which was reminiscent of what Sabaheddine had come to learn and respect from contemporary readings. With their concern for social, economic, and agrarian reforms and a democratic system of government, Armenians were thus part of the Ottoman political spectrum. But they occupied the left wing of the spectrum.

Two other issues were problematic for the Ittihad government. First, Armenian parties had strong popular bases due both to their long struggle and sacrifices and to their populist platforms. Secondly, given the socialistic nature of their programs, they had also made serious efforts, beginning in 1900, but especially after 1908, to spread the liberal creed among Turks, and even Kurds in Anatolia. While they had had very limited success, there always was a danger that Armenian revolutionary parties with socialistic tendencies could create politically viable coalitions of peasants and rural craftsmen, supported by a liberal bourgeoisie.

WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE

It was no accident that the Ottoman Empire entered World War I and did so on the side of Germany. A crisis situation, martial law, and war conditions in general would change the rules of politics and the need for accountability for failures, while creating the possibility of territorial expansion. Siding with Germany was in character with an elite in power increasingly hostile toward any element which reminded them of their promises and failures. Fighting the war on the side of Germany could free the Ittihad from its commitment to reform just as the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 had freed Abdul Hamid II from the pledge he made in 1876 to create a constitutional government. A war which was to be fought against France and England, the liberal states of Europe, allowed the linkage between external threats and internal reform to be articulated in the measures taken against Armenians, now seen as the main threat, the enemy of the Ittihad "vision"; the Turkish elite considered Armenians ideological allies of the French and British or as a population sympathizing with the traditional enemy, Russia, which in 1912 had resumed its role as the sponsor of Armenian reforms. The war provided an opportunity for the Ittihad to create a coherent world: an opportunity to prove Turkish military prowess by fighting on the side of a strongly militaristic non-liberal empire such as Germany, and against the bastions of liberalism, France and England.
But the war also made it possible to eliminate the particularities and dissent in the political arena by eliminating Armenians, who could never be part of the new vision since they were not Turks or Muslims, and who, by their political consciousness, were bound to become a permanent source of dissent and discontent, a particularity in a society which was expected to find solace in the Pan-Turanian, Pan-Islamic creeds or in Turkish nationalism rather than in the search for equality, justice, and a dignified human existence. Jemal Pasha, one of the Ittihad triumvirate and Minister of the Navy, conceded a fundamental relationship between the decision to enter the war, domestic policy, and the Armenian "problem":

Of course, it was our hope to free ourselves through the World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence.... Just as it was our chief aim to annul the capitulations and the Lebanon Statute, so in the matter of Armenian reforms we desired to release ourselves from the agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us. 72

Jemal certainly did not imply that reforms were not needed, since in these memoirs he confesses having promised Armenians reforms as soon as the war was over, if Armenians functioned as a fifth column in Russian Armenia against Russia. 73 In a strange but intriguingly vague style, Jemal stated that "it was an active domestic and foreign policy" that drove the Ittihad to war. The most important domestic problem was the question of the minorities, Jemal asserted, and, among the minorities, the Armenians were the most critical. 74 Subsequent justifications of the deportations and massacres clarify the meaning of "active" policy. It seems to have been nothing less than the domestic equivalent of war on enemy states.

The desire to proceed with state building unfettered by any external or internal accounting was, according to Jemal, one of the reasons for the Ittihad's decision to enter the war. Of course, as soon as the war started, the two European governors who had just arrived in the country to supervise reforms in Armenian provinces were sent back. But the war allowed the Ittihad to do more. The purpose of the deportations and massacres, wrote the German missionary and eyewitness Johannes Lepsius, "seems to be to drive the idea of reforms out of the Armenians' minds once and for all." 75 Perhaps this will explain why the murder of the intellectuals took on such a gruesome character. It is said by eyewitnesses that on more than one occasion their skulls were crushed with stones and the brains were thrown to the ground with an invitation to the victim to dare to "think again."

When the news of the deportations and massacres reached Europe, many Turks dissociated themselves from the policies of the Ittihad. Attempting to do so publicly, Mehmet Sherif Pasha, the son of the first
Grand Vizier of the constitutional regime in 1908, described the Armenians as industrious and peaceful people. Attempting to explain the carnage taking place in his homeland, Mehmet Sherif added that "the Armenians' agitation against despotisms in Turkey and Persia [is a quality] one suspects has not endeared them to the autocratic 'reformers' of the Young Turk regime."76

GENOCIDE: A RADICAL FORM OF POLITICAL REPRESSION?

The relationship between genocide and domestic change is a theme which precedes the Young Turks in Ottoman history. Evaluating the meaning of the Constitution first introduced by Midhat Pasha under the young Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 1876, Harry Luke wrote that, "[Midhat Pasha] was sufficiently shrewd and realistic a statesman to know that only by drastic internal reform, self administered, could the rapidly dissolving Empire stave off the coup de grace which Russia was impatient to administer."77 Soon after he felt secure, the Sultan exiled Midhat Pasha and replaced the Constitution with an administration repressive enough to invite a revolution from his most resilient subjects, the Turks. In the introduction to an unsigned study published in 1913, "Turkey: The Situation of Armenians in Turkey Introduced with Documents, 1908-1912," a commentator discussed the repression of the massacres of 1894-1896 in the following way:

The top officials of the old regime were convinced that repression is essential to despotism and reforms are deadly weapons. Seeing the determination of Armenians to obtain reforms and to make their Turkish compatriots companions in their aspirations, they preferred to massacre the Armenians as the ones responsible for the situation, instead of undertaking general reforms which could have brought the end of despotism and their rule.78

Given this strong sense of the relationship between repression and wholesale massacre felt by Armenian leaders and nurtured by events, it is not surprising that both major parties as well as conservative leaders could see by 1913 that the Young Turks might be moving in the same direction as the Sultan. "Turkey is promising reforms for European consumption," argued a Drosnak editorial in June 1913, "but is actually aiming at the destruction of the Armenian element in Anatolia." Only the method would be different from the Hamidian massacres, argued the editorialist.79 The Hunchakians thought that the scope would be different too.80

They were both correct, although it seems that none wanted to believe that the worst actually could happen. The parties did caution the Armenians not to give any reason for provocations. During the initial stages
of the roundups of leaders, the drafting of young men into the army, the inspections for caches of arms, and other preliminaries to the actual deportations and massacres, Armenians tended to accede to demands, avoided any actions which might have been construed as opposing the state, and hoped that the whole episode would ultimately be forgotten and that the community would survive with minimum damage. Local measures such as the murder of a few hundred intellectuals or a few thousand enlistees were nothing compared to what had been predicted. In most communities where any self-defense was possible the realization that the small incidents were part of the larger event came too late to be of any use. Where communities acted early, such as in Van, Shabin Garahisar, Musa Dagh, and Urfa, the self-defense became part of the justification for the genocide while the genocide was progressing.81

To complete the preliminary stages of the genocide, the emasculation of the nation without risking much resistance, the planners of the genocide had, in fact, counted on the infinite belief of Armenian leaders in the possibility of political solutions to their problems. Armenians were, after all, students of the Enlightenment and devotees of political discourse once discourse had been made possible by the elevation of the "revolutionary" Young Turks to power. To believe that their colleagues from the days of exile in Europe and from the Ottoman Parliament could in fact use the methods of the Sultan and improve on them was to undermine the basic motivation for their adoption of the best that the West had to offer: belief not only in progress by man but also progress in man, in his perfectibility, in his ability to reason and to do what is reasonable.

When the Young Turks determined to exterminate the Armenians, they were not just ridding themselves of another ethnic group; they were also eliminating the social basis for a substantial change in the regime. They were not guaranteeing just a turkified Turkey, but also a Turkey which was closer to the model of the Empire in its heyday: virile and run by elites who were inspired by ideas beyond the reach of common men and women, particularly those of a lower race and religion, by ideas beyond the reach of discourse, abstracted from reality and, ultimately, from humanity.

The genocide of the Armenian people may be a paradigm for twentieth-century "political" genocides, where the elite's vision was predicated upon the political and sociological dimensions of the society they wanted to rule over. The return to a traditional order where hierarchies are in place and unchallenged may be one such vision. Recent genocides, especially the Indonesian, the Cambodian, and the Ibo, have been more brazenly political in nature, confirming the worst fears that knowledge of evil does not necessarily result in abhorrence of evil; that human reasoning can always find ways to characterize evil as being
something else and to conclude that some societies must be destroyed or must destroy parts of themselves to be saved.

NOTES

The transliteration system used in this text is based on the phonetic values of Western Armenian.


4. Historic Armenia was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid Persian empires, once in the sixteenth century and finally in the seventeenth century. The eastern, and smaller, part was occupied by Persia until the Russo-Persian war of 1827-1828, when it became part of the Russian Empire. That segment of historic Armenia became independent in 1918 and was sovietized in 1920.


5. Because of the presence of the diplomatic corps and an international community, Armenians in the capital were spared deportations, although their leadership there was rounded up and murdered. The regions of Izmir and Adrianople were spared because the chief of the German Military Mission during the war in the Ottoman Empire, General Liman von Sanders, threatened to use force against the Turkish soldiers and gendarmes should they implement the deportation orders. He told his story in Otto Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre in der Türkei* (Berlin: A. Scherl, 1920), and repeated it during his testimony at the trial of Talaat Pasha's self-confessed executor, Soghomon Tehlirian, in Berlin in 1921. See *The Case of Soghomon Tehlirian* (Los Angeles: ARF Varantian Gomideh, 1985), pp. 83-85.

6. The cities and districts which resisted included Van, Musa Dagh, Urfa, Shabin Karahisar, and Hajin. Only the first two were able to survive long enough to receive assistance from the outside and save their people: Armenians in Van were saved by the Armenian volunteers with the Russian army; those in Musa Dagh were rescued by French ships off the coast of the Mediterranean. Resistance in most cases was not undertaken with the hope of ultimate salvation but rather to have a choice in the manner of death.

7. Information on the role of this organization is fragmentary, often from oral history sources. The only substantial research on the subject, done as a doctoral dissertation by Philip Hendrick Stoddard, is silent on the organization's role in Anatolia and the Armenian provinces where the deportations occurred; see Philip Hendrick Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911-1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teshkilat-i Mahsusa" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1963).

8. Over 4,000 interviews have been taped on cassettes with eyewitnesses and survivors of the Armenian genocide. Significant numbers of interviews have been conducted by Professor V. L. Parseghian (Rensselaer Institute),
Professor Richard G. Hovannisian (University of California at Los Angeles), and their associates as well as by organizations such as the Armenian Library and Museum of America (Belmont, Mass.) and the Armenian Assembly of America (Washington, D.C.). The Armenian Film Foundation of Los Angeles has a collection of filmed interviews with survivors, while the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research and Documentation (Cambridge, Mass.) has over 300 videotaped interviews.


11. The 1894-1896 massacres claimed over 200,000 Armenian victims throughout the Ottoman Empire; for an analysis of the events, see Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896," in Comparative Studies in Society and History 24, No. 3 (July 1982), pp. 481-509. The 1909 occurrence, known as the massacre of Adana, was in fact a series of massacres in many Cilician cities. It claimed over 20,000 Armenian lives. Coming less than a year after the revolution, the outbreak was embarrassing to the Young Turks trying to project a new image in Europe. The government sent Enver Pasha to participate in joint ceremonies condemning the massacres; see Msgr. Mouchegh, Les Vêpres Ciliciennes (Alexandria: Della Rocca, 1909), and the report of an Armenian deputy of the Ottoman Parliament, a member of the Ittihad, Hagop Babigian, Deghegakir [Report] (Paris: N.p., 1919).

12. There are no exact numbers or reliable census figures with regard to the various peoples of the Ottoman Empire. Figures proposed by the Armenian Patriarchate or the Turkish census have been challenged on various grounds. Figures used here are on the conservative side. See Hovannisian, Armenia, pp. 34-37; Turkish census figures have more recently been used by Justin McCarthy, Muslims and Minorities (New York: New York University Press, 1983).


14. This has been the dominant view among Armenian writers for decades. The most widely known works in this category are Haygazn Ghazarian, Tseghasban Turke [The Turk, Author of Genocide] (Beirut,
15. The most prominent scholar to advance this view is Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 356. As Robert Melson has pointed out in his recently delivered paper (see note 1), the equation between the nationalism of a Turkish elite with access to resources such as an empire and that of a relatively small and altogether unarmed subject people as the Armenians is not a valid one.


17. The Armenian Question, i.e., the interest which the Great Powers had regarding the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire as part of their imperialistic designs or occasional humanitarian concern should not be equated with the Armenian revolutionary movement, however the two were connected for tactical or strategic considerations. The revolutionary movement involved Armenians in Russia and Persia in addition to those in the Ottoman Empire; it also developed its own dynamics, which included cooperation with non-Armenian and non-Muslim peoples. See Gerard J. Libaridian, "Revolution and Liberation in the 1892 and 1907 Programs of the Dashnaktsutiune," in *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change*, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983).


19. Melson, "Neither Scapegoats Nor Provocateurs."

20. Armenian sympathy for Russia has a long history. In some respects it is the continuation of a medieval belief that Armenians would be freed of the rule of the infidel by a Christian savior; particularly for Armenians in border provinces such as Erzerum and Van, which were constantly ravaged by Ottoman armies during intermittent wars with Russia, and given the inability of the Ottoman government to implement reforms, Russian Armenia seemed a better place to be than Ottoman Armenia. Russia, of course, used these feelings for its own expansionist purposes. But Russia was also concerned that a revolutionary movement among Armenians inspired by the principles of democracy and equality might turn against the Romanov regime, which in fact did occur in 1903 and later, when the tsar's government adopted an assimilationist policy toward Armenians and fomented Armeno-Tatar clashes between 1905 and 1907.

It should also be pointed out that there were large segments of the Armenian population who thought the Ottoman system was preferable to the Russian, since the Ottomans had allowed a millet structure to develop, had
given more privileges to the Church, and had not tried to assimilate the Armenians. A debate on this issue raged in the newspapers intermittently.

21. Despite the fact that the genocide of 1915-1916 has a central position in Armenian consciousness and history, there is as yet no comprehensive, systematic history of the genocide.


25. See note 1.

26. Studies of the 1908-1918 period are rare; existing works also have made rare use of existing Armenian sources; historians have functioned under the assumption that Armenians could not have been that important in the minds of the Turkish leaders, even when the issue was the state's attitude toward the Armenians. See, for example, Tarik Z. Tunaya, Turkiyede Siyasi partiler, 1859-1952 [Political parties in Turkey, 1859-1952] (Istanbul: N.p., 1952).

For brief discussions of this period see Hovannisian, Armenia, pp. 28-34, and Mikayel Varantian, H. H. Dashnaktsutiun Batmutiun [History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation], vol. 2 (Cairo: N.p., 1950), pp. 183-235.

27. This agreement has been referred to briefly by Varantian, ibid., pp. 203-4. Members of the Turkish Section of the Dashnaktsutiune's Bureau were asked by the Sixth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutiune in 1911 to prepare a comprehensive report on the relations between the party and the Ittihad. The resulting study consists of two documents. The first is a diary-like notebook of about forty-six pages with entries on meetings between ARF and CUP leaders between 1909 and 1911 (Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 78/a-1). The second is entitled a "Memorandum" on the same issue; the document has forty-six pages (File Number 78/a-2). These archives contain extensive files on the period under study and are certain to yield much critical information once studied. Both documents mentioned here are drafts; it is hoped that further research may unearth the final versions, although drafts often provide clues on difficult points which may be covered in the final draft.

29. Simon Zavarian, "Asdijanganavochnchatsum" [Gradual extermination], *Azadamard*, August 9 and 26, 1911. The article provides statistical evidence of the dramatic decrease in the number of Armenians and Armenian-owned houses, farms, and farm utensils in a number of districts over a period of thirty years.


31. Archives of the Dashnaktsutiune, File 78/a-2. For the last point, see also Jemal Pasha, *The Memoirs of a Statesman* (New York: Dial, 1919), p. 254. Jemal states that the Ittihad asked the Dashnaktsutiune to come under the umbrella of the Ittihad as should all other parties. The argument was that there was no need for divisions when everyone was now an Ottoman.

32. Simon Zavarian, "Paregamutian Artunke" [Result of friendship], *Azadamard*, April 19, 1912.

33. Simon Zavarian, "Himnagan vdanke" [The fundamental danger], *Azadamard*, May 17, 1912. The titles indicate either large landownership, other great wealth, or positions of traditional authority.


38. Unsigned lead article, *Droshak*, June 1912.


40. The denial/justification pattern was set during the genocide itself and consecrated by none other than Talaat Pasha, the Minister of Interior of the Ittihad most responsible for the holocaust, in his memoirs, "Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha," *Current History* (November 1921), pp. 287-95.

41. It is difficult to find in Turkish historiography a serious treatment of the history of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In addition to limitations to archival sources imposed by the Turkish government even to some Turkish historians, the discussion of the genocide is a politically dangerous undertaking, unless one is denying it. To justify silence on the genocide, historians must also remain silent on pre-genocide relations.

42. To prove his humanitarian concerns, Jemal Pasha remembers having argued against deporting and killing all Armenians since these actions would have disastrous effects on the economy, especially the agriculture of Anatolia (*Memoirs*, p. 278). Zavarian had characterized the role of the Armenians in the Empire as "the milking cow" (*Azadamard*, August 5, 1911).

It should be noted that Armenians were involved in the reform movement, although in a different way, in the first constitutional period too, under Midhat Pasha. Krikor Odian, a Paris-trained lawyer who had played a major role in the development of the Armenian "National Constitution" for the *millet* in
1860-1863, was an advisor of Midhat Pasha, and is thought to have been instrumental in the writing of the 1876 Ottoman constitution.

The integration was particularly strong in folk culture, where language and other barriers break down; comparative studies in folk music and dance should be revealing.


44. Prince Sabaheddine, who was related to the Sultan and whose family went into exile, became one of the leading figures of the Young Turk movement. He became the founder of the Hurriyet ve Ittilaf Firkasi (Freedom and Private Initiative Party), which included Greeks, Turks, Armenians, Arabs, and Bulgarians. See Ahmad, Young Turks, p. 99, and Ramsaur, Young Turks, pp. 82-83.

45. Ramsaur, Young Turks, p. 92.

46. Ibid., p. 44.

47. Ahmad, Young Turks, p. 163.

48. Ibid., p. 158.

49. Ramsaur points out that one of the reasons why the Young Turk Damad Mahmud's critique of the Sultan's regime was effective with Turks was that "he was a Turk and a Muslim himself, as well as a member of the royal family" p. 59.


51. Gidur, Batmutiun, p. 319; Ramsaur, Young Turks, p. 73.

52. It seems to this writer that had the political, economic, and social reforms supported by Armenian political parties been part of the program of Turkish parties, Turkish historians would have found them relevant for understanding Ottoman history; some of them also might have found echoes in the concerns of more contemporary perspectives.

53. The most readily available studies of the subject are Louise Nalbandian's The Armenian Revolutionary Movement (Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California, 1967), which covers the early stages of the movement to 1896, and Anaide Ter Minassian, Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Liberation Movement, 1887-1912 (Cambridge, Mass.: Zoryan Institute, 1984).

54. "Dsrakir" [Program], Hunchak (London), October-November 1888; also in Gidur, pp. 32-37.

55. Unsigned editorials, "Heghapokhutian ayp pen kime" [The ABC of the revolution], Droshak, November 1893 and January 1984.

56. "Kordsi propagand" [Propaganda for action], Droshak, October 1907 and passim.
58. *Chorrort enthur zhoghovit voroshumner* [Resolutions of the Fourth World Congress] (Vienna, 1907); unsigned proclamation on the occasion of the Young Turk revolution, *Droshag*, September 1908.
59. The Hunchakian Party and the Dashnaksutiune continue to function to this day; the Ramgavar-Sahmanatragan Party joined with two smaller groups in 1921 to form what has since been the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party.
60. Mosse, *German Jews Beyond Judaism*.
62. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 147.
63. Ramsaur recognizes the role of the resentment of European interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire in the beginnings of Turkish nationalism, but he adds, "In their attitude toward the Armenians and other subject peoples, the Young Turks are basically imperialistic" (p. 44).
68. *Droshak*, January 1913.
69. Sabaheddine seems to have been impressed by Edmond Demolins, *Anglo-Saxon Superiority: To What It Is Due* (New York: R. F. Fenno & Co., 1889), in which the author argues that patriotism works when it is "founded on the independence of private life" in which the individual will defend his fatherland to protect his own freedom, when the state exists to facilitate the individual's own independence, and when the fatherland is made for man and not the other way around. See Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 82-83.
71. Ramsaur, *Young Turks*, p. 8.
73. Ibid., p. 276.
74. Ibid., p. 97.

76. Daily Telegraph, October 9, 1915.

77. Ramsaur, Young Turks, p. 7.

78. Droshak, February-March 1913.

79. Droshak, June 1913, p. 97.

80. Unsigned editorial, Hunchak, November 1913.