INTRODUCTION

To begin with, such a title requires an explanation. Why would anyone try to construct a typology of genocide? The great majority of serious studies that deal with genocide deal with a single case, usually the Holocaust, less often with the Armenians in Turkey, and very rarely with other cases. In doing a study of a single case no typology is required, either because the case is treated as a unique event, or because the argument involves the internal sequence of circumstances that led to the genocide.

The need for some method of classification becomes apparent only when one is trying to deal with a large number of cases comparatively. In fact, in so doing one even becomes aware of the need for a rather rigorous and unambiguous definition; how else will one decide which cases belong in the study and which ones really represent a quite different phenomenon and thus should not be included? But even after this first step has been taken, the question arises whether all of the cases that do meet the criteria of the definition should be considered as falling into one large group. This question tends to answer itself after some preliminary work on some of the cases has been done. It is quickly appar-

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ent that genocides occur in quite different societies, under vastly varying circumstances, confronting quite different people, and resulting in dramatically different outcomes. Thus, treating all such cases as if they represented an undifferentiated phenomenon seems unlikely to lead to the kinds of results that are the aim of scholarly research. What we need is to group together those cases that appear to have some crucial characteristics in common. If we can fit all observed cases into one of several such classes, then we can talk about a process of classification, the end result of which will be a typology.

The textbooks on research methods tell us that the classes in a typology must be exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Such a requirement is difficult enough to meet but is not sufficient. We are not interested in imposing on our data some typology for the sake of order and neatness. A typology is a tool of research; unless it can be used as a tool in the analysis of the data, it is merely a frill that looks elegant but leads neither to meaning nor to explanation. If our aim is to satisfy such requirements, then the question arises as to what to use as a basis of building a typology. It soon appears that typologies could be built around several criteria. Thus, one could look at minority-majority relations within a society as well as power relations between societies; one might classify genocides by the means employed as well as by the results achieved; or one could consider causes as well as intentions. No doubt other bases for developing a typology could be added. And good reasons for using any of these could probably be developed. The choice will depend on the kinds of questions we want to explore. But the answer is really based on a hunch about the nature of the research to be undertaken. The very word "research" tells us that we are entering the realm of the unknown; if we knew the answers beforehand, we would not be searching for them. Thus, the adequacy of any particular typology can only be assessed in terms of the research results it helps to produce.

The typology to be proposed here is based on the hunch that intent is one such crucial criterion. If a definable group of people was almost or wholly eliminated, but nobody intended this to occur, is this genocide? Some definitions of genocide do not include the intent of the perpetrator. However, the case made here is that such events, although equally regrettable, are not genocides and therefore should be called something else. This leaves us with the task of trying to classify the kinds of intentions of the perpetrators and leads directly to a major difficulty: how does one prove or infer intent?

One of the major reasons for engaging in the study of genocide from a historical and comparative perspective is to find out whether some kinds of societies are more likely to commit genocide than others. From this perspective, it seems that a typology based on intent might have a great deal of analytic utility. However, there are two problems with the criterion of intent: first, it is rarely easy to get good evidence on conscious
intent and, second, intent may be either explicit or implicit. However, the criterion of intent seems so important, and other criteria for constructing a typology seem to yield so little analytic gold, that these difficulties will simply have to be dealt with to the best of our ability. With these remarks in mind, the present chapter will discuss the need to examine events within the context in which they occurred, examine the reasons why genocidal events have been largely ignored in the literature until the middle of the twentieth century, and propose a typology of genocide.

THE BRUTISHNESS OF THE PAST AND COLLECTIVE DENIAL

Our study of genocide has forced us on many occasions to confront the brutishness of most human societies in the past and the changing value placed on human life. It was not very long ago that many human societies sacrificed human beings to propitiate the gods, to protect the living against their displeasure, and to reassert the corporate unity of society. Human sacrifice existed throughout the ancient world, buttressed by religions that promised a good life in the afterworld to the sacrificial victim as well as the favor of the gods in this world for those who carried out the ritual slayings. The most recent discovery by archeologists excavating at Carthage of the remains of 6,000 infants sealed in individual sacrificial urns gives credence to the reports of commentators in the ancient world that the Carthaginian aristocracy gave its youngest sons to the priests for sacrifice to win the favor of the gods of war. In many societies human sacrifice continued until the society embraced an ethic that ennobled the individual in this world and adopted a code of behavior that placed this new ethic above the need to satisfy the grim appetite of the old gods for human blood.¹ Nigel Davies, who traces this change among the ancient Hebrews, credits them with transforming the "concept of life-giving . . . into that of self-giving." He contends that once the ancient Hebrews came to see God as good and just, human sacrifice ceased entirely.²

Yet even in those societies which abandoned human sacrifice, daily life was coarse and brutal for all but the very few. The great French historian Fernand Braudel reminds us that famines and epidemics were so common that "they were incorporated into man's biological regime and built into his daily life."³ In Western Europe, which was favored by nature, "famine only disappeared at the close of the eighteenth century, or even later."⁴ Sixteenth-century European towns worked out elaborate stratagems to divert armies of starving peasants from their gates. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, France and England developed new institutions to control the poor displaced peasants who flocked to their
cities and to harness their labor. The physically fit poor of Paris were often chained together in pairs and forced to clean the drains, while the poor of London were held in poorhouses under the new authority of the Poor Laws and put to work at menial labor. Conditions for the mass of the people were even worse, according to Braudel, in China and India, where famines struck more frequently and with greater severity than in Europe.

Peasants in Europe who reacted to their misery by stealing food or property felt the full vengeance of the law. Death or maiming were the usual penalties until the late Middle Ages. Medieval penalties for such crimes were codified in the German Empire in the *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina* of 1532, which was representative of European practice. After specifying such penalties as hanging in chains, beheading or burial alive, and impaling for the graver crimes, the *Carolina* takes up less serious crimes such as theft. For these offenses it "prescribes afflicting punishments—flogging, pillorying, cutting off the ears, chopping off the fingers, cutting out the tongue—usually accompanied by a sentence of banishment."5 In Western Europe, following the enormous population losses of the Thirty Years' War and the start of the effort to populate overseas colonies, human life came to be more highly valued. In the mid-seventeenth century, England and France moderated their use of capital punishment in cases of crimes against property.6 As the number of executions in England diminished, the English turned to the transportation of convicts to the colonies for terms of labor as indentured servants.7 At the same time, France and other Mediterranean countries found it increasingly useful to sentence physically fit convicted felons to life sentences as oarsmen on naval galleys. (The argument in this paragraph follows Langbein, chapter 2.)

This coarseness and brutality of human existence throughout much of history was a subject that hardly ever appeared in the curricula of our schools. The good news was reported; the bad news was not. The great massacres of the past lay beyond the range of the telescopes designed to focus upon evidence that justice always triumphed. In high school and university-level textbooks, Athens flourished, but the massacre of the men of Melos was barely mentioned. The Romans destroyed Carthage and Corinth, but the fate of their peoples was not discussed. The authors of history textbooks hardly ever reported what the razing of an ancient city meant for its inhabitants. In other words, the fate of millions of human beings who died unnatural deaths as defenseless civilians was invisible.

Our review of the history of mass extermination and its neglect has led us to the conclusion that until very recently scholars participated in a process of pervasive and self-imposed denial. Many factors entered into the process of collective denial. Throughout most of recorded time, it was the victors who wrote the history of their conquests, and even the
victims of mass extermination accepted their fate as a natural outcome of defeat. The idea of human rights is relatively new in Western society; even today, many parts of the world still emphasize duties more than rights. The Enlightenment tradition of viewing human beings as inherently good and rational also played a part in the denial, as did the rise of nationalism. The slaughter of people of other races, religions, and nationalities barely offended anyone's sensibilities.

It took the shocks of the twentieth century to reverse the process of collective denial; the gap between practice and ideals simply became too great to support the intellectual foundations of such denial. The Jews who survived the Holocaust refused to accept meekly the Nazis' assault on their right to exist. They recorded their experiences for posterity. At the end of World War II, the victorious Allied powers tried and executed top Nazi leaders judged guilty of crimes against humanity, an action which created a new interest in the history of crimes against civilians. Parochialism and nationalism were undermined by the spread of the democratic ideal after the war and the increasing sophistication of the mass of the people that resulted from greater access to higher education. Increasingly, journalists in the West have cast themselves in the role of adversaries to the holders of power and as spokesmen for the underdog in national and international affairs. Emboldened by this freer, more sympathetic atmosphere, other victims of past exterminatory campaigns—the Ukrainians, the Armenians, and the Gypsies—have begun to tell their stories. Ultimately, even scholars awakened to the paucity of studies examining and analyzing the phenomenon of mass extermination in history.

A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

When we began our work on genocide in 1978, we could count on the fingers of one hand the number of scholars who had written comparatively about genocide. A small group of writers, taking up the challenge of Raphael Lemkin's work, contributed to this literature. The pioneering scholarly study of genocide published by Lemkin in 1944, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, established a definition of genocide which laid out the approximate boundaries of the concept and identified a number of specific historical events within its perimeter. Lemkin defined genocide as the coordinated and planned destruction of a national, religious, racial, or ethnic group by different actions through the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of the group with the aim of annihilating it physically or culturally. What we call ethnocide was a form of genocide in Lemkin's all-inclusive definition. After the war, the French coined the term ethnocide to deal with the extermination of a culture that did not involve the physical extermination of its people.
Writing as news of the Nazis' depredations flowed in from Europe, Lemkin defined genocide to include attacks on political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of the group. Acts directed against individuals because they were also members of a group came within his definition of genocide. These included killing the members of the group or the destruction of their personal security, liberty, health, and dignity.

Lemkin incorporated a three-part typology of genocide based on the intent of the perpetrator in *The Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. The aim of the first genocides—which he situated in antiquity and the Middle Ages—was a total or nearly total destruction of nations and groups. In the modern era, Lemkin argued, a second type of genocide emerged, involving the destruction of a culture without an attempt to physically annihilate its bearers. Nazi genocide comprised the third type of genocide in Lemkin's analysis. It combined ancient and modern genocide in a hybrid version characterized by the Nazi strategy of selecting some peoples and groups for extermination in the gas chambers and others for ethnoidal assimilation and Germanization. What Lemkin did not realize was that twentieth-century genocide was increasingly becoming a case of the state physically liquidating a group of its own citizens. Had he paid more attention in his 1944 book to the case of the Armenian genocide of 1915 or the genocide of the German Jews, this facet of modern genocide might have played a more prominent role in his analysis.

Until the early 1970s, there was almost no scholarly comparative output on genocide. Since then, several authors have produced books and articles renewing serious theoretical discourse on the subject. Hervé Savon's typology, which appeared in his book *Du Cannibalisme au Génocide*, consists of genocides of substitution, devastation, and elimination. These types of genocide take their meaning from the outcome of genocidal killings. While Savon's work revived interest in the problem of genocide, his typology based on outcomes fails to illuminate the events leading up to the genocide and the possible methods of interrupting the process.

In 1976, Irving Louis Horowitz tackled the subject in a short volume titled *Genocide* which he revised and reissued in 1980 under the title *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*. As the new title suggests, Horowitz views genocide as a fundamental policy employed by the state to assure conformity to its ideology and to its model of society. His discussion of the role of the state in genocide and his critique of the failure of modern social science to tackle the most pressing social issues of the day ring true.

Horowitz devises a continuum of modern societies in which the level of state-induced repression of the right to dissent and to be different is the key variable. This continuum ranges from genocidal societies at one extreme, through less repressive and more liberal societies, to per-
missive societies at the other extreme. Horowitz' typology is based primarily on twentieth-century cases. His approach focuses on outcomes and does little to explain the process whereby an authoritarian state resorts to genocide, nor does it account for pre-twentieth-century genocides. Moreover, as Horowitz himself admits, a typology based on internal repression cannot explain by itself those genocides conducted in foreign countries.

Vahakn Dadrian, who followed Lemkin in emphasizing the intent of the perpetrator, published a somewhat confusing typology at about the same time that Horowitz' book appeared. He posits five types of genocide: (1) cultural genocide, in which assimilation is the perpetrator's aim; (2) latent genocide, which is the result of activities with unintended consequences, such as civilian deaths during bombing raids or the accidental spread of disease during an invasion; (3) retributive genocide, designed to punish a segment of a minority which challenges a dominant group; (4) utilitarian genocide, using mass killing to obtain control of economic resources; and (5) optimal genocide, characterized by the slaughter of members of a group to achieve its total obliteration, as in the Armenian and Jewish holocausts. Dadrian's lumping together of intended and unintended genocide serves to weaken the rigor of his typology. It seems to us that Dadrian has blended together the motives of the perpetrators, unintended outcomes, ethnocide, and non-genocidal massacres. We learned a great deal from his discussion of the importance of perpetrator intent but have not been able to use his typology effectively in our work.

Helen Fein included two thoughtful pages on types of genocide in her 1979 book on the Holocaust, Accounting for Genocide. Before the rise of the nation-state, Fein argues, there were two types of genocide: genocides intended to eliminate members of another faith and genocides designed to exterminate other tribes because they could not be subdued or assimilated. In her view, the nation-state has given birth to three new types of genocide: in the first, the state commits mass extermination to legitimate its existence as the vehicle for the destiny of the dominant group; in the second, the state kills to eliminate an aboriginal group blocking its expansion or development; and, in the third, the state reacts spontaneously to rebellion by totally eliminating the rebels.

Understandably, there are omissions and gaps in Fein's typology, which is only incidental to her major task. She does not provide a place for mass exterminations intended to instill terror in others to facilitate conquest, or for mass killings to further economic enrichment. These are categories that we have found helpful in our work.

Leo Kuper has contributed more to the comparative study of the overall problem of genocide than any scholar since Raphael Lemkin. In his 1981 monograph on the subject, Kuper wrestles with the problems of genocidal process and motivation. His discussion of past genocides
clusters the motives of the perpetrator around three categories: (1) genocides designed to resolve religious, racial, and ethnic differences; (2) genocides intended to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire; and (3) genocides perpetrated to enforce or fulfill a political ideology. Kuper is especially concerned with the increasing frequency of genocidal events in the modern period. Since modern genocides occur within nation-states that have the character of plural societies, the creation of new plural societies during the period of colonization and decolonization becomes of particular significance for his analysis. Under the heading of "related atrocities," Kuper discusses two groups which are excluded under the U.N. definition of genocide. These are the victims of mass political slaughter and attempts to decimate an economic class. He examines three exterminations in this category: in Stalin's Russia, the decimation of the peasants, the Party elite, and the ethnic minorities; in Indonesia, the slaughter of Communists in 1965; and in Cambodia, the mass murders of the Kampuchean government led by the Khmer Rouge. Kuper concludes that each of these cases would have been labeled genocide if political groups had been protected by the U.N. Convention.

In examining a large number of cases, Kuper insists on the need to refer to specific conditions in each case. He does not think that it is possible to write in general terms about the genocidal process. "The only valid approach would be to set up a typology of genocides" and to analyze the genocidal process in each type and under specific conditions.

Kuper's book is the most useful contribution to the literature on genocide thus far, but we have two major problems with it. One, because he does not have a rigorous definition of genocide, he includes a number of cases in his discussion which have no salient characteristics in common. This is a serious handicap in attempting a comparative study of genocide. Although Kuper is aware of this problem, instead of excluding certain cases of large-scale killing, he includes them under the category of genocidal massacre and related atrocities. Two, in his analysis, he treats plural societies as particularly vulnerable to genocide. We think that the plural character of a society is at best an intervening variable. It is new states or new regimes attempting to impose conformity to a new ideology that are particularly likely to practice genocide. When tensions between the traditional society and the new regime escalate, it is the plural character of a society which is most likely to provide the social cleavages that define the perpetrator and victim groups.
A DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE

In order to distinguish genocide from the various misfortunes that befall people, it is important to include the criterion of planning and intent to destroy in its definition. The most widely accepted definition of genocide is that contained in the 1948 United Nations Convention on Genocide:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.\(^\text{17}\)

While this definition certainly does include the criterion of intent, it does not cover the extermination of political and economic groups—an exclusion made necessary in order to assure the passage of the Convention. In our own work, we have broadened the United Nations definition to include political and economic groups.

We propose to use this amended United Nations definition in our work although it has serious shortcomings: it does not adequately define the victim groups; it includes acts which we would consider ethnocide rather than genocide; and it obfuscates the distinction between genocides, massacres, and wartime casualties. However, since this definition is the most widely known one and since no better definition has been devised, we shall use it for the time being. But in our usage, we shall exclude those killings which are not the deliberate physical extermination of a defenseless group, in whole or in part.

In devising a typology of genocide, we had no difficulty in deciding that it should be based on intent, but the actual categories posed a much harder problem. We have tried a number of typologies only to discard them later. When we examined actual cases, it turned out that almost all of them could fit into more than one category and thus required decisions as to what should be considered the dominant intent. The present typology is offered as a heuristic device and not as a final product. It may well be modified as a result of our own further research or in response to such critiques as interested readers are prepared to contribute.
We have classified genocides in terms of those committed (1) to eliminate the threat of a rival; (2) to acquire economic wealth; (3) to create terror and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology. In looking at actual cases, the motives tend to be more complex than such a relatively simple scheme allows for; therefore, we have assigned cases to one of these types on the basis of what we consider to have been the dominant intent of the perpetrator.

We do not know when the first genocide occurred. It seems unlikely that early man engaged in genocide during the hunting and gathering stage. While we have no direct evidence, this seems a reasonable assumption because men lived in quite small groups and overall population densities were extremely low (1 per 10 km$^2$ of habitable terrain according to the estimates of McEvedy and Jones).\(^{18}\)

After the discovery of agriculture, the world divided into nomads and settlers. This marked the start of systematic conflict in the form of food raiding by the nomads. The nomads quickly learned to raid their settled neighbors at harvest time for their food stores; however, they had no interest in exterminating them because they planned to repeat their raids in subsequent years. The settlers may have had much better reason to do away with the nomads, but they had neither the means nor the skills to do so.

As the settlers improved their agricultural techniques and produced significant surpluses, they were able to support cities, rulers, and armies. They accumulated wealth and engaged in significant trade. With these developments, the scene changed dramatically. Conflicts arose over wealth, trade, and trade routes. Wars were fought over the access to wealth and over the control of transportation networks (to use a modern term). At first, these conflicts were probably in the nature of brigandage and robbery. Soon they escalated to wars between city-states. However, these warring peoples soon discovered that their victories were mostly temporary: the defeated peoples withdrew long enough to rebuild their resources and their armies, and then tried to recoup their losses and to avenge their defeat. This pattern became so common that it soon appeared that the only way to assure a stable future was to eliminate the defeated enemy once and for all. People that were not killed during or after the battle were sold into slavery and dispersed. This elimination of a potential future threat appears to be the reason for the first genocides in history.

Genocides of this first type seem to have been common throughout antiquity, especially in the Middle East, where trade routes between Asia, Africa, and Europe crossed. The Assyrians were expert practitioners; about a number of the peoples whom they vanquished we know little more than their names.\(^{19}\) When the empire of the Hittites was destroyed, it was done so efficiently that not even the location of their capital was known until an inspired German archeologist unearthed it
almost by accident in the nineteenth century. Perhaps the best-known example of this type of genocide is the destruction of Carthage. The so-called Punic Wars between Carthage and Rome lasted well over a century (264-146 B.C.) and were fought mostly over the control of the Mediterranean trade and economy. These wars were incredibly costly in terms of material and lives, even by modern standards. After Rome just barely won the Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.), it decided that Carthage had to be eliminated once and for all. Those who were not killed in the Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.) were sold into slavery, and the city was destroyed. Looking at the available evidence from antiquity, one might even develop a hypothesis that most wars at that time were genocidal in character.

The evidence from antiquity is often contradictory, ambiguous, or missing. Such evidence as we have consists almost exclusively of written materials that were produced either by the victims or by the perpetrators; in those rare cases where we have accounts from both sides, they tend not to confirm each other's evidence. It may well be that as yet undiscovered evidence will shed new light on how and why entire peoples have disappeared. Such disappearances in themselves are not evidence of genocide because they may have been due to a variety of processes, from migration to assimilation. However, if we should ever develop an archeology of genocide, we may acquire more conclusive proof of what happened to the populations of cities that were destroyed and to whole peoples that have disappeared. One case illustrating such possibilities is the extermination, reported by Iranian historians, of whole populations by the Mongols under Genghis Kahn; these reports were thought to be exaggerated because they originated from the victims. They gained renewed credibility, however, when archeologists unearthed the pyramids of skulls that Iranian historians had described.

The second type of genocide is one committed primarily to acquire economic wealth. It probably also originated in antiquity. People looking for greater wealth than their own territory could provide found it in the possession of others. When such wealth was in the form of fertile land and other primary resources, it could not be carried off as loot, but could only be acquired by occupying the land and enslaving and/or exterminating the indigenous population. This type of genocide has continued to occur throughout history up to the present day. It has often been associated with colonial expansion and the discovery and settlement of new parts of the world. The Tasmanians disappeared in the same way that some of the peoples of the interior of Brazil are disappearing today.

The third type of genocide is a somewhat later invention and was associated with the building and maintaining of empire. To conquer others and to keep them subjugated requires large armies and a permanent investment in a large occupying force. Genghis Khan probably
deserves credit for realizing that the creation of terror is far more efficient as well as more effective. He offered his prospective conquests the choice of submitting or of being exterminated. If they did not submit, the threat was ruthlessly carried out. Although there were never more than about 1 million Mongols, using these methods Genghis Khan was able to establish an empire that comprised most of the then known world from China to Central Europe.

These three types of genocide have largely disappeared from history for the simple reason that modern states have become so large that it is no longer possible for the victor to exterminate the defeated enemy. They persist, particularly genocides committed for economic reasons, only in cases where the victim population consists of a relatively small tribe living in relative isolation. In the twentieth century, several such cases have been reported in South America.

The fourth type of genocide is quite different from the first three and is also of much more recent origin. It is based on the implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology. When conformity is enforced by church or state, deviation from the dominating belief system is, in extreme cases, punished by extermination. It is in this fourth type of genocide that the definition of the group becomes problematic because the victim group is defined by the perpetrator; since the perpetrator's definition is derived from his belief, theory, or ideology, the group may be a real one or it may be a pseudo-group that has no existence outside the perpetrator's particular conceptual framework. Similarly, the deviation that the victim group is accused of may be real or it may be imaginary, taking the form of a pseudo-conspiracy or an imagined social pollution which threatens the survival of the regime, the state, or the church.

The combination of these two variables, the group and what it is accused of, leads to the following four sub-types:

In the first sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are real. Thus, the victims of the Albigensian Crusade were a real group of heretics who were accused by the Papacy of a real deviation—the Cathar Heresy.

In the second sub-type, both the group and what it is accused of are inventions of the perpetrator. The first occurrence of this phenomenon was the Great Witch-Hunt of the Middle Ages. We consider this a case of genocidal massacre rather than genocide; however, it is instructive because today we would all agree that there were no covens of witches flying to meetings with the Devil on the tops of mountains, that there were no pacts with the Devil to overthrow Christendom, and that no witch ever had intercourse with the Devil. Although neither the groups nor the accusations of conspiracy had a basis in reality, their horrible consequences were real enough. Accused witches were tortured to extract confessions on the basis of which they were then burned at the
stake. (We are fortunate that in the twentieth century a nation-state's belief in the Devil seems to decrease with the increase in its national debt).26

In the third sub-type, a real group is falsely accused of conspiracy. The Turkish genocide against the Armenians in 1915 illustrates this type. In contrast to the demonic witches, the Armenian people were a real group, based on a common language and religion many centuries old. But the Turkish charges of conspiracy against the state were wildly exaggerated. While there certainly were Armenian separatist organizations who cooperated with the Russians during World War I, their supporters were few and their ability to influence events was small. Yet the Turkish government attacked virtually the entire Armenian population when it launched its deportation and killing operations.

In the fourth sub-type, a pseudo-group is accused of a real conspiracy. This would be the case where the state had evidence of a real opposition without being able to identify its members. It might then accuse a pseudo-group and victimize it because its members are already unpopular with the regime. This is a form of scapegoating that is well known in other contexts. Such a pseudo-group can then be identified only through the definition imposed on it by the perpetrator. While such victimization does occur frequently enough, we can think of no actual case that has reached genocidal proportions.

Genocide associated with the implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology—our fourth type—had its origins in the Middle Ages but has become much more frequent in the twentieth century. The rising importance of theories and ideologies has produced a revival of accusations of pseudo-conspiracies which has resulted in much more frequent persecutions of real and pseudo-groups; some of these have resulted in horrible genocides and genocidal massacres. We are only too familiar with the horrors committed in Ottoman Turkey,27 in Stalin's Russia,28 and in Hitler's Germany.29 One of the things that is different about this fourth type of genocide is its result for the perpetrator: For the first three types, it can be argued that genocide produced tangible benefits for the perpetrators; in the case of the fourth type, it seems clear that genocide was carried out in spite of tremendous costs to the perpetrators, costs that can be measured in economic, political, and developmental terms.

A NOTE ON METHODS

The definition of concepts and the design of a typology are an essential part of any research enterprise. However, they are essential only in making sense of the data. In the study of genocide, the data
present a set of particularly difficult problems. This is not the place for exploring these problems in detail. However, four kinds of problems should be mentioned that make such study especially difficult:

1. The evidence is by its very nature difficult to obtain because throughout most of history relevant records either were not kept or did not survive;
2. Where records do exist, they either originate with the perpetrators or with the victims, but rarely do we find records from both;
3. When we do have records from the perpetrators and the victims, they are often so divergent that it is difficult to decide what actually did occur, and the intentions of the perpetrator may be the most difficult evidence to discover; and
4. The reliability of the records presents another problem, especially in the premodern period. Thus, we have evidence for genocides that occurred but were not reported; but we also have those that were reported but never occurred.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

In our century, the increasing prevalence of the conditions leading to type four genocide is becoming a matter of serious concern to those of us who care about human rights. If we look at societies from Horowitz' perspective, then we must ask how they deal with deviance and non-conformity. It seems to us that the crucial dimension in a society's handling of deviants is the way it defines and maintains their membership in the society itself. This is not a purely conceptual distinction, because it has wide-ranging consequences not only for the victims but also for the way the world responds to the victims and the perpetrators.

Insofar as a given society responds to its deviants and dissenters with something other than tolerance and permissiveness, the first question to be asked is whether such groups are defined as continuing members of the society or whether they are deprived of such membership. Loss of membership can be implemented in only two ways, that is, by deportation or by extermination. Any other form of repression or punishment implicitly acknowledges the victim's continuing membership.

Torture and harassment are ways of physically punishing "deviant" groups and individuals. But punishment is incidental to intimidating and terrorizing the rest of society: when victims remain at large or eventually rejoin their erstwhile groups, their membership in society remains unquestioned precisely because they are intended to serve as a dire warning to other actual or potential "deviants." It is also precisely because they have retained their membership and their citizenship that it is possible to take action on their behalf under various human rights legislations and conventions.
Deportation and extermination pose a different problem. In the case of deportation, the victims may be helped by being granted a new membership status and the associated civic rights in another society that is willing to welcome them. However, in the case of extermination assistance is, by definition, too late to help the victims. Thus, in these cases any meaningful action would have to address the search for methods of early warning and prevention. Such a search faces daunting problems of theory and practice. Prediction and early warning of mass exterminations and deportations have barely been raised as a theoretical problem, and a great deal of work remains to be done before any such prediction can be made with some assurance of correctness. But even after such theoretical problems are solved, there still remains the practical problem of the sovereignty of the perpetrator. The history of the United Nations, with all of its conventions, stands as mute testimony to the discouragement of those of us who still believe in the worth and dignity of all human beings.

Against this background, it is understandable that human rights activism addresses itself to torture and harassment much more than to deportation and extermination. With respect to torture and harassment, much more is known about help for the victims and the possibility of prevention. Success, when achieved or seen as attainable, reinforces further activism. No such encouragement seems to be available to those concerned with genocide and deportation. While mass deportations seem to be decreasing due to growing populations which are too large to transport, the spread of the nation-state, and the disappearance of relatively empty territories, genocides in the twentieth century seem to have been increasing in number and in scope. (To cite just one example, while it was possible for England, France, Spain, and Portugal to expel the Jews at different times, it was not possible for Hitler to expel the millions of Jews living in Germany and its occupied territories.)

In discussing the persecution and extermination of individuals and groups, it is important to remember the distinction between theory and practice. Many countries have declared judicial torture to be illegal; an even larger number of countries have signed the United Nations Convention on Genocide. Yet this has clearly not meant that either practice has disappeared or even diminished. There is a huge gap between declarations of good intentions and their application and realization.

The twentieth century has seen a tremendous increase of new states, the majority of which are ruled by one-party totalitarian or military regimes. Totalitarian or military regimes usually have to deal with dissenting groups, which leads inevitably to various forms of repression and persecution, and, with increasing frequency, to genocidal massacres and to outright genocide. Such states are particularly prone to engage in what we have called type four genocides, that is, genocides based on the implementation of a belief, a theory, or an ideology.
Individual activists and protest groups, assisted by several international conventions on human rights, have learned a great deal about the various ways of assisting the victims of persecution in different countries. Such help, while not always successful, is usually initiated by specific reports of incarceration and torture while the victims are alive. Similar reports of killings and genocides do not elicit the same kind of action for the obvious reason that the victims are already beyond help.

Why are human rights efforts not more successful? The first reason is that the very notion of human rights is foreign to most cultures of the world. It is often seen as another Western export that is being imposed on the rest of the world from outside. Implementation of human rights legislation is possible only in a democratic regime based on the rule of law. Where military and/or totalitarian regimes are in power, the whole notion of human rights is a contradiction in terms. The second reason is that the nation-state is both the guardian and the violator of human rights. Therefore, action from within is either impossible or fruitless, and action from without conflicts with the much too widely accepted definition of sovereignty. A further consequence of military and authoritarian regimes is that they can control access to and distribution of information, with the result that violations may not even become known or that proof may not be accessible. The third reason is that international bodies and international agreements, largely supported by the West, continue to exist mostly for symbolic reasons. Their continued existence is dependent upon the degree to which they serve the interests of all sides. However, their efficacy will remain largely symbolic because no supra-national body exists that can enforce their terms. The participants are sovereign nations that will not accept any diminution of their sovereignty, especially when they are also the offenders.

For these reasons, human rights actions will have to continue to rely on publicity and on shaming campaigns, where these are successful. In addition, their mission should be to spread the ideology of human rights and to encourage and support research into the conditions and situations which seem to increase or decrease the probability of human rights violations in various countries.

Any worthwhile activism with regard to genocide will have to be radically different from other human rights efforts. In order to be of help to the potential victims, it will have to focus solely on prevention. Theo van Boven, the former Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, has recently made a similar plea with regard to political assassinations and extra-judicial executions. However, in order to prevent such lethal crimes, we would have to be able to predict their occurrence—something that our present state of knowledge does not yet permit. Thus, any efforts at preventing future genocides will have to start with the kind of research capable of yielding predictive indicators that would then allow concerted efforts at prevention; in addition, re-
search will be needed to uncover those conditions and techniques of external pressure that are likely to be the most effective means of prevention.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 66.
4. Ibid., p. 39.
6. Ibid., p. 44.
7. Ibid., p. 40.
15. Ibid., pp. 138-60.
17. Reprinted as Appendix I in Kuper.