12. **Intrastate Conflict and Sustainable Development**

*Lessons from Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti*

Waltraud Queiser Morales

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**The Scarcity Connection**

> A community, alas, cannot be built on the unrelenting degradation of its inhabitants.

—Gerald Early

"Super Fly Meets Our Daily Bread"

Theoretical and philosophical literature on social revolution and societal instability have long isolated the central role of scarcity in provoking violence. Marxian and neo-Marxian theories of class struggle have emphasized the effects of oppression, exploitation, and emiseration of a subservient economic class. Liberal and neoliberal explanations have focused on the individual's political and economic deprivations and personal injustice. On the other hand, recent nationalist perspectives suggest a more ambivalent and secondary role for economic scarcity as a facilitator of violence. Culturalist theories, as many nationalist ones often are, point to social fragmentation, or what some have termed "balkanization," as the major cause of conflict within states. However, this explanation begs the question of *why and when* balkanization triggers violence. Ironically, despite, or perhaps because of, contemporary attention to multiculturalism and diversity, internal violence may be
facilitated by a postmodern climate. Questions such as what kind of diversity, how much diversity, and the historical timing and political and socioeconomic context of diversity have become extremely significant. The global spread of democratization, and the consequent changes in ethos, values, and sociopolitical structures, may be instrumental in the spread of ethnic and nationalistic violence. And radical and rapid shifts in the structure of minority-majority relations, especially under conditions of actual or perceived scarcity and deprivation, may encourage intrastate conflict and political instability.¹

Scarcity-induced ethnic or racial violence is everywhere, not just in the Balkans, Somalia, or Haiti, but even in the United States. No society is immune. Explanations of increased violence in Florida draw upon the classic 1949 study of the political scientist, V. O. Key, Jr. The theory suggests that Florida’s historical fragmentation impeded the development of a workable political structure, and that its physical geography created “a significant impediment to unity.” Recent waves of emigration from the Caribbean and Central America have further exacerbated “the state’s internal divisions” (Colburn 1993, G-3). Rootlessness and the absence of a shared culture and a sense of shared community are additional important causes of ethnic and racial conflict. These factors are further aggravated by the heightened political opportunism of political leaders, especially those who may manipulate xenophobia and the fear of outsiders. Without enlightened leadership Florida’s people, not unlike others around the world, will continue to succumb “to the social and geographic pressures that isolate them,” leaving few to believe in “a common heritage and similar needs” (Colburn 1993, G-3).

An important causal element, often only implied in these theories but which facilitates racial, ethnic, and nationalistic intrastate conflict, is economic scarcity. Although theoretical explanations may ignore or downplay the critical ingredient of scarcity—whether actual or perceived, or primarily economic, sociocultural, or a mixture of these—scarcity activates “balkanization.” Both the “objective” and “subjective” increase in socioeconomic competition for scarce state resources is an

¹. Intrastate conflict is defined as violence between or among one or more advantaged or disadvantaged minority or majority groups, and one or more of these groups and the political/juridical state, to gain either a greater share of limited resources or control or autonomy or both over the territorial state. Violence may take on ethnonationalist, indigenist, or religious dynamics.
essential (but not necessarily sufficient) precondition of intrastate violence. Scarcity establishes, triggers, and heightens the "us" versus "them" polarization of society. Therefore, explanations close to home isolate many of the same structural and cultural preconditions of intrastate conflict found in our three case studies and other similar cases around the world. The central argument of my analysis does not suppose that socioeconomic scarcity represents a unicausal explanation for global wars, ethnic violence and civil unrest within states (or between and among states). However, it does assert that the important conditioning and motivating role of scarcity may be obscured by overemphasis on cultural, ethnic, and nationality factors alone. Analysis of intrastate violence in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti will attempt to support this interpretation.

Theories of Intrastate Conflict

Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority.

—William H. Chafe

“Providing Guarantees of Equal Opportunity”

Contemporary theories of intrastate conflict reinterpret both classical and contemporary theories of revolution and civil violence; indeed, the well-known social scientist Harry Eckstein presciently termed such conflict “internal war,” and recently Ted Robert Gurr’s theory of “why men rebel” has been revisited as “why minorities rebel” (Morales 1973–74; Eckstein 1964; Gurr 1970, 1993a, 1993b, 14: 161–201; Johnson 1966; Davies 1971; Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979). Moreover, the convergence of theories of revolution, war, and violence with both classical and current studies of nationalism, ethnonationalism, and racial and indigenous resurgences has revitalized interdisciplinary theoretical and policy investigations (Wickham-Crowley 1991; Kellas 1991; Smith 1986; Shaw 1987, 31: 5–31; Gurr 1993b). Nor does the substantive overlap

2. For example, Colombia has long been characterized as one of the world’s most violent countries and as the “murder capital of the world” with eight times the murder rate of the United States. Sociologists have blamed this violence on a history of violence, proliferation of weapons, weak law enforcement and adjudication, drug wars, and decades of guerrilla warfare. However, a triggering factor or essential precondition would seem to be the economic inequality and scarcity endemic to the society. For recent statistics see the Orlando Sentinel (1995, A-14).
and theoretical cross-fertilization stop here. The precarious narrow line between internal and external conditions of strife, or domestic and international dimensions of conflict, has also been compromised. Nationalism and ethnopoltics pose major domestic as well as international and global challenges (Midlarsky 1992; Gurr 1990, 1: 82–98). With this convergence in mind, Joseph Rothschild's term, "politicized ethnicity," includes "all types of nationalism in international relations" and explains both intrastate and interstate conflict (quoted in Kellas 1991, 147). Rothschild asserts that "politicised ethnicity has become the most keen and potent edge of intrastate and interstate conflict, displacing class and ideological conflict, and it asserts itself today, dialectically, as the leading legitimator or delegitimating challenger of political authority" (quoted in Kellas 1991, 147; Rothschild 1981). Indeed, "real world" conflict management and many academic disciplines (comparative politics, comparative sociology, and international relations) are in turmoil because of extensive cross-penetration of internal and external violence in the post-cold war period. Decision makers have had to reassess their bag of "how-to's" and scholars their conceptual orthodoxies. Although the war in Bosnia is an example of the unprecedented substantive and theoretical overlap that confounds the conditions of war and revolution, and interstate and intrastate conflict, the multilateral interventions and peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti also demonstrate significant deterioration in state boundaries, authority, and sovereignty. For this reason, despite the emphasis on intrastate conflict in this chapter, the potential for a violent spillover into the international arena remains a constant threat, activated by many of the same forces that trigger outbreaks of internal strife.

James Kellas, in his impressive effort to provide an "integrated theory of the politics of nationalism and ethnicity," has also provided useful theoretical directions for a theory of intrastate conflict. Not unlike the more quantitative recent study of Ted Gurr on ethnic violence and minorities, Kellas meticulously differentiates among nationalism, ethnic politics, and racism (1991; Gurr 1993a). Common to both theori-
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cal approaches is the significance of the timing, place, and context of minority-group relations with a dominant majority, and the mechanisms (economic, social, psychological, and cultural) that create or intensify ingroup (the common ethnic group, nation, or race) and outgroup perceptions, attitudes, and behavior (peaceful and violent). Both theorists agree that an important indicator of the potential for intrastate conflict is whether the ethnic, racial, or nationality groups aspire to revolutionary political or territorial claims or both.

In his theory Kellas differentiates between necessary and sufficient conditions—an important logical distinction, which is also useful to explain internal violence. Regarding the current debate on the role of human nature and sociobiology in group conflict, Kellas concludes that “identity and behaviour are partly genetic, but they are also shaped by context and choice. In politics they are resources waiting to be used by politicians and their supporters for their own advantage. Human nature provides the ‘necessary’ condition for ethnocentric behavior, but politics converts this into the ‘sufficient conditions’ for nationalism” (1991, 19). Although Gurr also emphasizes the political dimension, his concept of “politicized communal groups” relies on the socioeconomic condition of discrimination and deprivation: “Treat a group differently, by denial or privilege, and its members become more self-conscious about their common bonds and interests” (1993a, 3). To be “politically salient,” Gurr believes that politicized communal groups must experience one or both of two key criteria: economic or political discrimination and political activism on behalf of collective interests (1993a, 5–6). Discrimination and deprivation, with or without collective mobilization are, therefore, essential and “sufficient conditions” for potential conflict.

Another important theoretical perspective attempts to link ethnic mobilization for warfare to human evolution and genetic predisposition. Theorists Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong propose “that kin selection nation,” or the nationalism created by the state. An ethnic group is smaller, exclusive, or ascriptive, and more clearly based on common ancestry and shared inborn characteristics; it may refer to a “quasi-national kind of ‘minority group’ within the state which has not achieved the status of a ‘nation.’ ” Race is distinguished from these as referring to predominantly biological, phenotypical, and genetic distinctions (1991, 2–4). Gurr focuses on “politicized communal groups,” divided into two main types and respective subtypes: (1) “national peoples,” or ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples; and (2) “minority peoples,” or ethnoclasses, militant sects, and communal contenders—either disadvantaged or advantaged (1993a, 15–23).
has interacted with environmental forces over evolutionary time to predispose genetically related individuals to band together in groups, oriented for conflict” (Shaw 1987, 31: 5). In other words, their research seeks to determine the “ultimate causes” or underlying reasons (“inclusive fitness” considerations) for warlike behavior, in distinction to the “emergent proximate causes” of human behavior, such as nepotism, xenophobia, and altruism (Shaw 1987, 31: 8–9). By combining kin selection theory and its axiom of “inclusive fitness” with cost-benefit analysis, they identify certain behaviors (intergroup conflict and warfare) as functional to reproductive fitness and survival of close relatives. Neither further elaboration of their complex and preliminary theory nor its acceptance is central to Shaw and Wang’s essay. What is essential, however, is the importance they place on certain environmental, structural, and socioeconomic conditions in triggering violent behavior.

Despite distinct and even competing approaches to nationalism and ethnopoltics, the three theories considered so far identify socioeconomic mechanisms (scarcity, deprivation, competition, and economic discrimination) as instrumental in the intensification of ingroup versus outgroup conflict. Several other theories of ethnonationalism (reviewed by Kellas) focus more exclusively on economic causes; two are of particular interest. First, Michael Hechter’s theory of “internal colonialism” posits that modernization, and the economic inequalities (or localized and discrimination-based scarcity) that it engenders, will increase the conflict between ethnic groups within a state and between these groups and the state (1975). Hechter’s related theory of the “cultural division of labour” asserts that internal colonialism will cause the “social stratification of ethnic or cultural groups, with the core group occupying the best class positions and the peripheral groups the inferior positions” (quoted in Kellas 1991, 39–40). Second, Ernest Gellner’s economic theory proposes that the development of industrial society necessitated the modern state system and a homogenous

4. “Inclusive fitness” is a central theorem of behavioral and evolutionary biology and a more controversial proposition in sociobiology. It refers to an individual’s expected prospects for genetic survival or reproductive success (classical fitness), combined with the reproductive fitness-enhancing effects (including health, power, beauty, or other physical traits) of an individual’s actions on the survival of his or her affected kin (inclusive fitness). Shaw and Wong define kin as “nucleus ethnicity,” or one’s “immediate relatives who share a high degree of genetic relatedness,” and “number a few hundred individuals at most” (Shaw 1987, 31, 8–9).
society and nation to maximize industrial production; thus, the hybrid nation-state was formed. Where the result was the repression of other cultures, nationalist unrest grew (Kellas 1991, 41–44). Gellner further argues that the volatile unrest for conflict was the correspondence of nationality or cultural differences with class divisions: “Classes, however oppressed and exploited, did not overturn the political system when they could not define themselves ‘ethnically.’ Only when a nation became a class . . . did it become politically conscious and activist . . . . Neither nations nor classes seem to be political catalysts: only nation-classes or class-nations are such” (quoted in Kellas 1991, 43).

Whether the ultimate causes of ethnonationalistic violence are biological, cultural, or economic, reputable theorists generally agree on the importance of changing environmental and contextual conditions—particularly competition over scarce resources. Specifically, this sampling of theorists—as well as others (not discussed here) who emphasize conditions of unequal economic development and incongruity between economic status and power resources—strongly suggests that conditions of unequal distribution and discrimination, and “absolute” or “relative” (or both) deprivation and scarcity of resources have a critical relationship to group violence. On this point, Ted Gurr is quite explicit: “By assumption, any communal group or minority that has been subject to political or material discrimination is at risk of collective adversity” (1993a, 6). Material deprivation (often extreme impoverishment) and systematic discrimination (by dominant groups and advantaged minorities) may threaten the group’s physical survival. In this sense, resource scarcity (both broadly or narrowly defined) is a necessary precondition that activates group conflict and transforms it into intrastate and ethnonationalist violence.5 Perhaps this convergence of grievances is what Gellner meant by his intriguing terms “nation-classes” and “class-nations.”

The most forceful presentation of the contributing role of scarcity and deprivation is found in Shaw and Wong. The biological process underlying human cooperation and aggression, they variously argue, “would be exacerbated under conditions of scarce resources or stress”;

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5. Intrastate violence is defined as physical conflict between advantaged or disadvantaged minority or majority groups and the political/juridical state, or among the groups themselves, to gain either a greater share of limited resources or autonomy or control over the territorial state. This violence may take on ethnonationalist, indigenist, or religious dynamics.
that “membership in an expanded group would have increased each individual’s access to scarce resources”; and that in the past “an increasing proportion of man’s ‘hostile environment’ has been other nucleus ethnic groups engaged in resource competition” (1987, 31: 6–7). They unequivocally affirm the hypothesis of competition and “conflict in an environment of scarce resources,” over the idea of resource sharing and conflict avoidance. The cooperative scenario would be likely only “when resources were abundant,” because if resources were really limited, “sharing would be unlikely.” An extensive quote best sums up their theory.

We propose that inclusive fitness considerations (an ultimate cause), have combined with competition over scarce resources (environment), intergroup conflict and weapon development (changing environment), to (1) reinforce humanity’s propensity to band together in groups of genetically related individuals, (2) predispose group members to act in concert for their own well-being, first and foremost, and (3) promote xenophobia, fear and antagonism among genetically related individuals towards strangers. We interpret these responses as “emerging” or reinforcing proximate causes which shaped the structure of social behavior in hunter/gatherer groups for 99 percent of humanity’s existence, (1987, 31: 11)

In conclusion, this limited review of current theories of intrastate conflict indicates that conditions of regional, and most especially, global scarcity are potentially devastating for the future of human cooperation and the delicate calculus between war and peace. Indeed, at no time in human history does it seem more vital that both civil and global society function as a “collective survival enterprise,” organized for peaceful competition and cooperation. Perhaps the combination of human “egoistic cooperation,” social learning, and a frank and calculated assessment of survival consequences can help forge awareness of, and a strategy to navigate, the difficult global future ahead. Certainly, a most viable choice, especially if we assume that the more difficult task would be to drastically alter human nature, is to facilitate a supportive environment and context for human behavior by reducing or eliminating the dehumanizing conditions of resource scarcity, inequality, and discrimination at all levels of social organization. In-

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Indeed, a global policy of authentically sustainable development represents a necessary step toward a comprehensive solution to global scarcity and intrastate conflict.

Sustainable Development and Collective Survival

The twenty-first century began with a North-South war. It will continue with a battle fought by all human kind for the collective survival of the planet. To stop this battle of all human kind for itself from turning once more into a North-South war, an alternative development is needed, in North and South. . . . Today, choosing peace implies choosing a new, alternative, social and ecological model.”

—Walden Bello

The cold war represented a long hiatus from the pressing global work at hand: the intractable problems of poverty, scarcity, overpopulation, and chronic underdevelopment. Activists in the development field have tended to assume that with the end of the cold war ideologized “developmentalism” would give way to rational and environmentally sound development policies. However, misguided orthodox developmentalism persists as free market (neoliberal) models and technological growth ideologies. Intolerance of alternative economic and social organizing models, whether nationalistic, socialistic, or mixed, has increased. Instead a “new cold war,” directed against the Third World and its radical development agenda, is being waged. Walden Bello, of the Institute for Food and Development Policy (Food First), has termed this northern process “structural resubordination” and argued: “Regarding the South as the principal enemy has since been institutionalized in US defense planning. In what was billed as the first detailed military planning for the post-Cold War era, the Pentagon in the early 1990s prepared seven scenarios of conflict—five of which saw US troops intervening in Third World countries” (1994, 109). Despite the policy rhetoric of governments, the goals of democratization, nation building, and sustainable development remain elusive, and if seriously implemented will complicate global interstate and intrastate politics in the short term and revolutionize them in the long term. Indeed, there may be no dedicated political will for this task, which will surely necessitate serious global redistribution and sharing of scarce resources. Early in the cold war, George Kennan, fittingly known as the “father of containment,” warned in a top secret State Department briefing
paper that because "we have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population..." our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security" (cited in Etzold 1978, 227). Can this egoistic development of global resources be replaced by a communal model?

A viable alternative is the new development model known as sustainable development. What is meant by sustainable development? Can an authentic sustainable development model resolve the global scarcity crisis and create an equitable and peaceful new world economic order? One Third World development expert has broadly defined sustainable development as "meeting the needs of the present without destroying resources that will be needed in the future" (Fisher 1988, xi). Another, more specific, definition, based on the 1987 Brundtland Commission’s report, asserts that "sustainable development therefore means, in essence, sustainable industrial development"; or minimally an annual 3 percent global per capita GDP growth rate (Chatterjee 1994, 21). A third definition argues that "sustained development depends on the existence of a viable middle class made up of people with education, technical know-how, and adequate facilities..." (Fisher 1988, 137). Consider the similar terminology and assumptions in the 1950s Millikan-Rostow foreign aid request "that the United States employ its resources to create and encourage conditions for self-sustaining economic growth in the underdeveloped countries...[that] would lead to the evolution of politically stable and viable democratic societies that could not easily be victimized by Communist promises or intimidation" (Millikan 1957 cited in Stoessinger 1979, 240). By comparison with the earlier cold war document, one can see that the Brundtland report, despite popularization of sustainable development and environmentalism, largely reasserted a traditional development paradigm of technological and industrialized growth.

Moreover, even the more recent 1992 Rio Summit (or Earth Summit), the ambitious United Nations-sponsored conference on environment and development, was ultimately coopted by traditional

7. The Brundtland Commission refers to the World Commission on Environment and Development created by the United Nations and headed by the former premier of Norway, Ms. Gro Harlem Brundtland with the mandate to report on the condition of the planet. The official title of the 1987 Brundtland report is Our Common Future (World Commission 1987).
developmentalism and the global development establishment. In their book, scholars Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger term this powerful planetary development elite “the Earth Brokers” (1994). They quote a frank admission by Maurice Strong, the influential secretary-general of the Earth Summit, that “the pattern of production and consumption that gave rise to so many of the global risks [sic] we are dealing with are still in place” (1994, 60). And, although Strong founded the Earth Council (a group of independent experts) in 1992 to promote “people power” and planetary awareness, and sought to ally “brass-roots” business, financial, and scientific constituencies with “grass-roots” developmentalist nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Greenpeace International (one such NGO) dismissed these efforts as an institutionalized “greenwash” of powerful global corporations (Chatterjee 1994, 160–61).

Because of an obsession with growth over equitable distribution and environmentally sustainable modes of production, traditional developmentalism has perpetuated and aggravated the conditions of global scarcity. The “old development myth” relied on established stages of growth: the first stage depends on society’s natural resource base to create the intellectual, economic, and technological capacity to fuel the second stage of growth, which establishes independence from the natural resource base. Brundtland and Rio basically reformulated “the myth of unlimited industrial development” and increased technological efficiency as primary solutions to scarcity and underdevelopment. Despite defining sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs,” in application, sustainable development contradicted this goal with a process based on society’s “techno-economic capacities, rather than on the natural resource base” (Chatterjee 1994, 21, 27). This hybrid model compromised “limits to growth.” Within its rubric, sustainable development meant inputs of “financial and human capital, technology, and organizational capacity,” which were all assumed to be independent of the planet’s natural and environmental limits (Chatterjee 1994, 27). From this perspective, inadequate technology and not natural-resource scarcity impeded planetary growth.

The fallacious promise implied in the Rio model is that all societies can achieve sustainable development with standards of living comparable to the industrial and postindustrial north. In short, “coopted” sustainable development seemed virtually indistinguishable from
modernity (Chatterjee 1994, 28). The "greening" of traditional developmentalism (under the guise of sustainable development) and slogans of "green business is good business" served as revamped vehicles for growth-based and market-based development strategies. The exclusive focus on environmentally friendly development encouraged the popular myopia that "clean growth," or growth that minimizes environmental and ecological damage, and growth that is technologically and organizationally efficient holds the solution. The "eco-efficiency" approach, by asserting that efficient growth provides the solution to problems of environmental destruction, scarcity, and economic inequality, deftly evaded the more fundamental and devastating impending crisis of limits to growth.

The critical analysis of Chatterjee and Finger further demonstrates that the "politically green" environmental and developmental NGOs were tricked by easy access to the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, unaware that the sessions and agenda were purposely structured to favor governments and business and industry partners. Small grassroots NGOs had little meaningful impact on the substance of the official agreements reached and were basically coopted by complex lobbying. The big winners at Rio were the financially powerful, especially the transnational corporations (TNCs), responsible for major global pollution, unsustainable depletion of habitats and resources, and other irreparable environmental damage. The Earth Summit legitimated TNCs as major global actors in sustainable development and made them appear less part of the problem and more part of "the solutions to the kind of problems for which they were at least partly responsible" (Chatterjee 1994, 107). Both the TNCs and the more powerful and mainstream NGOs have realized that environmentalism can be a profitable enterprise, especially when it stimulates more lucrative development projects. Chatterjee and Finger persuasively argue that as long as sustainable development is defined by "unsustainable development models" that fail to question the traditional assumptions of growth and further industrial development, the real crisis and the real solutions will be missed. Only a new vision of global ecology that affirms limits to growth, fosters downscaled consumption patterns, and challenges the roles of powerful nation-states and TNCs will truly foster sustainable development (1994, 173).

If in the development field the proponents of NGO-populism and the empowerment of grassroots people's movements found themselves
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upstaged by a so-called new global order run by a global managerial elite, a similar scenario has unfolded on the stage of global power politics managed by the U.S.-led international security elite. Many of the same actors are involved: nation-states and governments of north and south, transnational corporations, the United Nations system, and the United States. In global politics, as in sustainable development, the role and efficacy of the nation-state was also suspect and under attack, largely because of its inability and unwillingness to define and resolve global crises appropriately. In both arenas the fixation on technocratic crisis management became part of the problem. And whether dealing with the crises of global poverty, resource scarcity, and environmental destruction, or with the crises of global "disorder" and ethnic, tribal, and religious warfare, the tendency has been the same: to blame the victims. In both arenas the persistence of dominant, but irrelevant, traditional paradigms has impeded the implementation of real solutions. Finally, not only is the structure of global crises of underdevelopment, ecological destruction, and warfare the same in many fundamental respects, but all of these crises are integrally related. Perhaps, as with the rhetoric of the Earth Summit, the political rhetoric of the so-called new world order has also distracted many from the sure realization "that the only answer to the global crisis lay in profound structural changes, accompanied by deindustrialization and demilitarization" (Chatterjee 1994, 142).

Intrastate Wars: Why Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti?

To the extent that the exploited classes, poor peoples, and despised ethnic groups have been raising their consciousness of the oppression they have suffered for centuries, they have created a new historical situation. . . . [I]t is a situation charged with promise—a promise that the lords of this world see rather as a menace.

—Gutiérrez

What do Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, three contemporary cases of intrastate conflict, have in common? The peoples, languages, cultures, histories, governments, and religions (in part) are distinct. Yet, the violence in these countries from three different and distant regions of the world may suggest similar causal roots. First, these societies share, in various forms and degrees, internal economic, social, cultural, and political oppression and exploitation. Second, parallel histories of
colonialism, neocolonialism, and dependent development in the periphery perpetuated chronic underdevelopment and the “development of underdevelopment.” Third, unsustainable development models have created and increased resource scarcity, poverty, and ecological and environmental devastation. Fourth, activist racial, ethnic, religious, and nationalist identities have combined with socioeconomic differentials to intensify out-group discrimination. Fifth, the context and balance of minority/majority group relations and the role or condition of the state has recently and radically changed. Sixth, potential conflict and instability threatens neighboring spheres of prosperity. As the theorist Jacques Attali eloquently observed: “If the people in the emerging spheres of prosperity knew how to think in the long term, they would watch carefully the peripheries at their doors. In the coming world order, there will be winners and there will be losers. The losers will outnumber the winners by an unimaginable factor” (Attali 1991 cited in Bello 1994).

In summary, the three cases exhibit the environmental, structural, and socioeconomic preconditions of intrastate violence that have been identified by selected theorists. Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti contain societies torn by the uncertainty and stress of resource competition and discrimination-based scarcity and deprivation; they have become “nation-classes” or “class-nations.” In response to extreme collective adversity and violent threats to the physical survival of minority and majority groups in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, intrastate conflict has escalated into war and revolution.

**Bosnia: Rich Man’s War**

*When Tito died, leaving a Yugoslavia too decentralized for any ethnic group to dominate, it became inevitable that a Serbian nationalist would rise up to redress the perceived wrongs dealt his people.*

—Warren Zimmermann

“The Last Ambassador”

United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali lashed out at the world community in mid-1992 for its apparently racist preoccupation with the “rich man’s war” in Bosnia while thousands starved in Somalia. The United States, nevertheless, assumed a direct role in Somalia but not in Bosnia, where its interests were more confused, but greater, perhaps because intervention in the Balkans looked costly and militarily not very “do-able.” Several North American concerns were
clear: the sanctity of international borders; the proliferation of a Balkan war; the swell of war refugees; and the global spread of ethnic warfare (ABC 1993). Despite the world press coverage of "ethnic cleansing" and genocide, power politics has largely kept the United States from direct involvement in the Balkans. Experts were divided: was this an intrastate or interstate conflict; a civil war, interethnic war, religious war, or international aggression? In a sense, Bosnia was all of these. In Bosnia by the summer of 1995, as the United Nations peacekeeping forces were themselves being held hostage, multilateral diplomacy and conflict management were too little, too late. As Robert Oakley observed regarding both Somalia and Bosnia, "once a crisis has gone beyond preventive diplomacy or small-scale conventional peacekeeping, the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement cannot easily be maintained" (Hirsch 1995, 162). What were some of the critical causes behind this most gruesome intrastate conflict?

The crisis began in early 1991. The former republic of Yugoslavia, a multiethnic state of six component republics or regions (Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia) under Titoist communism, disintegrated largely because the Greater Serbian nationalism of Slobodan Milosevic raised the ethnic consciousness and fears of other minorities. Between 1987 and 1989, Milosevic’s attempts to make Greater Serbia the new postcommunist Yugoslavia precipitated the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. Serbia (or the new Yugoslav army) attacked, but both Slovenia and Croatia won independence. In Croatia, local Serbs rebelled against the new Croatian government and hoped to reunite their Serbian Krajina republic (some 30 percent of Croatian territory) with Serbia (Kinzer 1993, 4). In 1992 Bosnian Moslem leaders also voted for secession; but the Bosnian Serbs (about one-third of the population) boycotted the referendum. The United States and European Community recognized the newly independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. Serbia’s leader, Milosevic, then armed local Bosnian Serbs and began a wider war (Haass 1994, 37-43).

In February 1992 a United Nations peacekeeping force was dispatched to Croatia and by November 1992 some six thousand peacekeeping troops were also sent to Bosnia, eventually some twenty-five thousand peacekeepers, largely from Western European countries, to protect "safe havens" and prevent "ethnic cleansing." To date, the three-way, intrastate and interstate conflict has resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths and some 3 million refugees. And after more than three years of negotiations, violated cease-fires, Western bombing of
Serbian military targets, and on-and-off-again Western threats to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, the Balkan war continued. Armed violence and "ethnic cleansing" by Bosnia's internal Serbian minority, allied with the Serbian/Yugoslav army, created conditions of comprehensive oppression, which provoked further ethnic conflict and, finally, the intervention of United Nations' forces. Before the outbreak of war in Bosnia, the Moslem majority (about 44 percent of the population) faced the prospect of being a disadvantaged minority group in Serbia, subject to various degrees of economic, social, cultural, and political oppression. After Bosnian independence the Bosnian Serb minority (about 31 percent of the population) feared that they would become a disadvantaged minority instead of an advantaged majority group in Serbia. And unless reunited with independent Croatia, the Catholic Bosnian Croats (17 percent) would be a minority in either state. Regime change or the dissolution of the communist system in Yugoslavia (which had kept firm authoritarian control over separatist nationalist aspirations) and the consequent severe weakening of the central state created the destabilizing precondition that potentially reopened minority/majority group relations. The 1990 multiparty elections represented an important regime change, or alteration in the condition and status of the state and its relationship to minority groups. The elections allowed noncommunist, nationalist governments to be elected in Slovenia and Croatia, which led to the independence of these republics (Kellas 1991, 116). Further, with the demise of communist ideology and the death of Tito, "the power of the centre to resist these nationalisms" became particularly weak, James Kellas explains, because there was "little in the way of 'official nationalism,'" and no really charismatic leader (1991, 116). Ironically, democracy in the former Eastern Europe advantaged all the region's ethnic and minority groups, but also made it almost impossible for the state government to reassert central control and a state-nationalist unity.

The economic preconditions of the Balkan crisis also suggest that some ethnic groups were economically disadvantaged more than others, and that uneven economic development and internal colonialism favored certain regions over others. These regional disparities in income, employment, and industrial production (and the resulting ethnic group inequalities) became more severe with the failures in the Yugoslav economy in the 1980s (Lydall 1989, 4; Hall 1994). The economic downturn in the post-Tito period had a greater impact in Kosovo, one of the poorest parts of the country, and less on Slovenia and Croatia,
two of the richest provinces, and also the first to become independent after 1990. Although not extreme compared to European standards, the major regions of the former Yugoslavia could easily be divided into the northern developed (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Vojvodina) and southern lesser-developed regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Kosovo).

On the other hand, the southern areas possessed many of the country’s important natural resources (coal, bauxite, iron, chrome) (Hall 1994, 130–32, 142–43). Economic decentralization in 1974 increased the importance of nationalistic considerations, so that ethnic strife became played out more and more in economic terms, with richer republics complaining that development assistance was squandered by the poorer regions, and the poorer regions complaining of exploitation by the richer north (Hall 1994, 136–37). Finally, critics of the Yugoslav economy argue that misconceived development models and an emphasis on industrialization resulted in the waste of needed resources, high rates of inflation, unemployment, price controls, IMF-imposed austerity (1988), and economic stagnation. As Gregory Hall concludes, “essentially, Yugoslavia’s citizens had become increasingly impoverished in the 1980s, and the government . . . found it increasingly difficult to meet peoples’ needs” (Hall 1994, 138–39).

When the Balkan conflict first erupted, the Western European nations responded halfheartedly, and have continued to reject more forceful action by the United Nations forces, NATO, or the United States. With peacekeepers on the ground and subject to death and mass hostage taking, their main concern remains containment of the crisis in Bosnia. And although the destructive intrastate conflict in Bosnia threatens the neighboring spheres of prosperity in Europe and the region, the threat is not yet great enough to risk greater intervention.

**Somalia: A Failed Humanitarian Intervention**

*But it seems likely that, as environmental degradation proceeds, not only will the size of the potential social disruption increase, but the capacity to intervene to prevent this disruption will decrease.*

—Thomas Homer-Dixon

“Global Environmental Change and International Security”

The immediate problem in Somalia was starvation, but the underlying problem was intrastate violence among some fifteen warring clans,
engaged in a protracted urban guerrilla conflict. The warring in 1992 seemed a phase in the broader historical struggle for national liberation from foreign rule and repressive internal dictatorship. A United Nations trusteeship between 1949 and 1960 ended formal colonial rule by Italy in southern Somalia and Britain in the north (Rinehart 1982, 27–35). And after only a decade of independence came a brutal twenty-year dictatorship, which a coalition of clans finally toppled in 1991. Interposing itself into these complicated political events, the 1992 United States–United Nations humanitarian rescue mission ("Operation Restore Hope") rapidly escalated into a nasty policing operation against the relentless violence among the forces of the warlord, Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid and rival warlords and clans who still supported the former president-dictator.

President Mohamed Siad Barre’s Socialist-Islamic dictatorship, which seized power in a 1969 coup, had forcefully repressed rival clan loyalties (sought to control fundamentalist Islamic leaders) and imposed a state-sponsored nationalism on the country. Although a people largely homogeneous ethnically, Siad Barre’s imposition of an artificial nationhood activated and intensified the tribal and, to some extent, religious differences (fundamentalism versus a scientific socialist version of Islam) among the Somalis. Nevertheless, Siad Barre tended to favor his own minority Marehan clan, and in the last years of dictatorship, he manipulated clan politics to remain in power, undermining the foundations of the state-nationalist identity he had tried to build. Moreover, colonialism had left Somali minorities in the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and a cultural and economic divide between the south and the north of the country. Irredentism and Pan-Somali nationalism touched off repeated border fighting and a major regional war (Somali-Ethiopian War in the Ogaden in 1977–78). These conflicts and a protracted civil war (1988–91) interrupted farming and herding, devastated the land, created a massive refugee crisis (there were some 1.3 million in camps in 1981), and reinforced a cycle of mass famine.

By July 1992 a famine had been raging for over eight months and two hundred thousand Somalis had already starved to death; another 2 million were at risk, and fighting continued over access to, and hoarding of, private food and medical aid. In times of extreme scarcity

8. Siad Barre and his revolutionary government hoped to eliminate "clan particularism" or "tribalism," which he saw as the pernicious disease afflicting the Third World and obstructing national development (Rinehart 1982, 46–49).
In the best of times, food and resources were divided up along tribal and clan lines, with the dominant clans discriminating against the outgroups. Thus, in Somalia, once tribal identities were reinforced by wide socioeconomic differentials and further aggravated by scarcity and famine, several key preconditions of intrastate conflict were in place. Finally, the civil war, which deposed Siad Barre, overturned the established balance of minority and majority group relations in Somalia, and simultaneously created a political vacuum that radically undermined the legal status and authority of the official state. Both the polity and society disintegrated into chaos.

Siad Barre’s model of economic development (if one may call it that) had turned Somalia into an economic and military client of both superpowers (Bryden 1995, 94: 145–51). Jeremy Harding notes that Siad Barre received some “$600 million in US military aid, which he used to enforce a new but no less ruinous form of totalitarian rule in Somalia. After almost twenty years of tyranny, his country simply fell apart” (Harding 1993, 265). Somalia, like Haiti, is one of the world’s poorest countries, chronically dependent on food imports, and with scarce arable land, subject to misuse by farmers, overgrazing by nomadic herdsmen, and, ultimately, desertification. The economy (as in most of Africa, and again as in Haiti) relied upon cash crop–primary exports (livestock, hides, bananas, and some cotton—whose earnings have steadily declined) and import-intensive and capital-intensive development. This situation resulted in a severe trade imbalance, with imports greatly exceeding exports, and a $2 billion foreign debt. When the government attempted IMF structural adjustment measures, riots broke out in 1987. In addition, dependence on United States economic aid (Somalia with the Sudan, Zaire, Kenya, and Liberia—all “police states”—received half of all the total aid for sub-Saharan Africa in 1985) did solve local needs, and in the case of food aid, undermined local farm prices and agricultural productivity. Northern focus on “growth” areas for development assistance ignored the importance of

9. Although space does not permit further elaboration here, the Somali case appears to mesh well with the theory of ethnic conflict developed by Shaw and Wong. Culturally, conditions reinforced the environmental, inclusive fitness, and cost-benefit aspects of their model. Traditionally, Somali society is a warrior society that extolls aggression because “force or the potential to use force often decided who prevailed in the harsh environment.” Also, warfare was important in the relations among Somali clans and outsiders. “Antagonists in intra-Somali conflicts generally belonged to groups bound by their commitment to pay or receive *dia* (blood compensation).” The entire group was responsible for this compensation, calculated as either a loss or a gain (Ehrenreich 1982, 237).
sustainable development and left the poorest of the poor few alternatives other than humanitarian assistance or more anthropogenic destruction of their habitat (Timberlake 1986).

At the time of the U.S.-UN intervention, Presidents Bush and Clinton insisted that no North American security interests were involved; however, Clinton justified the U.S. military presence as one of superpower credibility and keeping faith with commitments made to the United Nations and the world community. There was little public analysis of U.S. regional, Middle Eastern, and African interests—such as insulating oil-rich sheikdoms, especially Saudi Arabia, and the Sudan and Egypt from the tribal instability in the Horn of Africa, a geostrategic access point to the Suez Canal and Red Sea. As one reporter argued: “How Somalia is put together is likely to have implications for other African nations. The kind of political system created here could fuel or snuff aspirations in other regions” (Schemo 1993, 3). In short, intrastate conflict in Somalia posed a potential threat to the neighboring spheres of prosperity in the region.

Somalia (not unlike Bosnia and Haiti) was a hapless victim of both cold war and post–cold war intervention and a shortsighted and exploitative northern model of unsustainable development. Despite statistics of thousands of lives saved, the claims of success for the 1992–93 humanitarian intervention ring hollow because little was done to deal with the endemic causes of hunger, scarcity, and conflict. In June 1995 the French organization, International Action Against Hunger, reported steadily worsening conditions of hunger. Since the pullout of North American troops in March 1994 and the United Nations in March 1995, unemployment had greatly increased; there was a scarcity of clean drinking water, and one child in four was starving. Although the capital of Mogadishu seemed calm, some 500 kilometers to the north the fighting between the supporters of Mohammed Farah Aidid and those of Mohamed Siad Barre continued unabated. The cost of the United Nations’ humanitarian operation ranged from $3 to $4 billion.

**Haiti: The Black Slave Revolution**

*In Haiti, the peasantry is the nation.*

—Trouillot

*If the Haitians don’t sell their blood, what do you want them to do with it?*

—Saint-Gérard
The Haitian recent and historical experience reflects comprehensive oppression and exploitation, which has been compounded by cumulative resource scarcity in the twentieth century. Not unlike the fantastic but true story of former Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza's lucrative trade in blood to the United States by his company, Plasmatélica, in Haiti, Hemo-Caribbean and Company, financed by North American and international capital and with the blessing of dictator-president François Duvalier and even facilitated by his notorious macoutes, sold plasma to the United States (Farmer 1994, 49–50). This brutal image of "blood sucking" the people dry starkly captures the depths of Haïti's exploitation by internal and external colonialism. Before and since independence, the country's history of political instability can be attributed to foreign and class exploitation. After the original Indian inhabitants had been exterminated, Spanish and French colonizers imported black African slave labor to mine the riches of the island paradise. First a mercantilist plantation system and later export-based dependent development reduced today's Haiti, one of France's most prosperous colonies, into the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. After independence in 1804 the black nation was isolated and shunned by a "white world" of racist and slave-owning states, like the United States, which withheld recognition until 1862. In 1915 the United States Marines intervened, occupied Haïti (after a series of eight revolutions in four years) and made the country a United States protectorate. When they withdrew in 1934, their experiment in nation building left behind a Caribbean pattern of repressive dictatorship, agro-export plantations, and cheap-labor assembly platforms.

An unsustainable development model relied on the export of primary commodities (sugar, rum, cotton, woods, cocoa, and coffee) and assembly products (apparel, toys, and baseballs) to the United States and global market, and on aid from the United States (USAID). As dictator Papa Doc bragged to Nelson Rockefeller in 1969, "Haïti could be a vast reservoir of man-power for Americans establishing re-exportation industries closer, safer, and more convenient than Hong Kong" (quoted in Farmer 1994, 115). In this model, U.S. industries enjoyed a cheap (the minimum hourly wage is less than fifteen cents), subservient, nonunionized labor force, no customs taxes, and full repatriation of profits. This model contributed to an absolute poverty level in 1986 of $60 per capita income per year, with 60 percent of all Haitians at this level (Farmer 1994, 117; Chomsky 1994,
Describing Haiti as the rising “Taiwan of the Caribbean,” Noam Chomsky writes that the effect of this development strategy was “to shift 30 percent of cultivated land from food for local consumption to export crops” (1994, 13). Desperation to survive forced starving peasants to denude the island of trees for cheap fuel, and to exhaust sparse arable land to eke out a small food crop. Already by the time Baby Doc came to power in 1971, Haiti’s soil and resource depletion portended a major environmental and ecological disaster. Extreme resource depletion, brutal deprivation and inequality, and decades of dictatorship spurred the thousands of Haitian “boat people” since the 1970s until more than a million and a half Haitians lived abroad, despite a vigorous and forceful return policy by the U.S. Coast Guard (Stepick 1992). Paul Farmer poignantly writes that Haiti had become “a country increasingly immiserated even as the false ‘industrialization’ of offshore assembly grew; a country governed by one iron-fisted family; and a country increasingly inhospitable to its own people” (1994, 119).

Internal and external developments in Haiti were accompanied by racial discrimination. As the first sovereign black republic under the self-rule of free African slaves, Haiti was a threatening anomaly and symbol to neighboring centers of prosperity. A powerful mulatto elite (which comprised the commercial and political sectors, the military, and to an extent the Catholic Church) controlled the land and economic wealth of Haiti and maintained the darker peasantry as wage slaves. The rise of François (Papa Doc) Duvalier broke the hold of the creole and mulatto elite in favor of his personal palace guard, the dark-skinned Haitian Guard, and the hated and feared paramilitary national security forces, the Tontons Macoutes. A scholar of Haitian culture, Duvalier mobilized personal and political support for his dictatorship with a racist doctrine of African negritude and anti-American Haitian nationalism (Morales 1995, 38: 29). But by the time his nineteen-year-old son Jean Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier, succeeded as president for life, relations with the lighter-skilled creole elite and the United States defined a cozy dependency: the U.S. Pentagon supported and trained the Haitian military, and the Agency for International Development (USAID) virtually dictated the Haitian economy through economic assistance and development planning. Thus, when revolution

10. Farmer cites 1976 World Bank data, which note a per capita income of $140 per year, with 75 percent of all Haitians at this level (1994, 117).
erupted in 1986, the lines of struggle were determined by racism, nationalism, and class.

The 1986 revolution was preceded by some of the worst violations of human rights and genocide in Haitian history. Amnesty International documented the violence, torture, and killings by the state's military and security forces against the peasantry, youth movement, and the Christian Base Communities of Haiti's popular church led by Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Between 1986 and Aristide's landslide election in 1990, and again after Aristide's overthrow by the military in 1991 and his restoration to the presidency in October 1994 by the North American intervention, a form of "Duvalierism without Duvalier" gripped the island. Successive military juntas (the most recent headed by Gen. Raúl Cédras) brutalized the people and made a mockery of democracy and free elections. This period represented a major shift in the balance of power and the traditionally subservient relationship between the minority ruling class and the peasant majority. The state machinery and leadership were under daily attack; the 1986 revolution represented a radical sea change. It became clear to all that "in Haiti, the peasantry is the nation," and any long term solution would have to deal with this fact. The United States' response, therefore, was to intervene in September 1994 and contain the threatening intrastate conflict off its shores before thousands more boat people invaded its sphere of prosperity. Aristide was to be the instrument of this "structural resubordination" and containment.

Conclusion

One possible alternative explanation for the rise in hostilities during past years is the cumulative effect of decades of unsustainable development, the consequences and pressures of which have begun to undermine the well-being and security of many countries.

—Hal Kane
"The Hour of Departure"

Perhaps the passing of the cold war will not have as great an effect on the potential for global war and peace and intrastate conflict as many policy makers have feared. More global conflicts appear to be rooted in the convergence of resource scarcity, environmental depletion, human degradation and deprivation, minority/majority group relations, and ethnopolitical and religious discrimination. If this is the case, it
will become necessary to redefine human security in a more humane manner and to systematically investigate and address the causes behind the conditions and preconditions of intrastate conflict. The 1994 United Nations Development Report asserts that global interdependence means that the world’s crises of famine, disease, environmental degradation, and ethnic strife are no longer isolated or confined within national borders (United Nations 1995, 94: 229). This portends a future of immense challenge in which either truly sustainable development, equitable resource consumption, and the elimination of poverty and scarcity will help liberate the body and soul of man or in which resource wars and ethnopolitical conflicts will proliferate. I share the view of Fred Riggs that "the rise of inter-nationality conflict in recent years should forewarn us of much worse to come. Unless radical solutions are found, the massive death-tolls of the 20th century may appear trivial by contrast with what is yet to come" (1994, 15: 585).