Before anything can be said about the scope and applicability of Marx's theory of estrangement, we must clarify whether it is legitimate to speak of only one theory of estrangement. If it is not legitimate to speak of only one theory, it will have to be specified which theory of estrangement is referred to when addressing the applicability of Marx's theory of estrangement.

Some students of Marx maintain that he abandoned the terms "estrangement" and "alienation" in his later work, and based on this assertion, they argue that Marx also abandoned or changed his theory of estrangement. This argument is weak on at least two counts. First, the content of a theory should not, and cannot, be evaluated solely on the basis of whether a certain vocabulary is present. Thus, by investigating the properties of Marx's theory of estrangement in the foregoing analysis, it was possible to show that these properties do not change, although the vocabulary may undergo some changes. It was shown that Marx's theory of estrangement is derived from his definition of human nature, a definition that is present in both his early and later work. Man is said to be estranged if, contrary to his nature, he is prevented from subjecting his labor power, as well as the product of his labor, to his own will. If one is so prevented, the existence of an involuntary division of labor can be implied. If, therefore, it can be shown that
Marx, throughout his work, maintained the same definition of human nature as well as his search for a society with a voluntary division of labor, it can be concluded that his theory of estrangement remained the same throughout his work, regardless of any changes in his vocabulary from the early to the later writings. As shown above, Marx adhered to an unaltered definition of human nature, and the notion of an involuntary division of labor is absolutely central to his theory of estrangement. Throughout his work, he viewed the desirable society as one with a voluntary division of labor and, therefore, free from estrangement. As a consequence, we can conclude that Marx's theory of estrangement remained the same.

Second, those who maintain that Marx abandoned or changed his theory of estrangement on the basis that he abandoned the terms "alienation" and "estrangement," are at least partially incorrect in their assertions. In an excellent treatment of the subject, Mészáros (1972) shows that in many instances Marx continued to use the above terms in his later works and did not abandon them at all.1 As can be seen from the quotes given so far, this study confirms Mészáros' assessment. Marx did, indeed make use of the terms in his later writings, though not as frequently as in his Manuscripts, and his theory of estrangement remains unchanged throughout his works since the theory's properties were never abandoned or altered.

Israel (1971, 1976) suggests that Marx abandoned his theory of estrangement for a theory of reification. He bases this argument on the assertion that Marx changed his theory of human nature. Before the Theses on Feuerbach, Israel claims, Marx adhered to a philosophical anthropological position which claims

a general abstract human nature which contrasts with the idea that human nature is a historically determined product that changed as societal conditions change. In the sixth of his "Theses on Feuerbach" Marx explicitly rejects this anthropological position by asserting that man's nature is the totality of his societal relations. By doing so he also removed one of the essential preconditions for his theory of alienation. It was abandoned, but reappeared in a new form as the theory of reification (Israel, 1976:47).2

Israel's position, shared by LeoGrande, (1977) is fundamentally incorrect, however. While Marx undisputably took Feuerbach to task for not seeing man in an historical light, his theory of estrangement was never
based on a theory of human nature that did not take history into account. Rather, as shown in Chapter 2, this theory was derived from a biological definition of human nature. This definition is not subject to the historical relativism argument, an argument with which Marx not only criticizes Feuerbach’s understanding of human nature but also Bentham’s and others’. The biological definition is empirically arrived at by comparing man with animals. This becomes in the thought of Marx “human nature in general,” while those aspects of human nature that are subject to historical change signify “human nature as modified in each historical period.” As pointed out earlier in a different context, Israel does not note this very important distinction. Thus, he reaches some wrong conclusions concerning Marx’s adherence to his theory of estrangement as formulated in the Manuscripts. That Israel does not appreciate this distinction fully can be observed in the following passage which, consequently, is very unclear. Israel says that Marx differentiates between “(1) ‘human nature at a given historical period’ being a consequence of man’s existing social relations and (2) man’s ‘general human nature as it is changed in the historical process’, though always being a consequence of the social relations he has created himself” (Israel 1971: 57).

Israel’s and LeoGrande’s thesis presents some additional problems. First, as shown in Chapter 2, those who argue that Marx did not conceive human nature to be socially conditioned until he wrote the Theses on Feuerbach are factually incorrect. Second, it is not meaningful to argue that Marx abandoned his early theory of estrangement in favor of a theory of reification, since even his early and only theory of estrangement is a theory of reification. The present study shows abundant evidence that in his early work Marx already perceived man under capital to be dominated by an alien will and alien forces, by the products of his own labor. Precisely this element of reification has always distinguished Marx’s concept of estrangement from Hegel’s, in which estrangement is seen to result from the mere objectification of labor. We do not argue here that Marx paid the same attention to the processes of reification in his Manuscripts as he did in his later works starting with the German Ideology. However, a distinction between his theory of estrangement and his theory of reification is not only arbitrary but also unjustified. The differential attention he paid to processes of reification is quite a different matter, since Marx’s theory of estrangement is categorically also a theory of reification. Man is estranged because both his labor power and the product of his labor
are subject to an alien will, that is, because man is subject to an involuntary
division of labor, a division that he controls neither at his place of work
nor in the society at large. Under communism, this would not be so and
estrangement would be abolished.

THE QUESTION OF BEING MORE OR LESS ESTRANGED

The secondary literature dealing with Marx’s theory of estrangement
often asserts that estrangement can have different magnitudes. That is,
Marx’s theory of estrangement is viewed in such a way that estrange-
ment as such is seen to exist to a greater or lesser extent. For example,
Ollman (1976: 132, 245-246, 252, 308) generally speaks of degrees of
estrangement, as does Mészáros (1972: 249) and Petrović (1967: 149-150),
while Mandel and Novack (1973: 43) and Mészáros (1972: 249) speak of
progressive de-estrangement, or a decreasing trend of estrangement. Archi-
bald (1976: 69-70) speaks of differences of estrangement among classes,
“between capitalist and non-capitalist societies” and between “currently
capitalist societies and their own histories.”

According to Marx, all estrangement is essentially reducible to the
fact that man is subject to an alien will, that is, an involuntary division
of labor. Moreover, man under precapitalist social formations can also be
said to be estranged as long as the division of labor can be shown to be an
involuntary one. Whether it be the involuntary division of labor under
feudalism or capitalism, estrangement remains estrangement. Estrange-
ment, which for Marx is the byproduct of any involuntary division of
labor, is therefore a qualitative and not a quantitative phenomenon. If
Marx is not to be misinterpreted, estrangement must be viewed as a di-
chotomous phenomenon. It exists wherever man is prevented from liv-
ing according to his nature, as a result of the subjection of his labor
power and the product of his labor to an alien will. It ceases to exist
under communism where man is free from the domination of other
men and where the division of labor is therefore a voluntary one. Marx’s
concept of estrangement cannot therefore be interpreted as a phenom-
енon of different magnitudes. Man either is or is not estranged; estrange-
ment either exists or it does not exist. This position is the direct logical
consequence of Marx’s theory of estrangement as interpreted here. If
it is correct, then no evidence to the contrary should be found in the
writings of Marx, and indeed, this seems to be the case.
Marx does, of course, mention that the alien forces that control man have become more powerful, and increasingly so, ever since the emergence of private property and the involuntary division of labor.

In the present epoch, the domination of material relations over individuals, and the suppression of individuality by fortuitous circumstances, has assumed its sharpest and most universal form, thereby setting existing individuals a very definite task. It has set them the task of replacing the domination of circumstances and of chance over individuals by the domination of individuals over chance and circumstances. . . . This task, dictated by present-day relations, coincides with the task of organizing society in a communist way (CW5, p. 438; MEW, 3, p. 424).

In the *Holy Family*, he writes:

All communist and socialist writers proceeded from the observation that . . . all progress of the Spirit had so far been progress against the mass of mankind, driving it into an ever more dehumanised situation. They therefore declared "progress" (see Fourier) to be an inadequate, abstract phrase; they assumed (see Owen among others) a fundamental flaw in the civilized world (CW, 4, p. 84; MEW, 2, p. 88; see also MEW, EB 1.T., p. 543).

When Marx says that the alien forces that control man are becoming more and more powerful, he is referring to the consequences of estrangement and not of estrangement as such. While the consequences of estrangement can be viewed as more or less severe (that is, they can be viewed in terms of magnitude), this is quite different from viewing estrangement as such in terms of a magnitude. Even when Marx uses the term "estrangement" (*Entfremdung*) in this context, it designates the alien force that increasingly dominates man in the form of the objective conditions of production, that is, capital. The conversion of surplus labor into capital or accumulation "reveals that . . . unpaid labour of the worker confronts his as the totality of the objective conditions of labour. In this form it confronts him as an alien property with the result that the capital which is antecedent to his labour, appears to be independent of it" (TS3, p. 352;
With the advance in the productivity of social labour, accompanied as it is by the growth of constant capital, a relatively ever increasing part of the annual product of labour will, therefore, fall to the share of capital as such, and thus property in the form of capital (apart from revenue) will be constantly increasing and proportionately that part of value which the individual worker and even the working class creates, will be steadily decreasing, compared with the product of their past labour that confronts them as capital. The alienation and the antagonism between labour-power and the objective conditions of labour which have become independent in the form of capital, thereby grow continuously (TS2, p. 416; MEW, 26.2, pp. 417-418).

Clearly, in the context in which the term *Entfremdung* is used here, it does not designate categoric estrangement, that is, that man is estranged because his labor power and the product of his labor are subject to an alien will. Rather, it signifies that, given categoric estrangement, the consequences thereof become more and more overpowering. The alien property confronting the worker is increasingly powerful. The categorically estranged product of man's labor confronts him in ever more "estranging" ways, being ever more drastic to his existence and survival as a human being. During feudalism, the estranged elements of life tended to be bound by man (see Chapter 8), thus producing conditions that were often more dignifying. This is not the case under capital. In both cases, however, man is estranged because of his subjection to an involuntary division of labor.

It must therefore be concluded that Marx clearly distinguishes between estrangement as such and the consequences of estrangement. The consequences of estrangement do not reflect on the magnitude of estrangement as such, inasmuch as estrangement as such is a qualitative and not a quantitative phenomenon. Indeed, the Marxian system of thought allows for only a separation between estrangement as such and the consequences of estrangement. It can be shown in many ways that a distinction must be made between the two if Marx's theory of estrangement is not to be violated. Several of these ways will be discussed here.

If estrangement were thought to have a magnitude, it would logically have to be concluded that man's estrangement is greater or less because
his subjection to an alien will is greater or less. As can immediately be seen, however, this is an absurd conclusion inasmuch as an alien will remains an alien will, for "alien will" or "involuntary division of labor" are qualitative and not quantitative phenomena.

The objection may be made that subjection to an alien will may occur only part of the time, or for some people not at all. Hence, it could be maintained that under feudalism, the serf was forced to work the land of the lord only during some days of the week, while on the other days of the week he was allowed to care for his own subsistence by working his own land. In addition, the example of the capitalist may be given, who is forced neither to sell his labor power nor to produce a product that could become subject to an alien will. The answer to this objection lies first in the recognition that Marx himself does not distinguish between the estrangement of the capitalist and that of the worker in quantitative terms. He believes they are both estranged, although he considers the consequences of the capitalist's estrangement to be different from those of the worker. For the capitalist, estrangement at least has consequences that entail the "semblance of a human existence."

The capitalist is also subject to the involuntary division of labor. As has already been pointed out, he is merely the human agent of capital, and as a human being he is subject to forces that he does not control. An example of this control is competition which regulates the capitalist's activities in terms of investment and exchange of products. In fact, his class status as a capitalist designates his involvement in an involuntary division of labor.

From the vantage point of Marx's theory of the development of the individual, the capitalist cannot develop freely and fully, even if he manages to live in luxury. Marx's pronouncement on the Roman nobility may be applied in this context. Although in ancient Rome "the individuals may appear great, . . . "there can be no conception here of a free and full development either of the individual or of the society, since such development stands in contradiction to the original relation" (see chapter 7, footnote 8). As a consequence, unless all are free from domination of man by man, the development of individuals remains limited even for those whose life has "the semblance of a human existence." We therefore agree with Ollman (1976: 156) when he says that the capitalist's estrangement also "stands out not only in all he is but in all he is not. Communist fulfillment is equally unavailable to both classes." This relates
to our discussion of the estrangement from the species and from man. Since the interaction among human beings in situations where man dominates man is not in accord with the nature of the species, man is said to be estranged from the species and from one another. Although the capitalist, like the Roman, may have abundant time and resources, his individual development remains stunted. The reason is that he is not interacting with others according to the natural ability of the species, that is, in such a way that the "need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the other." (See also Chapter 2.)

From various points of view, then, Marx's concept of estrangement cannot be viewed as a quantity rather than as a quality. Estrangement as such, which is a qualitative phenomenon, must be strictly distinguished from the consequences of estrangement, which is a quantitative phenomenon. Students of Marx have too often failed to make this important distinction. As a result, even if unknowingly, Marx is interpreted from a reformist perspective. Regardless of the consequences of estrangement, the only society Marx advocated was one free from estrangement—free from any domination of man by man. It is therefore impossible to measure estrangement without misinterpreting Marx in the process. Consequently, Archibald's (1976:69-70) suggestion that we measure what Marx called estrangement, in order to determine differences in estrangement among classes and societies, is very misleading.

Seeman bases his rationale for his work on estrangement on the same misleading attempt to measure what Marx calls estrangement. Seeman says that his work represents an attempt to "make more organized sense of one of the great traditions in sociological thought; and to make the traditional interest in alienation more amenable to sharp empirical statement" (Seeman, 1959:511). He reiterates this rationale in his paper "The Urban Alienation: Some Dubious Theses from Marx to Marcuse":

To speak of dubious theses about alienation is to suggest an interest in secularizing this more or less "sacred" concept; it is to suggest that there is something here about which an empirical demonstration has to be made—the critical, evocative, and even romantic spirit that has infused the literature on alienation, whatever its very valid uses in some respects, being no substitute for clarity and rigor (Seeman, 1971a:135).
As well intentioned as Seeman's position may be, it misses the point. What Marx called estrangement is in need neither of "clarity and rigor," nor of a "sharp empirical" statement of the kind Seeman intends to provide. It can simply not be measured, although Marx himself derived what he called estrangement empirically. Admittedly, the empirical categories Marx used are of a different empirical order than those Seeman has in mind. Nevertheless, they are empirical categories. By investigating the differences between man and animal, Marx determines what he calls human nature in general. As a result of being subject to an involuntary division of labor, however, man is prevented from living according to his nature and is estranged. Marx's notion of estrangement is a straightforward, logical procedure based on empirical data. Thus, man is estranged as long as his labor power and the product of his labor are subject to an alien will. However—and this point Seeman and others fail to recognize—the subject to an alien will is an occurrence of a dichotomous kind; the subject either exists or it does not exist, and it is therefore not measurable in terms of quantities.

WHAT MARX CALLS ESTRANGEMENT: A CAUSE OF CERTAIN IDENTIFIABLE BEHAVIOR OR ATTITUDES?

Students of Marx in various disciplines have been mistaken not only in their attempt to measure estrangement, but also in viewing estrangement as such as the cause of certain identifiable behavior or attitudes. This is true of those who are concerned with operationalizing and measuring estrangement as well as of Schaff (1970a:107, 135, 223, 225, 227), who implies that estrangement leads to "the arms race," "nationalism," "racial hatred," "religious intolerance," "certain forms of family organization," "depersonalization," "impoverishment of human personality," and "discrepancies in artistic tastes and opinions." Israel (1971:83-84) makes similar inferences. He postulates that if individuals are unable to live according to their human nature, as Marx understands it, they will experience estrangement. To assume that individuals can experience their estrangement presupposes that individuals can make causal inferences as to which feelings are caused by what Marx calls estrangement and which feelings are caused by something else. The emphasis here is not on whether the feelings can be identified perfectly. Rather, it is on the implicit or explicit assumption, which students of Marx often hold, that Marx's
theory of estrangement lends itself to making causal inferences. According to this assumption, it is postulated, for example, that estrangement causes certain identifiable feelings or "disrepancies in artistic tastes and opinions."\textsuperscript{11} The interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement given in this study, however, shows this view to be incorrect.

The reasons why behavior, feelings, or attitudes cannot meaningfully be said to be caused by estrangement lie in the lack of variance. Thus, nothing is known about the state of nonestrangement (true communism). Neither is estrangement under feudalism or capitalism seen to exist in greater or lesser quantities; rather, Marx views it as a dichotomous phenomenon. As a result, variance cannot be obtained from historical comparisons. The same holds true for inter or intrasocietal comparisons, since there as well estrangement does not lend itself to measurement.

Hence, man is estranged, because he is subject to an involuntary division of labor, but it is impossible to determine how estrangement causes certain identifiable behavior, feelings, or attitudes. Theoretically, such a determination could be made only if it was possible to observe behavior, feelings, or attitudes under conditions of nonestrangement or various degrees of estrangement. Therefore, any hypothesis or claim implying that estrangement, as defined by Marx, is the cause of certain identifiable kinds of behavior, feelings, or attitudes in the present society must be termed speculative and cannot be verified empirically because of a lack of variance.\textsuperscript{12} Of course, we maintain that what Marx calls estrangement is not manifest in certain types of behavior, attitudes, or feelings; this would clearly be an untenable position. According to Marx's theory of estrangement, it is impossible to identify which particular behavior, attitudes, or feelings are caused by the fact that man is estranged and therefore would not exist under nonestrangement. Israel and Schaff are not the only scholars who point to estrangement as the cause of certain identifiable behavior, feelings, or attitudes. Others (Strmiska, 1974:112 and Rouset, 1974:251, for example) are also mistaken on this point, although some, for example, Israel (1971) and Gabel, et al. (1974) are very critical of previous attempts to measure estrangement.

Numerous social scientists whose intention it is to measure estrangement also view estrangement as a cause and often theoretically link their enterprise with Marx's theory of estrangement (Dean, 1961; Barakat, 1969; Seeman, 1959, 1971a, 1971b). With the help of some theoretical reasoning, estrangement is seen to cause particular and identifiable social or
psychological phenomena which then serve as indicators or dimensions of estrangement. Social scientists postulate that, when measured, these indicators or dimensions will directly reflect the degree and nature of estrangement. As we already pointed out in this chapter, estrangement cannot be measured if Marx is not to be misinterpreted. What is of particular interest right now, however, is the widespread notion that estrangement can be seen to cause identifiable behavior, feelings, or attitudes, and how this notion manifests itself with those social scientists whose attempt it is to measure estrangement.

Seeman has pioneered in the attempt to measure estrangement, and many have followed in his footsteps (Fischer, 1973; Neal and Rettig, 1967; Dean, 1961; and Middleton, 1963). Seeman (1972a: 387) assumes that estrangement causes identifiable and particular feelings or attitudes. He defines his measures as follows:

1. Powerlessness—There is not much that I can do about most of the important problems that we face today.
2. Meaninglessness—Things have become so complicated in the world today that I really don’t understand just what is going on.
3. Normlessness—In order to get ahead in the world today, you are almost forced to do some things which are not right.
4. Cultural estrangement—I am not much interested in the TV programs, movies, and magazines that most people seem to like.
5. Social isolation—I often feel lonely.
6. Self-estrangement in work—I really don’t enjoy most of the work that I do, but I feel that I must do it in order to have other things that I need and want.

If the subject who is confronted with these measures discovers in her/himself the same feelings or perceives his surroundings in the same way, he is said to be estranged. Thus, estrangement as Marx understands it is postulated to cause identifiable and particular feelings which in turn, if measured, are seen to confirm the existence of estrangement.

Did Marx himself believe that particular and identifiable attitudes or feelings resulted from what he called estrangement? For this answer, our analysis will focus on certain passages in his early work.

It has been shown (Wallimann, 1975: 280) that translations of a particular passage from Marx wrongly imply that he saw estrangement as the cause of
certain feelings, attitudes, or behavior. These misleading translations appear at least in Tucker (1972:105) and Israel (1971:52). Tucker’s text says that the propertied class “experiences the alienation as a sign of its own power,” while Israel’s states that the proletariat “feels itself crushed by this self-alienation” (emphasis mine). In both instances, estrangement is postulated to generate certain identifiable feelings or experiences, while in fact Marx did not imply this at all:

[T]he propertied class and the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement. But the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognises estrangement as its own power and has the semblance of a human existence. The latter feels annihilated in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman existence (CW, 2, p. 36; MEW, 2, p. 37).  

The consequences of estrangement, as the above passage indicates, differ according to one’s social position and in ways that can be contradictory. Thus, the propertied class feels at ease and strengthened, while the proletariat feels annihilated in its estrangement. Under these circumstances, it would not make any sense to postulate, for example, that estrangement causes a feeling of annihilation, since it could equally be maintained that estrangement also causes the opposite feeling. Yet, Seeman proceeds on the assumption that estrangement causes specific and identifiable feelings or attitudes. If these feelings or attitudes can be found to be present in individuals, estrangement is considered to be present. According to our interpretation, however, estrangement is not defined by the feelings or attitudes it causes, but by the fact that man is subject to an involuntary division of labor and is unable to live according to his nature.

In this context, the following passage must also be considered:

What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home
when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is *forced labour* (CW, 3, p. 274; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 514).17

It would be wrong to conclude from this quotation that Marx saw certain feelings or attitudes result from estrangement, and that estrangement can be identified with such feelings or attitudes. Rather, this passage must be interpreted within a framework that distinguishes estrangement as such from its consequences. Since the worker is forced to sell his labor power “labor is *external* to the worker”; it is “forced labour.” Hence the worker is estranged. In very general terms, his and the estrangement of all other individuals allows for a world which they do not fully control, which they do not fully subject to their own will. It allows for a world in which, unlike under communism, man is dominated and subject to an involuntary division of labor affecting all. However, not all are equally affected. For example, the workers are forced to sell their labor power. The capitalist, although subject to an involuntary division of labor and therefore estranged, is not compelled to sell his labor power. As a result, he is not subject to many of the consequences brought about by circumstances he does not control. For the worker, the world he does not control has quite different consequences. For him, it means that work is external to him, that he feels unhappy, and so forth.

The existence of estrangement in general (that is, the existence of *any* involuntary division of labor) allows for the emergence of societal structures and processes that are not under the conscious control of societal members and that have had different consequences in different historical epochs. These consequences may be perceived as “burdensome,”18 although estrangement remains a constant in view of the persistence of an involuntary division of labor.

Here I disagree with Ollman (1976: 132) who fails to make a clear distinction between estrangement as such and its various consequences. He maintains that the “forms of alienation differ for each class because their position and style of life differ, and, as expected, the proletariat’s affliction is the most severe.” On the contrary, estrangement is a constant since all are subject to an involuntary division of labor and are prevented from living according to their nature. According to our opinion, only the consequences of estrangement vary. However, this is not the same as saying that the forms of estrangement vary.
Within any particular historical period, these societal structures and processes can also be seen to have agreeable consequences. Although both the capitalists and the workers are estranged, being subject to an involuntary division of labor, the processes that arose because of estrangement affect both classes quite differently.

It is therefore meaningful to speak of estrangement as that condition which brings about a social world that escapes full control by the participants. It is meaningless to view estrangement as a cause of particular, identifiable feelings, behavior, and attitudes. First, such a cause cannot be verified because of a lack of variance and, second, such feelings, behavior, and attitudes can never be identified as the only ones resulting from estrangement. Third, Marx himself did not view estrangement as the cause of only a select number of identifiable feelings, attitudes, and behaviors. Any attempt to do so would imply that estrangement constitutes only certain phenomena perceived to be undesirable or arbitrarily selected by the social scientist.

ESTRANGEMENT AS AN OBJECTIVELY DEFINED CONCEPT

It is frequently debated whether Marx's concept of estrangement should be defined according to objective or subjective criteria. (See, for example, Israel, 1971; Schacht, 1971; and Fischer, 1976.) Subjective criteria are seen to involve "a state of mind," while a definition based on objective criteria "involves a condition of the whole or parts of society" (Mizruchi, 1964:46).

Based on our interpretation of Marx's theory of estrangement, it can be concluded that Marx defines estrangement according to objective criteria: individuals are estranged because they are subject to an involuntary division of labor, and not because they exhibit a certain "state of mind." The rather fruitless debate on whether estrangement is objectively or subjectively defined is partially attributable to the fact that students of Marx have not separated estrangement as such from the consequences of estrangement. Thus, many have mistaken particular consequences for the elements defining estrangement. Seeman's social-psychological operationalizations are a case in point. However, as has already been established, estrangement cannot be defined on the basis of certain manifestations, since the manifestations vary from one historical epoch to another as
well as in a given population at a given time. Accordingly, once a separation is made between estrangement as such and the consequences of estrangement, it immediately becomes obvious that estrangement cannot be defined on the basis of a "state of mind" which individuals exhibit, since any such "state of mind" must be seen as a consequence of estrangement.

NOTES

1. For details, the reader is advised to consult Mészáros' study (1972:217-27) directly.

2. Apparently, without knowing of Israel's work (see Israel, 1976 and 1971), LeoGrande (1977) advances the same thesis concerning Marx's departure from his theory of estrangement outlined in the Manuscripts.

3. It may also be pointed out that neither Mészáros (1972:148, 163, 170) nor Ollman (1976:74, 80-81, 85, 92, 110) makes a well-defined distinction between the two definitions of human nature in Marx.

4. See also Chapter 2, note 2. In the Manuscripts, Marx says that Feuerbach's great achievement is "the establishment of true materialism and of real science, by making the social relationship of 'man to man' the basic principle of the theory." And in a letter to Feuerbach in August 1844, Marx wrote:

In these writings you have—whether intentionally I do not know—given a philosophical basis to socialism, and the communists, too, have similarly understood these works in that sense. The unity of man with man based on the real differences between men, the concept of human species transferred from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this other than the concept of society! (McLellan, 1971:184).

Marx had apparently revised his appraisal of Feuerbach by the time he wrote the Theses on Feuerbach; nevertheless, his concept of man was one of social man. Yet, Israel writes that "in the sixth of his 'Theses on Feuerbach' Marx explicitly rejects this anthropological position by asserting that man's nature is the totality of his social relations" (Israel, 1976:47).

5. See also Chapter 2, pp. 62-71.

6. Similarly, Lukács' identification of estrangement with objectification in his History and Class Consciousness may be mentioned. However, Lukács retreated from this position later in his life by admitting that the interpretation in this book was too Hegelian (Lukács, 1970:25).

7. Since no distinction is usually made between Marx's use of the terms "estrangement" and "alienation," students of Marx speak of alienation as existing to a greater or lesser extent, referring to what is here called estrangement as existing to a greater or lesser extent.
8. *Entfremdung* (estrangement) is used by Marx. As already indicated *Entfremdung* should be translated estrangement, and not alienation.


10. As earlier, "division of labor" also includes the division of labor in society as a whole.

11. "Cause" is used here to designate even the mere association of specific behavior, feelings, or attitudes with estrangement.

12. It is indeed ironical that, according to this analysis, those social scientists may be said to be speculative who, according to their own intentions, wish to avoid speculative statements. In this context, Seeman's (1971a:135) passage cited above may be recalled.

13. It is impossible to address and critically deal with all the literature that has been built up around the attempt to measure estrangement. Seeman is therefore selected here as a representative example of a whole group of scholars.

14. The translation of the same passage in the *Collected Works*, which appeared after my paper (Wallimann, 1975) was in press, avoids the same mistakes.

15. Note also that "estrangement" rather than "alienation" is correctly used here to translate *Entfremdung*.

16. Similarly, the consequences of estrangement are distinguished from estrangement as such (that is, from the inability to subject one's labor power and product of labor to one's own will) in other passages:

... the more objects the worker produces the less he can possess and the more he falls under the sway of his product, capital.

All these consequences are implied in the statement that the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object (CW, 3, p. 272; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 512).

(According to the economic laws the estrangement of the worker in his object is expressed thus: the more the worker produces, the less he has to consume; the more values he creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes; the better formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more civilised his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the more powerful labour becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the more ingenious labour becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and the more he becomes nature's servant.) (CW, 3, p. 273; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 513).

This estrangement manifests itself in part in that the sophistication of needs and of the means [of their satisfaction] on the one side produces a bestial barbarism, a complete, crude, abstract simplicity of need, on the other; or rather in that it merely reproduces itself in its opposite (CW, 3, p. 307; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 548).

While these statements share the distinction between estrangement and its consequences, they also show that the consequences of estrangement differ. The consequences simultaneously represent wealth and poverty, refinement and barbarity,
sophistication and crude simplicity. In sum, the consequences of estrangement entail contradictions.

17. Note that Marx talks in the above quote of "alienation" (Entäusserrung) and not of "estrangement" (Entfremdung), thus not implying that estrangement as such causes specific feelings. As is shown below, labor power must be sold, which is a type of coercion causing specific feelings.

18. See also Oiserman (1965:79).