If the foregoing interpretation of Marx, with its emphasis on the involuntary nature of the division of labor, is correct, it would have to be concluded that man is estranged whenever an involuntary division of labor exists. Such a conclusion would be the logical consequence of a theory that postulates estrangement to result from the involuntary nature of the division of labor and that assumes the lack of any estrangement under communism because of the absence of such a division of labor. In this chapter, instead of merely drawing the logical consequences, the attempt is made to investigate Marx's views on precapitalist, non-communistic societies in order to determine whether such a conclusion holds up and how the conclusion can be termed valid.

ESTRANGEMENT AND PRECAPITALISTIC, NONPRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

Marx thinks the division of labor became involuntary following the destruction of the communism of primitive societies. This belief is more concretely expressed in Marx's discussion of the nature of the master-servant relation (*Herrschaftsverhältnis*):
Basically the appropriation of animals, land etc. cannot take place in a master-servant relation, although the animal provides service. The presupposition of the master-servant relation is the appropriation of an alien will (G, pp. 500-501; MEW, G, p. 400).

In the master-servant relation, the same condition is given as under capital; namely, that labor power is subject to an alien will and is no longer directed by the will of the individual who exerts this power. The master can appropriate an alien will because of his ownership of the land¹ and the resulting dependency of others on him:

[F]eudal landed property is already by its very nature huckstered land—the earth which is estranged from man and hence confronts him in the shape of a few great lords. The domination of the land as an alien power over men is already inherent in feudal landed property. The serf is the adjunct of the land (CW, 3, p. 266; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 505).

Under precapitalist servitude, just as under capital, the serf and his labor power are subject to an alien will, and at least a portion of the product of labor is appropriated by the master. This action can be seen as a violation of human nature since, for Marx, man is by nature capable of consciously directing productive activity with his will and also of subjecting the product of his labor to his volition. Under servitude, as under capital, this condition is not given, and man is prevented from living according to his nature. Man must therefore emancipate himself from all servitude (Knechtschaftsverhältnisse), the most recent of which is that of capital:

From the relationship of estranged labour to private property it follows further that the emancipation of society from private property, etc., from servitude, is expressed in the political form of the emancipation of the workers; not that their emancipation alone is at stake, but because the emancipation of the workers contains universal human emancipation—and it contains this, because the whole of human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all relations of servitude are but modifications and consequences of this relation (CW, 3, p. 280; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 521).
Marx's analysis of precapitalist economic formations goes beyond the narrowest definition of the master-servant relationship. Nevertheless, the individuals who are in any way dependent remain unfree for him:

It is furthermore evident that in all forms in which the direct labourer remains the "possessor" of the means of production and labour conditions necessary for the production of his own means of subsistence, the property relationship must simultaneously appear as a direct relation of lordship and servitude, so that the direct producer is not free; a lack of freedom which may be reduced from serfdom with enforced labour to a mere tributary relationship. The direct producer, according to our assumption, is to be found here in possession of his own means of production, the necessary material labour conditions required for the realisation of his labour and the production of his means of subsistence . . . . Under such conditions the surplus-labour for the nominal owner of the land can only be extorted from them by other than economic pressure, whatever the form may be. This differs from slave or plantation economy in that the slave works under alien conditions of production and not independently. Thus, conditions of personal dependence are requisite, a lack of personal freedom, no matter to what extent, and being tied to the soil as its accessory, bondage in the true sense of the word (C3, pp. 790-791; MEW, 25, pp. 798-799).

Even though the tributary relationship implies freedom from enforced labor in which labor power is directly subsumed under an alien will, our thesis still holds. Because of an alien will, the individual is forced to expend labor power, in the form of surplus labor, for the nominal owner of the land. Against his will, he is compelled to produce a surplus he cannot appropriate. In addition, although his labor power is not directly subjected to an alien will, he is not free to produce any type of surplus. Thus, as under capital, he is free neither in deciding what total surplus is to be produced nor in appropriating all of the surplus and disposing over it. Marx describes the nature of coercion existing in this case:

Rent in kind presupposes a higher stage of civilization for the direct producer, i.e., a higher level of development of his labour and of society in general. And it is distinct from the preceding form in that
surplus-labour needs no longer be performed in its natural form, thus no longer under the direct supervision and compulsion of the landlord or his representatives; the direct producer is driven rather by force of circumstances than by direct coercion, through legal enactment rather than the whip, to perform it on his own responsibility. Surplus-production, in the sense of production beyond the indispensable needs of the direct producer, and within the field of production actually belonging to him, upon the land exploited by himself instead of, as earlier, upon the nearby lord's estate beyond his own land, has already become a self-understood rule here. In this relation the direct producer more or less disposes of his entire labour-time, although, as previously, a part of this labour-time, at first practically the entire surplus portion of it, belongs to the landlord without compensation; except that the landlord no longer directly receives this surplus-labour in its natural form, but rather in the products' natural form in which it is realised (C3, pp. 794-795; MEW, 25, p. 803).

Speaking of the source of value and the appropriation of surplus value, Marx compares the coercion under precapitalist social formations to wage labor:

The substance of value is and remains nothing but expended labour-power. . . . A serf for instance expends his labour-power for six days, and the fact of this expenditure as such is not altered by the circumstance that he may be working three days for himself, on his own field, and three days for his lord, on the field of the latter. Both his voluntary labour for himself and his forced labour for his lord are equally labour; so far as this labour is considered with reference to the values, or to the useful articles created by it, there is no difference in his six days of labour. The difference refers merely to the different conditions by which the expenditure of his labour-power during both halves of his labour-time of six days is called forth. The same applies to the necessary and surplus-labour of the wage-labourer (C2, p. 390; MEW, 24, p. 385).

In Theories of Surplus-Value, he states: “Serf-labour (just as slave-labour) has this in common with wage-labour, in respect to rent, that the latter is
paid in *labour* not in *products*, still less in *money*” (TS3, p. 401; MEW, 26.3, p. 392).

In general, other comments of Marx on precapitalist economic formations may be noted, particularly as they address the nature of coercion:

Hence, the historical movement which changes the producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as their emancipations from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, . . . . But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrangements. . . . The starting-point of the development that gave rise to the wage labourer as well as to the capitalist, was the servitude of the labourer. The advance consisted in a change of form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation (C1, p. 669; MEW, 23, p. 743).

And although Marx often points to the Asiatic precapitalist social formation as an example of a stable, persisting organization, resistant to the undermining forces of exchange, he is very critical of the way some surplus is appropriated through coercion:

Rent (as the Physiocrats conceive it by *reminiscence* of feudal conditions) appears historically (and still on the largest scale among the Asiatic peoples) as the general form of *surplus labour*, of labour performed without payment in return. The appropriation of this surplus labour is here not mediated by exchange, as is the case in capitalist society, but its basis is the forcible domination of one section of society over the other. (There is, accordingly, direct slavery, serfdom or political dependence) (TS3, p. 400; MEW, 26.3, p. 391).

Although man is subject to an alien will under precapitalist economic formations, the manner in which this subjection occurs differs from capital, the main distinction being the absence of exchange as the basis of all production. In precapitalist social formations, the estranged elements of life are still bound by man and are not subject to exchange relations and the resulting competition:
Precisely the slavery of civil society is in appearance the greatest freedom because it is in appearance the fully developed independence of the individual, who considers as his own freedom the uncurbed movement, no longer bound by a common bond or by man, of the estranged elements of his life, such as property, industry, religion, etc., whereas actually this is his fully developed slavery and inhumanity. Law has here taken the place of privilege (CW, 4, p. 116; MEW, 2, p. 123).

Similarly, in the German Ideology, Marx writes that

in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces” (CW, 5, pp. 78-79; MEW, 3, p. 76).²

Clearly, although coercion is a fact in precapitalist societies, it increases with increased exchange relationships. It would be a mistake, however, to think that coercion was based only on personal dominance, that the estranged elements of life were bound only by man. Marx's emphasis rather is on the degree to which either personal or impersonal forces were the source of coercion which resulted in the subjection of man to an alien will:

When we look at social relations which create an undeveloped system of exchange, of exchange values and of money, or which correspond to an undeveloped degree of these, then it is clear from the outset that the individuals in such a society, although their relations appear to be more personal, enter into connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc., or as members of a caste etc. or as members of an estate etc. . . . (As regards the illusion of the “purely personal relations” in feudal times, etc., it is of course not to be forgotten for a moment (1) that these relations, in a certain phase, also took on an objective character within their own sphere, as for example the development of landed proprietorship out of purely military relations of subordination; but (2) the objective relation on which they founder has still a limited, primitive character and therefore seems personal, while,
in the modern world, personal relations flow purely out of relations of production and exchange (G, pp. 163-165; MEW, G, pp. 80-82).³

The extent to which the estranged elements of life were still controlled by man, at the expense of having exchange relations, allows Marx to conclude that feudal institutions provided certain guarantees of existence. For example, even serfs tended to own some land and were allowed a share in common lands (MEW, 23, pp. 743-745). Although coercion was a fact, under precapitalist social formations it tended to affect individuals quite differently than did the type of coercion encountered under capital:

The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his "natural superiors", and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment". It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation (CW, 6, pp. 486-487; MEW, 4, pp. 464-465).

Thus far, the following has been established. On the one hand, individuals and their labor power were subject to an alien will even under precapitalist social formations. The product of labor, too, was only in part appropriated by the producers themselves. On the other hand, although the alien will appears to have been associated primarily with individuals, since the estranged life elements were still predominantly bound by man, impersonal, objective relations were also present. Marx's thesis that the division of labor has been an involuntary one ever since the emergence of private property, which itself is the result of estranged labor and exchange, is therefore not contradicted. For in precapitalist society, the producers could not organize all production on the basis of agreement, nor was exchange, which in itself causes division of labor, nonexistent.
DISCUSSION

Given the above assessment of the nature of precapitalist society, it must logically be concluded that, since Marx thought the division of labor was involuntary, individuals are estranged. This purely logical argument is not contradicted when we consider Marx’s account of concrete life-situations under precapitalist social formations. Thus, it was possible to show how, according to Marx, individuals and their labor power are subject to an alien will. This subjection, as under capital, prevents man from living according to his nature, with the consequence that he is estranged. Man is estranged by virtue of the same evidence and reasoning Marx himself applied in his analysis of estrangement under capital. The conditions under which man is estranged may be different from those of capitalist production, but estrangement nevertheless exists. Man is not free as is the case under communism where estrangement is nonexistent (see also MEW, 26.3, p. 514; MEW, 4, p. 462).

Marx illustrated his theory of estrangement with examples from, and an analysis of, capitalist society. Therefore, in connection with precapitalist social formations, he only infrequently uses the term “estrangement” or “estranged.” He does mention that under feudalism the earth is estranged from man and “confronts him in the shape of a few great lords.” He also speaks of landed property as being “alienated (entäussert) man” and of precapitalist private property as being “man’s actual externalisation (Entäußerung)” and “external to oneself (Sich-äusserlichsein)” (CW, 3, pp. 291-293; MEW, EB 1.T., pp. 531-532). On the whole, however, there is little use of the vocabulary that accompanied Marx’s early analysis of capitalist society. Of course, it must also be pointed out that most of Marx’s efforts were not devoted to the analysis of precapitalist society but primarily to capitalist society, thus further influencing our judgment that he made only scant use of such terms as Entfremdung and Entäußerung in his analysis of precapitalist society. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that Marx’s theory of estrangement has no validity when it concerns precapitalist society. This theory should not be assessed on the basis of purely semantic criteria. Rather, vocabulary should merely be seen as a “tool” in conveying a particular theory, implying that to some extent at least a theory can be conveyed with different sets of vocabulary.
IS ESTRANGEMENT LIMITED TO CAPITALIST SOCIETIES?

It follows that once the postulates of Marx's theory of estrangement—as he illustrates with reference to capitalist society—can clearly be defined and isolated, it is also possible to investigate whether the same postulates are being used in the analysis of precapitalist social formations. This is the way we proceeded in this work. First, the postulates of Marx's theory of estrangement, as he used it in his analysis of capitalist society, were identified. Then, in the first part of this chapter, it was found that Marx uses the same postulates when analyzing precapitalist social formations. The conclusion was drawn that, although the vocabulary Marx used seldom included the words "estrangement" and "alienation," man can still be said to be estranged even under precapitalist social formations (excluding primitive communistic societies). The major elements of Marx's theory of estrangement are not the words "estrangement" or "alienation" or derivatives thereof, but the notion of the involuntary division of labor. This notion also guides Marx's analysis of precapitalist social formations (see also MEW, 3, pp. 68-77).

IS MARX AN ANTI-INDUSTRIALIST ROMANTICIST?

Dawydo (1964: 50) maintains that Marx had a preconceived ideal of the "nature" of work and the "normal" relationship of the worker to his work according to which he analyzed work under capital. Marx did not hold such an ideal, however. This is not to say that he did not envision work as different under communism or that he did not admit that precapitalist and capitalist work differed. More important for Marx is the necessity that man be able to subject his labor power and its product to his own will and be able to live according to his nature. This necessity is the sine qua non of any society in which man is not estranged, regardless of the "nature" of work or the worker's relationship to it. In a society devoid of estrangement, man can be envisioned to have many dimensions. Such a vision of man may also be justified for communism. However, Marx never maintains that man in a society devoid of estrangement must be many-sided and that work must be of a certain nature. Neither estrangement nor nonestrangement is seen to depend on a definition of the ideal nature of work. It does, however, fully depend on whether one's labor power and product of labor are subject to an alien will. Following Dawydow's suggestion that Marx has a preconceived ideal of the nature of
work when analyzing work under capital, Israel (1971:263) asserts that this ideal was influenced by the romanticist criticism of industrial society:

The ideas concerning self-realization appear now to have been influenced by the existing conditions in preindustrialized, pre-capitalist society, being a part of the romanticist criticism of industrialized society. Among other things this criticism contained nostalgic, though probably not very realistic, views as to the work situation of the artisan, whose situation probably influenced Marx's ideal. The artisan could perhaps be seen as able to realize himself in his work activity.5

A closer look at the writings of Marx reveals that Israel's suggestion is not very convincing. It is, of course, true that Marx thought precapitalist society was less ruled than capitalist society by forces not controlled by man. He also admits that feudal society, for example, offered certain guarantees and degrees of freedom that were afterwards lost. It is also true that Marx believed that labor under the guild-corporation system was "still half artistic, half end-in-itself etc. Mastery," and that the capitalist was himself still a master-journeyman6 (G, p. 497; MEW, G, p. 397):

His position as master rests not only on his ownership of the conditions of production, but also on his own skill in the particular work. With the production of capital and from the very outset, the point is not this half-artistic relation to labour—which corresponds generally with the development of the use value of labour, the development of particular abilities of direct manual work, the formation of the human hand etc. The point from the outset is mass, because the point is exchange value and surplus value. The principle of developed capital is precisely to make special skill superfluous, and to make manual work directly physical labour, generally superfluous both as skill and as muscular exertion (G, p. 587; MEW, G, pp. 481-482).7

Even the guild-corporation system, which was not tied to the landholding class, made some material guarantees for the workers and human bonds that were lost under capital. "As journeyman (a genuine one) there is a certain communality in the consumption fund possessed by the master. While it is not the journeyman's property either, still, through the laws
of the guild, tradition etc., at least co-possession etc.” (G, p. 498; MEW, G, p. 397).

We may therefore conclude that precapitalist, preindustrial society offered conditions that in some ways were more dignifying than the wage slavery by which it was replaced. The estranged elements of life were still predominantly controlled by man rather than man being controlled by the forces of exchange which escaped the control of the participants. While Marx recognized these comparative differences, it would be a mistake to think he was idealizing preindustrial, precapitalist society. For example, when discussing primitive accumulation, the early accumulation of capital, Marx suggests that it could occur only by transforming serfs and slaves into wage laborers and by means of “the expropriation of the immediate producers, i.e., the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner” (C1, p. 713). This means, of course, that the immediate producers also became wage laborers. Historically, private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again, is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. Of course, this petty mode of production exists also under slavery, serfdom, and other states of dependence. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form, only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself: the peasant of the land which he cultivates, the artisan of the tool which he handles as a virtuoso (C1, p. 713; MEW, 23, p. 789).

Again, Marx alludes to the fact that the artisan’s work was half artistic. However, he immediately points out the historical limits of this mode of production in both agriculture and industry:

This mode of production pre-supposes parcelling of the soil, and scattering of the other means of production. As it excludes the concentration of these means of production, so it also excludes cooperation, division of labour within each separate process of production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces
of Nature by society, and the free development of the social productive powers. It is compatible only with a system of production, and a society, moving within narrow and more or less primitive bounds. To perpetuate it would be, as Pecqueur rightly says, “to decree universal mediocrity.” At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution. From that moment new forces and new passions spring up in the bosom of society; but the old social organisation fetters them and keeps them down. It must be annihilated; it is annihilated. Its annihilation, the transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones, of the pigmy property of the many into the huge property of the few. . . . Self-earned private property, that is based, so to say on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalist private property, which rests on exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, i.e., on wage-labour (C1, pp. 713-714; MEW, 23, pp. 789-790).

Marx writes these words without any sign of regret for what was “lost” as a result of the advance of the capitalist mode of production. In this respect, he differs remarkably from the romanticists who mourn the old social order disappearing in the face of rising capital.

In earlier stages of development the single individual seems to be developed more fully, because he has not yet worked out his relationships in their fullness, or erected them as independent social powers and relations opposite himself. It is as ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness as it is to believe that with this complete emptiness history has come to a standstill. The bourgeois viewpoint has never advanced beyond this antithesis between itself and this romantic viewpoint, and therefore the latter will accompany it as legitimate antithesis up to its blessed end (G, p. 162; MEW, G, p. 80).

In summary, Marx recognizes the differences between the capitalist and precapitalist mode of production and the individual’s fuller development in precapitalist society. Even though for him work in precapitalist society often assumes half-artistic proportions, he does not endorse it as an ideal
to be pursued or regained. There are two reasons for this. First, his ideal is communism, which is based on the development of the productive forces of man. Precapitalist production is little developed, however, and precludes further development. Thus, it effectively excludes itself as an example of production under communism as envisioned by Marx. And since the precapitalist artisan with his half-artistic work cannot be separated from the mode of production in which he was active, he, too, is effectively excluded as an example of productive activity under communism. On this basis, Marx can say that it is ridiculous to yearn for a return to that original fullness of the individual at earlier stages of development. He would therefore agree with those who maintain that it is unrealistic to desire the re-emergence of a society of artisans. However, those who hold such views often wrongly assert that Marx's view of the ideal society entails such an unrealistic desire.

That Marx cannot legitimately be criticized, as Israel does, for having been influenced by romanticist, unrealistic, and nostalgic criticism of industrialized society is evident through yet another example. In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, he criticizes Proudhon in the following way:

M. Proudhon, not having understood even this one revolutionary side of the automatic workshop, takes a step backward and proposes to the worker that he make not only the twelfth part of a pin, but successively all twelve parts of it. The worker would thus come to know and realise the pin. This is M. Proudhon's synthetic labour. . . .

To sum up, M. Proudhon has not gone further than the petty-bourgeois ideal. And to realise this ideal, he can think of nothing better than to take us back to the journeyman or, at most, to the master craftsman of the Middle Ages. It is enough, he says somewhere in his book, to have created a masterpiece once in one's life, to have felt oneself just once to be a man. Is not this, in form as in content, the masterpiece demanded by the craft guild of the Middle Ages (CW6, p. 190; MEW, 4, p. 157).  

Here we see that Marx's vision of the future does not exclude techniques of production that are generally associated with industrial society, the automatic factory being a case in point. In addition, Marx's observation that "the automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idiocy" (CW6,
p. 190) and is revolutionary must be taken seriously. On the basis of a higher level of productivity, Marx foresees a new type of fullness of individual development, a fullness that is not modeled after that of earlier stages of development:

What characterises the division of labour inside modern society is that it engenders specialities, specialists, and with them craft-idiocy....

What characterises the division of labour in the automatic workshop is that labour has there completely lost its specialised character. But the moment every special development stops, the need for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the individual begins to be felt (CW6, p. 190; MEW, 4, p. 157).

Marx does not envision the ideal society as one in which labor productivity is low and in which the individual develops that type of fullness associated with the precapitalist artisan. Rather, he sees the productive power of man to be high, enabling the individual under communism to develop in ways hitherto unknown.

This brings us to the second reason why Marx does not endorse the quasi-artistic nature of the precapitalist mode of production as an ideal to be pursued. He does not picture communism as a society in which the means of production are split and held by many individuals, since “it is the association of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control” (CW5, p. 80; MEW, 3, p. 75).

Yet, precapitalist production was based on the fact that many owned the means of production necessary to maintain themselves through their individual and isolated labor (Selbstbetätigung, or self-activity). Marx calls this type of activity “one-sided” (CW5, p. 82), and he maintains that “although isolated labour (its material conditions presupposed) can also create use values, it can create neither wealth nor culture” (CGP, p. 5; MEW, 19, p. 17).

Again, Marx hands down a strong indictment of the type of work found in precapitalist, preindustrial society. But there is another basis for the rejection of this type of work which relates to Marx’s notion of the development of the individual. This development is still incomplete in precapitalist societies. (See also the discussion on the development of the individual in chapter 7.) Although the artisans owned the means for their self-activity,
"they themselves remained subordinate to the division of labour and their own instrument of production" (CW5, p. 88; MEW, 3, p. 68). Under communism, however, man will no longer be subject to the involuntary division of labor, thus enabling "the development of a totality of capacities" (CW5, p. 87; MEW, 3, p. 68).

These two factors then—lack of productivity and the concomitant lack of development of the individual in precapitalist society—show why Marx is not an anti-industrial romanticist. Communist society, after capital has "laid the appropriate foundations," is seen as the only society in which the fullest possible development of the individual can occur. This development cannot be understood to mean that individuals will become latter-day artisans, since the mode of production will vary greatly from that of precapitalist societies. However, this in itself does not preclude that individuals will not also be artists.

NOTES

1. For Marx, "estranged labour is the direct cause of private property" (CW, 3, p. 280; MEW, EB 1.T., p. 521). This does not contradict his postulate that the involuntary division of labor and private property occurred simultaneously, since the immediate consequence of the appropriation of the labor power of others by some is private property.

2. Similarly in MEW, G, p. 81.

3. It could be said that Marx contradicts himself in Capital. There he says that, since personal dependence characterizes the social relations of production in the Middle Ages and

   personal dependence forms the ground-work of society, there is no necessity for labour and its products to assume a fantastic form different from their reality. They take the shape, in the transactions of society, of services in kind and payments in kind. Here the particular and natural form of labour, and not, as in a society based on production of commodities, its general abstract form is the immediate social form of labour (C1, pp. 81-82; MEW, 23, p. 91).

While he admits in the Grundrisse that objective relations exist under the feudal order, the above statement could be considered contradictory. A closer look at another passage in Capital may resolve this apparent contradiction:

[F]rom the moment there is a free sale, by the labourer himself, of labour-
power as a commodity . . . that commodity production is generalised and becomes the typical form of production . . . . Only when and where wage-
labour is its basis does commodity production impose itself upon society as a whole. (C1, pp. 550-551; MEW, 23, p. 613).
Hence, commodity production did exist under feudalism, which in itself could represent one form of objective relations in addition to military subordination. Rather, the commodity production remains limited as long as personal dependence persists. The matter is one of emphasis.

4. In the Manuscripts, Marx writes that “all human activity hitherto has been labour—that is, industry—activity estranged from itself” (CW, 3, p. 303; MEW, EB 1.T., pp. 542-543).

Commenting on the economic theory of the Physiocrats, Marx points out that “Physiocracy represents directly the decomposition of feudal property in economic terms, but it therefore just as directly represents its economic metamorphosis and restoration, save that now its language is no longer feudal but economic.” However, with the Physiocrats “labour is not yet grasped in its generality and abstraction: it is still bound to a particular natural element as its matter, and it is therefore only recognised in a particular mode of existence determined by nature. It is therefore still only a specific, particular alienation of man.” (CW, 3, p. 292; MEW, EB 1.T., pp. 531-532).

5. Israel seems to have superimposed the notion of self-realization on the thought of Marx. To my knowledge, Marx does not use a notion of self-realization to analyze the worker’s situation. If this notion has any place in Marx’s thought, it is in conjunction with the notion that man should be able to subject his labor power to his own will and to appropriate the product of his labor. It is inappropriate, however, for Israel to view self-realization as a negative function of industrial society and as a positive function of preindustrial society. It would be equally inappropriate to view the notion of self-realization in psychological terms. Should one want to define self-realization in terms of labor as a manifestation and development of human capacities, Marx would reply by saying: “How could labour ever be anything but a ‘manifestation of human capacities’?” (CW, 5, p. 482; MEW, 3, p. 471).

6. “Capitalist himself still master-journeyman” (G, p. 497). Here the word “capitalist” is used in the figurative sense, indicating that the master does own the consumption fund, a great part, if not all, of the means of production (see also MEW, G, p. 397), and does extract a surplus from his workers. However, neither wage labor nor exchange has yet developed fully. Capital is therefore not truly capital and the master is not a capitalist as Marx generally uses the term.

7. At another place in the Grundrisse, Marx states:

For example, in guild and craft labour, where capital itself still has a limited form, and is still entirely immersed in a particular substance, hence is not yet capital as such, labour, too, appears as still immersed in its particular specificity: not in the totality and abstraction of labour as such, in which it confronts capital. That is to say that labour is of course in each single case a specific labour, but capital can come into relation with every specific labour (G, pp. 296-297; MEW, G, p. 204).

8. This is just as much a mistake as it would be to label Marx a mere trade unionist on the basis that he supports the attempts of workers to obtain a higher wage at the expense of the capitalists’ profit (WPP, pp. 77-78; MEW, 16, pp. 151-152).
9. Only through capital, at the expense of the laborer's private ownership of his means of production, does further development occur.

10. Referring to the modern farmer, the capitalist and the worker, he asserts that

they feel an attachment only for the price of their production, the monetary product. Hence the jeremiads of the reactionary parties, who offer up all their prayers for the return of feudalism, of the good old patriarchal life, of the simple manners and the virtues of our forefathers. The subjection of the soil to the laws which dominate all other industries is and always will be the subject of interested condolences (CW6, p. 202; MEW, 4, p. 170).

Note that Marx calls those who envision or call for a return of the precapitalist mode of production reactionaries. Thus, he politically rejects those values which some claim are present in his thought. A similar rejection occurs in the Manifesto when petty-bourgeois socialism is being discussed:

In its positive aims, however, this form of socialism aspires either to restoring the old means of production and of exchange, and with them the old property relations, and the old society, or to cramping the modern means of production and of exchange, within the framework of the old property relations that have been, and were bound to be, exploded by those means. In either case, it is both reactionary and Utopian (CW6, pp. 509-510; MEW, 4, p. 485).