The Nazis attracted disproportionately large support in rural areas. Their greatest electoral successes came in such rural districts as Schleswig-Holstein (the only electoral district to give the Nazis an absolute majority before the party came to power), Lower Saxony, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg. Within these provinces, the Nazis drew their strongest support in rural areas; in Schleswig-Holstein, for example, rural communities cast 63.3 percent of their votes for the NSDAP in July 1932, while urban centers cast 44.3 percent for the NSDAP. The percentage of peasants and farmers joining the party sometimes lagged behind the voting results, but the intensity of rural support for Hitler was strong. The Strategic Bombing Survey reported that rural areas manifested the highest war morale. Above all, it was the party's breakthrough in the countryside from 1928 to 1932 that gave it political importance.

How can one explain the susceptibility of the countryside to Nazi appeals? First, one must discern which rural voters backed the NSDAP. Then, by analyzing the party's development, its appeals, its organization, and its opposition, one can hope to understand why these voters enlisted under the Nazi banner. Both of these steps are essential: Only by comprehending which individual voters lent their support is it possible to appreciate the causes of the Nazis' success. To bring intellectual order to the plethora of sociological and psychological explanations of nazism, it is essential to penetrate to the motivation of these individual voters. Who the rural Nazi supporters were and why they gave their support constitute the focus of this chapter.

Hitler's early plans for the seizure of power envisioned a coup similar to that of Mussolini's in Italy. By building support in the cities and by developing an armed force, the Nazis could seize control of the dominant means of production, transportation,
communication, administration, and violence. The turn from this strategy to a more rural and electoral orientation took place between 1924 and 1928. Two factors conditioned this change of emphasis: First, Hitler's dismal failure in the Beer-Hall Putsch of 1923, his subsequent imprisonment, and the restrictions upon his political activity convinced him that the NSDAP must pursue a strategy that would at least appear legal and parliamentary. Second, the party's unimpressive showing in urban areas in the 1928 Reichstag elections and its surprising success in such rural regions as Schleswig-Holstein, parts of Hanover, and Franconia prompted a redirection of effort.

A week after the 1928 elections, the party newspaper carried an article demonstrating how the party's rural successes produced a shift in strategy:

The election results in the country show that with less expenditure of effort, money and time greater successes can be achieved there than in the large towns. National Socialist mass meetings in small towns and market communities are important events and form the topic of daily conversation for weeks afterwards, while in the large towns meetings even with 3,000 and 4,000 people sink into insignificance and pass away. From this point the NSDAP, in Orlow's words, "deliberately set out to become the political party that gave the most blatant expression to the fears and prejudices of the middle- and particularly the lower-middle-classes in the rural and small-town regions of Germany."

These efforts bore fruit in the 1929 local elections and then dramatically in the 1930 Reichstag election when the NSDAP became the second largest party in the state, attracting 6.4 million voters and electing 107 Reichstag deputies. The party's greatest support came from agricultural and middle-class (especially lower-middle-class) regions in Protestant northern Germany. In Catholic districts and urban working-class districts, the party fared much poorer. In 1931 and 1932 the NSDAP seized control of major agricultural interest organizations, gaining power from the grass roots up. In the July 1932 Reichstag elections, the party registered impressive gains virtually everywhere, but again its greatest strength lay in the rural north; it lagged in southern Germany and industrial areas. The November elections and subsequent local elections produced NSDAP setbacks everywhere, but the March 1933 elections (held after the Nazis controlled the state machinery) produced enormous Nazi majorities in rural areas, although the Nazis still failed to achieve a majority of the votes in the nation as a whole. These global data demonstrate the Nazis' appeal for the Protestant rural middle class, but for a more discriminating view one needs to consult regional studies.
Rudolf Heberle's pioneering research continues to be the most valuable of a growing collection of excellent regional and local investigations. Heberle's sensitive analysis of electoral patterns in Schleswig-Holstein begins with a sketch of the three major geographic areas of the province: The lush west coast marshes with a risk-filled economy based on cattle-grazing and cabbage-growing and a society marked by sharp class differences between the wealthy farmers and the comparatively small stratum of farm workers; the eastern hill area with a social and economic structure characterized largely by estate agriculture; and the rolling, sandy Geest, a backward region of small peasant farmers and Dorfgemeinschaft (village community). The Nazis succeeded best in the Geest:

Table 4.1
NSDAP Vote (percent of total vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Marsh</th>
<th>Geest</th>
<th>Hill Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932 (July)</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the marshes and the hill area the rural working class voted steadily and dominantly for the Socialists or Communists, whereas the smaller rural proletariat of the Geest shed its allegiance to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) to vote first for the German National People's Party (DNVP) and then for the Nazis.

Heberle's analysis of the variation in voting patterns within Schleswig-Holstein strongly suggests that an abundance of family farmers and the relative absence of a distinct upper and especially of a lower class, as on the Geest, promoted Nazi gains. His correlations between voting and occupational status confirm this finding. The correlation between Nazi voting in July 1932 and the presence of small farmers is an eye-catching +.85. Nazi success also correlates highly with the percentage of independent proprietors, but negatively with the presence of wage earners. A typical Nazi supporter voted for the liberal parties immediately after the war, then for the German Nationalists in the mid-1920s, and finally for the Nazis. In short, the Nazis drew their adherents from family farmers who had previously supported liberal parties.
Gerhard Stoltenberg, the prominent CDU politician, has supplemented Heberle's analysis in two useful ways. First, he shows how the DNVP pursued a radical and antirepublican nationalism that attracted a broad rural following in the mid-twenties: it proved particularly compelling for the estate owners of the eastern hill area, who remained faithful to the DNVP into 1933. The DNVP's success in mid-decade indicates that the rural population had abandoned its allegiance to the Republic before the Nazi upsurge.

Stoltenberg also shows how the liberal and rightist parties failed to establish local organizational roots. In local elections the bourgeois parties yielded to local alliances claiming to be above parties. These minor "apolitical" local groupings evinced the rural property holders' and artisans' distrust of the urban middle-class parties and of the parliamentary system as a whole. All this evidence indicates that the rural population, particularly the farmers, craftsmen, and merchants, did not switch abruptly from staunch liberalism to nazism, but rather that they had never shown great enthusiasm for the Weimar Republic.

The political situation in Lower Saxony (the Prussian provinces of Hanover, Oldenburg /excluding Birkenfeld and Lübeck/, Brunswick, and Schaumburg-Lippe /excluding Bremen/) and its evolution closely resembled developments in Schleswig-Holstein. In both areas the NSDAP's first supporters were radical rightists with ties to older Freikorps, völkisch, or rightist organizations. Prior to 1930, party members came largely from the Mittelstand—peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, small businessmen, and white-collar workers; they tended to be young and many had served in World War I. In Lower Saxony, Jeremy Noakes reports, two-thirds of the membership "was under forty, with slightly more falling in the twenty-one to thirty age group than the thirty-one to forty group; 37 percent of the members were ex-servicemen." Their devotion to the party was fanatical.

In 1930 the NSDAP vote in Lower Saxony increased to 23 percent from 4.5 percent in 1928. The new NSDAP voters came from among previous nonvoters and defectors from the bourgeois parties. The party's strongholds lay in North Oldenburg and East Friesland and Kreise like Diepholz and Hoya—remote agricultural areas with poor Geest or moor conditions. The Nazis fell below average in two areas, first in Catholic areas in South Oldenburg and Osnabrück, where "religious loyalties were strong enough to withstand even the severest economic crisis," and second in Lüneburg, where deeply conservative peasants remained suspicious of the Nazis and retained their traditional loyalty to the Guelph party.

The July 1932 Reichstag elections demonstrated a further radicalization of the Lower Saxon electorate. The Nazis garnered
45.2 percent of the ballots. The Nazis' strongest bastions lay in remote, backward areas, where modern communications and social and economic organization penetrated only slowly, and traditional rural communities persisted.9

The Bavarian countryside, with its predominantly Catholic population, offered sterner resistance to Nazi inroads. The Nazis were slow in recruiting the Catholic peasantry. Available evidence indicates that the small-town bourgeoisie formed the backbone of the party in Bavaria, but the peasantry was distinctly underrepresented. As late as 1928, Bavaria remained the center of Nazi support in the country as a whole; the party received 6.3 percent of the vote in Bavaria, but only 2.6 percent nationwide. Nonetheless, Geoffrey Pridham observes, "the NSDAP had failed . . . to make much impact on the country areas, which in the predominantly rural state of Bavaria was crucial."10 Only in some Protestant areas of Franconia did the Nazis attract a sizeable rural following: Disenchanted Catholic peasants supported the local Bayerischer Bauern-und Mittelstandsbund (BBMB).

As elsewhere, in Bavaria the 1930 Reichstag elections marked a substantial Nazi advance, even though the provincial vote fell slightly below the national average, and the party's center of electoral gravity shifted north and east.11

The Nazis drew support from previous DNVP and BBMB voters who had become disillusioned by their parties' participation in government coalitions; rather than continue with parties tainted by their collusion with the Weimar system, these voters opted for the undiluted radicalism of the NSDAP. The Nazis also seem to have benefited from the rise in voter participation: In Bavaria as elsewhere "the overwhelming majority of new voters seem to have supported the NSDAP."12

The Nazi rural propaganda campaign produced results after 1930. As Pridham states, "the stampede of peasant voters to the NSDAP finally came in the Reichstag Election of July 1932, although this did not happen in the former BBMB stronghold of Lower Bavaria until the election of March 1933."13 By capturing disillusioned BBMB voters in even greater numbers, enlisting almost all the Deutsche Landvolk supporters, and attracting many new voters, the party registered enormous advances in rural areas. In the September 1933 elections, the towns of Franconia had voted 24.4 percent for the NSDAP, the rural areas 22.7 percent. In July 1932, the towns produced 39.0 percent, the countryside a striking 59.8 percent Nazi votes. With some local exceptions like the city of Passau, Catholic areas proved far more resistant to Nazi appeals than Protestant districts; not until the March 1933 elections, when the Nazis' control of the state allowed them distinctly new opportunities for propaganda and coercion, did the NSDAP finally win strong backing from Bavaria's rural Catholics.
This regional evidence allows one to conclude that the rural population of the Weimar Republic, never staunchly supportive of its institutions, began abandoning the Republic in the aftermath of the inflation crisis of 1923-1924. It turned first to right-wing parties like the DNVP and to local coalitions and then to the Nazis. The rural middle class, the small farmers, artisans, shopkeepers, and businessmen, formed the core of the Nazi electorate; in many regions they enlisted or intimidated farm workers and domestic servants into supporting the Nazi cause. Everywhere the Nazis succeeded in bring in new voters to the polls, people who had previously abstained from elections. Catholics resisted the Nazi appeal more steadfastly than did Protestants, but even in Bavaria most of them eventually voted for the NSDAP.

The facts regarding the Nazis' ascendancy in the German countryside and the major sources of their support are relatively undisputed; explanations for their ascent are, however, distinctly more controversial. To many contemporary Germans and to a segment of the academic community, the economic depression offers a satisfactory explanation of the Nazi upsurge. To others, the economic suffering of the rural population was more imagined than real; for them the rise of rural nazism represents either an irrational reaction to economic and social fears or a conscious commitment to extreme right-wing nationalism. Given the enormous number of individuals who voted for the NSDAP and the potential complexity of motivation in each individual case, it is unlikely that any single explanation will suffice; a variety of explanations must be advanced to account for the various grounds for NSDAP support. This commitment to a more synthetic and integrated explanation does not imply, however, that all explanations are equally valid; to understand the causes of the Nazis' rural victories requires more detailed scrutiny of the factors contributing to their advance.

Economic hardship certainly promoted the rise of the NSDAP. The ravages of the great inflation left many farmers with substantial debts. This was complicated by the general structural crisis of German agriculture (engendered by the pampering of German farmers behind high tariff barriers) combined with cyclical agricultural crises and declining urban consumption in the late 1920s, German farmers suffered genuine distress. Farm prices descended precipitously, incomes dropped, indebtedness and rural underemployment grew, and the rate of foreclosures rose sharply. Farmers' sons, who had hoped for urban jobs or stable rural living, saw their hopes dashed; the growing number of restive young men in the countryside was a conspicuous sign and result of the general economic slump, but the depression alone did not make them Nazis.

The economic determinist explanation of rural nazism, as Petzina has already indicated, suffers from numerous flaws. First, many
strong Nazi supporters sustained little economic loss. Bodo Uhse recalled that many of the rebellious Schleswig-Holstein farmers were "not exactly the poorest;" they "sat like lords on proud and splendid estates." And Rudolf Heberle suggests that "increasing economic insecurity rather than an actual suffering from the agricultural depression" accounts for the turn to nazism in Schleswig-Holstein's marshes.\textsuperscript{16}

The fit between agricultural distress and Nazi success is far from perfect. As noted earlier, the Nazis advanced far more slowly in Catholic than in Protestant areas even when economic conditions were similar. Organized rural farm workers, who endured privations at least as severe as those of other rural groups, largely retained their traditional allegiance to the Social Democrats, or if they defected, they veered to the Communist left rather than the Nazi right. Regional aberrations also occurred; Angeln in Schleswig-Holstein did not feel the impact of the economic crisis until late 1932, yet in July the Nazis had already gained 70.8 percent of the rural vote.\textsuperscript{17}

Perhaps the most compelling evidence that economic misery alone cannot constitute a sufficient explanation of nazism's rural appeal comes from international comparisons. Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—to cite just three nearby European cases—all underwent agricultural depressions in the same period, but rather than yielding to nazism, rural Scandinavians proved largely immune to fascist appeals, retained their allegiance to democratic parties, and in many cases supported Social Democratic initiatives.\textsuperscript{18} The Scandinavian experience does not demonstrate that the depression was unimportant, but only that economic events do not produce political results in a rigid and mechanical fashion; people interpret the significance of economic events in the light of their experience and intellectual tradition. In Germany and in Scandinavia what proved decisive was not the severity of the depression, but rural people's reaction to it, their interpretation of its causes, and their choice of remedies. As Barrington Moore, Jr., has written,

\begin{quote}
The partial failure of a set of institutions to live up to what is expected of them provides an atmosphere receptive to demands for a more or less extensive overhaul of the status quo. At this juncture the future course of events depends heavily upon the models of a better world that become available to various strategic groups in the population.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}

Thus, a more adequate explanation of the drift towards nazism requires a consideration of traditional rural ideology, the nature of the political system in rural areas, and the character of Nazi organization and propaganda.

The German rural population never warmed to Weimar democracy. In Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and other areas
incorporated by Prussia into the new Germany, the rural people longed for the simplicity of local government in a preindustrial setting. They disliked modern bureaucratic government with its distant structure of authority, regulations, and higher taxes. In particular, they disliked the Weimar Republic; at the time of the Kapp Putsch, farm organizations expressed support for Kapp's regime. As the 1920s unfolded, the rural people came to see the Weimar system as the tool of the Social Democrats who used it to harass religious education, channel benefits to urban workers rather than farmers, and permit what they regarded as decadent cultural phenomena.

A host of extremist right-wing and nationalist organizations, playing upon these attitudes and the belligerent nationalism of the countryside, stoked the fires of discontent. Ludendorff's Tannenburg League, the Stahlhelm, the Freikorps brigades, Werwolf, and Landvolk movement, the Schleswig-Holstein Bond, and the various völkisch organizations propagated widely among the rural population; even more respectable organizations like the Landbund and the DNVP kept up a steady barrage of antirepublican propaganda. The constant virulent attacks upon the Versailles treaty, the great inflation, and the Republic's social, cultural, and military policy helped create a climate in which rational political debate ceased to be effective and in which tendencies to political irrationality could flourish.

The reigning climate of opinion predisposed rural folk to interpret the depression in the categories of radical reaction, but their deep-seated distrust of urban outsiders made them suspicious of Nazi overtures. The Nazis overcame this reluctance by recruiting prominent local figures as their spokesmen; especially in the early phases. Using the right man gave the Nazis immediate respectability; where such figures did not exist, the Nazis' legitimacy as a political alternative grew with their electoral successes and their association with more established conservative movements as in the Young Plan referendum.

Even if the antidemocratic, antisocialist, nationalistic, and militarist content of traditional ideology biased rural people, drew them toward Nazi-like understandings of their situations, and lured them away from support of the Republic, the Nazis still had to assemble them under the swastika. This process occurred late and rapidly. In 1928 rural protest rallies raised largely economic demands. In Lower Saxony, for example, disgruntled rural groups called for protection against imports, lower and simpler taxes, cuts in public expenditure and bureaucracy, and the provision of long-term credit at low rates of interest. Not merely farmers, but all those dependent upon agricultural prosperity participated in a united demonstration of rural dissatisfaction. They firmly believed in the justice of their cause and remained confident that the state would assist them. Once their expectations of assistance were shattered and the traditional rural interest groups and parties were discredited.
by their failure to obtain aid, the rural population's patience with traditional arrangements was at an end. They were ready to heed appeals for more radical measures.

The failure of the traditional rural parties and lobbying organizations merits further consideration, for the turn to nazism occurred in two stages. First there was a withdrawal from the liberal parties and farm interest organizations and then adherence to nazism. The very structure of the Weimar political economy obstructed the possibilities for governmental aid to farmers. The Social Democrats, the staunchest supporters of the Republic, hesitated to extend help to agriculture because they feared that higher food prices or higher taxes would alienate their urban working-class supporters. Furthermore, they were slow to recognize that the family farmers of western and southern Germany differed significantly from the Junkers; not until 1923 did the Social Democrats promulgate a more attractive agricultural program. This situation allowed the Nazis to argue that farmers, as a permanent minority in an industrial democracy, could never gain satisfaction of their just demands and that only in the coming Third Reich would they receive their due.

The Weimar party system further facilitated the Nazis' triumph in two significant ways. First, the liberal bourgeois parties failed to organize in rural areas; they remained Honoratiorenparteien, loose groupings assembled around local notables. When their program and performance no longer appealed and their local leaders endorsed nazism, there were no organizational loyalties, no local offices, no party services to slow the tide of voters away from their ranks. The local bourgeois electoral alliances for communal and provincial elections likewise offered easy pickings for Nazi infiltration and demolition. Second, the variety of bourgeois parties meant that electoral results alone seldom determined the participants in national coalitions; instead deals among politicians in Berlin created governments. There was no umbrella party like the contemporary CDU to amalgamate bourgeois interests.

In contrast, the energy and organization of the NSDAP were essential conditions of its success. The Nazis pioneered a new style of politics. They essentially militarized politics; an electoral campaign was like a military operation. It penetrated into every village and sought out every potential recruit. It saturated areas with propaganda and followed up with personal canvassing. Meetings were planned like battles; the logistics of moving troops (SA and SS) were carefully attended to.

The Nazis also pioneered a new style of internal organization. To a degree then novel in German politics, the Nazis constituted a Volkspartei, a party appealing to all classes and groups. In its ranks it enlisted not only its middle-class core, but
workers, professionals, business executives, and the lumpen proletariat; Catholics, Protestants, and the irreligious; urban and rural elements. This uneasy coalition held together through the hope of success, Hitler's charisma, and the Nazi exploitation of traditional anti-Semitism among German peasants. To many, the Nazis represented the last prospect of social order, national resurrection, and economic salvation. Hitler personified these hopes and personal loyalty to him time and again overwhelmed internal opposition and tension. Anti-Semitism offered an effective target for the conflicting animosities of Hitler's followers; workers need not clash with capitalists nor farmers with urban consumers if Jews rather than structural arrangements created the conflicts. Rather than fall into internal dissension, all classes could unite against the one "foreign" element in the community.

The Nazis sought to organize not merely a political party, but an entire society. In 1930 Darre', the party's agricultural advisor, laid out a strategy to gain control of the traditional rural interest organizations through infiltration at the grass roots and established a special organization, the Agrarpolitischer Apparat, to execute this task. The Nazis swiftly seized control of the Landbund, the Chambers of Agriculture, and the rural artisans' organizations, in effect carrying out a Gleichschaltung of agriculture before Hitler came to power.

Elsewhere Nazi propaganda appeals proved extraordinarily effective with the rural population. To separate the content of these appeals from the style of Nazi propaganda is artificial, for the intensity and emotionality of the effort often outweighed any substantive content; nonetheless it is essential if one is to form a judgment about the motivations of Nazi voters.

The centerpiece of Nazi agrarian propaganda was the Agrarian Program of March 7, 1930. Based largely on the ideas of R. Walther Darre', the agrarian program began with a statement of the centrality of agriculture and the peasantry for Germany's future. It argued that the present international situation and the current German state made a restoration of agriculture impossible; taxation, tariff policies, and the exorbitant profits of Jewish middlemen and fertilizer dealers condemned farmers to penury. The program then proposed a series of measures to ensure farmers against the loss of their farms. It concluded by emphasizing the paralysis of the existing interest organizations and stressing that only the Nazi movement could save the farmers and the country.

The Nazis courted the rural population with specific proposals, but these proposals alone cannot explain their success. In addition, they denounced Marxism, they attacked the liberalism of their major rural opponents, condemning their emphasis on individualism, profit, and internationalism. They held out the prospect of an organic German community in which farmers enjoyed
They also employed anti-Semitic appeals. The sparse and anecdotal evidence available prevents precise judgments, but it is clear that anti-Semitic attitudes were prevalent among the rural population, although they seldom attained the virulence typical of leading Nazi propagandists. The Nazis regularly used anti-Semitism to appeal to economic self-interest; they castigated the machinations of Jewish cattle dealers, shopkeepers, and bankers as the source of all economic woes. They aroused traditionalist feeling by censuring the encroachment of Jewish entrepreneurs upon long-standing economic organizations; as Noakes nicely says: "The Jews, who in the countryside tended to represent the forces of the market in the flesh and who were rightly seen as pioneers of modern ideas and forms in culture, were made scapegoats for the dislike of modern developments in general."23 Finally, the Nazis spoke to the most irrational elements of the personality, weaving lurid fantasies about the depravity of Jews.

Just how effective these anti-Semitic ideologies were in attracting support is difficult to judge. Noakes maintains that in Lower Saxony "anti-Semitism appears to have been a major theme between 1925 and 1930, particularly during the Mittelstand campaign of 1928-30. After 1930, however, while remaining an important theme, it was used more as a background to appeals to economic interest and general political propaganda."24 Pridham contends that in Bavaria anti-Semitism did not form specifically one of the major themes of party propaganda in the early 1930s, but it often provided a leitmotiv for the major propaganda themes since the NSDAP's appeal on economic and political issues was frequently couched in anti-Semitic terms. The majority of Nazi voters in the elections of 1930-32 were probably little influenced directly by the racist ideology of the NSDAP, as they were primarily voting for a change in circumstances.25

Similarly, in Schleswig-Holstein the majority of Nazi voters, while susceptible to anti-Semitic propaganda, do not seem to have anticipated the steps to which the Nazis would go. What is striking is the voters' unwillingness to be shocked by the violence and indecency of the Nazis' anti-Semitism and their willingness to accept the Nazi explanation of the Jewish origin of their economic and political troubles.

This brief survey indicates that rural Germans succumbed to the NSDAP for a variety of reasons. Both collectively and as individuals, they succumbed to appeals based on economic self-interest, fears of loss of status, antipathy to modern institutions and culture, the desire for a national revival, intimidation, anti-Semitism, and a host of irrational drives. The greater the
economic and political uncertainty, the greater was their susceptibility to irrational appeals and their tolerance for Nazi violence. Finally, many simply yielded to the apparent irresistibility of the Nazi advance.

The Nazis triumphed, then, not because of the depression alone, but because rural people interpreted their difficulties in the categories of nationalist reaction. Modern liberalism had made little ideological or organizational impact upon their traditional way of life and mental outlook. Steeped in conservative, provincial, and anti-Marxist prejudices, they chose, particularly in Protestant areas, to blame their economic problems on the deviousness of international bankers, Jews, and Socialists rather than recognizing them as the result of severe structural and cyclical crises and poor harvests caused by bad weather. The reactionary nationalists, who had never reconciled themselves to a defeated and democratic republic, overwhelmed the poorly organized liberal forces. The sheer energy and organization of the Nazi party allowed it to overcome the few remaining scruples.
NOTES

1 Rudolph Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945), p. 95.


5 Gerhard Stollenberg, Politsche Strömungen im schleswig-holsteinischen Landvolk 1918-1933 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1962), pp. 48, 63, 100ff., 160; Peter Wulf, Die Politsche Haltung des Schleswig-holsteinischen Handwerks, 1923-1932 (Köln and Opladen; Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969), pp. 35-36.


8 Ibid., p. 154.

9 Ibid., pp. 218-19.

10 Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power, p. 33.
Ibid., p. 140.


Heberle, *Landbevölkerung*, pp. 74, 76.


Stoltenberg, *Politische Strömungen*, p. 117.


Ibid., p. 209.