Weimar society continues to fascinate us partly because of the ironic connection between cultural creativity and political brutalization. As unwelcome "insiders" of an unwanted Republic, German Jews were located at the very center of this dialectic, the concrete link tying these polarities. Their real and symbolic role in the disposition of Weimar Germany has been amply documented. Much less attention has been given to the role of the East European Jews (Ostjuden) in Germany during this period. This constitutes a serious gap. Ostjuden were the first and most vulnerable targets of the newly radicalized anti-Semitism. As a highly visible foreign minority, they were obvious victims of the growing climate of political violence. At the same time they greatly complicated German Jewry's own exposed situation and, in many ways, conditioned its responses. Because the Ostjudenfrage (Question of the Eastern European Jews) was portrayed as a German Schicksalfrage, it was transformed into a problem of vital popular and national concern. No treatment of the relationship between Weimar culture, the Jews, and anti-Semitism would be complete without it.

To be sure, the problem of East European Jews was not new to Germany. The geographical proximity of Poland to Germany was a special circumstance attending the course of German Jewish emancipation. German Jews were never able to forget that they shared a common border with the unemancipated Eastern ghetto masses. Throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century, German Jewish history was conditioned by this presence, both as myth and reality. Indeed, the articulation of a distinctive German Jewish identity was inseparable from the juxtaposition with the ghetto Jew of Eastern Europe. If most nineteenth-century Western Jews looked askance at their primitive ghetto cousins, German Jews articulated the negative conception of the Ostjude with special intensity because they felt the rift
most acutely. This was true too for many non-Jews. Elsewhere in Western Europe the Ostjude was regarded as an irritant—in Germany he became a major preoccupation, at times even an obsession.

This concern reached its height in the immediate post-World War I period. The shock of defeat, the fear of revolution, and unparalleled economic hardship provided new credence to the old slogan "the Jews are our misfortune!" For the first time in twentieth-century Germany, anti-Semitism achieved political respectability and gained mass support. While the anti-Jewish onslaught was generalized and clearly included native Jewry, the alien and defenseless nature of the Ostjuden made them particularly salient victims of the attack. Nothing, after all, concretized the Jewish danger more effectively than this strange, repellent ghetto creature. Hitler's purported "discovery" of the Jewish problem, let us not forget, occurred when he encountered the dirty, smelly East European Jew, "an apparition in a black caftan and black hair locks." Ostjudentum, as it filtered into German space and consciousness, kept alive the historical memory of the mysterious and brooding ghetto presence. This was a resonant tradition that became especially effective in a time of mass confusion, political chaos, and economic collapse. No wonder that in the rhetoric and actions directed against the Ostjuden the post-War brutalization of the Jews was most acute and achieved its first real success.

All myths, if they are to function, must have some basis, however tenuous, in social reality. Right-wing accusations of an invasion by ghetto Jews were made plausible by the fact that during the war, 70,000 Eastern Jews—workers, prisoners, internees—were added to the prewar population of 90,000. In addition, thousands more sought refuge from the brutal pogroms that rocked Eastern Europe after the war. Although by 1922 the majority of war-arrivals had left the country, their presence was still noticeable. Against the background of defeat and economic disintegration, it was easy to present this as a mass flood posing a fundamental threat to German morality, economy, sexuality, politics, and culture. Old accusations took on new significance. The Shylock myth was revitalized by constant accusations of ruthless Eastern Jewish enrichment at the expense of poor and honest patriotic folk. Radical right publications regularly employed parasitological language in their descriptions of Ostjuden. Thus in 1920 Theodor Fritsch's Die Hammer wrote:

A horrible sight, these faces of animals of prey: in them there is nary a sign of human feeling ... they stand before us as the embodiment of Jehova's promise: Thou shalt devour all other Nations! Yes, devour greedily, pitilessly. The myth that Jews were forced to become usurers and liars by their environment is exposed the minute these Ostjuden take their first step into our
These themes meshed effectively with the fear of radical political change. After the success of the Russian Revolution, bolshevism, that alien export, seemed palpably close to Germany. The prominent role of Jews in the Russian Revolution and Bela Kun's radical regime in Hungary lent plausibility to the equation of bolshevism with Judaism. After all, since the beginning of the century Ostjuden such as Rosa Luxembourg, Israel Helphand-Parvus, Leo Jogiches, and Karl Radek had been in the forefront of radical activity in Germany. Moreover, in the postwar Berlin and Munich revolutions, the figures of Luxembourg and Eugen Levine were notoriously prominent. Even radical figures who were clearly not Ostjuden were branded as such. Thus Kurt Eisner, the Berlin-born leader of the Bavarian Socialist Republic, became widely known as a "Galician Jew," symbol of the Jewish revolutionary "a Shylock . . . with a dirty yarmulke covering his head."

Hard-line anti-Semites were not bothered by the great distance that divided traditional Talmudic Jews from professional revolutionaries who were radically disaffected from their origins. Modern revolution, wrote Alfred Roth of the Deutsche Schutz und Trutz Bund, was merely the conspiratorial Jewish means to sow discontent among the nations, thereby guaranteeing the ultimate triumph of Talmudic world rule.

In the new polarized climate, even conservatives began increasingly to ignore the distinction between modern, assimilated German Jews and the Eastern ghetto masses. There were, however, exceptions to this rule. Thus Friedrich von Oppeln-Bronikowski attempted to deal with the Jewish problem by making a principled distinction between Eastern European and German Jewry. The former were "legitimate" targets of animosity, the latter were not. Notions of "international Jewry," he wrote, were palpably absurd. This distinction between cultured, assimilated German Jews and backward Ostjuden was obvious. Nothing established the point better than German Jewry's own pronounced antipathy. Did they not support moves to keep the Ostjuden out of Germany (Grenzschluss)? Here was an explicit attempt to deflect anti-Semitism onto the Ostjuden and away from the German Jews. Indeed, on the eve of Nazi accession to power, Bronikowski sharpened his attack on the Eastern Jews (and Zionists). But the distinction had never been clear in the minds of the different anti-Semitic groups, and the conservative Deutsch National Volkspartei was split on the question. The majority probably linked the two Jewries and regarded Ostjudentum as a massive reservoir for the constant revitalization of Western Jewry.

For all that, the success of anti-Semitic propaganda against the Ostjuden was not a function of their alleged identity with
Western Jews. Rather its effectiveness derived from the ongoing resonance which the traditional stereotype of "the ghetto Jew" still evoked. The ghetto Jew symbolized an age-old cultural tension. Moreover, Eastern Jews—alien, visible, vulnerable—could be attacked with greater impunity than native, enfranchised German Jewry. Election posters in Germany and Austria constantly exploited these figures in caricature. Thus in 1920, the Austrian Christian Socials portrayed a snake with the head of a repellent, side-locked Ostjude strangling his victim to death. Similarly in 1919 a German National Democratic party drawing tapped ancient fears of the dark ghetto. It pictured a priest, candle in hand, walking in front of a simple German worker who is pulling a coffin through the streets. Behind the coffin walks a gloating Ostjude. The only escape from this danger was to vote National Democratic. Of course the anti-Semitic camp attacked the Eastern Jew with particular vehemence. But what of other sectors of Weimar society? In a time of mass upheaval and a noticeable Eastern Jewish presence, how deeply had the stereotype of the ghetto Jew penetrated? With conservatives like Broniatowski, the answer is clear. Among völkisch activists like Hermann Popert, founder of the Vortrupf youth movement and obsessed with reinvigorating a degenerating Germany through alcohol abstinence, there was a similar response. Popert—himself a half Jew—was deeply concerned with German racial hygiene. But his notion of race was territorial, not genetic. All Germans could be legitimate members of the Volk if they fulfilled national demands. His movement explicitly disavowed racial anti-Semitism and insisted that anti-Jewish activity not touch any German citizens. But this was not applicable to Ostjuden, whom he portrayed in gross stereotypical forms. Ghetto Jews—with their filth and unclean sexual habits—were fundamentally undesirable elements. They were the cause of German anti-Semitism. Journals such as the Jesuit Hochland, also actively opposed to racial anti-Semitism, made clear distinctions between negative ghetto Jews and German Jews.

The strength of the anti-Jewish onslaught during this period enabled it to decisively influence the nature of political discourse and to exert pressure on, and successfully penetrate, previously unaffected sectors. Even the bastions of opposition to anti-Semitism, the liberal and Social Democratic parties, were affected. The German Democratic party maintained its public stance against all manifestations of anti-Semitism. Their decision to nominate fewer Jewish candidates was, however, a concession not only to the mood of the times but to the opinions of individual party members as well. Many conveniently attributed anti-Semitism to the presence and behavior of the Ostjuden. Otto Fishbeck, the party’s Prussian minister of trade and commerce, publicly opposed the unsavory presence of Eastern Jews but insisted that this did not make anti-Semites out of the Democrats, who deeply respected the law-abiding German Jews. In this
manner some of the more democratically inclined political forces sought to concentrate the animus on Ostjuden and away from German Jews. This had always been a more respectable position and, under the new circumstances, obviated the need for an examination of the deeper sources animating the widespread racist agitation.

The response of the Social Democratic party to the Ostjudenfrage illustrates the nature of the competing forces at work. Both during the war and after, there were certain elements in the party who expressed general anti-Semitic convictions but these never became a dominant factor. Indeed, to the end, the Social Democratic party was the German Jews’ “most important source of organized support in German society.” With regard to the Ostjudenfrage, however, the picture is slightly murkier, the ambivalence more evident. To a large extent this was related to the fact that in war-torn Germany the presence of Ostjuden constituted a real social problem—yet another burden on an already overloaded economy. In the pre-war period, the party had defended the rights of Jewish aliens in Germany and urged Eastern European Jews to actively participate in the class struggles that would bring about an age of universal socialist emancipation. There can be no doubt about this humanist orientation. But, like other groups in Germany, it is equally true that the Left accepted the negative concept of the ghetto and its products. Thus Karl Kautsky, although utterly opposed to all racist conceptions and a proponent of East European Jewish emancipation, regarded Judaism as a reactionary factor. Its natural home was the ghetto, which Kautsky, fitting into a long tradition, saw as the symbol for the distinction between progress and reaction, enlightenment and obscurantism.

The postwar response of the Social Democrats to the Ostjudenfrage in Germany must be seen in its overall historical context. The democratic parties were caught between the necessity to come to terms with popular opinion while at the same time maintaining a reasonable, compassionate policy. Certain individual members did indeed succumb to exploiting the stereotype as a justification for excluding Ostjuden from Weimar Germany. But the dominant argument held that Germany’s problem had objective socioeconomic roots and that, apart from a few profiteers and black-market operators, the small minority of Ostjuden could not possibly be blamed for the country’s woes. Anti-Semitic assertions that they were Germany’s foremost danger were dismissed as absurd.

The November 1919 edict concerning the Ostjuden, signed by Wolfgang Heine the Prussian minister of the interior, exemplified this approach. After extended consultations with Jewish organizations, the Prussian government undertook to resolve Eastern Jewish problems in an orderly and compassionate fashion. Working through the Jewish Workers Welfare Organization, employment for the Ostjuden would be procured—even where this could affect employment of local workers. Of course, this was
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predicated upon the assumption that the Eastern Jews would move on as soon as possible. Those Ostjuden who had committed a crime or were deemed a threat to law and order were to be forthrightly expelled—although this too was to be done together with Jewish organizations who would protect the rights of the affected persons. Moreover, the Jewish Workers Welfare Organization had priority in finding work for unemployed aliens. This would then avert the legally required expulsion of unemployed aliens.

Anti-Jewish forces quickly interpreted the edict as evidence of a plot to favor foreign Jewish workers over German workers. The pressures on the Social Democrats in this regard were obvious. The edict was remarkably free of anti-Jewish sentiments, despite Heine's past, which was not. Yet, in other contexts, Heine referred to the Ostjuden as "half-barbarian" and only one month after the publication of the edict made his ambivalence a matter of public record. While attempting to temper the political agitation against the Ostjuden, he conceded, in a speech to the Prussian Parliament, that the problem was getting worse and asserted that unsympathetic Jewish types could no longer be tolerated in German cities.

These remarks epitomized an unresolved split in Social Democratic attitudes. The traditional compassion and humanity of the Left was pitted against the equally ingrained distaste for the "anachronistic" ghetto Jews. Kautsky's formulation remained normative. It was only with Eduard Bernstein's postwar publications that there was any inclination at all to give the ghetto Jew a measure of intrinsic value. Indeed, the November 1919 edict was itself partly the product of German Jewish protests against previous anti-Eastern Jewish actions undertaken by the Social Democratic government. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office in April 1919, the Zionist Julius Berger—himself a Social Democrat—objected to widespread expulsions of Ostjuden from all areas of Germany and especially Prussia. These expulsions, he wrote, were carried out with unprecedented brutality. The grounds for these expulsions (unemployment, black-marketeering) were flimsy excuses for what Berger considered to be a basically anti-Jewish policy that dominated all levels of Prussian bureaucracy.

Expulsions were not the only actions perpetrated against the Ostjuden by SD officials. In early 1920, security forces, under the command of Social Democratic Police President Eugen Ernst, engaged in a full-scale raid on the Berlin ghetto. Under the pretext that it was necessary to ferret out black-marketeers and Bolshevik agents, the Berlin Eastern Jewish quarter was cordoned off, and between seven hundred and one thousand people were arrested. Of these, three hundred were placed in a concentration camp at Wünsdorf. Ernst had informed Heine that the Ostjuden were a cancerous sore on the national body, a real danger to Germany and, he warned, unless they were moved to
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Intern camps, he would not be able to control the growing tide of anti-Semitism. Although all those arrested were eventually released and the SD journal Vorwärts condemned the incident (while simultaneously putting the blame on the army), this incident was firmly imprinted on Jewish—especially Eastern Jewish—consciousness.32

There were, to be sure, lawbreakers among the Ostjuden. Not only anti-Semites praised the action. The liberal Berliner Tageblatt welcomed the initiative to rid the city of its "pests."33 But, as one sympathetic Jewish observer noted, the overall situation was conducive to economic lawlessness. German Jews, non-Jews and other foreigners were all implicated. To make the Ostjuden singularly responsible was shameful.34

This critique (of scape-goating powerless outsiders) also occupied nonparty social critics and dramatists on the far Left. Typically, these were German-Jewish intellectuals who had little sympathy for the inner world of the Eastern ghetto Jew. The famous novelist Alfred Doebelin was one of the very few disaffected Left Jewish intellectuals to discover the world of Eastern Jewry on its own terms and to record his appreciation of its intrinsic merits. His Reise in Polen (1925) was, however, quite atypical. The Ostjude was most often used as a foil to uncover some of the major hypocrisies of post-War German bourgeois morality and society. Thus Kurt Tucholsky—certainly no lover of the ghetto—bitterly caricatured Weimar’s system of judicial and social double-standards by which Eastern ghetto Jews and native aristocrats were treated for the same offences in his caustic Avrumele Schabesdeckel Und Prinz Eitel-Friedrich Von Hohenzollern (1921).35 At the same time he mocked the pathetic efforts of middle-class German Jews—as exemplified by the philistine Herr Wendriner—to justify anti-Semitism when it was aimed at Ostjuden.36

The most controversial statement of this type was the expressionist Walter Mehring’s play "The Merchant of Berlin" (1929), produced at the prestigious avant-garde Piscator theatre in Berlin.37 This tragicomic reconstruction of early Weimar inflation propelled Eastern Jewish reality onto the stage with uncompromising force. Simon Chaim Kaftan (located) comes to Berlin in the midst of the 1923 inflation. He is a typical creature of the ghetto who, throughout the play, talks in his native Yiddish. In partnership with a German Gentile, Kaftan exploits the inflation and soon becomes a millionaire. Yet the stereotype is softened, humanized by the fact that in the end Kaftan is brought down—like everyone else, a victim rather than creator of circumstance—while the German remains victorious and maintains his sway at the expense of others. This conclusion, of course, scandalized the nationalist and anti-Semitic press.38

Poised between these Eastern Jewish outsiders and the broader society were Germany’s Jews. Organized German Jewry had always
been ambivalent in their collective expressions and actions concerning Ostjuden. Protective and dissociative modes operated side by side in uneasy alliance. On the one hand they had always provided charity and aid to their distressed East European brethren (a fact which served usually to emphasize rather than diminish the distance between them), while on the other they sought the most efficacious ways in which to rid Germany of their unseemly presence. For liberal, middle-class German Jews the Ostjuden were suffused with symbolic significance. They constantly reminded German Jews of their own Jewishness. They also reinforced the reality of anti-Semitic stereotypes and were regarded as impeding the successful disposition of German Jewish assimilation. This dialectical tension—between responsibility and denial—was built into the normative German Jewish liberal approach to the Ostjuden.

By and large, the same was true for the Weimar period. The war, however, had disillusioned many German Jews, who were now less able to attribute anti-Semitism merely to the East European presence. Efforts on behalf of the Ostjuden were made with renewed vigor. To be sure, this was not a disinterested effort but was also an attempt to contain and defuse the animus aimed against German Jews themselves. Still, for the first time, liberals and Zionists were able to work together on a common platform. A concerted effort was made by representatives of the major Jewish institutions to protect the rights of Eastern Jews and provide them with employment and housing.

The general perception of Jewish interdependence weighed heavily on German Jewish leaders. Because the radical right had succeeded in making the Ostjudenfrage into a burning national issue, German Jews had to define the balance between Jewish responsibility and German loyalty with added caution. Paul Nathan's formulation was typical of the leadership's approach. It was clear, he wrote, that given Germany's desperate situation, the presence of foreign groups was undesirable. The agitation for expulsion, however, would be neither effective nor morally appropriate. Deportation would be an un-Germanic act and harm the country's international reputation. A speaker for the Centralverein, the liberal representative organization of German Jewry, scoffed at absurd anti-Semitic claims about Eastern Jews yet, almost as a matter of course, added: "That the German Jews do not encourage this immigration must be obvious to all reasonable people." Ostjuden would move on as soon as circumstances permitted. Berlin's Reform community also accepted responsibility for Ostjuden already in Germany but, as one typical article put it, no one could deny the abundance of "dubious" elements in their ranks. The majority of Germans clearly did not desire their presence. Reform Jews had more in common with Christian Germans than the Ostjuden, whose spirit and character was so alien.

These positions reflected the continuing unresolved ambivalence of most liberal German Jews toward the Ostjuden. There were,
to be sure, other positions on the continuum. Certain individuals—unhampered by the constraints of official communal responsibility—voiced the historic distaste in a much less ambivalent manner. Among the most prominent were the novelist Jacob Wassermann and the philosopher Constantin Brunner. For them, Ostjuden were wholly alien, generative of anti-Semitism and, because they constantly brought the ghetto and forgotten modes of Jewish exclusivism back to Germany, the prime inhibitor of successful German-Jewish integration.

Max Naumann's small but vocal Deutschnationale Juden made such sentiments its official policy. Founded in 1921, this group clearly reflected the postwar collapse of liberal certainties. It attempted to placate the fury of the right by appropriating some of its key values and advocating support of the conservative Deutschnational party. For Naumann, as he constantly repeated, there was only one political criterion: the welfare of the German Fatherland. Ostjuden were clearly antithetical to that welfare. It was not, wrote Naumann, that he disregarded the responsibilities of Jewish solidarity: "But it would mean the abandonment of Deutschtum if, out of sympathy for foreign Jews, we allowed the German Fatherland to come to grief."47

If many Weimar Jews believed that the Ostjuden were the real cause of the prevailing anti-Semitism, they voiced this conviction privately. Naumann's group, however, made the East-West Jewish distinction the critical pivot of its arguments and attempted to siphon anti-Jewish hostility onto the Eastern Jews. At times almost nothing distinguished their pronouncements on the issue from the anti-Semitic press. Ostjuden, they wrote, were totally unassimilable. They were swarming into Germany, cheating and demoralizing everyone in their way. They were ruthless, noisy, and uncultured. Their rapid departure from Germany was to be encouraged.

Naumann's group focused on yet another Jewish enemy: Zionism. For Nationaldeutsch Jews, Zionists and Eastern Jews were practically synonymous. Both embodied the Jewish national sensibility and contradicted the premises of Deutschtum. They represented alien, disloyal elements. As the German Zionists had always been the main supporters of Eastern Jewish rights in Germany, this was a plausible association. Indeed, to the chagrin of liberal Jews generally, many young German Zionists had initiated a veritable cult of the Ostjuden. Martin Buber's prewar Hasidic writings legitimized this growing trend. In a radical inversion of images, Ostjuden were held to symbolize Jewish authenticity, community, and lost spiritual values, while Western Jews were pictured as philistine, undignified and deracinated.49

In between all these competing forces were the Ostjuden themselves. Between 1913 and 1923 it was they who felt the
full force of the Weimar crisis. Expulsions, violence, internment in special concentration camps, police raids: All these were a part of Eastern Jewish reality during these years. The attack on the Ostjuden reached its climax in 1923, when economic suffering also reached its height. Between November 5 and 8, Germany's first twentieth century pogrom began. With over 10,000 people roaming the streets of the Eastern Jewish quarter, the Scheunenviertel, an orgy of looting and violence proceeded. Only with the insertion of massive police reinforcements was order restored.\(^5\) The November pogrom merely culminated a whole series of anti-Jewish outbreaks which had occurred that year in Munich, Beuthen, Koenigsberg, Nuremberg, Saxony, and elsewhere. Almost always the Eastern Jews, visible and vulnerable, were the prime targets of attack.

As one transplanted Eastern Jewish intellectual, Zalman Rubaschoff—later Shazar, president of the State of Israel—noted at the time, Ostjuden in Germany found themselves in a state of double exile. Far removed from the cultural world of the German workers, the Eastern Jewish proletariat had precious little in common with bourgeois German Jews (this even applied to their relations with German Zionists). The very presence of a Jewish proletariat in Germany was anomalous.\(^5\) Minority life was rendered doubly difficult.

This was reflected in the disunity, apathy, and fragmentation that hounded the only organization of Eastern Jews in Germany, the Verband der Ostjuden. Its leaders constantly complained that despite the concerted attacks upon them, Ostjuden refused to make a serious, unified response. Now, they asked, could German Jews be expected to defend them when they did not even bother to defend themselves?\(^5\) In the midst of the anti-Semitic agitation, their journal lamented: "We are a Galut (Exile) within Galut, pathetically dependent upon the goodwill of others."\(^5\) The position was further weakened by the defection of leaders who, as soon as they could, escaped the stigma of the Berlin ghetto.\(^5\) Those who remained, exhorted their brethren "to learn the basic principles of political and social life. We have to start at the beginning and learn the elementary ABCs. We hold ourselves to be very intelligent, children of the Book, yet we are illiterate. We do not know how to deal with the most important, critical and dangerous aspects of our existence."\(^5\)

The constellation of forces at work between 1913 and 1923, however, was well beyond the control of a transient, powerless community. It was only with the post-1923 economic recovery that life for these East European Jews became more tolerable. When, however, the final storm arrived ten years later, it became obvious to all that, for the radical right, the attack on the Ostjuden had been only the beginning of a massive onslaught against all Jews.
NOTES


3 The entire history of this problem is treated in Steven E. Aschheim, Strange Encounter: The East European Jew in German and German Jewish Consciousness 1800-1923 (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981).


5 For a detailed overview of these developments, see Werner Jochmann, "Die Ausbreitung des Antisemitismus," in Deutsches Judentum in Krieg und Revolution 1916-1923.


Quoted from "Die Hetze gegen die Ostjuden" in Mitteilungen aus dem Verein zur Abwehr des Antisemitismus 30, no. 1 (January 13, 1920), p. 3.


Both these caricatures are reproduced in Eduard Fuchs, Die Juden in der Karikatur: Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte (Munich: A. Langen, 1921). See opposite face of p. 196 and p. 300.


Hermann Popert, "Ostjuden," Der Vortrupp 3, no. 22 (November 2, 1919).
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22 Donald L. Niewyk, Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism 1918-1933 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), p. 221. Niewyk's point is well taken but he seems to underplay the dualities and ambivalences of the SD concerning the Ostjuden, especially when it had official responsibility for the problem.

23 See George L. Mosse, "German Socialists and the Jewish Question in the Weimar Republic," Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 16 (1971).


25 See Theodore Muller, "Die Einwanderung der Ostjuden," Neue Zeit 39 (June 24, and July 1, 1921).

26 For a history of this and Jewish social welfare efforts, see Adler-Rudel, Ostjuden, especially pp. 63-66.

27 Ibid., p. 66.


30 See his "Die Mizrach-Yidn in Daitschland" in the American Yiddish journal Die Zukunft 28, no. 11 (November 1923). See too George Mosse, "German Socialists and the Jewish Question in the Weimar Republic" for an account of the stereotype and Bernstein's role.

31 Julius Berger's private memorandum to Prof. H. Sobernheim of the Jewish Affairs Section of the Foreign Office, April 2, 1919. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem 23/718.

32 The following sources are useful: "Die Ostjudenverhaftungen," Juedische Rundschau 25, no. 22 (March 31, 1920), p. 154;

33 Berliner Tageblatt, February 10, 1920.
34 See C. Z. Klützel, "Razzia."


38 For samples of reviews and the controversy the play aroused, see Gunther Ruehle, Theater fuer die Republik 1917-1933: Im Spiegel der Kritik (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1967), pp. 961-68.

39 I deal with the genesis and development of these issues in Strange Encounter.


41 For details see Adler-Rudel, Ostjuden, Part 3.

42 Paul Nathan, "Nachschrift," Im Deutschen Reich 27, no. 1 (January 1921); Die Ostjuden in Deutschland und die Antisemitische Reaktion (Berlin: Philo-Verlag, 1922).

43 Kurt Alexander, "Zeitschau," Im Deutschen Reich 26, no. 7/8 (July-August 1920), especially p. 237. See also "Wandersturm," Im Deutschen Reich 26, no. 12 (December 1920).

44 Dr. F. Coblenz, "Ueber die Ostjudenfrage in Deutschland," Mitteilungen der juedischen Reformgemeinde zu Berlin, no. 2 (July 1, 1921), pp. 22-23.

45 See his 1921 work, translated by S. N. Brainin, My Life as German and Jew (New York: Conrad-McCann Inc., 1933), especially pp. 196-90.
See his Der Judenhass und die Juden (Berlin: Oesterheld, 1919); and Von den Pflichten der Juden und von den Pflichten des Staates (Berlin: G. Kiepenheuer, 1930). See too the semi-autobiographical Vom Einsiedler (Potsdam: G. Kiepenheuer, 1924).


See "Von nationaldeutschen Juden, Ostjuden und Dissidenten," Mitteilungen der juedischen Reformgemeinde zu Berlin, no. 3 (September 15, 1921), especially p. 8; "Angstpsychose," Juedische Rundschau, no. 101/132 (December 22, 1922); "Liegt Berlin in Deutschland?" quoted in Juedische Rundschau 27, no. 26 (March 31, 1922), pp. 167-63; and "Auslaendergefahr und Ostjudengefahr," Mitteilungsblatt des Verbandes Nationaldeutscher Juden, no. 1 (January/February 1923).

Strange Encounter, Chapters 5, 6 and 9.


For an account of the riots, see Ulrich Dunker, Der Reichsbund juedischer Frontsoldaten 1919-1939: Geschichte eines juedischen Abwehrvereins (Dusseldorf: Droste, 1977), pp. 49-56.

See "In Der Neue Achsanya," in the Yiddish journal Oif Der Schwell (On The Threshold), no. 1 (1918).

See "The Conference of Ostjuden in Germany," in the Yiddish Der Ostjude 2, no. 26 (July 7, 1921).


See Jakob Reich, "Deutschland (Rundschau)," Neue juedische Monatshefte 4, no. 11/12 (March 10-25, 1920), p. 266.

Dr. Israel Uerbach, "Die Ostjuedische Aleph-Bet," Der Ostjude 2, no. 23 (June 10, 1921).