8 The Genius of Internal Monologue

"Internal monologue" and stream-of-consciousness techniques purport to represent, or even to transcribe, fictional characters' internal speech. But how is it possible for written words to stand for unspoken language? The conventions of internal monologue appear most justified by the notion of thought as "speech minus sound." If talking to oneself is no different from talking aloud, then the inwardness of a subject might as well be represented in the familiar language of dialogue. While some authors do employ internal monologue as if to transcribe internal speech, the more radical twentieth-century novels break literary conventions by representing internal speech in ways that deviate from ordinary language. Opposing the psychologists who maintain that subjectivity can be transcribed, writers of stream-of-consciousness technique strive to create the illusion of an inwardness that eludes transcription.

According to a deceptively simple commonplace of literary history, modern literature strives to represent the "inner life" of subjects. This inwardness is, however, never as autonomous as it superficially appears to be. The innovative works by Edouard Dujardin, Arthur Schnitzler, and James Joyce demonstrate that the language of selfhood depends on otherness for its existence, because monologue always

1Throughout this chapter the reader should place the (perhaps unavoidable) misnomer "internal monologue" in imaginary quotation marks.
incorporates elements of dialogue. The context of vocalized speech is a sub-text of internal dialogue, and the context of writing is formed by the pre-texts of literary history.

Late nineteenth-century psychology suggests a distinction between "internal speech" and "stream of consciousness." While internal speech is the essentially linguistic process of thought, "stream of consciousness" refers to an extralinguistic level. Victor Egger opens his systematic discussion in *La parole intérieure* (1881) by stating, "At every instant, the soul speaks its thought internally." Egger suggests that internal and external speech are substantially alike. But Henri Bergson's *Essai sur les données immédiate de la conscience* (1888) and William James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) emphasize the nonverbal character of the "stream of thought." Stream of consciousness is conceived as a nebulous experiential process to which language is foreign, while internal speech occurs in our language of everyday communication.

Literary developments evidently parallel changes in psychological theory when they affirm these conceptions of thought. Internal monologue purports to represent internal speech directly, while stream-of-consciousness technique creates the illusion of representing a pre-linguistic realm. Literary critics for the most part agree on this distinction.3

One central tension within modern fiction derives from the contradictory claims of internal monologue and stream-of-consciousness techniques. Before the rise of the novel, Shaftesbury prepares a way for psychological fiction by discussing soliloquy at great length. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, then, characters' thoughts are often introduced as a kind of coherent talking to oneself. Such rationalistic conceptions begin to collapse with the rise of modern psychology and symbolist writing. Edouard Dujardin is among the first wave of writers whose fictions attempt to capture the extrarational workings of the mind; Arthur Schnitzler's coherent narratives of internal speech return to a more rationalistic form. James Joyce presses

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further into the textual unconscious that is inaccessible to ordinary language but that finds a possible expression in diverse forms of stream-of-consciousness technique. In no case can there be a direct correspondence of a literary passage to a represented process of thought: the relationship always depends on elaborate conventions of mimesis. The problem is not to evaluate these conventions, then, but to discern a competition between different formal devices and their structural differences in relation to thought.

The history of literary monologue is a story of the rhetorical processes that transform codes, literary devices that purport to correspond to phenomena of internal speech. The relationship between lived internal speech and literary internal monologue is, like the relationship Nietzsche describes between object and subject, "an indicative carry-over, a stammering translation into a completely foreign language." 4

The Consciousness of Internal Monologue

According to Edouard Dujardin, one of the central goals of literary internal monologue is to eliminate the apparent discrepancy between represented thought and the technique of representation. In his own terms, internal monologue suppresses the appearance of narrative intrusions: "The first object of internal monologue is, remaining within the conditions and the framework of the novel, to suppress the intervention, at least the apparent intervention, of the author, and to permit the character to express himself directly, as does the traditional monologue at the theatre." 5 The monologue aims to "express thoughts" and achieve the unmediated illusion by allowing a fictional character "to express himself directly" (MI 215). According to Dujardin, there are essential differences between monologue in drama and in the novel, since narrative monologue can accompany continued action, whereas the action of a play stops when a monologue begins. In fact, the essential difference between internal monologue and first-person narration is that the internal monologue can follow a character in the

4 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Über Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne."
5 Edouard Dujardin, "Les lauriers sont coupés" and "Le monologue intérieur," ed. Carmen Licari (Rome: Bulzoni, 1977), 214. I shall henceforth cite the former as LC and the latter as MI.
present tense while he moves through a fictional world, but as Fielding's *Shamela* demonstrates, first-person narrative easily becomes ridiculous when it describes a present action other than the scene of writing.

Internal monologue in fiction is supposed to correspond to a scene and moment of thought. Simultaneity is essential, as Valéry Larbaud observes when he writes that internal monologue seizes thought "close to its conception." If we conceive internal speech as a linguistic phenomenon that can be transcribed, then internal monologue is a pretended record of the linguistic stream of thought. But if internal speech is already a kind of writing in code, then the relationship between internal speech and internal monologue is closer to a translation from one code to another. The different types of internal monologue technique imply different conceptions of internal speech and of its rhetorical accessibility to narrative. The thoughts of a fictional character do not first exist in order to be secondarily represented, however, so that only the primary illusion is of a correspondence between writing and the scene of internal speech.

*Les lauriers sont coupés* (1887) opens impersonally, with a description that contains no trace of personal pronoun or verb: "An evening of setting sun, of distant air, of profound skies; and of confused crowds; of noises, of shadows, of multitudes; spaces infinitely extended; a vague evening." This disjointed sentence produces a double effect of mystery. The evening is modified by a sequence of genitive constructions; the twilight scene is replete with ambiguous distances in the air, sky, and space. To whom does the scene belong? "Of" confuses subjective and objective genitive to suggest that the evening belongs to the sun, air, confused crowds. Or is the scene only a

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6 In his preface to the second edition of *LC* (Paris: Albert Messein, 1924), 6.
8 Internal monologue clearly differs from Coleridge's conversational pretense to the extent that internal speech is not conscious of itself as a writing. Naturalistic internal monologue contrasts with Shakespearean dramatic soliloquy, because internal speech does not obviously occur in the eloquent diction of Shakespeare's verse. Internal monologue further differs from Poe's first-person narrations in which a character appears to address the reader, because a character's internal speech is addressed to himself or is addressed only imaginatively to another individual. Yet internal monologue shares, with all other forms of monologue, complex conventions that create illusions of subjectivity.
mysterious "infinitely extended" literary space? After the sequence of modifications, the only progress is from "an evening" to "a vague evening" until the continuation produces "a clear evening." The text revels in an invocation of elusive objects.

The second sentence-paragraph suggests the language of causal explanation when it introduces the narrative "I": "For under the chaos of appearances, among the durations and sites, in the illusion of things that engender and beget themselves, one among the others, one like the others, one the same and one more, of the infinitude of possible existences, I arise; and observe how time and place become precise; it is the today; it is the here; the hour that tolls; and, around me, life; the hour, the place, an evening in April, Paris, a clear evening of setting sun" (LC 93). The apparently unmotivated "For" (Car) points toward a new presence, the first-person consciousness. An "illusion of things that engender and beget themselves," the temporal and spatial chaos, is also a narrative illusion. The initial two sentences confront each other as two distinct narrative pretenses: impersonal and personal voice. Things only appear to "engender themselves" to the extent that the consciousness of the "I" is concealed. The text narrates a discovery of its own voice of internal monologue. Despite the fragmentary character of descriptive clauses, however, this voice sounds less like a transcription than like a written transformation of internal speech.

The evening remains "vague" until the "I" specifies, in Hegelian fashion, its particular moment and place: "it is the today; it is the here." The moment becomes "sweeter" by being reflected in a consciousness. The narrative takes pleasure in this turn, observing "a joy of being someone, of walking." Previously bound to impersonal description, the voice admits to a pleasure at becoming "someone," a center of consciousness and a body within the fictive world.

Echoing the opening section, chapter 8 speaks from the now established voice. Daniel Prince rides through Paris in a carriage with Lea: "In the streets the car in motion... . One in the crowd of unlimited existences, thus I henceforth take my course, one definitively among the others; thus the today and the here, the hour, life are created in me" (LC 163; ellipses in original). The "I" creates itself by representing the moment in itself. The "I" is an illusory point source, an "internal" generator of language that invents its place as the physical companion of Lea and as the narrative companion of the reader.
At the start of the novel, Daniel Prince is lost in a crowd; now he reaches the height of self-attainment, as his narrative vehicle carries him and Lea together: "It is a feminine dream, the today; it is a touched feminine flesh, my here; my hour; it is a woman whom I approach; and observe the dream towards which my life goes, this girl on this night" (ibid.). The evening has been redefined by the "I" that invokes and desires a feminine presence. "Observe the dream": fusing with the text, the voice is and tells its dream. The world of the fiction is "in me," where the "I" is both Daniel Prince's inner text and the text itself as origin of the illusion. Ultimately, there is no inner/outer dichotomy within the language of the narrative. No apparent intervention separates narrator from narrated because the narrative unifies this double illusion of the personal and impersonal.

One moment of internal language is especially riddled by paradox. Daniel Prince hears a slow waltz, and the narrative reproduces several measures of musical notation (LC 148).10 What rhetorical device produces this effect? There is an obvious discrepancy between written notation and inner experience. How can a musical language be part of internal monologue? On first consideration, one might believe that the musical staff stands for the experience of hearing the transcribed sounds. Or one might say that Daniel Prince imagines the notes, hums them to himself, perhaps even visualizes their notation. But these approaches take the mimetic pretense for granted. Musical notation is a written code that, by virtue of unstated conventions, forms part of a feigned presentation of the code of internal speech. According to the pretense, literary internal monologue stands in a relation to speech as musical notation to musical sound. Elaborate conventions make possible the fictive correspondences between writing and internal speech (or between musical notation and musical experience).

Although Dujardin names his stylistic device "monologue intérieur," his narrative rarely appears to transcribe coherent inner thought. Instead, along the lines of what is now called stream-of-consciousness technique, Dujardin represents disjointed associations and inchoate fantasies. The distinctly modern character of his project lies in its close linkage of narration with silent consciousness.

10Compare Arthur Schnitzler's more extensive use of musical notation in the closing pages of Fräulein Else, and that of James Joyce in Ulysses.
The Genius of Internal Monologue

Interiority Turns Outward

The fiction of Arthur Schnitzler, a Viennese physician working in psychiatry, introduces new conventions in the representation of thought. Unlike Dujardin's narrative, Schnitzler's *Leutnant Gustl* (1901) and *Fräulein Else* (1924) often appear as transcriptions of internal speech. Despite the borderline states of consciousness they express, these characters' internal monologues give an overriding impression of rational contemplation. This does not necessarily imply, however, that the represented internal speech is as coherent as the internal monologue that represents it; the problem is that we cannot confidently establish the difference.

Schnitzler acknowledges his formal debt to Dujardin in a letter to Georg Brandes: "I am pleased that the novella of Lieutenant Gustl amused you. A novella of Dostoyevsky, Krotkaya, which I do not know, is supposed to exhibit the same technique of thought-monologue. But the first inducement to the form was given to me by a story of Dujardin, entitled les lauriers sont coupés. Only that this author did not know how to find the right material for his form."11 While *Les lauriers sont coupés* crucially influences the form of *Leutnant Gustl*, several differences are immediately obvious. Dujardin anticipates the later stream-of-consciousness technique by hinting at a representation of Daniel Prince's incoherent, vaguely formulated impressions; Schnitzler writes an internal monologue that appears to transcribe only the rational processes of Lieutenant Gustl's thoughts. Dujardin implies that his narrative captures the prelinguistic stream of consciousness, but Schnitzler restricts himself to the fictive internal speech.

*Leutnant Gustl* is, in fact, one of the earliest works of fiction to be entirely structured around the represented internal speech of a protagonist. Apart from modifying the meaning of internal monologue, Schnitzler chooses a peculiar, though in some ways typical, center of consciousness. In contrast to Daniel Prince, who flows with his aestheticized world, Lieutenant Gustl bristles with animosity. Schnitzler acknowledges his formal debt to Dujardin in a letter to Georg Brandes: "I am pleased that the novella of Lieutenant Gustl amused you. A novella of Dostoyevsky, Krotkaya, which I do not know, is supposed to exhibit the same technique of thought-monologue. But the first inducement to the form was given to me by a story of Dujardin, entitled les lauriers sont coupés. Only that this author did not know how to find the right material for his form." While *Les lauriers sont coupés* crucially influences the form of *Leutnant Gustl*, several differences are immediately obvious. Dujardin anticipates the later stream-of-consciousness technique by hinting at a representation of Daniel Prince's incoherent, vaguely formulated impressions; Schnitzler writes an internal monologue that appears to transcribe only the rational processes of Lieutenant Gustl's thoughts. Dujardin implies that his narrative captures the prelinguistic stream of consciousness, but Schnitzler restricts himself to the fictive internal speech.

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zler's character strives to follow the military code in every respect, yet he constantly confronts "situations where inwardly he is not at one with the demands of his social persona." The contradictions within him serve as the starting point for Schnitzler's attack on the military order Gustl represents. Whereas Daniel Prince is at worst a naive and affected aesthete, Lieutenant Gustl is a despicable type. We may uneasily recognize aspects of ourselves in him, but we can hardly identify with Gustl. A dialogue of conflicting values is thus written into Schnitzler's story.

Dialogue is explicit even in the language of Gustl's internal speech. Imagining conversations with the doctor he has challenged to a duel, he thinks: "Just wait, Herr Doktor, you will lose the habit of making such remarks!" Later, when he contemplates suicide, he holds an imaginary dialogue: "Yes, you'll never see me again, Klara—finished! What, little sister, when you accompanied me to the train on New Year's, you didn't think that you would never see me again?" (LG 23). Dialogical tensions also characterize a sequence of Gustl's addresses to himself. Resolved momentarily to commit suicide in consequence of a baker's insult, Gustl thinks: "All right, you've heard, Gustl: finished, finished, your life is over!" (LG 17). Gustl appears to contain the critical author or reader in himself when he exclaims, "No, it won't be made so easy for you, Herr Lieutenant" (LG 21). At one moment, Gustl tries to gain rational control of his thoughts: "Look, Gustl, you've come here specially..., in the middle of the night, where not a soul disturbs you—now you can calmly think over everything for yourself" (LG 25). But control is elusive, morbid ideas unsettles him, and he desperately seeks to calm himself: "Gustl, be good: as it is, things are bad enough" (LG 35).

The narrative, as if situated inside Gustl's mind, nevertheless implies an ironic distance. We ultimately feel "closer" to Daniel Prince although bored by him. Schnitzler's use of internal monologue produces a powerful effect; Gustl stands for the established military code and at the same time undoes this code by discovering inconsistencies

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within himself. Gustl falls asleep in the park, too irresolute to decide on suicide, and awakens in the despairing fashion of Richard III: "What is it then?—Hey, Johann, bring me a glass of fresh water... What is it?... Where... Yes, am I dreaming?... My skull... o blast it... I can't open my eyes!" (LG 26-27; ellipses in original). Like Richard, Gustl finds that "no creature loves me": "It really is sad to have absolutely no one" (LG 28). If they do not approach madness, the characteristic form of literary monologists often leads them to be loners and extreme individualists.

While internal monologue purports to represent internal speech with complete accuracy, this apparent proximity can be riddled with ironic distances. At the moment of solitary crisis on the night before his duel, Gustl achieves no convincing individuality but only reveals the inability of a social type to escape or master its governing clichés. Schnitzler thus reveals that internal speech may constitute only an illusory form of autonomy: dominated by military codes of honor, Lieutenant Gustl finds himself incapable of independent thinking. In his irresolute decision to die, Gustl merely responds to a petty insult, and his continued life is an equally arbitrary result of the baker's sudden death. Lieutenant Gustl is a puppet of the society that authors him, or of the author who, within the fiction, pretends to let him speak for himself.

_Fraulein Else_, Schnitzler's major work of fiction based on internal monologue, also demonstrates that despite appearances of autonomy, internal speech is controlled by outside forces. This demonstration operates on both the mimetic and narrative levels. Manipulated by her parents, Else is also the puppet of the narrative; suicide is her individual response to this double bind.

An economic model governs the plot. Else's parents have sent her to an expensive resort, on vacation with her aunt and cousin. Else realizes that their money buys extreme solitude: "How alone I am here!" But an urgent letter intrudes. Her mother asks her to request a loan from another vacationer, which forces her into a system of exchange. Throughout, Else is identified with her reflective internal speech; according to the convention, she exists for us only by virtue of the fictional words that she purportedly speaks inwardly. But her

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father’s debt and mother’s plea demand that she enter into a new mode of language, a request. Monologue, a Marxist critic might say, is a luxury—or a delusion—of the rich.\textsuperscript{16} As soon as Else must pay for her dependence on others, she also loses her linguistic freedom. Language and flesh become the media of exchange. To the extent that human existence is based on interdependence, of course, the use of language is characterized by a threatened fall from freedom; the conflicting tendencies of the internal monologue impose this threat that can never be evaded unless a speaker gives up all efforts to assert individual identity.

Dorsday, a wealthy art dealer, agrees to satisfy the financial need that has been transferred from Else’s father to Else, on the condition that she reveal herself to him naked. As a specialist in buying and selling beautiful objects, Dorsday wishes to buy Else’s denuded image. Because she is essentially a character of inwardness, the situation of mercenary exchange destroys her: for Else to expose her nudity is like giving up the privacy of her thoughts. In a sense—and this is one of the paradoxes of the story—she always does give up her internal speech, to the reader.

Else’s predicament parallels a literary dilemma. The internal monologist appears to present herself, yet she is obviously manipulated by the author, her father. The language of the internal monologist is supposedly private and yet exposed to the reader, Dorsday. If Schnitzler is Else’s true father, the reader is her insidious seducer, a patron who buys her text as Dorsday buys a glimpse of her nudity. When the narrative ends, we have all finished with her, and she dies. Within her predicament, Else is painfully self-conscious: not only aware that men manipulate her, she understands that she has been asked to sell herself (\textit{FE} 157, 185). Furthermore, she recognizes that she is being asked to perform; at the same time her internal monologue is the totality of her performance.

Else has in fact always wanted to become an actress, but her family will hear nothing of this disreputable trade. As the story opens, she has just stopped playing tennis, and her cousin asks: “You really don’t want to play any more, Else?” (\textit{FE} 145). The story both opens and closes with an impulse to break off the performance, in conformity

with Else's strong urge to keep her expressions private. Formally, the speech of other characters, printed in italics, disrupts the flow of Else's internal speech. As a result of her father's addiction to financial gambling, a Spielleidenschaft (FE 180), Else must also become a passionate player, or a player of passions. When Else has prepared herself for self-exposure, she thinks: "The show can begin" (Die Vorstellung kann beginnen) (FE 200). Despite her parents' wish that she avoid an improper profession, then, Else makes her debut in what she ironically calls a "grand performance" (FE 202). She observes the justice of this return of the repressed: because stage acting has been made impossible, her peculiar performance will "serve them right, all of them," who "only raised me up in order to sell myself, one way or another" (FE 185). Else longs for a theatrical role, but she gives herself up in a live drama instead. Like all who sell themselves in love or marriage, Else may also stand for mercenary inclinations of the writer.

After uncovering her body and poisoning herself, Else falls inward and becomes all internal speech, all internal monologue, completely isolated from the world that exploits her. Escape is perhaps impossible. Psychologically, she has already determined that she must isolate herself: "I don't want to see anyone more" (ibid.). Despite the system of exchange that controls her, Else realizes that no one has been truly concerned for her inwardness. While we read what passes through her mind, Else condemns us along with those who think they know her: "But what goes on in me, what churns in me and agonizes me, have you ever been concerned for that?" (FE 186).

Like Dorsday, we pay to see Else naked; what do we really care what agitates her? We want to possess her private world, as does her cousin when he complains, "You are somewhere else with your thoughts" (FE 164). Absorbed in hidden language, Else is "secretive, daemonic, seductive" (ibid.). Her consciousness has been appropriated by the narrative, captured in or made identical with the text, so that suicide becomes her only option. For a moment she views her own image in a mirror, and enjoys a narcissistic fantasy: "Ah, come nearer, you beautiful girl. I want to kiss your blood-red lips. I want to press your breasts against mine. What a shame that the glass is between us, the cold glass. How well we would get along with each other. Isn't it so? We would need no one else" (FE 198). Else's existence hovers between the incompatible poles of autonomy and dependence, autoeroticism and rape, private and public language. When
her consciousness fades out with the fiction, she disappears behind the text. In a somewhat incestuous fantasy, Else imagines joining hands with her father, her author. Ultimately, no one can call her back to the represented world:

"Else! Else!"

They call from so far away! What do you want, anyway? Don’t wake me. I’m sleeping so well. Tomorrow morning, I’m dreaming and flying. I’m flying... flying... flying... sleep and dream... and fly... don’t wake... tomorrow morning...

"El...

I’m flying... I’m dreaming... I’m sleeping... I dre... dre—I’m fly
...... [FE 219; ellipses in original]

The death of consciousness corresponds to textual closure.

Dujardin’s and Schnitzler’s monologues bring a narrative paradox into sharp focus. From a formal standpoint, Lieutenant Gustl and Fräulein Else appear to speak more autonomously than does Daniel Prince; yet their internal speech only reveals an inability to control their lives. Internal speech is threatened by diverse absences.

The Genius of Modern Narrative

"Penelope," the final chapter of *Ulysses*, is the culmination of the literary tradition of internal monologue begun by Dujardin. Joyce was familiar with *Les lauriers sont coupés* and suggested that Valéry Larbaud read this novel in which "the reader finds himself installed, from the first lines, in the thought of the principal character."17 Although Joyce is often said to write stream-of-consciousness technique, "Penelope" appears more as a representation of internal speech than of preverbal consciousness. We may thus refer to this section as Molly’s internal monologue, which has, for various reasons, dominated the general reception of Joyce’s work.18 In eight paragraphs without punctuation, Joyce closes his novel as if striving to complete Western literary history since Homer.

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17 As attested by Valéry Larbaud in his preface to the second, 1924 edition of *LC* (p. 7).
After Molly's Odysseus returns home, they exchange questions and (somewhat deceptive) answers. On another level, the narrator has returned to Athena, the guardian spirit, or muse. If the penultimate chapter is "the ceremonious exchange between narrator and Muse," then the final pages constitute a language of "Muse without narrator." From the standpoint of mystical genius, the language of Molly's internal monologue appears to "show us how the Muse behaves without Homer"; in terms of authorial genius, the final chapter is "the voice of the pure composing faculty" (ibid., pp. 98–99). Bloom's return is simultaneously the return of narrator to listener and of author to muse and the awakening of narrative to inner potentials.

One of Joyce's letters supports the view that the concluding chapter is "the clou [sic] of the book." Joyce describes "Penelope" as if it were based on a kind of linguistic, erotic kabbala: "It begins and ends with the female word, yes. It turns like the huge earth ball slowly surely and evenly round and round spinning, its four cardinal points being the female breasts, arse, womb and . . . expressed by the words because, bottom (in all senses bottom button, bottom of the class, bottom of the sea, bottom of his heart), woman, yes" (ibid.). This image draws attention to the merging of mimetic illusion with sheer linguistic play. If the entire section turns "like the huge earth ball" around "female breasts, arse, womb and . . . ," this world finds bizarre expression in the unlikely words, "because, bottom, woman, yes." While the arse-bottom and womb-woman connections seem natural enough, Joyce pushes beyond the simple identification by expositing "bottom" associatively as "in all senses bottom button, bottom of the class, bottom of the sea, bottom of his heart"; the pairing of "womb" and "woman" is only motivated by Joyce's choice of this synecdoche and homonymic play. Between "breasts" and "because", "yes" and " . . . " there is no obvious relationship of even a conventional kind. Joyce generates a linguistic mythology that creates a set of unexpected parallels.

Joyce's letter continues beyond the linguistic mythology, suggesting a comic revision of Goethe: "Though probably more obscene than any preceding episode," Joyce adds, "it seems to me to be perfectly

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20 Letters of James Joyce, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Gilbert (New York: Viking, 1966), 170. In the following quotation, the ellipsis is introduced by Gilbert. Compare Shakespeare's The Comedy of Errors, Act 2, Scene 2: "She is spherical, like a globe. I could find out countries in her."
sane full amoral fertilisable untrustworthy engaging shrewd limited prudent indifferent Weib. Ich bin der [sic] Fleisch der stets bejaht [. . .]. Woman. I am the flesh that constantly affirms]" (ibid.). Molly Bloom is the womb-woman who says Yes and the flesh that constantly affirms. Placing himself once again in the position of writing Molly's words for her, Joyce has Molly speak her essence by reversing Mephistopheles' lines: "I am the spirit that constantly denies" (Ich bin der Geist, der stets verneint). Instead of being the spirit that negates, Molly is the body that affirms. Supernatural agency is once again introjected. Paradoxically, however, Molly is no body but only a text that refers endlessly to other texts; on the most profound level, Molly can exist only as a reversal of Mephistopoleles. By negation of a negator, she affirms. This produces, in the "depths" of Molly's consciousness, a language of affirmation, an acceptance of her textual past as individual, muse, genius. Because Stuart Gilbert's edition of Joyce's letters omits the word that corresponds to "yes," the censored signifier remains an absence through which all human life is affirmed and sustained. Molly is all Woman, carrying on the life of humanity by saying Yes to the flesh. She also says Yes to a textual past, as she refigures Penelope, Athena, Mephistopheles, Daniel Prince, and Lieutenant Gustl. Like her successor Fräulein Else, Molly concludes with sleep, a textual death.

Echoing an entire personal and impersonal past, Molly's internal monologue eludes commentary as it eludes punctuation. But Joyce offers a means of access by mentioning her "four cardinal points." Joyce's image is literally overdetermined, however, because a sphere spins on an axis that is sufficiently defined by two points. One reading would define these two points as the opening and closing words, "Yes . . . Yes." But an early passage links "yes" and "sex": "Mr Bloom reached Essex bridge. Yes, Mr Bloom crossed bridge of Yessex." "Yessex" is the axis around which Molly's thoughts turn.

22In The Stream of Consciousness and Beyond in Ulysses (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), Erwin R. Steinberg unconvincingly disputes Joyce's interpretation of Molly as an affirmer.
23Compare the final monologue of Faulkner's Darl, in As I Lay Dying, where the repeated "yes" works as an affirmation, not of life, but of madness, an inability to make sense. Perhaps there is a connection.
24James Joyce, Ulysses (New York: Random House, 1961), 261 (page numbers appear in text below). The association of "yes" with Eros is especially clear in the light of the
In the final chapter of *Ulysses*, Molly Bloom's internal monologue is not obviously controlled by outside forces. At two points a train whistle blows, but otherwise her language appears to follow from the train of her uninterrupted associations. Daniel Prince, Lieutenant Gustl, and Fräulein Else all live through experiences during their internal monologues, but no simultaneous events impinge on Molly. The distinction between external and internal events breaks down, finally, to the extent that Molly's internal monologue is its own performance, a union of narrative process with narrated world.

An interaction of narrative modes is evident in the uses of the word "yes." On one level, "yes" appears to transcribe Molly's inner speech; but on another level, "yes" is a sheer connective that stands for an elusive, prelinguistic moment. The section opens with a transition from the dialogue Bloom and Molly have shared: "Yes because he never did a thing like that before as ask to get his breakfast in bed with a couple of eggs since the City Arms hotel when he used to be pretending to be laid up with a sick voice doing his highness to make himself interesting" (p. 738). Apparently without regard for what would be a logical starting point, the narrative slips into a stream of language. Bloom's request to have breakfast in bed takes Molly back to a past time, but neither "yes" nor "because" follows any obvious antecedent. Rather than form part of a worldly logic, Molly's words are connectives in the verbal stream. Schnitzler employs ellipses and dashes to indicate what Coleridge calls "the interspersed vacancies / And momentary pauses of the thought." Molly's "yes because" works in much the same way (pp. 738, 739, 744), as a textual pause, no longer standing for an unvoiced *phōnē*. In part, then, the words

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25 In at least one passage, "yes because" does function as a logical connective. This phrase is an affirmation of both sexuality and the narrative itself, assenting to a human coupling while carrying the text further in its stream: "Of course some men can be dreadfully aggravating drive you mad and always the worst word in the world what do they ask us to marry them for if were so bad as all that comes to yes because they cant get on without us" (p. 744). Men speak "the worst word," a "no" of criticism, and yet always ask women to say, "yes." Like Molly's stream of words, men cannot get along without the female "yes."  

26 "Frost at Midnight," ll. 46–47.
of internal monologue relinquish the pretense of transcribing internal speech or stream of consciousness.

As Molly falls asleep and her internal monologue draws to its close, "yes because" turns toward the single "yes." In the early days of their relationship, Bloom "pestered me to say yes" (p. 746). The "yes" to sexuality always joins with a narrative "yes": "I had to say Im a fright yes but he was a real old gent" (p. 747). "Yes" remains profoundly sexual: "theyre all mad to get in there where they come out of youd think they could never get far enough up and then theyre done with you in a way till the next time yes because theres a wonderfull feeling there all the time so tender how did we finish it off yes O yes I pulled him off into my handkerchiff" (p. 760). The muse says "yes" to the poet, to the narrative. For Bloom, like Odysseus, is a great "Deceiver" (p. 746). On occasion, where she does not stand opposite her own kind, she must say "no": "I hate an unlucky man and if I knew what it meant of course I had to say no for form sake dont understand you" (p. 747).

Molly's affirmation reaches a climax in the final pages. She recalls the day "I gave him all the pleasure I could leading him on till he asked me to say yes." In this primal scene of election, "yes" flows between the languages of past and present: "The day I got him to propose to me yes first I gave him the bit of seedcake out of my mouth and it was leapyear like now yes 16 years ago my God after that long kiss I near lost my breath yes he said I was a flower of the mountain yes so we are flowers all a womans body yes" (p. 782). Molly the muse passes her breath to Bloom the poet, who then voices the most clichéd of images. No matter, he is right; yes, by synecdoche a woman's body is like a flower. The poet speaks an image that convinces the muse that he knows her: "yes that was why I liked him because I saw he understood or felt what a woman is."

The "yes" of Molly's internal monologue builds toward the "yes" by which she affirms his selection of her, and they are to be wedded for life. Molly does not answer Bloom's question but interrupts their dialogue as she looks "out over the sea and the sky I was thinking of so many things he didnt know of." How can the muse limit herself to one poet? After an imaginative flight around "all the ends of Eu-

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27This "yes" can also function within the recalled scenes or reasoning logic: "does that suit me yes take that" (p. 752); "didnt I cry yes I believe I did" (p. 756).
rope,” Molly returns to their scene through the connective agency of a “yes,” when “I thought well as well him as another” (p. 783). Aware of this arbitrariness, the muse comically undermines the poetic myth of a fated choice. Bloom wants to claim Molly as his own, but even Athena spreads her favors among several heroes. The narrative strives to appropriate her language, but language is always common property. Again, “yes” hovers between meaningful affirmation and meaningless connective, rising to a crescendo: “then asked him with my eyes to ask again yes and then he asked me would I say yes my mountain flower and first I put my arms around him yes and drew him down to me so he could feel my breasts all perfume yes and his heart was going like mad” (p. 783). Grammatical structures compete. The implied phrase, “he asked me... to say yes” is disrupted by a “would I yes.” She must both say and perform “yes.” The “would I yes” is Molly’s connective, almost a verb of affirmation. Molly says and does “yes” by embracing Bloom, “and yes I said yes I will Yes.” Where is punctuation implied, and what are the words of Molly’s response? At first we may read her answer as being, “Yes, yes I will, Yes.” But according to another reading Molly reports, “I said... I will,” punctuated by a thrice-repeated “yes” of narration that affirms the narrative of affirmation. In fact, a previous draft of the final words reads, “I said I will yes.” Superimposed in the published edition, several possibilities stand together, as

“Yes,” I said, “Yes, I will. Yes” and

(Yes) I said, (yes) “I will” (yes).

The affirmation of poetic desire corresponds to an affirmation of the process of language that creates Ulysses. In the final monologue, or Mollylogue, key words function both symbolically and by contiguity, metaphorically and metonymically.

28CSE III, 1726. This edition substantially illuminates the processes of Joyce’s verbal art. While the recurrent, sexually charged “yes” in the original edition of Ulysses (p. 760) is present at an early stage (see CSE III, 1680), Joyce inserts many of the connective instances later (CSE III, 1724–26): “yes because” already acts as a connective in the earlier versions. Particularly in the closing lines of the book, successive drafts multiply the rhythmic “yes,” building toward the climax of the final “Yes,” as Joyce holds a dialogue with Molly and encourages her yes to merge with the stream of textual affirmation.
"Monologue" names several types of solitary speech that deviate from dialogical norms. By a sequence of innovations, the literary tradition corresponds to human solitude through the forms of syntactic and semantic solitude. First-person monologues draw attention to the present of the monological act of speech, whether represented by staged soliloquy, conversational poetry, narrative, or internal monologue. As the psychological novel cedes to more radical writing as monologue, the moment of thought becomes inseparable from the act of writing. Internal monologue is, finally, not a representation of internal speech but its enactment; internal speech is already a kind of code. European literature does not develop exclusively toward dramatized scenes of writing, but this movement in the direction of internal monologue does parallel the transformations of genius.

Internal monologue and stream-of-consciousness techniques, when they question psychological assumptions and accept themselves as writing, hold a privileged place in modern literature. One critic refers to the breakdown of mimetic monologue, ascertaining that in the internal monologue "there is in general no authentic speaking, but rather there whispers [es raunt] a sequence of associations." An unspoken "whispering" moves away from representation of consciousness, toward hints at "a differentiation in the illusion." At first, the narrator appears to enter the monologist's thought, but their proximity actually dissolves the distinction between narrator and narrated and enhances a self-reflective awareness of the narrative illusion. Other literary critics have, while according a privileged place to internal monologue, sought more exact terminology. Taking the final chapter of Ulysses as "the most famous and the most perfectly executed specimen of its species," one critic discusses the genre of "autonomous monologue." Analyses of Schnitzler and Joyce show, however, that monologists are incapable of attaining the autonomy they superficially seek.

In his Critique et vérité, Roland Barthes opposes classical criticism, with its naive belief in the "fullness" of the subject. In contrast, Barthes' criticism holds that "the subject is not an individual plenitude..., but on the contrary an emptiness around which the writer weaves

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29 Gerhard Storz, "Über den 'Monologue intérieur' oder die 'Erlebte Rede,'" in Der Deutschunterricht, vol. 7, no. 1 (1955), 50.
an infinitely transformed speech (inserted into a chain of transformation), such that every writing which does not lie designates, not the internal attributes of the subject, but its absence." The absence of the traditional subject turns out to mean that, from another standpoint, language is itself the subject.

Gérard Genette, in a parallel discussion, refers to Paul Valéry, Maurice Blanchot, and Albert Thibaudet. Valéry suggests that the author "is positively no one—or better, that one of the functions of language, and of literature as language, is to destroy its interlocutor and to designate it as absent." As cited by Genette, Blanchot proposes that the writer "belongs to a language which no one speaks, which is addressed to no one, which has no center, which reveals nothing." Genette closes his discussion of the abolition of the subject by reference to Thibaudet and the figure of the génie. Genette paraphrases: "Genius . . . is at once the superlative of the individual and the breakup [l'éclatement] of individuality" (Fig. 13). Thibaudet further explains that "genius" can refer to an individual, a genre, an epoch, or a religion.

The secret of genius reminds us of the power of language to designate the absence of the subject at the same time that it brings this subject into apparent existence. Like the language of modern literature that collapses the narrating with the narrated, genius points to the stream of invention beyond the flow of invented objects and subjects. Proust discovered his génie, Genette comments, "at the moment when he found in his work the place of language where his individuality would be able to break up and dissolve itself in the Idea" (Fig. 14).

The final "Yes" of Ulysses circles back to Greek myth, slips away from its cognitive function, and unites with a narrative stream that re-presents the stream of consciousness. By affirming itself as language, even as language that corresponds to an absence of coherent language, the emerging literature of internal monologue discovers


33Albert Thibaudet, *Physiologie de la Critique* (Paris: Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1930), 125. In his own words, genius is "la plus haute figure de l'individu, le superlatif de l'individuel, et cependant le secret du génie c'est de faire éclater l'individualité, d'être Idée, de représenter, par-delà l'invention, le courant d'invention" (pp. 139–40).
limits of the philosophical monad. The monological genius is neither object nor subject, neither an externally conceived Socratic daimonion, nor a psychologically conceived Romantic genius, but the figure that disrupts this opposition in the peculiar literary modes that dissolve individuality, efface personae by taking the part of the muse, and become identified with the guardian genius, an intertextual force, a stream of literary work in progress, riverrun...