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THE ANTI-NOMIES OF SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON: SOME ANTHROPOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PUNDIT

By Fethi Keles*

INTRODUCTION

Sweeping generalizations on sociocultural phenomena of the sort made by influential political scientist Samuel Huntington exhibit a proclivity toward representing the globe in terms of analytical categories devised without adequate attention to inter- as well as intra-cultural specificities. Huntington's simplistic and politically-motivated conceptualizations of such notions as culture, globalization, and undue reifications of ethnonyms (challenging *Hispanics*, *bellicose Muslims* etc.) distort the reality on the ground. His—probably unconscious—trespasses into what is arguably the most anthropological of all issues studied by anthropologists—kinship—in the context of his search at the macropolitical level for perennial roots of collective violence are even more questionable. With his hypothesis that the globe is composed of cultures/civilizations each of which a) is complete unto itself with neatly identifiable borders—imaginary or otherwise—and b) legitimizes amicable relations with others only on the basis of civilizational same- or similar-kindness, the political scientist poses himself as a globalization theorist, culture theorist, and kinship theorist simultaneously.

In a world where “globalization has shrunk the distances between elites, shifted key relations between producers and consumers, broken many links between labor and family life, obscured the lines between temporary locales and imaginary national attachments,”¹ Huntingtonesque portrayals of the globe and its cultures, too stratospheric to be representative of ethnographic complexity of the down-to-earth world, deserve rigorous testing against that which they are devised to represent: peoples and cultures of the world. And such a test is precisely what this paper seeks to provide: an anthropological critique of the broad-brush assumptions of Huntington about globalization, culture, civilization, intergroup affinity, ethnoreligious violence et cetera. By providing an ethnographically-informed, critical reading of Huntington's work on Hispanic immigration to the United States, his notion of culture as applied

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in analyses of the anticipated sources of regional/global conflict, and his precocious attempt to formulate a theory of civilizational kinship, this paper will reiterate the importance of, and the unique insights that may be provided by, an anthropological approach to phenomena of global scope. In that respect, the paper may be construed as a contribution to calls (whose early makers were no less characters than Franz Boas and Margaret Mead, and whose more recent supporters include Paul Farmer, Phillippe Bourgois, and Robert Borofsky, among others) for an ever-more public anthropology.

LOVE THY NEIGHBOR?: HUNTINGTON AND THE 'HISPANIC CHALLENGE'

Huntington thinks that "the persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream U.S. culture, forming instead their own political and linguistic enclaves—from Los Angeles to Miami— and rejecting the Anglo-Protestant values that built the American dream. The United States ignores this challenge at its peril."² In particular, he wishes to imagine Hispanic immigrants as a) unsupportive of the American dream, b) negligent of white-anglo-saxon-protestant values which prioritize a deep faith in the importance of education and hard work, and c) as cultural exclusivists not buying into mainstream America and becoming an isolated community unto themselves with their unyielding preference for Spanish as *the* language of daily economic, political, and schooling practices mainly in the American Southwest. There, for Huntington, is only one America, and that is the America whose identity was defined in the 17th and 18th centuries by the overwhelmingly white, British, and Protestant settlers. More specifically, Huntington thinks "There is no *Americano* dream. There is only the American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican Americans will share in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English."¹

In Huntington's argument, Hispanic immigration to the United States is without precedent in the three-hundred-year American history: "The experience and lessons of past immigration have little relevance to understanding its dynamics and consequences."⁴ The unprecedented character of Hispanic immigration manifests itself, in his account, along six dimensions: contiguity, scale, illegality, regional concentration, persistence, and historical presence. Briefly, "contiguity enables Mexican immigrants to remain in intimate contact with their families, friends, and home localities in Mexico as no other immigrants have been able to do"; "...by 2000, Hispanics totaled

about one half of all migrants entering the continental United States"; ...by 2000, an estimated 4.8 million illegal Mexicans made up 69 percent of [the total illegal] population."⁵ In addition, contravening the historical pattern of dispersion of immigrants throughout the U.S. soil, Mexicans concentrate overwhelmingly in Southern California, Cubans in Miami, and Dominicans and (technically non-immigrant) Puerto Ricans in New York. Furthermore, "current wave [of Mexican immigration] shows no sign of ebbing", and Mexicans and Mexican Americans can and do make a historical claim to U.S. territory, given their historical presence in what was once part of Mexico (today's Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, and Utah).⁶

Note, importantly, that Huntington rests his assumption of the 'Hispanic peril' upon a strictly *territorial* conception of contiguity. Mexican immigration to the U.S. is without precedent because Mexico-U.S. border contiguity allows emigrating Mexicans to remain in intimate contact with their homelands by constantly moving back and forth: an intimacy historically unprecedented. This approach, however, amounts to an effective reduction of the ability to main ethnic, cultural, familial...unity down to the availability of physical contact. Are/were other immigrant groups whose countries of origin are not *territorially* contiguous with the U.S. unable to maintain intimate links with their kin, to an extent at least matching if not surpassing Mexicans' ability to do so? Why should Mexicans be unique simply because of their home country's territorial proximity to the U.S.? If 'maintaining intimate links' means, at a minimum, sending remittances to those in the home country; raising family over there; deep engagement with 'home politics'; frequent travel, for whatever purpose, back and forth...then, notably, even the most cursory look at the ethnographic record would suggest that the answer to the first question above is clearly in the negative. Consider, for a telling example, anthropologist Paul Stoller's richly detailed account of the lives and experiences West African migrant merchants on the streets of New York City. Despite the obvious lack of any territorial congruity, Stoller's West African informants from Niger, Mali, and Senegal do send remittances to their families out of their earnings from street vending, remain actively involved in the spiritual and material care of their children left behind, frequently travel back and forth mainly for the purpose of bringing in authentic Africana stuff for sale on New York City streets.⁷ There's concrete reason, provided by Stoller's ethnography, to think that West African migrants match if not surpass Mexican immigrants to the U.S. in terms of the ability to 'maintain intimate links' with their native countries even in the presence of massive territorial distance. When one considers Aihwa Ong's (2002) account of the incredible business flexibility of Chinese investors in the U.S., more doubt is cast on assumption of the uniqueness of Mexican immigration which is supposed to have arisen

from Mexico's physical proximity to the US. In her book *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*, anthropologist Ong demonstrates persuasively how Chinese diaspora in America, in their efforts to position themselves profitably (not without adverse psychosocial consequences, though) in global economic order, manipulate kinship networks, resort to various familial and economic practices to remain enabled to move back and forth as much as they like, to continue their businesses in Hong Kong while "...[parking] their families in safe havens in Australia, Canada, the United States, and Great Britain."⁸ And finally, consider Miller and Slater's (2001) ethnographic work on the use of Internet in Trinidad. Trini immigrants to New York, for example, are able to maintain intimate contact with their relatives in Trinidad, and continue to represent Trini-ness through the heavy use of email, Internet telephony, and such software as the ICQ.⁹ Trini mothers, for example, maintain daily contact with their children in the US and thus are able to keep the idea of family intact despite the lack of any territorial contiguity between Trinidad and the U.S.

At a deeper, theoretical level, these ethnographic examples suggest a fundamental flaw in Huntington's conceptualization of what noted British sociologist Anthony Giddens has defined as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa."¹⁰ In other words, the assessment that it is through the unprecedented feature—contiguity with the U.S.—of a sending country (in this case, Mexico) that Mexican immigrants can claim distinctness, keep intact ideas of Mexican-ness, continue to exist as a non-Americanizing culture suggests an attachment to a rather undue perception of globalization: If territorial proximity is the factor which results in the sustenance of a distinct, unyielding Mexican identity, then other immigrant populations lacking such territorial contiguity should not be anywhere near Mexicans in the US in terms of maintaining distinct, separate cultural identities. But that clearly is not the case as the ethnographic examples above suggest. If one thing is certain about globalization, it is probably that it helps undo physical borders: Human communities all over the globe are able to develop, strengthen, reinvent, or reconstitute group identities even in the absence of any physical contact. Indeed, Huntington is quite correct in his assumption that "...globalization produces [needs] among people for smaller and more meaningful 'blood and belief' identities."¹¹ But he is wrong in thinking that such 'blood and belief identities' require physical proximity between persons who are to develop and maintain them. Ascribing a perilous uniqueness to Mexican immigration on the basis of the presence of such a proximity is not justified on at least two counts: First, it should be noted that groups of immigrants whose native countries are far away from U.S. territory can and do maintain such identities through instruments offered by

technological globalization. It should further be noted, second, that if it is indeed true that there is less and less of a need, as a result of globalization, for geographical nearness between the sending country and the U.S. so that immigrants can live in enclaves-imaginary or otherwise- of their own, then other immigrant groups, such as West Africans, Chinese, Trinians, Italians who to no small extent have created similar enclaves should also be considered perilous to the future of American national identity. But Huntington singles out the Mexican case. His work seems to heed neither of the two caveats above, and his account does not consider other immigrant groups challenging, and allows no room for a deterritorialized understanding of globalization. Nevertheless, "the advent of modernity [no doubt co-occurring with or as a result of globalization], tears space away from place by fostering relations between "absent" others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction. In conditions of modernity, place becomes increasingly *phantasmagoric*."¹²

If one accepts, for the sake of argument, the claim that there exists a Mexican cultural exclusivism which is in fact a besetting sin, Huntington is no less guilty of committing it than the Mexicans he is on uneasy terms with, and he would likely have a hard time expiating himself for his excommunication of non-WASP from the sacred domain of American-ness. For him, the 'creed' that America is the creation of white, British, Protestant settlers is infallible, the Declaration of Independence is the manifest embodiment of the Anglo-Protestant values which made, exclusively, America what it is and has always been, and more importantly, what it should continue to be. His reflects an extremely narrow formulation of enculturation: Why should the process of becoming American be defined only in relation to whether one assimilates oneself into the WASP culture? For Huntington, it is to be defined as such because, as aptly noted by Mexican novelist Carlos Fuentes, "That there existed (and, still, exists) an indigenous-"America"...prior to the European colonization is of no concern to him. That besides Anglo-America, there existed a prior French-"America" (Louisiana) and, even, a Russian-America (Alaska) is of no interest to Huntington."¹³ Furthermore, in commenting on Hispanic immigrants' willingness and ability to accommodate the dominant (i.e. the WASP America) group and adopt its culture, Huntington suggests that "Sustained numerical expansion [in Hispanic immigration] promotes cultural consolidation and leads Mexican Americans not to minimize but to glory in the differences between their culture and U.S. culture."¹⁴ One wonders, however, from within whose cultural framework the commander of US troops in Iraq, Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez (mind you, *a Hispanic!*), was operating in a strictly American war. Looking at Huntington's prophecy that U.S. faces the threat of a bulky immigrant group which is in the U.S. but not of it, one also wonders

what he has to say about "...the readiness of Hispanic immigrants to serve and die in the US armed forces. There is a disproportionately high representation of Latinos in the US armed forces."¹⁵ One is also perplexed at the following, rather abrupt shift of mentality: In his article *The Clash of Civilizations?*, Huntington (1993) remarks that Mexico has been redefining its identity from a Latin American to a North American one, and notes that all of the three requirements (support by political and economic elite; public willingness in such a redefinition; recipient [American] public's willingness to accept the redefinition) that a country must meet to redefine its civilization identity exist in the case of Mexico¹⁶. In the book which grew out of the article, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), the political scientist confirms his earlier conclusion: "Will Mexico succeed in its North American quest? The overwhelming bulk of the political, economic, and intellectual elites favor that course. Also [...], the overwhelming bulk of the political, economic, and intellectual elites of the recipient civilization have favored Mexico's cultural realignment."¹⁷ But this appreciation of Mexican successes is completely reversed, without any obvious reason, in his later work which considers Hispanic immigrants (the products of the Mexico Huntington lauds approvingly) in rather negative terms: They are contemptuous of American culture, have their "irreconcilable differences" with mainstream American values, isolate themselves in linguistic, political, and economic senses.¹⁸ The shift of opinion in his work in a rather short span of time –about a decade–about Mexicans/Hispanic population is remarkable, but intellectually more seriously, it is without justification.

Perhaps because of the epistemological dearness, rooted in the history of the discipline, of the concept of culture to anthropology, there is a good chance that anthropologists would be more critical of one particular aspect of Huntington's work on Hispanic immigration than of its other aspects: the assumption of a monolithic Hispanic culture, and virtually total disregard to any internal variation in that culture. From an anthropological perspective, the undue reification of the ethnonym *Hispanic*, accompanied by an ever-fixed and rigid notion of Hispanic identity, has serious analytical consequences. In Huntington's somewhat apocalyptic vision, all Hispanics in America support Mexican president Vicente Fox's statement that he is the president of 123 million Mexicans (100 million in the home, 23 million in American southwest); all Hispanics rely exclusively on their native Spanish while going about their daily businesses; all, in sum, are one and the same. But the results of a comprehensive opinion poll, referred to in *The Economist*, are telling in that they demonstrate the ways in which intra-cultural variation surfaces among the Hispanic population. The poll, conducted in 2000 by the *Washington Post*, "found that 90% of new arrivals from Latin America believe that it is important for them to change in order to fit in with their adopted country. Only one in ten

of second-generation Latinos relies mainly on speaking Spanish. Latinos do not see themselves as a monolithic ethnic group. Nor do they necessarily agree with the politics of their countrymen back home."¹⁹ A sign of variation is also evident in these lines: "...while the father [of the Hispanic family] may have arrived barefoot and soaking wet, the descendents of migrants have attained income levels comparable to those of Asian and Caucasian laborers. By the second generation, 55 percent of Hispanic households are owners of their own homes..."²⁰ Thus, it is clearly not useful to imagine all of Hispanic immigrant population as visionaries of an *Amexica*, given, additionally, that "parents of Latinos growing up in Los Angeles and Houston [complain] that their children are abandoning their old culture"²¹ That abandoning, nevertheless, does not seem to satisfy the assimilation criteria set rather unilaterally by Huntington.

IN SEARCH OF CIVILITY: CULTURAL CLASHES AND THE NEW KINSHIP

In making predictions on what is to follow the Cold War, Huntington (1993, 1996) has been suggesting that 'the next pattern of conflict' will be a cultural one. Ideologically formed blocs of the Cold War era are now being replaced by clusters of countries who are thought to be sharing same civilizational zone, each such zone (except the Islamic one which he singles out for being bellicose, anarchic, and with bloody borders) including a core country. U.S. as the core of Western civilization, and Russia as the core of Orthodox civilization are examples. Specifically, he likes to think of the post-Cold War globe as composed of seven distinct civilizations, namely Chinese, Islamic, Western, Orthodox, Latin American, and Hindu. Thousands of years of African history has not been able to convince him that Africa, too, qualifies as a civilization. He expects conflicts to occur most heavily at what he calls civilizational fault-lines, concrete geographical locations where different, sometimes mutually hostile civilizations are supposed to be confronting each other.

The problem with Huntington's argument most obvious to the anthropological eye, to anthropologist Hugh Gusterson's for example, is that "...it stereotypes entire cultures while denying the reality of change and diversity within cultures and the possibility of solidarity between them."²² Gusterson suggests further that Huntington sticks to very basic definitions of otherwise extremely complex phenomena, stigmatizes cultures, ignores the very obvious fact of (the possibility of) cultural change, allows no room for multiculturalism, develops a particular animus against Islam and Muslims, orders civilizations against criteria he himself has set, and glorifies the West

as the ultimate reality of mankind.²³

To fine-tune the critique, let us consider the war in former Yugoslavia between the years 1992 and 1995, and then Huntington's treatment of it. After Josip Broz's (Tito) one-party socialist rule over former Yugoslavia ended in 1980 when Tito died, a struggle over the federal republic's economic, political, and military resources soon took hold among representatives of the six republics and two autonomous regions that had been constituting the federal Yugoslav Republic. Through his control of the party apparatus which outlived Tito and with his influence over national media, Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic gained immense political power and, in an early move, translated that power into an actual outcome by amending the Serbian constitution to strip Kosovo (an autonomous region under the Serbian republic in the former federal Yugoslav state) of its autonomy. Witness to Milosevic's repressive policies against Kosovars (namely the Albanian Kosovars) and his maneuvers to capture the federal government apparatus, other entities in former Yugoslavia (in particular Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia) sought to separate themselves entirely from the federal structure by declaring their independence through their governments just recently elected before the onset of the war in 1991. By that time Milosevic had acquired the tools that he thought would help him create the 'Greater Serbia': political power and total control of military. To Croatia's vote for secession from the federal structure, Milosevic-controlled Yugoslav National Army responded by seizing one-third of Croatian territory and massacring thousands of Croatians. Bosnian declaration of independence was followed with the siege of Sarajevo –the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina in early April, 1992. Commanding over the heavy and sophisticated the artillery of the army of former Yugoslavia, Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb compatriot Radovan Karadzic engaged in systematic ethnic cleansing throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina with the aid of fierce nationalist propaganda emanating in the main from Serbia. The end result of four years of war was the killing of some 200,000 Bosnians (including Bosnians of different ethnic backgrounds, i.e. Bosnian Muslims (major victims), Bosnian Croats, and even Bosnian Serbs who refused to acquiesce to the cleansing project of Serbian masterminds), organized use of rape as a military tactic against Muslim women (as well as Croatians), severe instances of torture, infrastructural destruction coupled with the loss of power systems, schools, hospitals, transportation networks et cetera. The war officially ended with the conclusion of Dayton Peace Accords in Ohio, United States in December 1995. Serbians were granted 49% of the territory they occupied in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the remaining 51% is now the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina composed of Muslim and Croat rotating leadership, each dictating its own neck of the woods with a separate government and police force and military but being subject to a central government's rule in matters of finance and foreign policy.

This was a war occurring at what Huntington (1993) named a civilizational fault-line. Nevertheless, his analysis was countered when it turned out to be the *Christian* United States which brokered the peace agreement, thus possibly saved *Bosnian Muslims* from extinction on a much larger scale than had happened thus far, accommodated hundreds of thousands of Bosnian Muslims as refugees during and after the war. Although Huntington regarded this as an anomaly, the record is too obvious to miss the fact such anomalies continued: In the case of Serbian aggression, in 1999, against Kosovar Albanians, it was NATO (an institution Huntington would certainly not consider to be an instrument of Islamic civilization) which rushed to the aid of (mostly) Muslim Albanians; contrary to what Huntington would most probably expect, Muslim Libya and Iraq had sided with Orthodox Serbia in that conflict. It seems, then, that real people in real contexts go about making sociopolitical preferences based on criteria Huntington appears to be unaware of. As noted by anthropologist Keith Brown (2005), Huntington's theory that countries which belonged in the same civilizational kin group (a term pseudo-kinship theorist Huntington invented) would cluster around one another was proven gravely false by the empirical reality on the ground. Based on her fieldwork in the region, Brown forcefully attacks Huntington's kinship notions, and exposes how the civilizational kin belongings that Huntington thought were so clearly identified were much more complex given the institution of *fictive kinship* in the Balkans whereby people (who, in Huntington's civilizational grid, should not ever be on good terms as they belong in different civilizations) became related to one another through *kumtsvo* (godfatherhood) ties crosscutting so-called primordial civilizational attachments.²⁴

That such neat cultural borders exist nowhere except in Huntington's mind is further demonstrated by the work of anthropologist Tone Bringa (1996, 2005). Based on her fieldwork in Central Bosnia for a total period of six years, from 1988 to 1993, Bringa notes that before the war, in the ethnically mixed village (Muslim Bosnians and Catholic Croats) where she carried out her fieldwork, adherents of the two separate religious communities helped each other build the village church and the mosque, attended one another's holy days, extended a hand to one another while building houses, and elsewhere peoples of different ethnic backgrounds intermarried.²⁵

Huntington's anticipation that bloodiest conflicts of the post-Cold War world will be between different civilizations rather than within them is also without warrant. Consider the following facts of the final decade of the 20th century all of which took place or accelerated after or about the time of Huntington (1993) writing about the nature of future conflicts: The Hutus of Rwanda who exterminated about one million Tutsis of Rwanda in a span of three months and at a speed three times faster than that of the Nazis killing

Jews in the Holocaust; Colombian civil war over the control of cocaine trade which displaced millions of people and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of others; Kashmiri Muslims, in search of political independence, opposing both Hindu India *and* Muslim Pakistan; Arab governments' obvious support to the U.S. involvement in Iraq in the First Gulf War against another Arab, namely Iraqi, government; and the escalation of internal violence in Afghanistan, which resulted in several thousands of casualties-meted out by Afghans against their fellow Afghans-, after the end of Soviet invasion.²⁶

In addition to his failure to attend to the multicultural complexity of the world, Huntington is misleading with respect to intracultural variation as well. This is probably most obvious in his treatment of peoples and cultures of the Islamic world as a monolithic bloc. For him, "the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power."²⁷ If Huntington's theory is indeed correct, one would then have reason to say simply that Morocco and Indonesia belong in the same civilizational group. But is it indeed the case? Consider the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz who notes that "To say that Morocco and Indonesia are both Islamic societies, in the sense that most everyone in them (well over nine-tenths of the population in either case) is as much to point up their differences as it is to locate their similarities."²⁸ In persuasively demonstrating the different trajectories of Islam in the two contexts, Geertz draws attention to "material reasons why Moroccan Islam became activist, rigorous, dogmatic and more than a little anthropatrous and why Indonesian Islam became syncretistic, reflective, multifarious, and strikingly phenomenal..."²⁹ Importantly, Geertz also points to the fact that a similarity in two different contexts in the *naming* of a socially significant set of religious practices need not entail that the actual practices contained within each such set overlap completely. Thus, saying that Islamic *mysticism* has become deeply rooted in both Morocco and Indonesia is not a revealing statement. This has been most obvious in the two countries' differing responses to externally stimulated events. Upon the dawn of European-led colonialism on the world, Islamic world's response, the scripturalist movement, (which espoused an ultimate return to the original sources of religion to avoid pitfalls of colonialism) had different echoes in the two countries. Indonesian scripturalists "have sought...to portray science, and indeed secular thought in general, as but an expression of Islam, merely another...way of putting what...the Koran has already said"; Moroccan scripturalists, however, sought to purge all superstitions (including science) from Islam so that a return to a hermetically sealed, original faith would be possible.³⁰ In Huntington's very broad groupings, one gets an understanding of none of these fine points of difference between two countries which are otherwise lumped as being part of the same

civilization. The striking variation in the responses of countries with an overwhelmingly Muslim population to the events of September 11 is itself another testament to the fact that those responses do not look like anything the civilization theorist would have predicted. Journalist Peter Bergen's discussion of the results of a major Gallop poll conducted in nine Muslim countries containing about half of the global Muslim population is telling: "Of those surveyed, two-thirds saw the September 11 attacks as morally unjustified..."³¹

CONCLUSION

This paper suggested that very broad generalizations on such concepts as globalization, identity, culture, and civilization run the risk of presenting the lay as well as the informed reader a distorted version of sociocultural reality as it is actually lived all around the globe by tangible human beings in concrete contexts. The work of political scientist Samuel Huntington thus far has been a prime example of such risk-running behavior: Gross misrepresentations in his latest writings of various aspects of Hispanic presence in the United States suggest only an old-fashioned notion of the world. Ethnographic evidence casts a serious doubt on his reasons for considering the Hispanic immigration to the U.S. perilous for the future of American national identity which he assumes to be represented, and represented only, by WASP values. His assumption of a one-way process of enculturation is problematic. He wants incoming populations to adjust themselves according to the 'creed', while expecting the creed to remain rigidly unchanged while times continue to change.

Huntington's characterization of the post-Cold War globe as made up of a number of different civilizations neatly separable from one another is countered by anthropological evidence given above, as well. Edward Said puts it most elegantly: "What culture today-whether Japanese, Arab, European, Korean, Chinese, or Indian-has not had long, intimate, and extraordinarily rich contacts with other cultures?"³² Not only is Huntington indifferent to the complex nature of the multicultural world, but also he disregards intra-cultural or -civilizational variation as well. Neither the Hispanics nor Muslims can escape that fate in his writings: Regardless of their internal differences, each group is presented as if it constituted a monolith.

This paper further sought to show that the anthropological eye is particularly well-suited to heal the analytical wounds opened by such broad-brush treatment of sociocultural phenomena as Huntington's. With its effort to understand peoples of the world as they understand themselves, its cautious, bottom-up approach in making generalizations about surface level similarities - between and within Western and non-Western cultures alike-, its attention to cross-cutting cultural connections, its endless search for local manifestations

of globalization, identity politics, culture, assimilation, and other phenomena, anthropology is sure to contribute to a more accurate assessment of issues of global scope. Only after he starts paying attention to detail, of the sort provided by anthropology, may Huntington have the chance of transforming his approach from a constantly risk-running sort to relatively risk-averse one. Absent such an attention, there will be little reason to excuse him for not including a single foreign language reference (a detail finely noted by anthropologist Hugh Gusterson) in his densely footnoted, some three-hundred-page apocalyptic book of, and with, clashes.

NOTES

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
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10. Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 64.
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18. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge," pp. 43-45.
19. The Economist, "A question of Identity" Vol. 370, No. 8365 (2004): p. 54.
20. Carlos Fuentes, "Huntington and the Mask of Racism," p. 79
21. The Economist, (2004): p. 54.
22. Hugh Gusterson, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Samuel Huntington" in Caroline Besteman and Hugh Gusterson, (eds.), *Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong. Anthropologists Talk Back.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 25.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-42.
24. Keith Brown, "Samuel Huntington, Meet the Nuer. Kinship, Local Knowledge and The Clash of Civilizations," in Caroline Besteman and Hugh Gusterson, (eds.), *Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong. Anthropologists Talk Back.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 43-59.
25. Tone Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way. Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), Tone Bringa, "Haunted by the Imaginations of the Past. Robert Kaplan's *Balkan Ghosts*," in Caroline Besteman and Hugh Gusterson, (eds.), *Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong. Anthropologists Talk Back.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 60-82.
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27. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, p. 217.
28. Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 13-14.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
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32. Edward Said, *Reflections On Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 583.