CHAPTER 7

Costliest Campaign

For a third party that has successfully hurdled the bars of organizing its machinery and of getting its name on the ballot, there remains perhaps the most difficult barrier of all—securing adequate finances. The task of conducting a nationwide campaign in a land as vast as the United States has always been difficult and expensive, and in 1948 costs were higher than ever before. Since 1944, there had been a marked inflation, and there were new and costly campaign media to be employed. While television had not yet come into its own, a single half-hour of radio time on a national network cost some $17,000, air travel by chartered plane between $1 and $2 a mile. For all parties involved this campaign was clearly the "costliest in the history of the nation," as Clayton Knowles observed in the *New York Times*.

What were the implications of this high cost of politics for the Wallace party? In the past, with only normal expenditure heights to hurdle, many a third party had come to grief. In 1924, according to party historian Kenneth MacKay, "The financial efforts of the Progressives had been such a dismal failure that there were insufficient funds to carry the candidate's train beyond St. Louis." In the light of 1948's even higher costs, would the new party encounter tremendous difficulty in securing sufficient funds or find it necessary to cur-
tail expenditures drastically? What were the Progressives’ goals? Where did they expect the money would come from?

Early in 1948, party strategists concluded that it would cost about $3,000,000 to finance Wallace’s candidacy. They expected that the leftwing unions—chiefly CIO—and the Progressive Citizens of America would bear the brunt of their fundraising efforts. They anticipated that a program of paid admissions for Wallace rallies and speeches would raise about $1,000,000, with another $1,000,000 expected from individual members of leftwing unions, as well as substantial individual contributions from theatrical and other sources.

In the light of these expectations, what was the actual performance of the Wallace forces? To what extent were these contribution goals achieved? What techniques were utilized for gathering the funds? And how was the money ultimately spent?

The highways and byways of party finance are dark and devious for all American parties—major as well as minor. Following them is no task for the uninitiated. Yet the exploration must be made if the above and other questions are to be answered. Although federal statutes—the Hatch and Corrupt Practices acts—purportedly set limits on campaign contributions and spending and although they require the reporting of all such monies, they have proved less than effective in practice. In the first place, they exempt all political groups operating in a single state unless such an organization is a “branch or subsidiary of a national committee, association or organization.” While they limit national group expenditures to $3,000,000 and individual contributions to $5,000, they fail to spell out any prohibition against multiple organization or multiple donation. Thus it has been customary for the major parties to organize as many separate groups as necessary to encompass the anticipated funds. And individual donors have found no restrictions on the size of their gifts to
state organizations or the number of their grants to separate national groups.

With respect to the reporting provisions of the law, there has been ignorance, doubt, and even outright evasion, with little or no attempt to punish violators. The resultant impossibility of formulating any exact picture of the amount contributed to or spent by any party—whether major or minor, Republican, Democratic, or Progressive—has led informed observers to a double-the-visible rule of thumb as a minimal estimate of actual contributions or expenditures.

Consequently, the reported contributions of the two national groups of the 1948 crusade—the Progressive Party and the National Wallace-for-President Committee—have been measured against newspaper reports and party officials’ estimates in an attempt to arrive at an answer to the question, “How much did the third party actually receive in contributions?” Party leaders’ comments were particularly important in view of the accounting system adopted for the reports filed with the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives—a system that caused such an experienced reporter as Clayton Knowles of the New York Times to report a deficit for the party groups at a time they were actually enjoying a surplus.1

Having carefully negotiated the intricate report paths and made the necessary adjustments along lines pointed out by party leaders C. B. “Beanie” Baldwin and Ralph Shikes, it may be reasonably concluded that the two national groups of the Wallace campaign reported net contributions of approximately one and one quarter million dollars ($1,280,279.49). Campaign manager Baldwin himself apparently applied the double-the-visible rule in setting his estimate of over-all con-

---

1 See reports of “$320,000 deficit” in New York Times, October 22, 1948, and correction by Ralph Shikes to “$7,525 surplus” in the Times, October 23, 1948. (These reports covered the period ending October 16, 1948.)
tributions at $2,500,000, although he admitted that his figure might be off by 25 or 30 per cent.

But where did the money come from? To what extent was the financing left to the people, as anticipated by Henry A. Wallace? In announcing his candidacy, the former Vice President had indicated his expectation that the common man—workers, housewives, and professional people all across America—would bear the financial burden. He had remarked wryly, “I certainly don’t know any other way. I don’t think the corporations will finance it.”

On the basis of the reports filed, it is possible to reach a threefold classification of Progressive Party contributions: (1) individual contributions, both under and over $100; (2) paid admissions under $100; and (3) organizational contributions, including direct and indirect through the purchase of campaign material at cost. Although it is obviously impossible to determine whether the organizational contributions originated with large or with small donors, an over-all pattern in total giving can be discerned.

If the known national pattern is assumed to hold true for the organizations, slightly more than one half—57 per cent—of the Wallace contributions came from those donating less than $100 each. The figures for each grouping are shown in the table which appears on the opposite page.

By way of contrast, the reported figures for both major parties from 1920 through 1940 indicate that their contributions came far more heavily from large-scale contributors. For the six presidential years involved, the Democrats reported only 18.4 per cent of their funds came from donors of less than $100, the Republicans only 11.8 per cent. In this area at least, the 1948 Progressive candidate’s expectations were fairly well realized. Far more than the major parties of his competitors, his Progressive following was, in
Topping the list of those who presented large-scale gifts to the Wallace venture was the late Mrs. Anita McCormick Blaine of Chicago, heiress to the International Harvester fortune. Available reports disclose contributions of at least $28,500 to one third-party group or another—$20,000 donated to the Maryland Progressive Party, $6,000 to the Montana Party, and $2,500 to the National Wallace-for-President Committee. Wallace, however, has estimated that Mrs. Blaine’s contributions ultimately reached a total of more than $100,000. Two other women were represented by substantial sums—Mrs. Elinor S. Gimbel, one of the party’s vice-chairmen and organizer of the Women-for-Wallace group, and Mrs. Luke Wilson, mother of the Washington, D.C., Progressive Citizens of America leader. Both were listed as having donated the legal maximum of $5,000 to both the Progressive Party and the National Committee.

### TABLE A

**Sources of Contributions to the Progressive Party and the National Wallace-for-President Committee**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Contributions</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Individual Contributions</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>$1,280,279.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Under $100.00</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>$247,717.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Over $100.00</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>$278,494.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Admissions under $100.00</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>$120,883.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Organizational Contributions from State, Local, and Associated Groups</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>$1,280,279.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Direct Contributions</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>$434,982.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Purchase of Campaign Material at Cost</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>$198,200.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Terms of financial contributions, a “party of the people.”
The theatrical profession was well represented among the major donors, with such names as Paul Draper (listed together with his wife for a contribution of $100 to the Wallace Committee), Libby Holman Reynolds ($500 to the same committee), Lillian Hellman (two contributions of $500 each), and E. Y. Harburg ($1,000). Names with social connotations were also to be found—Margaret and Corliss Lamont, Mrs. Marjorie Sloan, Mr. and Mrs. J. B. Sloan, as well as Lady Pascoe Rutter.

From the left wing were millionaire Frederick Vanderbilt Field and Miles Sherover, who in 1938, according to the House Committee on un-American Activities, had been in charge of the Soviet-American Securities Corporation, an organization engaged in selling Soviet bonds to the American public. Another repeat donor was Dan S. Gillmor, of New York, who gave at least $3,500—two $1,000 contributions and one of $1,500—to the National Wallace Committee.

Although most of the party officials—C. B. Baldwin, Ralph Shikes, and Clark Foreman—were listed as having contributed on several occasions, Wallace himself was listed only once—for a $1,000 sum—despite his personal wealth. This substantiated the earlier prediction in the New York Times that "Mr. Wallace is noted for his careful personal spending . . . [he is] not expected to contribute himself." In all fairness, however, it should be remarked that the physical contribution involved in a campaign such as Wallace was to wage transcended any monetary donation he could have made.

Senator Glen Taylor, frank to admit that his congressional post was the best job he ever had, was not among the contributors, but, again, his share was in the strenuous labor of a national campaign rather than in its financing. His earlier remark, "If I do accept the offer [to run], it will be the first time in my life that I have had any money with which to campaign," was significant.

What motivated these individuals to contribute such large
Costliest Campaign

sums? Certainly they had few expectations of any *quid pro quo* in a party whose chances were as slender as those of the Progressives. In fact, for many, mere listing as Progressive Party contributors led to immediate investigation by the House Committee on un-American Activities and to publication of the results of previous digging into their records by that august body.

In an interesting partnership, the Americans for Democratic Action compiled and Representative (later Senator) Karl Mundt of South Dakota inserted in the *Congressional Record* a list of contributors of amounts greater than $1,000 to Wallace groups together with their House Committee on un-American Activities dossiers. Although the committee's evidence may have indicated that Frederick V. Field, donor of $5,000 to the National Wallace-for-President Committee, had Communist leanings, most of the information was as nebulous as that about Mrs. Blaine. Of her, the Committee reported, "The *Daily Worker* of January 11, 1938, p. 2, listed Mrs. Anita McCormich [sic] Blaine as a signer of the Union of Concerted Peace Efforts, cited as a Communist-front organization by the Committee . . . *March 29, 1944.*" ²

What, then, were the reasons that persuaded them, despite the likelihood of attempted intimidation, to support the crusade? Wallace himself had several suggestions to offer. First, he felt, many in the export-import trade contributed because party international policies would aid their business and because they had agreed with Wallace's position during the 1920's for expanding the United States's imports as a creditor nation. Second, he conjectured that large numbers of Jewish families contributed to the party because of their general "awareness of the international position and of world politics." To which might be added parenthetically, and because

of his party's position on the Palestine issue. The final factor, Wallace suggested, was personal friendship for himself or agreement with his over-all views. There were businessmen attracted by his work as Secretary of Commerce and a liberal group in a general agreement with his expressed foreign and domestic policies. Mrs. Blaine's contributions, said Wallace, came "absolutely out of the blue." She had read his book *Statemanship and Religion*, which had so impressed her that she wanted to give directly to its author. Wallace advised a party contribution as the best way of promoting his ideas.

Factors other than those suggested by the candidate may also have been involved. For instance, the well-to-do amateurs wanting to get into politics—such as the theatrical people—could do so easily by contributing financially. More difficult to explain was the mass phenomenon of the voluntary contributions from the more humble. The fervor leading workers in New York City's garment industry to shower the Wallace caravan with dollar bills from their windows, in the course of a district street rally, was typical. It may have been the desire to belong—the desire to merit membership in a crusade—that moved them, as it moved so many others, to dig down into slim pockets for a last handful of change to place in the collection box at a rally. In short there was something akin to "getting religion" on a political level.

Although there are relatively satisfactory sources for measuring individual contributions to the Wallace crusade, the material available on the associated groups is much less revealing.

For example, it is clear that the goal of $1,000,000 adopted by the National Labor Committee for Wallace and Taylor was never attained. Although individual union-member contributions were not taken into account, the reported organizational labor contributions of only $9,025
demonstrated conclusively the failure of the Progressive Party to achieve financial support from union sources.

The only definitely identifiable labor contribution of size was that of the Fur and Leather Workers Committee for Wallace, Taylor, and Progressive Candidates. This group, under the admittedly Communist leadership of Ben Gold, reported total donations of $21,230.99—"voluntary contributions of less than $100 each from members of affiliated locals." The word "voluntary" was disputed by fur manufacturers who testified before a subcommittee of the House that coercion had been employed to secure contributions. The union committee reported expenditures of some $19,822.44 including a lump sum donation of $5,000 to the Progressive Party.

The Independent Political Committee of the Greater New York Council, relied upon to produce large sums from the metropolitan New York area, contributed only $1,425 to the national groups, although its direct expenditures were undoubtedly more substantial. The best party estimate available, that of campaign manager C. B. Baldwin, indicated that organized labor barely approached the halfway mark toward its million-dollar goal.

Contrast with this the estimated labor contribution of $1,-500,000 to the Truman campaign chest. Of this sum about $600,000 came from the AFL Labor League for Political Education, while another $500,000 came from the CIO Political Action Committee groups at one time expected to carry the Wallace banners. In New York the American Labor Party split proved costly, as David Dubinsky gathered more than $250,000 from his International Ladies' Garment Workers Union and its affiliates, which also went to President Truman and the Democrats.

Since much less was expected of it, the Nationalities Division turned in a relatively better, though hardly substantial, performance, primarily from East European sources—
Greeks, Lithuanians, Romanians, Russians, Serbians, Slovenians and Yugoslavs (all "hyphenated Americans")—but also including Armenian, Italian-American, and Irish-American Committees. The Armenians and Slovenians were the most successful groups, contributing some $3,500 of the $5,407.20 total reported under the Nationalities banner.

Women-for-Wallace was credited with identifiable contributions totaling only $782.85. Yet a cursory glance at newspaper accounts of their dinners reveals that New York City branches of this group, led by the indefatigable Mrs. Elinor S. Gimbel, secured at least $27,000 (net) from only three such affairs. The figures for the national groups also reveal a rather high proportion of women donating sums over $100—31.2 per cent of those giving to the National Committee, for instance. It is virtually impossible to evaluate the part that the women's organization played in producing this result. Mrs. Gimbel, however, ascribed feminine support to two main factors. First, she said, women were vitally interested in the "peace and home issues" that the Wallace party espoused, and second, it was possible for a woman to contribute without fear of Red-baiting or of causing economic losses that might have accrued to her husband's business, had his name been listed as a donor.

The contributions of the Young Progressives of America were negative. Theirs was the only subsidiary organization that had to be supported by monetary transfusions from various state organizations. Of their $18,993.66 total income, about $12,000 came to the YPA from state bodies, less than $7,000 from individual contributors. The National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions was strong only in New York and in California, where it expended directly a total of some $38,000 ($1,500 more than it took in) on behalf of the Wallace-Taylor candidacy.

The role of the Progressive Citizens of America is difficult to determine, for midway in the campaign they merged into
the National Wallace-for-President Committee. Prior to that, their financial support had likewise been concentrated in New York and California, with only scattered strength elsewhere. The PCA spent approximately $82,000 and contributed identifiable amounts totaling $4,104.90 to the national groups.

On the basis of available information, it is impossible to discover either any direct contribution by the Communists to the Progressive Party or, more importantly, any possible diversion through individual contributions. The Communist Party reported a fund of some $20,000, made up of contributions from ten state parties, for its 1948 National Election Campaign Committee. Committee expenditures were only $11,982.02, with the balance of the $20,000 being turned back into the parent organization. Judging by this total, the Communists may not have been as well-heeled as they had been in earlier campaigns—or else their supporters gave directly to the Wallace party. The Communist Party in the United States had spent $162,040.45—for its own candidates—in 1936 and $89,548.26 in 1940. But, in view of the magnitude of Wallace financing in 1948 and the relatively modest Communist spending of previous years, it is evident that the party, while working actively for the Wallace candidacy, could have played no more than an exceedingly minor financial role.

Were there any significant geographical patterns of financial support revealed in the contributions of state and local groups to the two national organizations? Although donations were reported from groups in twenty-eight states as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, it is clear that four states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California, in that order—constituted the major financial strength of the party. Not unexpectedly, these four contributed well
over one half of the total organizational gifts that the national groups received. This pattern was in keeping with both early expectations and ultimate ballot strength, except in the case of Pennsylvania, where springtime dollars ran well ahead of November votes. It is impossible, however, to determine whether this situation in Pennsylvania was the result of high average contributions or last-minute allegiance shifts by Pennsylvanians who had donated to the Progressives and then voted for the Democrats—or had perhaps supported the Republicans.

A few other states ranked unexpectedly high in financial strength in view of the Progressives' platform—Texas in sixth place—and in view of the relatively small populations of these states—Colorado in eleventh. On the other hand, the weakness of financial support from Wisconsin spotlighted the Wallace failure to capture the public allegiance earlier given the La Follette Progressive Party. Ironically, in both Texas and Missouri, supporters gave the Progressive Party almost four times as many dollars as they ultimately gave votes.

But what of the means whereby the Progressive Party was able to obtain such sizable contributions? What were its strategy and techniques of fundraising—both national and local?

Few of the various techniques employed on national and local levels sprang into being during the 1948 campaign itself. Their origins were in the devices employed by the CIO Political Action Committee as early as 1944, when a one and one-half million-dollar fund had been raised to support the Roosevelt-Truman ticket. The Political Action Committee voluntary-contribution methods, including the paid-admission political rally, had been taken over and perfected by the Progressive Citizens of America during the preceding year. A test-run series of speaking tours undertaken by Wallace in
1947, utilizing both paid admissions and voluntary contributions, had netted some $265,000, according to Howard Norton in the *Baltimore Sun*. The PCA had also employed direct mail appeals, social functions such as dinners and breakfasts, and small house parties—always with the inevitable moment for passing the hat.

In 1948 the nation-wide tours of both presidential and vice-presidential candidates employed two PCA stand-bys—both the paid-admission rallies and the multiple-dollar-per-plate dinners. Two sources reveal the magnitude of the amounts realized by these methods: first, a "consolidated surplus statement" prepared for party headquarters; and, second, scattered newspaper reports during the course of the campaign, primarily in the *New York Times* and *Baltimore Sun*.

Party reports indicated that gross national cash income from "Tours (Wallace, Robeson, Taylor)" and "Fundraising Events" was $561,591.70—more than one half of one million. National expenditures were reported for the same items totaling $269,324.77, leaving a net income for the national groups of $292,266.93. With national and local groups sharing a fifty-fifty split, the combined over-all totals were approximately $1,120,000 gross and about $580,000 net income. Admittedly incomplete newspaper sources revealed a total of some three quarters of one million dollars from rallies and dinners, thus suggesting the accuracy of this million-plus figure.

While $100-per-plate dinners had been common to both Republican and Democratic fundraising in the past, the idea of charging admission to a political rally had been generally held to be out of the question. The Progressives were the first to try it on such a wide scale. The sums received demonstrated that it was as successful as it was unique. Instead of keeping audiences away, exacting an admission price had the opposite effect, according to party officials, leading to a much greater turnout than might otherwise have resulted.
Party workers entered enthusiastically into ticket-selling drives, and purchasers who had invested $2.40 in a ticket to hear Wallace had a financial stake to insure their attendance.

What were the details of this rally technique worked out by the Progressives in the 1948 campaign? All across the nation—from New York to California—the series of name meetings, campus assemblies, and ball-park rallies employed the same general scheme to swell third-party coffers. Admission prices ranged from a low of 10¢ at student gatherings to a high of $3.60 for choice seats at Yankee Stadium in September. For most events the range was from 60¢ to $2.40.

What was the audience's reward in return for the admission contribution exacted from it on the basis of the drawing power of the national candidates—Henry A. Wallace and Senator Glen H. Taylor? The Progressives acted on the theory, simple but previously untested, that a political rally can be just as well staged, well lighted, well timed, dramatic, and entertaining as a Broadway hit. While the exact role of the various playwrights, theatrical directors, song writers and others from the legitimate stage was difficult to assess, the end product of their cooperation exhibited all the finish and skill of a professional presentation. By comparison, the traditional Republican and Democratic meetings seemed dull, long-winded, and amateurish. And, above all, this new staging brought results—at least financial results.

At a typical rally, the festivities would start with a community sing as the audience was gradually finding its way to its seats. Then followed an invocation—often by a Negro minister—and introductory remarks by some local figure—maybe the party's candidate for state or local office. The script kept these remarks brief and pointed, just enough to set a pattern of urgency in relating the national campaign to locally important issues—Palestine partition for a Jewish audience, segregation and discrimination for mixed racial
gatherings, peace and home issues for a predominantly feminine audience. Many times the local speaker would be a professor from a near-by university, perhaps a scientist portraying the immediate need for carrying out Progressive Party foreign policy to avert a new and overwhelming atomic world war. These preliminary remarks were all designed as warm-up for the audience.

Once the party’s ties to the community—its interest in and proposed solutions for local issues—had been exhibited, the scene was shifted gradually to national levels. A well-known actor or artist usually played the preliminary part in this transformation. Paul Robeson and Canada Lee were two who filled the spot frequently. With their professional training, histrionic and vocal talent, and, above all, their sense of timing, these seasoned performers would skillfully dramatize an important current issue, something out of the day’s headlines, perhaps, to prepare their listeners for the actual fund drive.

The stage was now set for what came to be known as the pitch. This phrase, borrowed from carnival lingo, admirably described the performance of William Gailmor, who always occupied a spot on the bill. During the 1947 Progressive Citizens of America tour, Raymond Walsh had been the performer, but he had parted from the troupe when it took to the third-party road. Gailmor, a former radio newscaster, proved a natural for the role—a born pitchman.

At first, the rather stocky, almost completely bald, too nattily attired Gailmor would let the audience down from its previous peak, even arousing latent antagonism, especially in rural areas, with his New York attitude and manner of speaking. This first unfavorable impression, however, would soon be counteracted—dispelled by sheer oratorical ability. Linking personal anecdote to world problems, Gailmor had the knack of bringing remote affairs right into the room and of surrounding them with an air of urgency, a feeling of need
for immediate action that only a third party—the Progressive Party—could successfully undertake.

By this time, generally a matter of some fifteen minutes, the audience would be well charmed—completely in hand. Then would come the climax:

America needs a people’s party. The Progressive Party is that people’s party. Each of you needs a people’s party—the Progressive Party—to carry the story of the people’s needs all across this broad land of ours. But . . . that takes money, money to buy radio time to refute the lies being spread about the people’s party, money to buy advertising space in the hostile press, money to let people all across the country see and hear Henry Wallace and Glen Taylor just as you are seeing them tonight. The Progressive Party lacks, and is proud that it lacks, the wealth of Wall Street and the gold of the industrialists. This party is not backed by the power of the militarists, the vested interests of both old parties. This people’s party depends upon each and every one of you. Isn’t it worth your while to help such a people’s party?—a party that represents no cliques, no organizations of wealth, no combines of monopolists and cartels, but does represent you—the little people, the real people, of America.

“It ought to be worth”—then a planned pause, an overlong pause for “reflection” or receipt by mental transmission of an amount already carefully determined in advance—“it ought to be worth $1000 to someone here in this room to help carry the words of Henry Wallace the length and breadth of America, to print his speeches, to buy radio time . . . .” And with the request carefully tailored to fit the audience, there would be an almost immediate response. The drive was off to a fine start.

As the amounts asked for were progressively lowered—
“Who will give $50 to buy radio time, to print pamphlets ...?”—a new segment would be encouraged to dig down into its pockets for the party, for its party, for the people’s party that depended upon it for financing. And finally, when the last ten- and five-dollar contribution had been milked out, there would come the exhortation for everyone in the audience to take a dollar bill out of his pocket. “Even if you can’t give a dollar, take one out and hold it up in the air for the cameraman. Now wave them around, let Henry Wallace, who’s waiting in the wings to talk to you, see that you’re with him 100 per cent. Hold them up and wave them high! Higher still! Wave them around!” Then would come the pay-off: “All right, ushers, take the bills away before they have time to put them back in their pockets.”

About to leave the stage, Gailmor would dash back to the microphone to add, “A people’s party depends on the dimes and nickels as well as on the dollar bills of the little people. Just reach down into your pocket and bring out the loose change you have there. Wouldn’t you rather have it go toward your very own party—your people’s party—instead of for beer on the way home tonight? Well then, put it in the containers that the ushers will pass among you.”

The audience that had by these rites proved its worth and been accepted as partner in the “people’s party” was now allowed its long-awaited glimpse of the candidate. The house lights would darken and a single spotlight pick out the figure of Henry A. Wallace making his way to the center of the stage, or down the aisle to the speaker’s platform. With a sudden burst of vitality he would stride out, greeting them with the familiar Wallace smile and waving recognition while waiting for the tumultuous reception to subside. Finally, with the audience restored to order, the speech of the night for which they had paid so handsomely would commence.

The success of the pitch can be judged from the incomplete figures—the only ones available—indicating voluntary
contributions at the rallies. The identifiable total—approximately $116,000—was probably less than one half of the amount actually realized, since the total take was shared with local sponsoring groups. No wonder that hardened political writers remarked that the Wallace tours had something of the air of a Billy Sunday revival meeting about them, with so many "converts" ready to part with dollars to promote their "new religion." As Milburn P. Akers, commenting on the success of a Minnesota tour in the midst of the winter's worst weather, wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times, "It's one way of financing a political campaign. But few politicians other than Henry could get away with it."

Although the rallies, with their inevitable pitch, held the center of the fundraising stage, the secondary feature of all Wallace campaign tours was the series of dinners at which the presidential candidate spoke. Here the technique was copied after the traditional major-party affairs, with the tariff varied according to the local situation. In April, 1,400 attended a $100-a-plate dinner in New York, while 425 paid $25 each at a Philadelphia banquet in October, and several hundred had contributed $12.50 each to a Hollywood session earlier the same month.

At these dinners, the touch for additional contributions was the main Progressive Party variation. Early in the campaign a "bed-sheet" technique was briefly employed in which four pretty girl volunteers carried the corners of a sheet into which cash, pledges, and checks were tossed. This approach enjoyed marked success in Chicago, where it netted some $35,000 at two meetings. However, it was later abandoned in favor of tactics similar to those employed at the rallies. Combining all these techniques, the series of luncheons and dinners brought to the party tills at least $202,000, and probably well over the quarter-million-dollar mark.

Party reports, newspaper accounts, and personal attendance—all substantiated the conclusion that in their rallies and meetings the Progressives had been highly successful,
Costliest Campaign

going well over their $1,000,000 goal set early in the campaign. While the future applicability of such techniques to other campaigns and other parties was doubtful, their value to the Wallace-inspired groups in 1948 was tremendous.

While the pitch and the multiple-dollar-per-plate dinner were the mainstays of the parent bodies, with a percentage of the receipts diverted to state and local groups, there was a wide variety of devices employed by the latter directly. The range was almost as broad as the groups employing them, and their success almost as hidden as some of the localities in which they were used.

There were lunches and dinners similar to those noted above, but with less prominent guest speakers and smaller levies exacted. There were house parties—in the homes of local backers—on the precinct level, for which a canned version of the Gailmor pitch was available on phonograph records, as were speeches by Wallace and Taylor. A series of twenty-five home movies with sound was also produced for use at these smaller gatherings. The latter device was sufficiently unusual to merit discussion by the theatrical editor of the Sunday New York Times.

All of these media, in addition to presenting the program of the party, emphasized the need for funds. Form letters for direct mailing to selected lists were employed. One of these urged contributions to the Progressive Party on the occasion of Wallace's sixtieth birthday, October 7, 1948, "to buy more radio time, print more leaflets, hold more meetings, mail the truth to more voters."

There was also an attempt to imitate the remunerative Christmas and Easter seal drives of health organizations by utilizing "Wallace seals." Like the letters, these were mailed to select lists in the expectation that 90 per cent would return the expected donation ($1 for a sheet), 8 per cent would return the seals, and only 2 per cent would fail to do either.
There is no evidence concerning whether or not these optimistic goals were attained.

A four-page pamphlet was prepared to set everyone up for a contribution at the parties and meetings. Titled Not a R—Cent, this was, according to Publicity Director Ralph Shikes, "slanted to show that while General Motors, the DuPonts, Wall Street and Standard Oil don’t give a cent to the Wallace-Taylor campaign fund, housewives, veterans, clergymen, steelworkers, farmers give their hard-earned dollars . . . because it’s their Progressive Party.” These pamphlets, like all the other printed materials, were made available to the local groups at cost. After June 1, 1948, the provision was added that “all orders from local groups will be for cash only.” Some of the groups had been slow in paying the national committee for the literature supplied, and the national did not intend to carry any local groups, even to the extent of supplying them with gratis publicity material.

Other devices, such as auctions, raffles, and theater benefits, were also employed by local groups, particularly in the metropolitan New York area. Again, however, data for evaluating their success are lacking. On the whole, the techniques applied on the local levels were remarkable only for their diversity. For the most part they were evolved at headquarters level and transmitted to local groups for execution. While the total funds thus obtained may have been substantial, they were small in comparison with those from the national techniques that had proven so effective.

But what was the total cost of the Wallace campaign, and what was the pattern of expenditure? With funds coming in strongly and regularly, how were they employed? How did the national and state organizations share the burden?

On the basis of known expenditures in those states where such reports are available and known contributions from such
groups to the national committee and party, it is possible to arrive at an estimate of the total amount expended on the state level for the Wallace-Taylor candidacy—an amount between one million and one and one-half million dollars. To this sum must be added a less firmly based estimate for the associated groups, derived from the few known figures and from a sense of expenditures resulting from long work with the party’s finances. Bringing in Campaign Manager Beanie Baldwin’s estimate of $500,000 spent by the leftwing unions, an estimated $50,000 by the women’s groups, and $30,000 by the Progressive Youth of America, farm, and business groups, it is possible to arrive at an over-all expenditure total of some three and one-third million dollars—the best practicable

### TABLE B

**Over-all Estimate of Total Expenditures of the 1948 Wallace-Taylor Candidacy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Group Expenditures</th>
<th>$1,260,102.91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party, National Wallace-for-President Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(from reports filed with the Clerk of the U.S. House of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Local Expenditures</th>
<th>1,325,000.00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive of Contributions to National Groups (estimated)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associated Group Expenditures</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reported (reports filed with the Clerk of the House)</td>
<td>169,029.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated: Labor</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women-for-Wallace</td>
<td>50,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (Farm, Business, Student, Veterans)</td>
<td>30,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Over-all Total** $3,334,132.70
estimate. This total is clearly in keeping with Baldwin’s mid-
September estimate of $2,500,000 of expenditures through
that time and is likely to be less, if the total is substantially
different, than the actual figure.

Information about where the money went proves even
more elusive than that concerning its sources. Full accounting
is available for only the million and a quarter reportedly
spent by the national committee and party, with only scattered
reports to suggest state and local spending. Both committee
and party records indicate that the national groups expended
very little for local purposes, while substantial state funds
were used on the national campaign.

Major national expenditures were for fundraising events
($207,624.50—18.2 per cent), tours ($61,700.27—5.5 per
cent), campaign material ($171,589.46—15.0 per cent), and
budgetary expenses ($583,484.25—51.0 per cent). The
money expended on fundraising events and tours was more
than balanced by the income received at these events. The
national groups listed gross income of $561,591.70 for a net
income of $282,266.93 from such sources. Campaign ma-
terial was also on a better than self-sustaining basis for
the national committee and party, with nearly $200,000
($198,200.63) realized from sales at cost to local groups,
leaving an apparent profit of more than $25,000 on this item.

Travel expenditures were remarkably low—especially in
view of the extensive campaign tours undertaken by both
Wallace and Taylor, many by planes chartered at high rates.
Incidentally, the reports listed disbursements to Senator
Taylor for travel but none to Mr. Wallace. This, however,
does not indicate that Wallace paid his own expenses as he
had in the 1944 campaign for Roosevelt and Truman. The
explanation lies in the fact that the Senator traveled on an
expense account basis, whereas headquarters paid Wallace’s
travel bills directly rather than reimburse him later.
The fact that the national group lumped more than one half of their total expenditures under an unrevealing budgetary expenses item makes it impossible to ascertain such items as salary expenses, the cost of office overhead, and the amounts expended on various advertising media. There is no precise way to determine just how much was spent on radio advertising, particularly in the later phases of the fall campaign. Wallace radio talks formed an important part of party strategy in the last six weeks, with some seven fifteen-minute addresses going out over a national network. At an estimated $17,000 per half hour, this represented approximately $60,000 for this project alone. And, in addition to national broadcasts, there were many local ones employing transcriptions and records. Toward the end of the campaign, the party was so anxious to press the increased use of radio that it agreed to pay 30 per cent of the costs incurred by state and local groups for air time.

For the most part, however, the state groups were expected to contribute to the national, and they did so. Only a very small amount, some $43,000 (3.0 per cent) went from the national to the weaker state parties. According to the recollection of C. B. Baldwin, "most of this money was sent to the southern states for petition campaigns in order to get on the ballot. Also, some funds were sent to West Virginia, for the same purpose." And while an $1,800 contribution was made by the national to the Georgia Committee for Wallace and Taylor, the Georgia Progressive Party contributed $3,000 to the national Progressive Party. In contrast, $14,000 or 39.4 per cent of their total money was contributed by the Washington, D.C. organization to the parent bodies. And Professor T. I. Emerson estimated that some 40 per cent of the Connecticut People's Party expenditures of approximately $75,000 went for similar contributions to the national groups. This practice reversed the major-party pattern of na-
tional assistance to weaker state committees, for even the "weak sisters" in the Wallace camp gave more to national headquarters than they received.

What conclusions may be reached from this survey of Wallace party financing? How successfully had this major obstacle been hurdled? The over-all pattern was one of success. The party's national balance sheet was in the black, showing (on the basis of the available figures) an actual surplus of some $20,000, whereas a deficit is usually anticipated—even by major parties. The total monetary goals set earlier in the campaign were achieved before its close. Unlike earlier minor parties, no plans were abandoned because of insufficient funds, no candidate left stranded through inadequate resources. The crusade had extracted the fiscal resources from which to forge its weapons in the "fight for peace."

And even though it had not emerged completely as the popularly supported mass movement portrayed by party publicists, the Progressive group could legitimately lay claim to being, in contrast to its major adversaries, a party of the people—a party of small contributors. Possessing its share of major contributors and first magnitude angels, the Wallace band had relied heavily and successfully on new and daring techniques—on the voluntary contributions of converts to its cause. This was a phenomenon unique—certainly on the scale employed—in American history, in which the true believers backed their faith and conviction with dollars and dimes.

On the other hand, there was the conspicuous failure of labor—both organization and individual alike—to respond

*In contrast, the Democratic National Committee reported a deficit of $263,935.59 for the campaign year 1948, and the Republican deficit for the same period was estimated at $300,000. The Dixiecrats reported a surplus of $1,360.42.
Henry Wallace's third party: varying points of view.
“Listen! Listen To The People Cheering!”

Crowd waving $1.00 bills for collection at the Henry Wallace rally held in the Cow Palace in San Francisco, May 18, 1948.
Members of audience gathered at Peekskill, N.Y. Sept. 4, 1949, to hear singer Paul Robeson, watching parade of protesting veterans.
About 8,000 people jamming 38th St., New York City, in Oct., 1948 to hear Henry A. Wallace.
Costliest Campaign

to the call. Labor’s million-dollar investment in the 1948 campaign went to the party and candidate that, lesser evil or not, had a chance of winning. And geographically, financial support for the new party proved extremely narrow—limited for the most part to the coastal, industrial confines and never reaching the main streams of middle America, even in those areas where political dissent had a proud heritage.

But measured by the most critical device of all, ultimate strength at the polls, the Progressives’ financial success was to prove completely out of keeping. On the basis of the 1,156,103 votes received in November, the Wallace party had spent an average of nearly $3 per vote—the highest ever recorded in an American campaign. For even in the infamous 1926 Pepper-Vare Pennsylvania primary fight where, according to Professor V. O. Key, “the Pepper supporters set the highest recorded figures for expenditure per vote received,” they had achieved an average level of only $2.42. Certainly, if cost be measured in average expenditure per vote, the Progressives had come up with the costliest campaign of American history.4 As one observer bitingly remarked, not without some measure of truth, “Back where I come from, they could have bought their votes cheaper than that.”

4 By way of contrast, the States’ Rights Democrats (Dixiecrats) received 1,169,021 votes after their reported expenditure of only $160,081.66—approximately 14¢ per vote.