Deepening Democracy at the Grassroots Level: Citizen Participation in State Devolved Funds (CDF) In Kenya

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Abstract

That democracy is the most suitable form of government is no longer contested. However many questions shaking this global consensus continue to abound. Why is there a growing cynicism and apathy with the notion of democracy across the globe? Why has the concept of democracy had to attract adjectives that attempt to qualify or categorize it in different parts of the world? And perhaps most importantly, if in deed democracy is such a good “thing” how can it be made meaningful? This thesis looks at citizen participation in a state devolved fund (CDF) in Kenya as a space through which democracy at the grassroots level can be deepened and hence contribute to the growth of a national democratic culture. The CDF program in Kenya was established in 2003 when a new regime with overwhelming national mandate replaced an authoritarian neopatrimonial system that had been in existence for twenty four years. But the seeds of exclusion, what in Kenya had been historically referred to as “siasa mbaya maisha mbaya” a Kiswahili phrase warning regions in Kenya opposed to the ruling party of dire material conditions, had long been planted by the first post-independent state. The CDF program, a space in which the national government allocates 7.5% of all the government’s ordinary revenues in a financial year and distributes it to all the electoral districts allowing local citizens in collaboration with their Members of Parliament to identify, prioritize and implement local development projects thus has been viewed as a culmination of a long history of struggle to redefine citizenship in Kenya. Deepening democracy is concept that attempts to move the focus away from regular elections to further strengthening of citizenship and democratizing the state by transforming citizens from passive actors in dependent relationships with politicians and
political parties into active ones who can demand public goods provision from the state. Herein lies the attempts to make the concept of democracy more meaningful. Empirical evidence from the research on the study shows that whereas the CDF program in Kenya still has structural impediments to citizen participation, there are many aspects of the program that looks promising for a thriving grassroots democracy in Kenya. There is are flourishing civic and welfare organizations which are the architectural basis of a bottom up democracy, the increasing benefits from public goods provision will continue to mobilize mass citizen interest in the program and finally, there is a burgeoning local political rhetoric based on the CDF program, a development which has begun to reflect on local voting choices.
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY AT THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN STATE DEVOLVED FUNDS (CDF) IN KENYA

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THESIS
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of degree of Master of Arts in Pan-African Studies in the Graduate School of Syracuse University

May 2013
...dedicating this work to...

*My two elder brothers Desmond & Silas Otieno (Deceased)*

for your belief in me and the adamant stand that no relatives would split up our family at the sad
demise of our parents while I was barely twelve, you were central pillars upon which my
resilience rested. I would be a herds-boy somewhere in the village now, but see what you have
turned me into. I am sure your spirits will smile at this milestone.

*Nephews and Nieces*

in the summer of 2010, your dad, my elder brother and father figure fell ill and passed on within
weeks, essentially passing the responsibility over you to me. You were all looking up to me but a
wonderful opportunity to come to America had also come at the same time. I took up the
opportunity even though all of you barely understood the implied absence. You have been in my
heart through this journey. Thank you for understanding.

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my three year sojourn in America, culminating into this work began with your belief in me!

*Monica, Beloved*

finally…
you went through nine arduous months carrying our baby Nina when all I could do was to make
occasional phone calls from six thousand miles away, and for the first year of Nina’s life you
have singled handedly been a great mom to her, What a strength of a woman! I cherish you,
patience is your middle name.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The Problem

That democracy is the most suitable form of governance is no longer a subject of intense scholarly debate (Sen, 1999). However, the process of democratization still remains a divisive one even among scholars and policy makers who attempt to pursue it. The overemphasized concentration on such conspicuous events as electoral processes, state institutional reforms and constitutionalism overlook other micro political processes that may have more meaningful contributions to democratization. Micro political processes refer to less visible political events within a country such as local civic groups petitioning their members of parliament on local issues, citizen relationships with local government offices and youth’s and women’s political meetings, picketing and demonstrations. Micro-political processes are crucial components of the larger polity, but often receive little or no attention at all. I argue that meaningful local citizen participation in the political process greatly contribute to a country’s national democratic culture.

There is an abundant literature on local (micro) democratization experiments in Latin America, where innovative citizen participation in political processes took root in the 1980s with the rise of Left-leaning governments. In Porto Alegre in Brazil for instance, interesting conclusions about democratization have been drawn from the Participatory Budgeting programs. The literature has not only challenged the dominant democratization discourse, but has also attracted scholarly attention. Over time, such participatory processes have helped nurture a thriving democratic culture across Latin America (Golfrank 2011, Abers 1998, Cabannes, 2004 and Baiocchi, 2005). Scholars who have been studying citizen participation in local political
processes refer to the phenomenon as ‘deepening democracy’. Goldfrank (2011) contends that the concept of deepening democracy involves moving from the usual regular elections and taking further steps in strengthening citizenship and democratizing the state. He defines “strengthening citizenship” as the process of transforming residents from passive subjects in dependent relationships with particular politicians or parties into active citizens, who know that they have political rights, can legitimately make demands on the government for public services, and can make their voices heard in political debates (Goldfrank, 2011 p.13). The concept of deepening democracy will be at the center of my thesis which examines citizen participation through the devolved Constituency Development Fund in Kenya. This thesis is not a comparative work on Latin American local participatory experiments and the Kenyan program but rather draws insights from the former to reinforce the point that local participatory programs can work to promote democracy in Africa.

The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a noble idea which was introduced in Kenya in 2003 after a 24-year authoritarian regime characterized by neopatrimonialism was defeated. The idea sought to compel the state to allocate directly a standardized amount of money to all electoral districts (constituencies) every financial year to cater to local development needs. Initially, the CDF kitty per constituency was twenty million Kenya shillings (approx. $270,000) every financial year. It has since been tripled over the initial amount per constituency thanks to the amended Act of Parliament requiring the government to allocate no less than 7.5% of its annual revenue to the kitty. 1 The allocated fund is no longer a flat rate, but takes into consideration each constituency’s unique development circumstances. The unique development

1 The CDF Act was amended by the Kenyan parliament in 2007 after about four years of operation. The amendment sought to correct many operational challenges experienced earlier on, and also increased the percentage allocation.
circumstances include relative poverty levels, access to basic facilities such as education, health, and roads. Citizens at local levels are supposed to prioritize their unique development needs through local committees in liaison with the local legislator. The management of the fund at constituency level and local committees has largely remained under the control of the local members of parliament. Since its inception, the CDF fund has received both national and international recognition for its attempt to address growing citizen legitimacy concerns and to remedy the deeply rooted patronage in governing African states.

This type of fund management where citizens participate directly in political decision-making at local the level is an important laboratory in which democracy at the micro-level can be studied and strengthened. In the past two decades, Latin America has witnessed similar democratic experiments. In Brazil, some regional Participatory Budgeting programs have turned out to be success stories in so far as local citizen participation and, hence, democratization is concerned. Conversely, in other Latin American countries like Uruguay (Montevideo specifically) similar programs have failed to promote local democratization. This mixed result clearly prompts the need to study similar programs elsewhere in order to grasp the factors that ensure meaningful participation by local citizens in state governance and potentially lead to failure.

**Research Question**

In Kenya, my observation, which is largely echoed by many ordinary Kenyans, is that the management of the CDF fund has fallen short of citizens’ expectations about democracy at the local level. There is a mixed result in terms of citizen participation within the program. The level of awareness of committee members and local projects appears to be high but the degree of
involvement does not measure up to it. There is a high level of under-tapped local civic and
welfare organizations which might be useful for civic engagement in the program.

Therefore the thesis seeks to establish if devolution through the CDF contributes to
citizen participation in local political spaces and whether the program has cultivated any
democratic norms. And because I suspect that this is not the case, what explains the recurrent
pitfalls faced by the CDF in its attempts to establish democracy at the local level? And how does
one overcome them?

The question involves the following sub-questions.

i) Are there structural shortcomings of the CDF program as a devolved fund which
hinder local citizen participation in the state funded program?

ii) What are some of the alternative structural models upon which the CDF program
and other similar devolved funds in Kenya can be based in order to enhance
citizen participation?

iii) Does local citizen participation in political processes (deepening democracy) have
a potential for creating a robust national democratic culture?

**Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis**

This study acknowledges that the term democracy, as much as it may be a popularly used
concept both in political science and in other day to day rhetoric, has inadequacies that sometime
mock the very original meaning of the term. The work thus looks into how the concept of
democracy can be made to resonate with the aspirations of citizens by enhancing citizen
participation beyond macro-political process, such as regular elections. It looks at the
relationship between local citizens and a state-devolved fund in Kenya (Constituency
Development Fund) which is largely run by local legislators. Theoretically, the work makes use of two approaches: Structural Functionalism and Participatory Democratic Theory (Pateman, 1972) in order to attempt a concrete understanding of the relationship between the state (through legislators) and citizens in a participatory space -CDF program. I use the structural functionalist approach to dissect the structural nuances of the CDF program. However due to its inadequacy in explaining what makes functionally distinct institutions to fail I use Participatory Democratic Theory to fill the gap.

Structural functionalism theory is as old as the times of Aristotle who was concerned with ultimate causes or actions in relation to their ends (Fisher, 2010). According to the theory, systems that do not adapt to their functions become extinct (Fisher, 2010). The theory first became prominent in sociology and anthropology before finding its way into political science. Structural functionalism attempts to describe social system in terms of structures, mechanisms, processes and functions. It seeks to explain why a given structure contributes towards a given function more than other structures at a particular time (Holt and Turner 1966). As such structures within a system are viewed under functionalism just like organs of a body, each with a differentiated role working towards the success of the whole body but whose failure negatively affects the entire body. In political science, Fisher (2010) observes that the state implies the political system, powers mean functions, offices represent rules while institutions stand for structures. I therefore situate the CDF program within a structural functionalist theory in an attempt to understand why the program has failed to realize citizen participation. In this case I look at the level of autonomy in decentralization of the fund by the state (political system), the powers vested in various players within the CDF program (functions), the offices involved
(rules) and even most important the institutional framework (structures) upon which the program is anchored.

Structural functionalism in this case offers an explanation, but the theory has shortcomings. The functionalist explanation blames the political system (state) for clamping powers (functions) to the legislators and by extension their committee members (bureaucratic offices/rules) which hinder the functionality of the CDF as an institution. One would be prompted to ask why institutional structures would fail within a political system where functions/powers are clearly differentiated? To attempt to answer this question perhaps is the right step in fixing the ambiguity of functionalism and its obsession with institutions. Indeed, the theory is mostly criticized for its difficulty to define what a “system” really is and whether that clear differentiation really exists, and its focus on equilibrium, stability and survival (Groth, 1970). The shortcomings of functionalism theory must be traced from the attempts by comparativists in the 1960s who in their attempt to explain why Western democracies differed from those in the developing world wrongfully emphasized institutions while ignoring other causes.

Sangmpam’s (2007) argument which places primacy on what he terms society-rooted politics over institutions is useful in Pateman’s theory. Sangmpam argues that politics involves competition to control scarce resources and services and its corollary political power. The state and institutions are thus products of politics (political competition) and the political character of institutions is not an accident. In terms of relationship, therefore, politics creates the state which acquires its coercive sanction from the resultant political power; it also creates institutions. Institutions, he further argues can influence politics but of importance is that politics influences institutions more because of the very fact that institutions are products of politics. In the context
of the CDF and Kenyan society-rooted politics, three characteristics emerge. First, political elite have an appetite to control the purse-string for political gain. Second, there is always huge pressure for favoritism from legislator’s clan and community lineage considering that limited funds accrue from the CDF. And finally, as rational actors, legislators desire to take credit from the program to gain political mileage.

Sangmpam’s argument on the primacy of society-rooted politics brings a different perspective on institutions, thereby remedying the inadequacies of using functionalism to explain failures of the CDF program in Kenya. Participatory democratic theory further sheds light on how to go beyond the institutional failure argument. Carole Pateman’s Participatory Democratic Theory offers a philosophical argument on participation by citizens within the state. It shows the obsession of political sociology with stability of a political system just like the functionalist theory. The philosophical argument better corroborates the argument on politics as it relates to the state, institutions and citizens. Pateman (1972) anchors Participatory Democratic Theory within the larger classical theory of democracy beginning with Jean Jacques Rousseau’s masterpiece *The Social Contract* which set the parameters of relationship between an individual and the state within a civil society. It then looks at the tenets of participatory democratic theory and counterarguments advanced by purveyors of the theory.

Pateman outlines four central tenets of the Participatory Democratic Theory. First, the theory asserts that capacities, skills and characteristics of individuals are interrelated with forms of authority structures through participation. Democratic institutions must therefore be viewed in terms of individual human beings and the human values they are meant to serve. In other words, individuals learn to participate by participating within the democratic structures. Second, the participatory democratic argument is an argument about democratization. Pateman argues that it
is about those changes that will make our own social and political life democratic both as individuals in their own lives or individuals in the wider society. Third, for a meaningful participatory democratic theory to occur there is need for creating a participatory society. Opponents of participatory democratic theory put primacy on national representative institutions. Pateman however asserts that such institutions are just a small part required for democracy. Finally, the required changes are structural in nature. They necessitate reforms of undemocratic sociopolitical structures which inhibit participatory processes.

Critics of Pateman’s theory contend that Participatory Democratic Theory is idealistic and that with the emergence of large and complex industrial societies and beginning of bureaucratic forms of organization, the much needed order and stability is impossible under the theory. The term “participation” also attracted unnecessary baggage during the totalitarian Weimar Republic in Germany. Political sociologists also cast doubt on feasibility of the theory arguing that there is a general citizen apathy which is even more prevalent among the lower socio-economic status citizenry.

Using structural functionalism, I view the CDF as an institution of the state. However, without first understanding the role politics plays in creating institutions and the state, one cannot adequately deal with the CDF. Participatory democratic theory, on the other hand, sheds light on the struggles (politics) involving citizens and the political power resulting from creation of the state and its institutions. The intersection between politics, state and institutions in my opinion offers a clearer lens with which to study the CDF as a state devolved fund in which citizen participation is expected. Pateman argues that the purported apathy from regular citizens towards state institutions such as the CDF program may be stemming from the elites’ usurping of power originally provided for in the Social Contract arrangement. Citizens thus need to be wary of
elitist vested interest in creating institutions and have to struggle within the political competition for space in such programs like the CDF

**Hypotheses**

The CDF faces two realities within the Kenyan political landscape. First, national politics tends to dominate local politics, which makes local politics to reflect the national political picture. National politics is transmitted to local politics through ethnically or regionally based political parties. The balance of power between MPs and the constituents is hugely disproportionate in favor of the MPs. MPs wield tremendous economic and political power via patronage. Second, clanism is an important determinant of local constituency politics. Before the CDF program, when constituents heavily relied on the legislator’s largesse, legislators tended to favor their own clans and their political allies. Even though patronage is not as pronounced as it was during the previous regime, there is still a high propensity for favoritism among legislators. The two situations lead to the following hypothesis:

**H1:** The unchecked and disproportionate powers of patronage and clanic favoritism of MPs are likely to hinder meaningful local citizen participation in the functioning of the CDF. Reducing the level of patronage and clanic favoritism of MPs will increase citizen participation.

**Interest of the study**

There has been a growing discontentment with the normative discourse on democracy especially its apparent inability to foster substantive inclusivity. How does one sustain the claim
that democracy is the best form of government when citizens living in “democracies” often complain about various forms of exclusion? The procedural minimum definition of democracy emphasizes regular, free and fair elections in which participation and contestation is guaranteed (Dahl, 1971). Critics of continued relevance of this emphasis contend that it is necessary but in itself not sufficient for a meaningful democracy. This research therefore seeks to contribute to making the concept of democracy more meaningful.

First, the work makes a strong case for the concept of deepening democracy. It contends that the procedural minimum definition of democracy as advanced by scholars such as Robert Dahl needs to be improved with more emphasis on the aspect of participation. By advancing a strong argument backed by empirical findings on the concept of deepening democracy, the work hopes to make democracy more meaningful and acceptable to regular citizens.

Second, the concept of deepening democracy through devolved funds has been well studied in Latin America since the end of military dictatorships in the 1980s. Elsewhere around the world, the concept is not as well studied. This thesis examines the CDF program as a participatory space within the larger participatory democracy debate. The study aims at identifying the structural weaknesses of the CDF program in Kenya, which impede effective local citizen participation.

Third, the work is timely for Kenya. Following a new constitution overwhelmingly passed in a national referendum in 2010, the country is expected to go into a full blown devolution system in 2013. On top of the CDF program, there will be numerous other democratic spaces opening at local levels where citizen participation is constitutionally guaranteed. This
study therefore offers the much needed practical input upon which future citizen participatory programs will be anchored.

Finally, this work is equally important for democracy promotion policy makers. It makes a strong argument that local citizen participation in micro-level political processes can have a significant bearing on a polity’s national democratic culture. This profound argument challenges the dominant focus on electoral reforms, institutions and constitutionalism. In so doing, the study offers a dimension which, when complemented with other mainstream democratization strategies, can lead to an even more robust democracy.

Methodology and Limitations

The broad methodology I use is structural functionalism but I rely on the quantitative and interview techniques. I gather data by administering questionnaires in two constituencies in Kenya. The questionnaires involve a total number of 116 respondents, about half each from the two constituencies drawn through purposive sampling. Characteristically, one of the two constituencies (Karachuonyo) is in a rural setting while the other (Embakasi) is based in the capital city Nairobi; this also allows my design to observe any differences in terms of rural and urban participation. I chose Karachuonyo constituency because, as a resident, I am conversant with the nuances of the politics as well as the geographical terrain. Embakasi constituency is the most populous constituency in Kenya.² It also has the various socio-economic classes as opposed to other urban constituencies which have either the poor or the rich. This allows the research to capture the class dynamics in political participation, if any. Embakasi constituency also has a

² According to the national census report 2009, Embakasi constituency is the most populous constituency in the country with 925,775 people. Here is the link: http://www.knbs.or.ke/Census%20Results/Presentation%20by%20Minister%20for%20Planning%20revised.pdf
legislator, who is controversially very popular with the masses, making it an interesting place to measure citizen participation from a bottom-up model. In each case respondents are drawn from three distinct regions within the constituency. For instance in the rural constituency of Karachuonyo, one region is where the local MP comes from, while the other two are distant from the MPs location, but at least in one of the locations there is a person who sits in the CDF committee.

In Embakasi, regional distinction is based on a totally different criterion. The first region is a slum characterized by poor residents, petty traders, and a working class population. It is also a region infamous for a nationally and internationally known environmental-political issue. The environmental-cum political issue is a waste dumpsite which naturally should form the epicenter of the region’s politics. In deed a perimeter wall around the dumpsite built using CDF funds would suggest to a researcher that there was probably a great deal of citizen participation. The second region is selected purely based on the fact that it is located further from the city, the third is predominantly inhabited by the urban middle class. In each of the six regions of the constituency, about 20 respondents are targeted.

The research also uses informal interviews to bolster the understanding of nuances of citizen participation and institutional structures and functions. In particular, there were three informal interviews, one with a local vernacular radio presenter who worked with local political leaders, civic organizations and constituents within the CDF program. The second one was with a local government consultant and former employee of the Ministry of Local Government who

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3 Odhiambo M’cOwiti was for over eight years a presenter with Ramogi Radio, a Dholuo vernacular station where he did a lot of development related programs within Nyanza region. According to him, Gem constituency was the best run because of involvement of the local professionals.
has worked extensively with various devolved funds in Kenya and South Sudan. The last informal interview was with a former legislator, who is the original brainchild of the CDF program. The research also makes use of personal field notes made from observations while conducting the research.

In terms of limitations, due to time and financial constraints the research was only able to deal with 2 out of 210 constituencies. Although there are many structural similarities within constituencies regarding the CDF program nationally, it is perhaps naïve to generalize from the two constituencies. Originally my design also targeted administering questionnaires on CDF committee members, a goal I was not able to achieve due to unavailability of the committee members despite constant attempts over three months to reach out to them.

**Chapter Outline**

The thesis has six chapters. Chapter two is a Literature Review. It discusses the concept of deepening democracy at the grassroots level. It largely focuses on Latin America in general and Brazil in particular. It attempts to answer such questions as: What makes local participatory programs really work? Why do such programs fail elsewhere? Are there unique explanations to regions where the programs work? Is there any evidence linking deepened democracy to a national democratic culture where it has worked? The chapter also summarizes the theoretical debate on civic culture, its acquisition and role within democracy.

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4 I interviewed Ms Alice Oyalo, a consultant on issues of state decentralization and who previously worked with the Ministry of Local Government in charge of decentralized funds and citizen participation. She argued that Kenya has had many decentralization programs, but both the state and citizens have not worked together.

5 I interviewed Hon. Engineer Muriuki Karue, the former MP for Ol Kalou constituency; he came up with the idea of CDF and spent over five years lobbying for it against resistance by the state. In his original idea, the MP envisioned both development and citizen involvement.
Chapter three is solely dedicated to Kenya, contextualizing the thesis within certain broad historical realities of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial Africa. It seeks to trace political exclusion from a historical perspective in Kenya, by discussing the question of citizenship, the rise of sectarian political cleavages and identities, the advent of the struggle for democracy and state legitimacy concerns, and other devolved fund programs.

Chapter four is a brief discussion of the CDF program in Kenya. It attempts to answer questions like: How really does the CDF program look like? What are the functions of various structures? How do local citizens identify with it? The chapter mainly relies on the revised 2007 CDF Act but also uses other secondary documents, mainly reports from the civil society and NGOs.

Chapter five is dedicated to quantitative research findings. It entails hypothesis testing and discusses the implications of the specific research questions on the CDF as a space for local citizen participation. The final chapter discusses the impact of deepened democracy at local levels on the national polity. It proposes recommendations about the CDF program and about how devolved funds in general could be opened up for citizen participation.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

There is an abundant literature on local democratization experiments in Latin America, where interesting citizen participation in political processes began in the 1980s with the rise of Left leaning governments. Scholars who have been studying citizen participation in local political processes in Latin America refer to the phenomenon as ‘deepening democracy’ (Goldfrank, 2011). Goldfrank contends that the concept of deepening democracy involves moving from the usual regular elections and taking further steps in strengthening citizenship and democratizing the state. He defines “strengthening citizenship” as the process of transforming residents from passive subjects in dependent relationships with particular politicians or parties into active citizens who know that they have political rights, that they can legitimately make demands on the government for public services and that they can make their voices heard in political debates (Goldfrank, 2011 p.13). Goldfrank’s conceptualization of deepening democracy and strengthening citizenship resonate with my research on the Constituency Development Fund.

Participatory Democracy and Civic Culture

The importance of citizen participation, especially the poor who oftentimes are disproportionately disadvantaged in terms of access to political power, cannot be understated. Valenzuela (2002) argues that if given the opportunity, the poor and marginalized people can build strong and sustainable organizations, build enormous generosity and solidarity, successfully improve their quality of life, generate participation and accountability mechanisms, and stimulate the emergence of democratic leadership. Diamond (1999) underscores the crucial role of meaningful, representative, local government to democratic vitality in five broad overlapping ways. First, it helps foster democratic values and skills among citizens. Second, it
increases accountability and responsiveness to local interests and concerns. Third, it provides additional channels of access to power for historically marginalized groups and thus improves the representativeness of democracy. Fourth, it enhances checks and balances vis-à-vis power at the center. Fifth, it provides opportunities for parties and factions in opposition at the center to exercise some measure of political power. Diamond further argues that each of these functions enhance the legitimacy and stability of democracy.

Valenzuela’s and Diamond’s assertions about the potential of the poor and marginalized and importance of participation can be further bolstered by the argument advanced by sociologists on the concept of social capital. Evolving from Marx’s conceptualization of capital within economic realms and later into human capital (skills, education, talents etc.) social capital has become a central focus of political analysis today. Lin (2001) defines social capital as a resource that individuals could gain by working with others. It essentially implies involvement beyond the self. Through working with others, Lin observes, human beings develop social networks and resources which the networks bring to individuals (personal connections, enhanced knowledge and wherewithal etc.) Social capital includes economic goods too. My research is interested in the concept of social capital as a contribution of a deepened democracy to a polity.

Not all participatory processes work successfully. Each usually experiences its own bottlenecks. What then should help a successful or working participatory program? An effective participatory process has certain prerequisites, such as pre-existing strong civic organizations or culture that favors participation. Where they are absent, it takes time to build them (Abers, 1998). According to Abers there can be initial conflicts in the process of establishing a functioning local participatory citizenship, which can take up to 4-5 years for strong civic groups to emerge. Abers’ research examined the transition from clientelism to cooperation in Porto
Alegre, Brazil, specifically how participatory policy led to the emergence of a culture of civic organizing. The research observed initial skepticism among residents, which changed gradually due to encouragement from the government and because of noticeable benefits to groups which participated. Neighborhood associations started holding large and regular meetings and thereafter started to promote activities that went beyond the budget discussion. Abers observed that the motive of obtaining localized benefits broadened and the people started thinking about the whole district and about how neighborhood groups could work together to realize their potential. Abers sums up the civic organizing as having reflected not only in the way people voted but also the way they perceived the process of deliberation.

The presence of local organizing groups at the launch and promotion of a participatory process also matters (Font & Galais, 2011). The authors’ research sought to examine how ideology, external support and civil society influence the quality of local participation. Regarding civil society their study points to three positive effects of the presence of civil society at the launch and promotion of local participatory programs. The first is the partnership effect in which the presence of two or more promoters results in scrupulous procedures due to increased scrutiny. Second, the presence of local organizing groups will normally mean a greater degree of cooperation from organized civil society. Finally, the same presence also acts as a guarantee of the significance of the experience because local groups usually will not waste time in poorly planned processes with uncertain effects. If Font & Galais’ findings are anything to go by, then genuine participation needs the role of local organizing civil groups.

The quality of deliberation also matters. It is one thing for citizens to have access to a participatory forum, yet it is another altogether for their contribution to impact final decisions. Savini (2011) identifies the nature of participants, the political environment, previous
experiences of local participation and individual preferences of participants as contextual factors on which outcomes of deliberations depend. Participants should have some degree of readiness to engage authorities; such prerequisites basically are found in civic skills, political consciousness, and education. Participation can only thrive where some political goodwill for it exists, so the political environment is crucial.

Savini further discusses the concepts of empowerment and endowment as central elements of participation. Empowerment is a measure of the significance of the role of the citizen in public decision making. The term is used to assess the functioning of democratic institutions by determining citizens’ access to social power, political power and psychological power. Social power refers to access to social organizations, financial resources and information. Political power is defined in terms of access to decision making while psychological power has to do with an individual’s sense of effective potency. Citizens are considered empowered if they have the effective capacity to access political arenas and to influence decisions that affect them. Savini, however, faults the empowerment perspective in assessing citizen participation on three grounds. First, calculating empowerment does not say much on modalities under which it is created. Second, the concept is multidimensional thus there is a need for a rigorous examination of the various indicators of empowerment. Finally, the empowerment approach may mislead especially due to its focus on decisions and not processes.

The inadequacies of the empowerment approach to citizen participation forced Savini to rethink his interpretation. He brings up the concept of endowment which emphasizes an assessment based on structures, procedures and the rights to access decision making. Such an institutional design, Savini argues, provides participants with the rules of the game. Savini further identifies three dimensions of endowment: type of participant, procedures of participation
and the way deliberative arenas are connected to formal decision making bodies. The type of participant deals with the socio-political character of participants, their affiliations to community groups, and the nature of their entitlement to participate in the process. Procedures of participation dimension refers to the structure and procedure of participation, paying particular attention to the formal arenas where discussions take place, the internal organization roles and the type of expertise that mediates the process. The final dimension of endowment refers to the procedures and devices that establish the links between the forums of discussion and the local government actors as well as those rules that guide their interaction.

Perhaps another important question to worry about while discussing the possibility of deepening democracy through local citizen participation is how the process (of deepening democracy) really works. For citizen participation to be feasible, some level of civic consciousness about the citizens’ political environment is necessary. Does democracy make citizens acquire civic virtues or is it the other way round? Earlier researches largely acknowledged existence of competing explanations to this question: Inglehart (1988) for example terms the relationship between civic culture and the presence or absence of modern social structures as chicken-versus-egg question.

My point of departure, which is citizen participation gradually creating a civic culture that deepens democracy, is aware of the chicken-egg conundrum. Almond and Verba’s work of 1963 is perhaps the starting point in grasping the concept of civic culture in relation to participation. Traditional understanding of civic culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), social capital (Putnam, 1993) and an autonomous civic sphere (Tocqueville, 1988) assumes civics as independent of, not caused by, and usually existing prior to the state. The prior existence of civil characteristics thus becomes an anchor upon which the state may establish a democratic society.
Clearly, these scholars’ position conflicts with the general belief among political sociologists, who do not see much participation among regular citizens, especially those of the lower socioeconomic status. My broad aim is to understand how citizen participation can nurture a civic culture, which favors democracy.

Almond and Verba (1963) were concerned with the question of “the political culture of democracy and the social structures and processes that sustain it” (p.3). The authors had predicted a pattern in which large groups of people, who have been marginalized politically, would increasingly demand their involvement and the political elite would commit to include these groups. They term this phenomenon as “participation explosion”. It is against this background that their work opens with the contention that a democratic form of participatory political system entails a political culture consistent with it. In an attempt to analyze the spread of Western democracy elsewhere, the authors identify two obstacles faced by the process. The first factor was the nature of the democratic culture itself and, second, the “archaic” technologies and social systems in the receiving polities. The second obstacle implies the importance of preconditions, a favorable cultural orientation in the recipient polities which sustain democracy.

The argument of a political culture consistent with a democratic form of participation is not clear on cause-effect mechanism. Perhaps one interpretation is that the culture is required both as a prerequisite and as a concomitant condition. Almond and Verba therefore define political culture as “the specifically political orientations- attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (p.13). Almond and Verba then sum civic culture as, “a participant political culture in which the political culture and political structure are congruent.” (p.17). This definition of civic culture introduces another important term-- political structure.
By political structure, Almond and Verba refer to legislative bodies, executive and
government bureaucracies. The structural functioning involves inputs and outputs in which the
former means the flow of demands from the society to the polity while the latter implies the
conversion of these demands into authoritative policies. When citizens are involved in both the
input and the output stages within a political structure, Almond and Verba terms the culture a
participant political culture. Although the term “involved” here is rather vague and needs
operationalization, my study on citizen participation in the CDF program clearly aims at creating
a participant political culture as defined by these authors. The CDF program creates the
opportunity for local citizens to develop certain attitudes about the political system and how they
view their roles within that system.

**Deepening Democracy in Latin America**

Left-leaning governments in Latin America introduced various citizen participatory
programs from mid 1980s after transition to democracy. These programs were successful in
certain regions and not in others. In order to locate the prerequisites and favorable conditions of
participatory democracy, this section will look at the reasons given for the failures and success
stories in some of those programs. One of the success stories is Porto Alegre in Brazil. First, it
briefly discusses the historical context upon which various grass root social movements and
NGOs emerged in Latin America, how they generally played a pivotal role in establishing a
thriving civil society in the region and their various vicissitudes over time. Second, it provides a
broad but relevant overview of the Brazilian society or polity in order to situate the Porto Alegre
participatory experiments into context.
Latin America has witnessed many initiatives of what Almond & Verba (1963) term “participation explosion.” Some of these programs have partially succeeded, fully succeeded and failed for different reasons. The patterns of interaction between local organizations and the state determine the success or failure of a participatory program (Canel, 2010). Such patterns of association are what Canel calls “associational culture”, which emerges historically under a particular socio-political environment. The associational culture then creates a political-cultural context in which social movements and civic society organizations operate. Canel’s argument implies that at least for a participatory program initiated by the state authorities to work, two prerequisites are necessary. First, the state must provide the conducive atmosphere for interaction. Second, the point of departure of citizens participating must be a culture which is compatible with democracy.

The thriving citizen participatory experiments in various parts of Latin America are results of both efforts from above and below (Cameron, 2010). However it is the efforts from below to which the architecture upon which the contemporary participatory spaces being witnessed in the region have to be credited (Foweraker, 2001). Mercer (2002) however cautions that evaluating the role which such social movements and NGOs have played in the democratization process in Latin America should not be oversimplified and must be done both spatially and temporally. Foweraker identifies four distinct historical phases through which the civil society in Latin America has evolved with each phase defined by the prevailing political situation of the moment. Such political situations at different phases determined both the scope and impact of the social movements on democratization of the region.

The first phase of social movements in Latin America according to Foweraker started between 1930s and 1960s which was characterized by populist regimes at the wake of
nationalization and import substitution policies. As such the state was the guarantor of scarce resources. The central issues around which urban grassroots organizations mobilized were provision of public utilities, social services and access to land. Foweraker observes that the significant development by the social movements in Latin America at this point was their ability to coin such demands in the language of rights. The second phase in the evolution of these social movements was in the 1970s, a period characterized by authoritarian regimes across the region. The social movements continued with demands for rights but also brought in the important question of citizenship demands. The third phase of the social movements was in the 1980s as the region transited into democracy. The advent of neoliberal democracy in the region came with a renewed rhetoric of institutionalism, restoring the universal promise of constitutional rights. Such rhetoric watered down the strength of most social movements while co-opting others. The focus of such social groups shifted to gender issues, pursuit of human rights beyond the neoliberal rhetoric and basic survival. The last phase in the evolution of social movements at the turn of the millennium has coincided with more ascendancy of regimes committed to more genuine inclusion. The demands have thus been anchored on micro-finance issues such as communal banks, cooperatives and credit unions.

**The Porto Alegre (Brazil) Experiment**

The most lauded participatory program in Latin America is that of Porto Alegre in Brazil (Abers, 1998, Gret & Sintomer, 2005, Baiocchi 2005, Wampler & Avritzer, 2004 and Goldfrank, 2011). Porto Alegre must thus be viewed as a culmination of back and forth struggles between social movements faced with issues contingent on a particular time period and the state. The degree to which social movements pervade a country is therefore a crucial determinant of whether citizen participatory programs succeed or not.
Brazil is one the largest countries in the Americas and with its economic potential and emerging role in regional and international affairs, the focus on it will continue for some time. It is a vast country with a federal system comprising 26 states and Brasilia with a diverse multi-ethnic composition; it is the fifth most populous country in the world and is largely recognized as a thriving democracy with an impressive network of sophisticated and well organized civil society groups. From 1964 to 1985 Brazil was ruled by a military dictatorship: the transition from dictatorship to democracy took place between 1985 and 1988; the free elections to Congress in 1986; new constitution in the autumn of 1988; and the first free presidential elections in 1989. The period between 1985 and 1989/90 is considered the period of transition to democracy. However, the emergence of new political actors and civil society had taken root in the early 1970s. It was during this time that blacks, women, student and indigenous groups-operating above and below ground would begin to challenge the dictatorship (Dixon: Personal Interview).

Brazil is relevant to this thesis for three reasons. First, its ethnic diversity is an interesting variable to look at in terms of how this may facilitate or hinder local citizen participatory initiatives, considering that not all participatory experiments in the various regions of Brazil have been successful. Second, the emergence of an avalanche of social movements challenging the dictatorship since the 1970s means that such social movements have had over thirty years to transform themselves into formidable players within the diverse socio-political rubric of Brazil. Finally, and what may appear very similar to Kenya, the ascendancy of President Lula da Silva, a staunch supporter of left-leaning participatory programs in 2002 after several previous attempts, was an important impetus to the vitality of the participatory programs. In deed as Gret & Sintomer (2005, p. viii) “Lula’s election is a break in this vicious circle. It makes everybody look
at the social world differently, and understand that what had been considered as fate is only a historical contingency that can be changed.”

Goldfrank identifies three levels of the society which hold success or failure of a participatory process and which all were suitable in Porto Alegre. For a local level participation to succeed, three levels of factors (meso-level, micro-level and macro-level) need to be in place (Goldfrank, 2010). Macro-level factors refer to the availability of financial resources with which the program can be run. These factors facilitate decentralization while also giving the local level capacity to handle participation.

The micro-level factors refer to the trust and solidarity that is built among the local communities. That social capital and presence of social movements are critical for success of a participatory process is an argument which has a fair amount of consensus among scholars (Abers, 1998; Avritzer & Wampler, 2004; Baiocchi, 2005). As Goldfrank puts it, “…the local civil society organizations be especially vigorous, autonomous and capable of contentious collective action” (2010, p. 27). Political parties and organizational strategies form the meso-level factors. A politically powerful proponent of state-society forums mostly from the Left is needed. Gret and Sintomer (2005) give credit to former municipal council leaders, whom the Lula regime turned into ministers dealing directly with the participatory programs. Goldfrank observes that Left leaning parties must overcome two challenges. First, they must design the participatory forum in a fashion that maximizes citizen participation. Second, they have to overcome the resistance from the opposition party, from within and from the bureaucratic system.
In Caracas the participatory program failed (Goldfrank, 2011). According to Goldfrank the failure was due to a very restrictive municipal authority which dominated the whole program. The left leaning government had replaced a strongly institutionalized party system, which restricted the arenas for citizen participation. The strong opposition party ensured that the participatory process did not give meaningful powers to citizens. The real decision making power remained in the hands of political party representatives which discouraged citizen participation and revitalization of community organizations. Caracas thus had two limitations to citizen participation. First the structural basis for the program did not encourage meaningful citizen participation. Second, the prerequisite culture in Caracas, characterized by a strong party system, was unfavorable for citizen participation. The Caracas case illustrates that a deepened local democratization may not necessarily be a consequence of state funded programs. In Rio, failure has also been attributed to restrictive municipal authority. 6

In Porto Alegre, two factors ensured success of the participatory budgeting (Goldfrank, 2011, Canel, 2010). First, the decentralization of national authority and the fact that resources at local levels were sufficient. When the national government genuinely and fully decentralizes, local citizens do not run onto bottle-necks which frustrate participation. Citizens will only get the motivation to participate if they believe that there are adequate resources to get things done. Otherwise, they will dismiss participation without resources as a waste of time (Font & Galais, 2011). Decentralization and availability of resources thus go hand in hand. According to Crook (1996) however, extra resource in itself does not improve responsiveness.

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6 The link provides a researcher’s first hand experiences in a social policing participatory forum in two favelas of Rio where the program (UPP) was characterized by restrictive authorities thwarting genuine participation by local residents. 
http://rioonwatch.org/?p=3582
Second, in Porto Alegre, the opposition parties were also weak. As opposed to Caracas, where the parties used their institutionalized strength to frustrate participation, limited opposition allowed the progressive incumbents to design meaningful participatory institutions which attracted and sustained citizens. An important question to raise and which makes this work to be invaluable towards deepening democracy is how the civic skills that may be acquired through a particular participatory process actually transcend the program. It is in the diffusion of such skills among citizens which actually counts.

The successful participatory experiment in Brazil has not only deepened democracy within the program. Scholars who have studied the effects provide compelling stories which support the notion that once citizens acquire skills within the confines of the programs, their behaviors elsewhere exhibit “exportation of the civic skills.” First, the relationship between the state and citizens within a participatory arrangement usually aims at promoting values of cooperation and reciprocity (Abers, 1998). Abers argues that this relationship is clearly political in that the Leftist governments aimed at generating wide support for their ruling parties. Specifically the governments concern is to gain support from poor neighborhoods while building a reputation for democratic government. The citizens, on the other hand, are driven by the expectations of public goods provision. It is the degree of decentralization which then distinguishes genuine participatory program from an outright state corporatism. In Porto Alegre, this mutual relationship went beyond both actors expectations as Abers observes:

The end result went well beyond mere electoral strategy leading to a fundamental transformation of political life in Porto Alegre as neighborhoods residents that had earlier served as powerless cogs in clientelist machines were now active participants in public life, organized into representative civic associations and engaging in an open, transparent debate about government policy (1998:534).
Abers also points at the increased associationalism. Increased associationalism here should be viewed as a manifestation of developments consistent with Inglehart’s interpersonal trust as a measure of civic culture. In successful participatory programs in Latin America, the participation went beyond fixed citizens’ official neighborhoods associations. Porto Alegre citizens also participated in community centers, mothers’ clubs and informal street commissions. It is therefore not far-fetched to imagine that citizens who have participated in larger successful projects can ably transfer certain civic skills to these smaller associations.

Goldfrank also observes certain structural-functionalist outcomes of participatory programs consistent with Pateman’s theory. In the Porto Alegre program, there was a change in the structure of neighborhood associations. Before the participatory budgeting program started, the nature of state-citizen relationship was more of a presidentialist top-down structure with instructions trickling from above giving little or sometimes no room for consultation. The participatory program gradually changed this into a more genuinely participatory bottom-up style. In such districts as Gloria and Extremo Sul, citizens began holding more regular meetings and elections among themselves. They demonstrated better civic organizing skills in terms of rules of meetings, penalties, etc. Such collective behavioral characteristics according to Goldfrank have a direct bearing on democracy especially in neighborhoods which never practiced them previously. In areas where strong civic organizations had existed prior to the budget policy, the transformation was characterized by new neighborhoods gaining strength while older leadership lost influence (Abers, 1998). In other words, the citizens involved gain some practice in new ways of exercising their citizenship (Pateman, 2012).

Redistribution of resources which creates a fairly equal polity is an important factor in political economy theories of democracy. In all the successful participatory programs in Latin
America, there was a general influx of participants. The burgeoning number of participants is attributed to the realization of futility of individual efforts and the emphasis on group organizations in order to benefit from participatory budgeting (Abers, 1998, Canel, 2010, Goldfrank, 2011). Specifically about low income citizens, Wampler (2007) argues that the programs forced them into “institutionalized political environment where they engage in meaningful negotiations with their fellow citizens and government officials.” (p.73). Wampler further contends that in so doing, the programs mitigate the most intense social, political and economic differences, destroys rigid class lines allowing poor citizens to participate in broader political exercises. In other words, as an outcome of institutions which delegate authority to citizens, there has been eroding cynicism about politics, politicians, elections and policy outcomes.

The participatory experiments in Latin America have drawn the attention of scholars of democratization around the world. The success story of Porto Alegre particularly poses the question of whether transferability is possible. Some Latin American scholars on democratization argue that the Porto Alegre circumstances were uniquely favorable and that explains why similar attempts elsewhere do not yield as much success, or even worse, fail altogether. Goldfrank admits that the three reasons that explain the success in Porto Alegre (degree of decentralization, availability of resources, and absence of strong opposition parties) can all be invalidated if they are culturally specific or if they are transferrable. In order to widen the research on the same question, it is imperative that other similar experiments be examined. The CDF experiment offers the opportunity for such an examination
Chapter 3: Historical Background: Exclusion and the Emergence of Contestation in Kenya

The Constituency Development Fund program in Kenya is a culmination of historical struggles both ideologically and practically to bridge a perennial socioeconomic gap among the population. One needs therefore a grasp the historical origins of political marginalization and inequality in Kenya in order to understand the CDF better. Such origins can be traced back to colonial rule as it (re)structured African societies. But one needs also an account of Kenya’s post-colonial state, neopatrimonialism, politics of exclusion, and the emergence of social pressure on which socio-political innovations like the CDF can be credited.

Origins of the Neopatrimonial State

Bratton & Van De Walle (1997) define a neopatrimonial political system as one in which the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law. As such, they observe that the right to rule is ascribed not to an office but to a person. Leaders are in public office not to perform public service but to acquire wealth and status and so purposely blur the line between private and public interests. Bratton and Van De Walle further observe that the essence of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors both within the state and in society while in return the clients mobilize political support and refer all decisions upwards as a mark of deference to patrons.

A neopatrimonial political system uses favors to reward its loyal supporters be it individuals or groups, while intentionally blocking opponents from access to political power. As long as a neopatrimonial regime has enough support to keep it in power, it usually does not care about the rest of the population. This makes every individual or group aspire to be in good books
with the state so as to enjoy the favors that power has to offer. But given the scarce nature of the state resources, in practice, favoritism has a limit. This means that there will always be excluded groups.

Colonial rule, which strategically balkanized African societies into “tribes”, pitting them against each other in a divide and rule policy, is an important point of departure for grasping systemic marginalization in post-colonial states. Such balkanization is what Mahmood Mamdani refers to as colonial containerization of Africans into ethnic ascriptions (tribes).\(^7\) Colonialists later stratified such “containers” into good tribes (collaborators) and bad ones (those who resisted). The collaborators were thus on the “windward” side of the colonial masters’ largesse while those who resisted remained on the “leeward” side. This concept also applied to individual African colonial chiefs who through their collaboration, soon begun exhibiting trappings of power while those who resisted were literally overthrown. Therefore for both African colonial administrative leaders and the regular masses, the premium on loyalty was high. Facing massive resistance, the administrators would dangle the carrot and occasionally placate groups of people.

The containerization of African ethnic groups during the colonial era into collaborators, and therefore good; and resistors and therefore “bad” molded the “good tribes” into inheriting power. In strict Weberian sense, the patrimonial type of authority which characterized pre-colonial African societies was not synonymous with corruption, bad governance, violence, tribalism or weak states as contemporary political science literature portray it (Pitcher, et al. 2009). Pitcher et al. further observes that the notion of reciprocity within African pre-colonial patrimonial societies had a deliberate oversight role which checked forms of exploitation.

\(^7\) Jacqueline Klopp’s (2001) article which focuses on how the state in Kenya used ethnic clashes to win elections cites Mahmood Mahmdani’s historical account tracing the colonial constructions of tribalism which containerized various ethnic communities in Kenya.
Odinga’s (1976) account of how colonialism transformed pre-colonial chiefs from custodians of people’s tribal laws and customs into accumulators exemplifies neopatrimonial forms of authority created by colonialism and which later manifested themselves into the attendant post-colonial states. Through containerization of Africans into ethnic ascriptions, allowing the “good tribal chiefs” to accumulate thereby altering the rubric of African pre-colonial patrimonial societal relations, neopatrimonialism inevitably characterized the post-colonial African state. Sangmpam (2007) even argues that neopatrimonialism is characterized by inherent undemocratic traits thus it is tautological to attempt to explain absence of democracy in Africa by neopatrimonialism.

According to Clapham (1985) however, neopatrimonialism existed in normal forms of political organization in pre-colonial societies. This claim is corroborated by Berman (1998)’s analysis of the pre-colonial African societies. He observes complex differentiations of wealth and power even in those pre-colonial societies which were ‘stateless’. He further posits that the communities were pervaded by relations of domination and dependence based on patriarchal power which created a patron-client relationship. “‘Big men’ presided over intricate networks of clientage involving reciprocal but unequal relations with ‘small boys’ as well as power over women and children…” (Berman, 1998:311). Berman argues that even though pre-colonial African societies had some patron-client relationship, the arrival of colonialists and their consequent introduction of the global economy of capitalism profoundly influenced in form, scope and content the African socioeconomic and political configuration. Colonialism, he further asserts, produced a partial and extremely skewed representation of Europe through the state, missions, merchant capital and even settler communities. It reproduced bureaucratic institutions of political domination. Berman contends that the strategic logic of political control in the
colonial state rested on particular application of divide and rule, a practice characterized by fragmenting and isolating African political activity thereby inhibiting the spread of opposition and resistance.

Berman’s in-depth examination of the patron-client relationship between European district administrators and the local chiefs has three consequences which are crucial in understanding neopatrimonial African state after independence and even the emergence of contestation. First, administrators sought to supplement the chiefs’ meager salaries and rewarded them with benefits which only accrued to collaborators. This created the notion that it is only the state which is the principle source of benefits of modernity and development. It also reinforced the belief that it is only through patron-client relations that one would access the state and its resources, a belief which is still widespread in Kenya today. Secondly, through the chiefs’ increasing control of the peasant labor, access to land and distribution of state patronage and resources, the colonial state penetrated the exchange networks of the rural society. This compromised the colonial state’s ability to act as a benevolent paternal protector in factional conflicts of lineages and clans. Oginga Odinga’s autobiography Not Yet Uhuru expresses bewilderment on how the role of the chiefs changed from that of “custodians of people’s tribal laws and customs who never took advantage of their positions into accumulators”(Odinga, 1976:22). They were now civil servants employed by the colonial system with an appetite for accumulation and control of their subjects. Third, through active pursuit of wealth and distribution of patronage to families and supporters and occasional abuse of their powers extorting extra-legal payments from opponents, the chiefs became active agents in social differentiation and class formation.
The post-colonial state quickly built an administrative infrastructure which intertwined political control and business interests of the elite (Odinga, 1976). This move, Odinga observes, resulted in an easily controllable and corruptible middle class. This middle class bureaucracy complemented the provincial administration in executing the patrimonial control and close surveillance of the citizenry. This thesis posits that it is important to understand the nature of the state bureaucracy, provincial administration and the elite in Kenya and the common thread joining them in order to grasp both systemic exclusion and later hurdles to citizen participation. Bienen (1974) argues that even if one looks at the post independent political elite in Kenya in terms of benevolent elitism, the benevolence is absent. Instead, the privileged elite selectively distributed the gains acquired through alliances with Europeans in a fashion that exacerbated tribal tensions and also created them where they did not exist.

This appetite to amass wealth and redistribute it selectively was clear within Kenya’s colonial political economy. It has subsequently continued to manifest itself in many ways in the post-colonial African state, facing stiff resistance after the 1990s. Schatzberg (1993) offers an unusual approach to deconstructing power in post-colonial Africa through examining the political language which he opines portrays a real dialectical struggle. He asserts that “Only in understanding this task well will we begin to appreciate the conflict for the terrain of the mind occurring between those who control the state, on the one hand, and the powerless on the other” (Schatzberg, 1993:446). Schatzberg contends that power in Africa has three faces; the first face is that of consumption rather than transformation, second, a spiritual face and finally that of unity and indivisibility.
The political rhetoric depicts an image of the central government as a sumptuous pot of soup with mixed meat and fish which all nationalities wish to corner and eat alone. Schatzberg gives examples of Nigeria during the Second Republic, in the transition of a political party named “You chop, I chop” party. The term chop is used in West African pidgin to mean to eat. The party appealed to voters in the promise that both the voters and the candidates would get to “eat” if the party ascended to power implying that other regimes had locked others away from the state’s pot. In Kenya, Daniel Moi, the former authoritarian president who was in power for twenty four years, was famous for the political message in Kiswahili “Siása mbaya, maisha mbaya” which translates to “wrong choices in politics, poor life”, a message often targeting regions perceived to be supporting opposition political movements. As a matter of fact, there was clear difference in terms of development between regions in opposition and those that supported the government.

The second image is of a spiritual face in which the president’s powers are exaggerated both constitutionally and through propaganda machinery to the extent that over time he/she is perceived to possess supernatural abilities. The former Zairian (now DR Congo) president Mobutu Seseeko was perceived to have power over life, death and resurrection because of the tactical ways with which he used the constitutional powers of clemency. In Kenya, at the height of sycophancy within the patron-client arrangement in the late 1980s, president Moi earned the honorific title “mtukufu”, a Kiswahili word with the highest reverence usually reserved for God or the most sacred.

On unity and indivisibility, power in African politics for a long time has been difficult to divide. Whoever has it has it all thus creating a major social and political divide producing winners and losers. Swatzberg gives the example of former Kenyan president Moi who always
reminded his opponents, “… I am the only “father”, the only head of government of this country.” (Swatzberg, 1993:449). Indivisibility of power here should be construed to mean that there is only one hand capable of distributing the contents of the national pot and that whoever wants to chop is at the mercy of that hand.

In Kenya neopatrimonialism has had numerous specific manifestations of its resultant systemic marginalization. The exclusion is particularly prominent under land allocation which has been characterized by politically instigated inter-ethnic conflicts (Klopp, 2001; Onoma, 2010). Exclusion through the land resource, however, could not work well if the executive did not collude with the political elite and state bureaucracy. Even before independence, there was already a clear divide between the then only two political parties KANU and KADU. KANU consisted of elites drawn from the perceived big ethnic communities while KADU was for the perceived small ethnic communities which feared exclusion of the smaller ethnic communities in the post independent Kenya (Odinga, 1976). As a matter of fact, Bildad Kaggia, one of the heroes of independence alongside President Kenyatta was to fall out with the latter barely two years into independence in protest of Kenyatta’s about turn on the earlier commitment of redistributing land to the poor (Odinga, 1976).

Politically instigated conflicts and evictions which have occurred in the Rift Valley since independence have been facilitated by the administrative infrastructure. Onoma (2010) points out the essential role played by the bureaucracy under the Office of the President and the provincial administration later in the 1990s in evicting and later attaching the reversal of the eviction of those perceived as opposition sympathizers on guarantee of their political support. Such evictions and conflicts were also witnessed in other regions of the country although not as pronounced.
The pattern of political exclusion using land as a political resource in the Rift Valley led to the coinage of the Kiswahili word *madoadooa*, whose metaphorical usage in the broader Kenyan political context requires a further analysis for this work (Klopp, 2001). *Madoadooa* literally means “spots”. On a leopard skin for example, it is glaringly easy to identify the spots. In the Kenyan political context, *madoadooa* has been broadly used to refer to the “odd ones” within government assisted settled areas. In cosmopolitan settlements especially in the Rift Valley, ethnic groups which are usually minorities in the place and with different political opinion have borne the brunt of intimidation, eviction or worse, death. The *madoadooa* phenomenon could also be stretched nationally to refer to regions which were perceived as opposition areas especially in the national politics up to 2003.

**The Emergence of Contestation**

This chapter has so far encapsulated the origins of the neopatrimonial state as a critical political tool of manipulation in Kenya since independence. It has also looked at the axis of the executive, bureaucracy and elite with whose blessings several forms of political exclusion have taken place particularly under the first two post independent regimes (1963-2002). I will now shift focus to various forms of responses from the Kenyan masses against such forms of exclusion that led to the CDF program. Conceptually, this section is pegged on what Patricia McFadden (2007) terms “Post-coloniality.” Post-coloniality is the emergence of contestation among those who have occupied instruments of the state and those whose interests have been pushed to the periphery (McFadden, 2007 p.37). The social forces in Kenya started in the late 1980s but gained momentum in the early 1990s. At this time, there emerged tremendous
democratization demands both in Africa and globally which played an instrumental role towards change.

The civil society organizations played an invaluable role in the democratization agenda in Kenya. Nasong’o (2007) compares the role of the civil society organizations (CSOs) in Africa to that of Lenin’s strong vanguard Communist Party in political mobilization and education of the masses. Nasong’o further observes that after an attempted coup in Kenya in 1982, president Moi orchestrated several constitutional amendments which not only made Kenya a de jure one-party state, but also made the country a “personal state”, in which no legal form of opposition was possible. This development led to the proliferation of CSOs albeit with intense state reprisals. Among such prominent CSOs were Release Political Prisoners (RPP-1991), Institute for Civic Education in Africa (ICEDA-1992), Center for Legal Aid and Research International (CLARION-1992), Center for Legal Education and Aid Networks (CLEAN-1995), National Convention Executive Council (NCEC-1997), Media Institute (1997) and National Youth Movement (NYM-1998). As the names suggest, these CSOs largely dealt with civic education and provision of legal awareness and redress at the height of the state dictatorship. These organizations were largely donor-funded, a fact that state propaganda machinery constantly labeled as neocolonialism thereby watering down some of their benign intentions.

The opposition politicians also played an important part in the struggle both within parliament and in the public domain through charged political rallies across the country. Their most significant contribution was their success in pushing for the repeal of section 2(a) of the constitution in 1991. This repeal, widely agreed upon as the major turning point in Kenya’s struggle for democracy, reversed the constitutional amendment which had earlier declared Kenya a de jure one party state in 1982. Subsequently, in the 1992 general elections, opposition
politicians fielded candidates for the presidency, parliament and civic seats. Although the opposition lost due to internal divisions, this marked the beginning of competitive politics whose fruits came a decade later in 2002. The second important contribution of the opposition politicians was through a body called Inter-Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG) in 1997. The IPPG sought to institutionalize some minimum pre-election reforms which would ensure a level playing field especially for opposition candidates. According to Barkan (1998), the formation of the IPPG was a gesture that president Moi was open to some level of dialogue following internal and international pressure ahead of 1997 general elections. Even though Moi dictated the rules of the game, about 70 opposition and 80 moderate government members of parliament formed the parliament led IPPG negotiations. Although the numbers kept fluctuating depending on the issue of debate, minimal electoral reforms before the election and Moi’s agreement to establish a national constitution review commission are gains which came to fruition after 2002.

Not to be left behind were religio-political movements, such as the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Mungiki, a radical pseudo-religious ethnic movement. According to Nasong’o (2005), NCCK, an umbrella organization of protestant churches in Kenya consistently opposed the ruling party’s politics of exclusion; For example, it opposed queue voting system in 1988, disseminated civic education materials during 1992 elections, and remained the voice of moral reason during major national debates. The NCCK has played a major role in Kenya’s quest for a new constitution in the multiparty era.

Mungiki is a religio-political group from Kenya’s single most populous ethnic community-Kikuyu with a history laden with contradictions. According to Gecaga (2007), the group initially started as a renaissance of Kikuyu culture advocating self-pride, self-reliance and the rejection of Western culture. Kagwanja (2003) compares the militancy of Mungiki at
inception to that of Mau Mau during the decolonization struggle of Kenya. According to Kagwanja, the etymological root of the name Mungiki, i.e. *ingiki* is a Kikuyu word that means crowds. Kagwanja further observes that the group draws its support from masses displaced from their lands by ethnic clashes. During state sponsored inter-ethnic clashes in Kenya in 1992 and 1997, land ownership issues and economic hardships necessitated the group’s gradual evolution into a militant resistance especially to the Kikuyu bourgeoisie (Gacaga, 2007 p.). The group soon grew into a formidable non state actor, filling the gap created by state incapacity through provision of security especially in urban slum settlements. In order to mobilize funding, the group started cartels controlling the public transport sector and extorting funds from the public and business owners. A confrontation between the state and the group soon ensued, at times taking a guerilla warfare fashion. This protracted battle with the state police forces, which was a clear protest against hard economic times necessitated by state has been largely viewed to have contributed to pressure for change. In fact, Kagwanja also adds that in the recent past, Mungiki has been viewed as an important focal point of the burgeoning “globalization from below” pressures.

The Kenyan women were not to be left behind either. Nasong’o and Ayot (2007) observe that the women through such professional organizations as International Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), League of Kenya Women Voters (LKWV), Education Center for Women in Democracy (ECWD), National Council for Women of Kenya (NCWK) and the Green Belt Movement immensely influenced the wave of change. In 1992 for instance, Professor Wangari Maathai, who was later to win a Nobel Peace Prize for her environmental justice activism, mobilized mothers of political prisoners into a hunger strike demanding their release. These
women stripped themselves naked in a public Park in urban Nairobi- clearly a taboo in African tradition in the face of police brutality forcing even international condemnation.

Music and Art which is usually contemporaneous to all societies did not let the period between 1990-2000 in Kenya go unattended. Haugerud (1995) has examined the role of what was termed as “seditious music” by the Moi dictatorship in the early 1990s. Such music was popularly played in matatu-the public transport system popular with the urban working class and middle class without private cars. The music discussed political themes of the time. Haugerud gives the example of Muoroto music in May 1990 which sang about state demolition of shanties of the poor and which likened that act to Operation Anvil against the Mau Mau in which the British colonial government in 1954 had destroyed poor peoples’ shanties. This song posited that there was no difference between the Moi regime and colonialism. Klopp (2008) refers to Muoroto music as a form of cultural manifestation of resistance against state sponsored evictions. Finally, performance art theatres acted Kiswahili versions of George Orwell’s famous play Animal Farm and other plays like Can’t Pay Won’t Pay. Such plays targeted the growing inequality within the society while also highlighting gender implications of the turbulent economic conditions by depicting women who could not afford escalating commodity prices. In that sense, art contributed to the rebellion against Kenya’s repressive state.

The other group which also had a formidable contribution was that of intellectuals. Amutabi (2007) notes that 1970s was the most prolific in terms of growth of intellectuals in East Africa. This phenomenon made universities attractive centers of intellectual debates where even politicians frequented to discuss thorny policy and national debates. University lecturers also engaged in demonstrations through lecturers’ organization University Academic Staff Union (UASU). The camaraderie between politicians and university lecturers was then to serve the
interests of opposition in building political vehicles with national support, for example the biggest opposition party Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) formed in 1992 was a product of University lecturers and opposition politicians. The triumphant NARC which swept the 24 year dictatorship in 2002 was also attributed to intellectuals’ input. A significant number of intellectuals were also detained or forced into exile due to their association with the opposition. The contribution of students in pressuring for reforms was also enormous. According to Mwangola (2007), with the authoritarian regime having declared most public spaces “sedition” to gather, the universities remained some of those rare spaces where intellectual debates on socio-political issues could take place with some degree of freedom. The universities occasionally organized strikes and demonstrations, through Literature Students Association of the University of Nairobi (LSA), the students organized drama gigs laced with scathing satire of the regime. Secondary Schools and Colleges national drama festivals also scathingly attacked the regime in their performances.

It will be inaccurate to point any single event as the ultimate consequence of the triumph of the opposition against nearly 40 years of authoritarianism in Kenya. Rather the credit must be shared among the various social forces as incremental contributors towards what is largely termed as the second liberation of the Kenyan republic in the 1990s. There are two implications of the transition in 2003, which have a direct bearing on participatory process. First, as earlier pointed, just one month into the 2002 general election, a Gallup International survey indicated that Kenyans were the most optimistic people in the world; of course, that has since changed. Second, the Kenyan electorate’s overwhelming mandate to fashion a new regime, which cuts across usual ethno-regional cleavages, was a profound national statement against previous exclusion patterns. There could be several interpretations of these developments. The optimism
implied that the citizenry would more than ever before be interested in any participatory initiatives that the new political dispensation would bring forth. On the other hand, the cross-cutting overwhelming mandate meant that the new regime would have to be very conscious about not exacerbating previous forms of exclusion. It was against such a background of the general goodwill from the state and the citizens that the Constituency Development Fund was set up. In the next chapter, I shift attention to discussing the structure and functionality of the CDF program.
Chapter 4: The Structure of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF)

The constituency development fund (CDF) came into force in the year 2003, coinciding with the ascension to power of a popularly elected regime which replaced a 24-year authoritarian order. The Act establishing the fund originally required that the treasury allocates 2.5% of all collected government ordinary revenue; this figure was changed to 7.5% in 2009. After four years, the CDF Act 2003 was amended in 2007 so as to remedy various loopholes in the original Act. Most studies on the CDF program have focused on the economic perspectives of the fund with little attention being given to participation.

In terms of accountability of the CDF, most of the studies have tended to focus on how the structures are accountable to the central government which devolves the funds and on efficiency of the program’s projects (Mwangi, 2005; Nyamori, 2009; Sangori, 2010). Nyamori’s work actually concludes that the systems of accountability within the CDF are skewed towards the needs of a centralized national planning, neglecting the aspect of citizen participation and development. In cases where participation has been covered, participation takes the perspective of citizens as rational choice actors within an economic space rather than participation within a democratic space provided by the program. For instance, numerous participatory examples are given where local businessmen win road, schools and health center tenders (IEA—Kenya, 2006, Gituto, 2007). Clearly this is not the kind of participation in which this thesis is interested. The only study on the CDF that closely relates to my thesis is by Gutiérrez-Romeru (2009) which makes two important conclusions. First, the use of CDF funds intensified nearer to the elections. Second, the probability of MPs being re-elected was not affected by the amount of the reported
funds spent but partly by how the CDF funds were spent. The first conclusion points towards the future role of the CDF in local politics while the second one suggests the potential of the CDF program to elevate the quality of citizen participation. This chapter looks at exactly how the CDF program works, with specific attention to the program’s aspects touching on democratic participation. It then gives anecdotal accounts drawn from my summer research on some of the practical issues that pop up during participation in the program.

My interview with Engineer Muriuki Karue, the Member of Parliament whose brainchild the program is, gave me some insights which are not in the mainstream discourse on the program but are vital in understanding the dynamics of citizen participation. The insights from my interview with the MP are also captured in detail in his chronicles of his experiences as an MP called *Episodes from an MP’s Diary*. In order to best grasp various reactionary forces within the program which manifest themselves through powers (functions) offices (rules) and structures (institutions) one needs to first understand the back and forth struggles that culminated into the CDF Act 2003. The former Member of Parliament first initiated the idea of the CDF program in 1999 but was quickly dismissed by the then highly authoritarian Moi government (Karue, 2011). The Moi government did not only have the adequate resources to devolve but was also uncomfortable with a semi-autonomous devolved fund which could threaten its heavy control of the masses at local levels.

When Engineer Muruiki Karue again reintroduced the bill after a new regime had just come into office, the government frustrated the bill for some time and at one point he was even asked to surrender the bill to the government which would then introduce it afresh in Parliament. It is after the former legislator vehemently resisted that the government allowed the bill to be passed in late 2003. Interestingly, it took several months again before the bill was finally gazetted
sometime in 2004. In his interpretation, the sponsor of the bill believed that the new regime also wanted to hijack the noble bill and use it in a manner that would provide them with political capital. It is against such forms of resistance that one has to begin understanding the institutional hurdles to meaningful citizen participation through the CDF program. A case in point is the section 23 (1) of Amended CDF Act (which was in the original Act) which gives the local MP powers to appoint a 15 member constituency development committee. In the former legislator’s original idea, such a committee would be constituted by local citizens, in which case participation may have taken a totally different path. Karue had to make such concessions given the massive resistance to some of the revolutionary components of the bill such as vesting the powers to constitute the committees in citizens. The next section summarizes the structure of the program and then identifies provisions of the Amended CDF Act of 2007 which have to do with participation.

At the national level, the CDF program is technically run by a National Constituency Development Fund Board as provided in section 5(1-6) of the amended Act 2007, which consists of Permanent Secretaries of relevant ministries, the Clerk to the National Assembly, the Attorney General, technocrats in law, economics, finance, accounting and community development. It is this board that the Members of Parliament of all constituencies are accountable to administratively. The board receives all annual project proposals from each constituency and may reject some on technical grounds. The board also nominates its representatives to each CDF committee.

The Member of Parliament does not only appoint the 15 member CDF committee but also chairs it according to section 23 (1-2) of the CDF Act 2007. This is one of the provisions of the program which is most criticized for its blanket powers vested on the MP. Incidences of
cronyism, nepotism and favoritism have characterized appointments of the CDF Committee members to an extent that significantly jeopardizes local citizen participation. In fact, the first ever committees formed when the program first rolled out consisted of legislators’ mistresses, wives, close relatives and friends until a public outcry necessitated correction. The MP also submits a list of project proposals from the constituency to the national board. The power to submit projects on behalf of the citizens emanates from the principle of representative democracy which gives Members of Parliament such presumptive legitimacy. The CDF Act operationalizes projects here as community based and with widespread cross sectional benefits to the inhabitants of a particular area. Because the MP and the CDF committee members are supposed to represent various interests of local inhabitants in this particular case their preferred projects, it is only logical that this thesis dwells on the politics of interest articulation on CDF projects.

Another provision of the Act which is relevant to citizen participation is in article 23(2). This article spells out that the Member of Parliament has to convene locational meetings to deliberate on development matters within the first year of parliament and at least once every two years thereafter. Given that each location is required within the program’s structure to prioritize projects from the citizens and present them to the committee members, one would expect the participatory space for local citizens to form a formidable nexus with the committees. This should be so in the sense that if a citizen has a say in locational committees, at least some form of representation in the fifteen member committee and the same citizen also participates in the locational conventions, one would expect such citizens’ involvement through the program to be reasonably high. For example in Karachuonyo constituency where there are 13 locations, at least 39 meetings convened by the MP are expected within a five year term of parliament. Because
CDF issues are also equally discussed informally by individual citizens with personal or community interests whenever MPs retreat to their respective constituencies during weekends, participatory space should be even wider.

The final provision which is relevant for citizen participation through the CDF program is Article 38 which gives the local community an opportunity to nominate a representative to cater to their interests in an ongoing project. Building from previously discussed provisions that create space for citizen involvement particularly on articulating their project interests, this article provides the last opportunity for local citizen involvement if such opportunity is missed. Nominating a local community representative at a time when the CDF committee is undertaking a project to build a relationship between the community and the CDF bureaucracy creates a relationship that can be explored for a continuous participatory space.
**Structure of the CDF (Flow Chart)**

Permanent Secretary – Planning
Ministry Permanent Secretary –
Finance Ministry National Assembly
Clerk
Attorney General
8 Technocrats from Law, Engineering,
Finance, Accounting, Economics,
Community Development
4 Qualified Persons for regional balance
Board CEO

Headed by a Chairperson

National CDF Board

Local Member of Parliament
(Legislator)

Constituency Development
Fund Committee

Locational Committees

Sub-locational Committees,

Appoints 15 Member CDF Committee
Convenes regular Locational
Constituency
Development
Meetings

Forwards projects to the National Board
on behalf of CDF committee and local
citizens

15 members appointed by the MP,
nominee from the National Board,
represents various interest of the citizens
in the program e.g.
Youth, Women, NGOs,
Provincial

Prioritizes and forwards agreed upon projects
to the CDF Committee (formation criteria
unclear)

Participation at individual and group levels
through
Locational Committees, CDF Committees, and MP Local Citizens within a Constituency 49
Chapter 5: Research Findings & Analysis

This research was conducted in two constituencies in Kenya, one rural (Karachuonyo) and the other urban (Embakasi) primarily using questionnaires. My 116 respondents were drawn from six purposively selected regions, three each from the two constituencies. The three regions in Karachuonyo constituency were: Kanjira, Kanyipir and West Kanyulu. The regions in Embakasi were Dandora, Ruai and Buruburu. In this chapter, I use a statistical software STATA, to analyze the data in light of the thesis’ research question: What explains the current pitfalls faced by the CDF in its attempts to establish democracy at the grassroots level? And how does one overcome them? In so doing I hope to achieve the thesis’ specific objectives which are to identify some of the structural hurdles prohibiting citizen participation, suggesting some alternative structural models upon which state-devolved fund participation can be based. I will also attempt to answer the question of whether local citizen participation in micro-political processes such as state-devolved funds has the potential of contributing to a robust national democratic culture.

General Data Description

I will first present an analysis of four basic variables i) gender, ii) age, iii) location and iv) education level of respondents. I expect that the four variables will assist in making inferences on how the respondents answer other questions on local participation in the CDF program. In terms of gender distribution of my respondents, 75 were male representing 65% of the respondents while 41 were female representing 35%. The rural male respondents were higher than the urban at 59% and 41% respectively. Conversely, the female respondents in the urban constituency accounted for 59% of all the female respondents compared to 41% females from the
rural constituency. Pie chart 1 below shows the general distribution of respondents according to gender.

**Chart 1: Gender of Respondents**

![Gender Distribution Chart]

*Chart 1 Source: Summer 2012 Externship Dataset*

The research categorized the respondents in four different age brackets i.e. 18-25, 26-35, 36-45 and above 45 years of age. Those within 18-25 age bracket made up 15% of the respondents, those in the 26-35 were 51%, the age bracket of 36-45 constituted 21% and the last age bracket constituted 13%. The age distribution of 66% being between 18 and 35 years more or less reflects the national age distribution in which majority of the population is 18 and 35. In terms of how the age variable was spread across the gender variable, of all the 74 males who responded to the age question, 15% were between 18-25, 54% fell between 25-35, 16% were between 36-45 while 15% were above 45 years of age. Among the 41 female respondents, 15% were between 18-25, 46% were between 26-35, 29% fell between 36-45 while 10% fell above 45. Graph 1 below is a histogram showing the general distribution of the respondents by age.

51
Another general information in which my research was interested was the education levels of the respondents. I categorized the education level variable fivefold i.e. those with primary, high school, middle level college, university and those who would not fit into any of the categories. Of the 116 respondents, 27% had primary education, 30% had high school education, 26% of the respondents had middle level college education while 16% had university education, and less than 1% identified their education level outside the four categories. This implies that 57% of respondents had basic education while the other 43% had college level education and above. In order to characterize respondents in terms of age and education, I collapse the education categories into those with basic education (primary and secondary) and those with college (middle level college, university and others). Of all the 65 respondents with basic education, 12% are between the age bracket 18-25, 54% are between 26-35, 22% are between 36-45 while 12% are above 45 years of age. Respondents with college education and above total to 50, out of this number, 18% are aged between 18-25, 48% are between 26-35, 20% are between 36-45 while 14% are above 45 years of age. In terms of education level of respondents according to location, 58% of rural respondents had basic education compared to 42% of urban respondents with basic education. Rural respondents with at least some college education accounted for 46% while 54% of the urban respondents had some college education. An
An overarching pattern in characteristics of the respondents is that the age bracket 26-35 constitute the majority in both attributes gender and education. We also observe that urban respondents are slightly more educated than rural respondents. The discrepancy of education in terms of whether a respondent is urban or rural based might be of interest to the question of participation. Graph 2 shows respondents various educational levels.

**Graph 2 : Respondents Education Level**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle College</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Summer 2012 Externship Dataset

**Citizen Knowledge of CDF Committee Members**

I now turn to a one by one critical analysis of research findings from the respondents’ answers to questions which aimed at answering the main research question of the thesis. The first of these questions sought to know whether a respondent knew a CDF committee member from their locality. I argue in the question that at the very minimum, by a local citizen knowing one of the fifteen committee members who are supposed to represent them within the CDF decision making bureaucracy should be the beginning point of the participatory thread. Out of all the 116 respondents, 56% knew a committee member compared to the 44% who did not. If the argument that citizens’ basic knowledge of existence of committee members’ within their localities points to some minimum level of participation holds water, then the higher percentage of respondents who know a committee member should be a positive beginning on the citizen participation
question. Graph 3 shows the percentage of the respondents who know a committee member and those who don’t.

![Graph 3: Knowledge of Committee Member](image)

The general information on respondent’s knowledge of CDF Committee Members does not paint the full picture that in itself is helpful to the thesis. I therefore shift the focus to some of the plausible hypotheses on this question. Does knowing a committee member depend on such variables as gender, location or education? Put differently, is participation dependent on some specific variables? Here are the results of the cross tabulation analyses. I begin with a hypothesis: Knowing a CDF committee member is affected by whether a respondent dwells in the rural or urban location.

From the cross tabulation result indicated below, nearly 82% respondents in the rural constituency know a CDF committee member as compared to 27% in the urban constituency. This finding remotely suggests that participation in the CDF program is better in the rural constituencies than it is in the urban. What might be the factors explaining this observation? From my observations during the research, one possible explanation would be differences in
terms of the social fabric in the urban and rural constituencies. In the rural constituency people seem to have closer personal ties and are more open to knowing each other in detail compared to the urban set-up where people are more individualistic and guarded. It is more likely that neighbors in the city do not know each other beyond names. For example they do not know what others do or where they come from. The social networks that exist in the cities often focus on ethnic welfare activities and rarely have political agenda.

Table 1: Knowing committee members versus where respondents live

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81.97%</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I turn to the next plausible scenario: Does knowing a CDF committee member depend on the interplay between gender and location? As table 2 shows below, about 86% of all the male respondents in the rural constituency know a committee member while just 45% of all the urban male respondents do.

Table 2: Male respondents who know a committee member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86.36%</td>
<td>45.16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8 The percentage 56.03 represents the total number of respondents who know a CDF committee member.

The figure 69.33 represents percentage for males out of all respondents who know a committee member. It shows that among all those who know committee member, there are more males than females.
For female respondents table 3 below shows that nearly 71% of all the female respondents in the rural constituency know a committee member while just 4% of those in the urban do. Therefore, whereas rural participation is higher than urban participation, male participation is significantly higher than that of female location notwithstanding. Rural female participation is also significantly higher than in the urban.

Table 3: Female respondents who know a committee member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.59%</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.71%</td>
<td>31.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents’ Relationship with CDF Committee Members

Related to the question on whether respondents know a committee member, two other questions were posed on how the respondents who know a committee member relate to those members and the frequency with which they hold CDF related discussions. These two questions intended to establish whether there is any relationship between knowledge of committee members and the expected advantage that accrues to such citizens in terms of participation. These two questions could therefore be answered only by the 56% of the respondents who already know a committee member. The question of how citizens relate with the committee member whom they had identified had three categories of responses: i) personal friend, ii) comes

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10 The figure 31.71% represents percentage for females out of all respondents who know a committee member. It shows that among all those who know committee member, there are fewer females than males.
from my village and iii) through a third party. These three categories, I argue, would present different degrees of participation or opportunity for participation to the citizens with those who identify committee members as personal friends more likely to participate than in cases where the committee members come from the respondents’ villages and where respondents only know members through third parties. Of all the respondents who knew a committee member, 12% indicated that those committee members are their personal friends, 59% indicated that the CDF committee members come from their villages while 29% indicated that they know the committee members through third parties. Graph 4 on below shows the percentage of respondents as they relate to the local committee members.

**Graph 4: How Respondent Relates to Committee Member**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation to Committee Member</th>
<th>Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Friend</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From my Village</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Third Party</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Summer 2012 Externship Research Dataset*

**Frequency of Discussion with Committee Members**

The question on frequency of participation for the respondents who already knew a committee member had three categories of responses: i) very often, ii) less often and iii) never at all. Only 15% of respondents indicated that they discuss CDF issues with the committee members very often, 54% discusses less often while 31% of those who know committee members
members do not discuss CDF issues with them at all. In other words, out of the 56% of the respondents who know CDF committee members just 15% can be directly linked to regular discussion of CDF matters with the committee members. As a matter of fact, while administering the questionnaires, I asked those choosing “less often” what exactly they meant and most of them considered attending unrelated events like weekend funerals where committee members informally discuss CDF matters to be part of the discussion. This confession further eats into the 54% which discusses less often probably spilling into those who do not discuss CDF at all. Graph 5 below shows the frequency of respondent-committee member discussion.

![Graph 5: Frequency of Discussion with Committee members](image)

Source: Summer 2012 dataset

**Discussion with MP**

Other than citizen participation through committee members who are nominees of the Member of Parliament, direct engagement of the MP is another space which is supposed to be available for citizen participation within the CDF program. This space is not only justified by the normative philosophy of representative democracy in which elected political representatives are
supposed to be accountable to the voters, but in this case specifically by Article 23 (2) of the CDF Act 2007 which stipulates that the MP convenes locational meetings to deliberate on local developmental needs. I therefore sought to establish whether respondents discussed CDF issues with their local MPs. By this I meant: i) one-on-one, ii) radio phone-in program, and iii) through public events in which the MP discussed the issues with them. This is because of my understanding that one-on-one discussions between MPs and local citizens are generally rare occurrences, and when they happen, citizens tend to discuss personal problems. The findings indicate an alarming participatory gap between local citizens and MPs, only 17% of the respondents indicated some form of discussion with the legislators. The graph 6 summarizes the findings.

I further analyze the question on citizen discussion with MPs from other hypothetical scenarios. For example does discussion with MPs depend on location of citizens? From earlier findings suggesting that rural participation is generally higher than urban, one plausible hypothesis would be that more citizens from the rural constituency discuss CDF issues with the MPs. The results indicate that of the 116 respondents, there are about 20% of rural constituents who discuss with their MPs compared to 13% who do so in the urban constituency. Graph 6 represents whether respondents discuss with their MPs or not. Thus there is more discussion by the rural citizen with their MPs than there is between the general responding population with their MPs. Table 4 shows citizen discussion with MPs according to region and gender.
Table 4: Respondent Discussion with MPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>10 (23%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
<td>12 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16 (23%)</td>
<td>3 (7%)</td>
<td>11 (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to whether location of respondent has a bearing on discussion with the MP, one also wonders if there is any gender dynamics at play to this question. How do women compare with men in discussing CDF issues with their MP? What about intra-gender participation across the constituencies? Indeed, the data indicates that more males than females hold some form of discussion with the MPs. Only 16% of those who discuss CDF issues with their MPs are female. In comparing male respondents across the two constituencies in terms of how they hold some form of discussion with the MPs, 23% of the males do so from the rural constituency compared to 20% from the urban constituency.
A comparison of female discussion with the MPs across the two constituencies shows a finding which is consistent with the previous ones. Female participants in the rural constituency tend to discuss CDF issues with their MPs more than does their counterparts in the urban constituency. Rural female respondents who discuss CDF issues with the MP is about 13% of all the female respondents in the research while just about 4% of all the urban female respondents discuss CDF issues with their MP.

Still one would want to look at this question of whether respondents discuss CDF issues with their respective MPs in terms of age. Does citizen discussion of CDF matters vary along age lines in rural and urban constituencies? The research’s findings show that young urban respondents, defined between the age bracket of 18 and 35 discuss CDF issues with their MPs slightly more than their counterparts in the rural. Of all those who discuss CDF issues with their MPs 18% of the proportion is urban youth compared to 17% of rural youth. Among older respondents defined from 35 years and above, there are no respondents from the urban constituency who discuss with the MP. In the rural constituency older citizens who discuss with the MP form 24%. Table 5 below summarizes discussion with MP across the regions along age group.

Table 5: Respondent Discussion with MP according to age group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>6 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (24%)</td>
<td>12 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>19 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Lack of urban citizens above 35 years who discuss CDF issues with their MPs might be explained by the fact that that age group is more likely to be in formal employment than younger urban dwellers, thus having little time to get involved in the CDF program. Moreover from the related question which asked respondents who discuss with MPs to describe the nature and structure of their discussions, the urban youth indicate use of social media and rallies, trends most associated with the youth.

**Structure and Nature of Discussion with MP**

A related open ended question asked the 17% of respondents who somewhat discusses with MPs to describe the nature and structure of such discussions. Answers exhibit inherent power relations which do not only limit the quality of deliberations for those who get to discuss with the MPs (Savini, 2011) but also explain why as many as 83% of local citizens do not get to discuss CDF issues with their MPs. The political environment, one of Savini’s central tenets of quality deliberations appear to be unfavorable due to the power wielded by MPs, which in turn shields them away from local citizens. I aggregate the responses into four categories according to closeness in their interpretations: i) direct meeting with the MP, ii) discussion through agents or representatives of the MP, iii) through lobby groups and iv) discussion via social media.

About 37% of the respondents who happen to have held some discussion with their MPs on CDF issues did so in what can be categorized as direct meeting with the MP. Under this category, respondents mainly identified discussions held while the MP was either distributing checks for the local CDF projects, meeting with the youth, speaking at a funeral or in a political rally. Although compared to all the other structures of discussion listed by the respondents this appears to be the closest which meets the rigors of quality deliberation, it is still not convincing.
Other than direct meetings with the youth in which a two way communication is expected, distributing checks, funeral speeches and political rallies reduces the local citizens into passive recipients of the MP’s message. This however is an important starting point to future iterations of participation in which citizens no longer are passive actors within the participatory milieu as Goldfrank observed in the case of Porto Alegre.

The second category in terms of the structure of discussion between the MP and local citizens was through agents or representatives of the MP. This category formed about 47% of the categories of discussion with the MPs. Under this category, citizens indicated that they discuss CDF issues with local administrative committee representatives at sub locational and locational levels, visits to local CDF offices or during administrative visits to local CDF projects by monitoring and evaluation teams working under instructions of the MP. The respondents who indicated their discussion through this channel expressed mixed reactions. On the one hand, they suggested that their discussions were less tense and more on equal level as compared to direct discussions with the MP in which power relations are more intimidating. On the other hand, however, the citizens expressed doubt with MPs’ representatives since they could not ascertain whether their concerns with the CDF program got reached their MP.

Discussions through organized lobby groups were exclusively a response from urban middle class respondents. Although only two indicated this channel of discussion, use of lobby groups is typical of the urban middle class who throughout the research findings tend to be less involved in the local urban politics of the CDF. The lobby groups would consist of professionals articulating the interests of the middle class neighborhoods in the city. As indicated earlier in chapter four, organized professional groups tend to be the most productive participants within the CDF arrangement. I asked the only two respondents who indicated discussion through lobby
groups to evaluate the success of their lobby groups. In what appear consistent with the claim that organized professional groups tend to reap most within the participatory space offered by the CDF program, the middle class respondents suggested that the MP respects and listens to their views oftentimes. This perhaps could be due to the real threat that professional groups pose to the MPs political career and the civic skills of organizing and engaging MPs in serious discussions. Besides, professional groups, due to their education are better informed on issues of development.

The final form of discussion that the respondents listed was through the use of social media in this specific case a facebook page run by the legislator. The only respondent who identified the form of discussion to be social media was a male between the age brackets of 18-25 from the urban constituency. This is understandably so since the social media phenomenon is currently dominated by young urban dwellers. Whereas social media as a channel of political participation in general and in this particular case has a lot to be desired, going forward, it will be one of those spaces in political participation which will attract a burgeoning intellectual attention. Table 6 summarizes the four categories of discussion which citizens explore with their MPs.
Table 6: Respondent Discussion Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Discussion</td>
<td>7 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Agents</td>
<td>9 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobby Groups</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizen Identification of Local CDF Projects

Citizens are supposed to participate in the entire process of identifying and implementing local CDF projects. It is therefore only logical to claim that citizens’ ability to identify local projects should be an indicator of at least some level of participation. In fact, Article 38 of the CDF Act 2007 provides that local communities can nominate a representative to cater for their interests in an ongoing project. To the extent that this article can be enforced, citizen awareness of local projects should be high.

An overwhelming 79% of respondents could identify at least a local CDF project compared to 21% who could not. In fact, most of the respondents could not only identify more than one project but also do so in different regions of the constituency. Graph 7 displays respondent identification of local CDF projects. However, as we will see in the findings, it is important to caution that this indicator of participation can be misleading for reasons that I will address shortly.
Project Approval

In order to bolster the case on participation measured in terms of citizens’ ability to identify projects, I further asked respondents several other related questions.

They were asked to point exactly where the project is which would give an idea that citizens identify with specific projects among the many within the constituencies; to indicate their approval ratings of the projects; and to justify their approval rating. Citizen approval of the CDF projects is very high. The approval level question had three options from which respondents could choose: i) I approve, ii) I don’t Approve and iii) I don’t care. Out of all the 79% respondents who could identify at least a CDF project, 73% approved, 23% did not while just 4% did not care at all about the CDF project. Graph 8 gives a graphical representation of CDF project approval.
**Justification for Approval/Non Approval**

Does project identification and approval necessarily imply massive citizen participation? In order to answer this question, I take a look at the responses supplied for the open ended question challenging respondents to justify their approval of local CDF projects. In what might challenge the normative expectation, the 4% respondents who don’t care about the local CDF projects they identify are the most useful to the question of citizen participation followed by the 23% who don’t approve the local CDF projects. The 73% respondents who approve local CDF projects are the least meaningful to the participatory question. Those who approve the local projects appear to do so purely due to economic reasons. Their justifications are entirely that the projects which are mostly hospitals, roads, water pumps, student bursaries and school construction have tremendously bridged the gap of the provision of public goods in an unprecedented fashion. Coming from a long history of neopatrimonial culture, it is no surprise that many citizens who
have been denied access to social amenities for a long time massively support any attempts to bridge that gap. Oftentimes, such support may not necessarily be based on critical evaluation of the quality and process of public goods provision. As a result, it is usually very easy for politicians to mobilize this rather blind support and succeed in creating a low intensity participation susceptible to manipulation. If one is only interested in the Utilitarian notion of participation which emphasizes on the benefits of participation, then the 73% respondents have a case, however this thesis is interested more in the quality of participation.

The 23% respondents who did not approve the local CDF projects cited reasons which are of interest to local participation within the CDF program. Their reasons range from concerns on proper use of the allocated funds for particular projects; the quality and sustainability of some of the projects; questions on the prioritization of local projects (implying absence of local participation in decision making) and on how decisions on the project installations were made; and limited access to some of the projects, which implies favoritism. Clearly, these concerns question not only whether meaningful local citizen participation exists but also the quality of such participation where it may exist. The concerns also point towards overwhelming powers wielded either directly by the MPs or by their associates who could be CDF committee members or personal agents.

The most important group of respondents to the question of approval of local projects is the 4% which does not care about the projects they identified. This group only cites two reasons for their apathy. First, they claim that they do not discuss CDF issues with their MP at all. Second, they add that there has not been any effort made to involve them in decision making within the CDF program during prioritization and implementation of local projects. The 4%
respondents therefore may best represent the need to raise the discourse on effective citizen participation in state devolved funds, especially those managed politically.

I further carry out cross tabulation analysis of discussion frequency and identification of projects in order to demonstrate that the overwhelming citizen ability to identify projects may be explained by other reasons other than participation. Frequent discussion with the CDF committee members ideally should translate into those citizens easily identifying CDF projects which are at the center of this discussion. There is a weak positive correlation coefficient of 0.23. Weak as it may be, the correlation suggests that if local citizens were to discuss CDF issues with the committee members more often, they are likely to increase their awareness of local CDF projects thereby enhancing the quality of participation. Table 7 below shows how citizens who frequently discuss CDF issues with committee members identify projects across locations. All those who indicated frequent discussion with committee members identify a local CDF project. This should not be a surprising finding since it is a consequence of logical relationship between frequent discussion and ability to identify local projects which presumably are discussed in such frequent meetings.

Table 7: Respondent knowledge of projects among frequency discussants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly 90% of rural respondents who less frequently discuss CDF issues with committee members are able to identify local projects. Even better, in the urban constituency where
participation is relatively lower than the rural constituency, 100% of respondents who hold
discussions with committee members infrequently are able to identify a project. This clearly
shows that something else explains identification of local CDF projects. Table 8 below
summarizes the information.

Table 8: Respondent knowledge of projects among less frequency discussants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.66</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The final evidence that some other factor rather than participation may be the one
explaining local citizens’ ability to identify projects is the finding on those who do not at all
discuss CDF issues with committee members yet identify local projects. About 81% of rural
respondents who do not discuss with committee members can identify a local project. In the
urban constituency the figure is 75%. It is therefore accurate to conclude that participation and
ability to identify local projects are not necessarily correlated. As I earlier claimed, when citizens
are deprived of basic infrastructural installations such as good schools, roads and hospitals they
are overwhelming likely to notice and support any efforts to bridge the gap. This however does
not necessarily mean their participation.

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11 The figure 91.43% represents the number of respondents who know a local CDF project but
discusses CDF issues less frequently with the CDF committee members.
Attendance of Public Forums

Article 23(2) of the CDF Act 2007 spells out that a Member of Parliament has to convene locational meetings to deliberate on development matters within the first year of parliament and at least once every two years thereafter. With each constituency having averagely fifteen locations, if MPs adhere to this article then there are bound to be numerous public forums discussing CDF issues within the five years of parliament’s lifespan. This mobilizes mass citizen participation. Do respondents attend any public CDF forum convened by the MP? For both negative and positive answers, the research also added an open ended question. In the case of a positive response the respondents were to indicate how they got to know about the forum and in case of a negative response respondents were to indicate the reason for not attending any forum.

Attendance of public forums fell below expectation considering the fact that numerous conventions were expected within the five years life span of parliament. Only about 17% of respondents indicated that they have attended a public forum leaving 83% having not attended any such forums. This finding raises questions of whether there exists citizen apathy towards the CDF program, whether MPs do not hold enough public forums specifically for CDF issues or the public forums do not get well publicized. However going by high approval ratings for local CDF projects is fairly plausible to eliminate citizen apathy. Graph 9 below shows how respondents attend public CDF forums.
Why respondents have (not) attended public forums

My analysis aggregates responses of the 83% of respondents who indicated that they had never attended any CDF forum into three: i) those who have never received any information about planned conventions or never been invited, ii) those who are too busy to attend and iii) specific personal issues ranging from barriers laid on the way of people with disability and those generally disinterested in politics etc. The findings suggest that CDF forums are convened less often than required by the CDF Act and if they are held regularly then they are not well publicized. Out of all those who have never attended public CDF forums, 69% have not done so due to lack of information or because they were not invited. Though so many explanations as to why this happens can be advanced, from my observations during research and general experiences with the CDF I attribute this observation to the general tendency by MPs and committee members to shield local citizens from day to day activities of the program for fear of accountability. Those who have not attended CDF forums because they are busy make up to 18%
of all those have never attended CDF forums while 13% had various reasons for not attending
the forums. Table 8 below shows the reasons given by respondents for not attending public CDF
forums.

Table 8: Respondents reason for not attending forums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No information/never been invited</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am Busy</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other reasons</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the 17% of respondents who indicated that they have attended public CDF
forums gave interesting reasons which deserves serious consideration. About 15% of them heard
about the forums announced through local vernacular FM radio stations, 20% were told by
friends, another 20% were told by the actual committee members, 30% got the information from
local administrative leaders and schools while 15% did not indicate how they got to know about
the forums. Table 9 shows how the various sources of information contributed to respondents’
attendance of public forums.

First, there are currently about 90 FM stations in Kenya, nearly half of which are
vernacular stations which penetrate villages. This is a powerful tool at the disposal of the CDF
program bureaucracy to mobilize mass local citizen participation.12 Second, throughout
history
local administrative leaders and school-age children have been used to effectively disseminate

12 There is a huge proliferation of FM stations in Kenya, almost each of the 43 ethnic languages
having a number of stations broadcasting in their languages. Dissemination of information on the
CDF program usually uses these media.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_of_Kenya
important information such as disease outbreaks, vaccination campaigns, new government policies etc.

*Table 9: How Attendees got Information for Forums*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Friends</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Members</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Leaders/Schools</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is yet another effective channel with which local citizen participation can be realized. It is needless to reiterate the role that CDF committee members ought to play in stimulating local citizen participation since it is these citizens’ interests that they are supposed to represent.

In order to better understand other dynamics that might be at play in citizen attendance of public CDF forums, I look at the possibility that: urban citizens are more likely to attend public forums than their rural counterparts due to access to multiple sources of information. The research findings indicate however, that 23% of the Karachuonyo respondents have attended a public forum as compared to 11% in Embakasi. Table 10 below summarizes the information on citizen attendance of CDF public forums by location.
Citizen attendance of public forums can still be analyzed through the age variable. Two plausible hypotheses common in literature on political participation can be advanced. First, older citizens are more likely to be interested in politics than young citizens. A counter hypothesis would be that due to ease of mobility, younger citizens are more likely to attend public CDF forums than older citizens. Because the overall goal of this thesis is to find out what explains pitfalls which hinder the CDF program from establishing local democracy, the two hypotheses above are of central interest to this analysis. Does age hinder citizen participation? Does the running of the CDF deliberately favor participation of citizens of a certain age group? I thus collapse respondents between the age 18 and 35 under youth and those above 35 years under old to test these hypotheses. Out of all those who have ever attended CDF public forums, 70% fall under youth. In terms of location, the percentage of youth who attend CDF forums in the rural are exactly the double of their counterparts in the city at 25%. Among the old, rural participants are almost three times more than participants in the city constituency at 20% against 7% respectively. Below is table 11 showing respondents’ attendance of public forums according to age.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.95</td>
<td>10.91</td>
<td>17.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13 The figure 17.24% represents the total number of respondents who have ever attended a public CDF forum.
Table 11: Respondents attendance of forums by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Young</th>
<th>Old</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>9 (25%)</td>
<td>12 (20%)</td>
<td>21 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
<td>9 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14 (18%)</td>
<td>16 (41%)</td>
<td>30 (26%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A gender perspective to citizen attendance of public CDF forums is also a useful analysis. In general among all the male respondents, 21% have ever attended public forums compared to 10% among female respondents. As a proportion of the entire sample size, male respondents who have attended public forums are approximately 14% while their female counterparts form a mere 3%. In terms of whether the constituency is rural or urban, rural attendance of public CDF forums is still higher. Among male respondents, the rural attendance is 25% compared to 16% urban male attendance of forums. Among the female respondents, rural attendance of public forums is at 18% compared to 4% in the city. Attendance of public forums is therefore better among male respondents than female respondents and also in the rural more than it is in the city. Table 12 below summarizes attendance across gender in both constituencies.

Table 12: Respondent attendance of forums by gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>11 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (18%)</td>
<td>14 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>5 (16%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16 (21%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>20 (17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is also plausible that local citizens who attend public CDF forums are likely to be those who in some way know a CDF committee member. If such a correlation exists then one can argue that there is a promising potential for CDF committee-propelled local citizen participation. There is a weak but positive correlation of 0.17 between knowing committee members and attending public forums. Further, the research findings in deed show that among the 17% who attend forums, those who know a CDF committee member are more than two times the percentage of those who have attended forums but do not know a committee member. Table 13 below shows the summary.

*Table 13: Respondent attendance of forums by to knowledge of committee members*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Tota</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.08</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>17.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Satisfaction with Decision Making Process**

In addition to the specific questions which seek to establish how much local citizen participation exists within the CDF program, I also sought to know respondents overall evaluation of how the decision making process takes place in the program. Respondents had to choose their level of satisfaction with decision making from four options namely: i) very satisfied, ii) satisfied, iii) somehow satisfied and iv) not satisfied. Out of all the 116 respondents just about 9% indicated that they are very satisfied, 23% were just satisfied, 35% were somehow satisfied while 33% were not satisfied at all. The data shows that all those respondents with some form of reservation are lumped together, then more than two thirds i.e. 68% of respondents are
not really satisfied by how MPs and committee members make decisions on matters of the CDF program. Graph 10 displays various levels of citizen satisfaction with decision making process within the CDF program.

An interesting analysis of citizen satisfaction with the decision making process within the CDF program is the pattern of satisfaction according to whether respondents are rural or urban. According to the findings, there appears to be a clear pattern of general dissatisfaction among urban citizens compared to rural respondents who are relatively more satisfied. Among those who indicate that they are very satisfied with the decision making process within the program, 10% are rural while 7% are from the urban constituency. Among those who indicate just satisfied the rural percentage is slightly more than triple those in the urban constituency at 34% against 11%. As satisfaction lowers, the percentage of urban less satisfied respondents increases. For instance among those who indicate that they are somehow satisfied—a choice which arguably
expresses dissatisfaction, the urban respondents are slightly more than the rural counterparts at 36% against 34%. Among those who are completely not satisfied, the percentage of urban respondents is more than twice that of the rural respondents at 45% against 21%.

Several possible explanations as to why urban respondents are generally less satisfied with the decision making process can be advanced. From my observations during the research, the clear differences between urban and rural social fabric cited earlier as an explanation as to why rural citizens are likely to know CDF committee members more than their counterparts in the city is at play here too. Related to the absence of close social ties especially on political issues among urban dwellers is the fact that politicians and CDF committee members by extension are more likely to get away with identifying a small section of the urban community and work with them on CDF issues. The third plausible explanation is related to the reasons given by respondents who did not approve or did not care about local CDF project. This group of respondents looks at the CDF program with a more critical lens. Because the urban population is more likely to be more educated and enlightened on current issues they are more likely to be dissatisfied by decision making process within the CDF for genuine reasons beyond mere evidence of the program’s provision of public goods which satisfies more rural dwellers.

**Presence of Civic Organizations and Groups**

As articulated earlier in the literature on deepening democracy through citizen participation in devolved funds, the presence of civic organizations or groups has a fundamental role in both nascent participatory programs and consolidating already existing ones (Abers, 1998, Font & Galais, 2011, Canel, 2010 and Goldfrank, 2010). Font and Galais observed that the presence of civic organizations create a partnership effect, enhance the degree of cooperation and
also gives the programs the desired legitimacy. Goldfrank’s conceptualization of the micro-level factors which are indispensable to a successful local participatory program is the vibrancy of local communities and social movements. Canel underscores the patterns of association between the state and local organizations created by the presence of civic organizations. The civic culture literature also unequivocally point how social movements and civic organizations single handedly contribute to the development of social capital.

Against this background and given that the CDF program has only existed for about nine years, I therefore sought to establish the impact of presence of local civic organizations and groups. My question was flexible to include welfare organizations. My flexibility with the concept of local civic organizations or groups which includes local welfare groups is justified by the role such groups ought to play in nurturing civic skills. The civic skills acquired by organizations through such activities as calling meetings, moderating such meetings, time management, deliberation on issues etc. are not strictly the preserve of civic organizations; they are also possible in local micro-credit welfare groups in the villages and among poor city dwellers. Perhaps it may be premature to link any form of success of citizen participation within the CDF to the presence of civic organizations because such organizations tend to have long term effects, it is nevertheless worthwhile to begin thinking about the links. Graph 11 shows how respondents belong in civic organizations.

**Civic Organization versus Attendance of Forums**

According to the findings, nearly two thirds of respondents (63%) indicated that they belong to a civic organization or group while 37% did not belong to any such groups. In terms of the regions, there seem not to be any big differences in terms of presence of civic organizations
in the rural and urban constituencies even though more respondents from the rural belong to civic organizations. In Karachuonyo, 64% of respondents belong to a civic organization compared to 61% in Embakasi.

In order to stretch the analysis to see if there is any link between presence of civic groups and forms of participation, I run cross tabulation analysis of the variable civic groups and attendance of forums as well as civic groups versus knowing a committee member. There seem to be some consistency in the link between existence of civic groups and attendance of CDF forums in both Karachuonyo and Embakasi. There is a weak but positive correlation coefficient of the two variables at 0.08.

In the rural constituency, 21% of those who have ever attended CDF public forums belong to some civic groups compared to 19% who have ever attended public forums yet don’t belong to any civic groups. The effect of presence of civic organizations in the rural constituency on participation in the CDF program does not appear to be significantly different from
participation by those who do not belong to civic groups but this is a relationship which is better testable temporally. Below is table 14 summarizing effect of civic groups on attendance of forums.

Table 14: Rural respondent in civic groups and attendance of forums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.05</td>
<td>19.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20.34$^{14}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the urban constituency, there appears to be an even better link between membership in civic groups and participation. The proportion of respondents who belong to civic organizations and have attended public forums is three times that which does not belong to any civic groups but have attended public forums. There are about 15% of respondents who have ever attended public CDF forums and who also belong to some civic group compared to just about 5% who have attended such forums yet do not belong to any civic organizations. Table 15 below shows how attendance of public forums relates with civic organizations.

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$^{14}$ The figure 20.34% represents the percentage of rural respondents who attend forums out of the total 59 respondents who answered the question.
Table 15: Urban respondent in civic groups and attendance of forums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.71</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civic Organization versus Knowing Committee Member

The correlation between respondent membership in civic organizations and knowing a CDF committee member is a weak positive one at 0.12 which is statistically insignificant. In Karachuonyo constituency there is no evidence that membership in civic groups enhances participation in the form of knowing committee members. There are 76% respondents who know a committee member and belong to civic groups compared to 90% of those who do not belong to civic groups yet they know CDF committee members. As discussed earlier, it is important to note that the variable “knowing-member” is a weaker proxy of participation especially in the rural constituency. Table 16 below shows the relationship between knowing CDF committee member and belonging to civic organizations in the rural constituency.

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15 The figure 10.91% represents the percentage of urban respondents who attend forums out of 55 respondents who answered the question.
Table 16: Rural respondent in civic groups and knowledge of committee member

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.32</td>
<td>90.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, the effect of respondent belonging to civic groups on participation appears to be relatively big in the urban constituency. There are 41% respondents who belong to a civic organization and who know a committee member compared to just 5% who do not belong to a civic organization but know a committee member. One would argue that in the cities where citizens know little about each other, membership in civic groups can enhance an individual’s participation in political spaces such as the CDF program. This phenomenon is not necessarily true in the villages where almost everyone knows each other. Table 17 below summarizes the relationship between knowing committee members and belonging to civic organizations in the urban constituency.

Table 17: Urban respondent in civic groups and knowing committee member

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.18</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 The figure 81.36% represents the percentage of rural respondents who know a member of the CDF committee out of 59 who answered the question.

17 The figure 27.27% represents the percentage of urban respondents who know a member of the CDF committee out of 55 who answered the question.
Influence of CDF Program on Voting Decision

Central to this thesis are two questions, first can citizen participation in devolved funds lead to acquisition of civic skills? Second, assuming that such civic skills are acquired; can they lead to a deepened democratic culture at national level? In similar Latin American experiences, Goldfrank observed what he terms as a fundamental transformation of political life in which participants were gradually transformed from passive to active participants in public life changing the top-down clientelist structures into vibrant bottom up democratic spaces. Abers on the other hand observed two important developments, first is the increased associationalism by which he means acquisition and application of civic skills among citizens in their day to day businesses. Second, Abers observes exportation of the civic skills into other spheres of life. Pateman (2012) argues that acquisition of such skills by citizens lead to new ways of exercising citizenship.

Against this background I sought to establish whether for the last nine years of existence of the CDF program citizens have been able to acquire any civic skills which they apply in making local civic and parliamentary voting decisions. The question asked respondents to choose out of four CDF program related options the one which best described their voting decision in civic and constituency elections. For the first option in which citizens’ voting decision for civic leaders and MPs would be entirely informed by CDF concerns, 35% of all the respondents indicated so. Those who indicated that CDF concerns would somehow inform their local voting decision were 32%. There are 24% respondents who indicated that their voting decision is not influenced by CDF issues. Finally, another 9% of respondents did not identify with any of the three options as to determine their voting decision. It is fairly accurate to lump the first two categories together and argue that 67% of respondents’ local leaders voting decision is
influenced by CDF issues. A weak but positive correlation coefficient of 0.18 between voting decision and program satisfaction perhaps points towards the potential of the CDF program in shaping future voter behavior among citizens. Graph 12 below shows various ways through which the CDF program concerns influence voters’ decisions at local civic and parliamentary elections.

Graph 12: Whether CDF influences respondent voting decision

Source: Summer 2012 dataset
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis has been about the concept of citizen participation in micro-political processes through state devolved fund programs. Specifically, it has looked at the CDF program in Kenya as a space in which citizen participation in day to day democratic norms should be espoused. The work has applied structural functionalism and participatory democratic theory as theoretical lenses with which to look at citizen participation in semi-autonomous state devolved funds. Structural functionalist approach has been useful to the thesis by delineating the roles of various organs that constitute the CDF program. However due to the theory’s deficiency in explaining the reasons as to why the CDF program has not succeeded in nurturing citizen participation even with specialized roles of its various organs, participatory democratic theory has stepped in to add the theoretical underpinnings of the place for citizen participation in democratic spaces as may be occasioned by state programs.

On top the theoretical lenses, the thesis’ literature review has dwelt on the process of civic skills acquisition through local citizen participation in state devolved funds. In order to demonstrate the limits of the possibility of nurturing a flourishing bottom-up democratic polity, the literature review has focused on the Porto Alegre success story while highlighting Montevideo, Caracass and Rio as some of the places where participatory democracy did not succeed. The recognition that citizen participation in devolved programs sometime does not yield the desired outcomes is important for this thesis for two main reasons. First, it offers the much needed caveat to any scholarship interested in research on citizen participation not to romanticize the potential of deepening democracy through citizen participation in state devolved funds. Second, it enables this work to begin comparing some of the reasons that might explain failures of the CDF to allow citizen participation to the justifications elsewhere.
The thesis has also given a broad historical context of Kenya: the making of the neopatrimonial post-independence state, the rise of citizen legitimacy concerns and the subsequent emergence of contestation seeking inclusion; contextualizing the CDF as the node of unprecedented mass optimism and the coming into power of an overwhelmingly elected regime on the basis of its promise of left leaning policy priorities. The thesis has also dissected the structure of the CDF program, highlighting the absence of goodwill in the politics which culminated into the institution, the powers vested in various offices and how such powers, offices have hindered meaningful citizen participation. Finally the thesis has comprehensively analyzed the data which I collected during the summer of 2012 in two constituencies in Kenya. I now turn to drawing of specific conclusions based on empirical research findings as they relate to the main research question and the other questions guiding this thesis.

My research has been preoccupied with how to explain recurrent pitfalls faced by the CDF program in its attempts to establish democracy at local levels through enhanced citizen participation. The second part of the question which is a logical consequence of the first part has to do with suggesting solutions to the pitfalls. My guiding hypothesis has been that the CDF Act vests tremendous unchecked powers on the MPs, a situation which is likely to hinder meaningful local citizen participation. In order to deal with the main thesis question, I further ask specific questions on whether there are structural shortcomings within the CDF program that hinder citizen participation, whether there are alternative structural models upon which the program can be anchored in order to facilitate meaningful citizen participation, and whether deepening local citizen participation in such state devolved funds like the CDF has the potential to nurture a robust national democratic culture.
The research findings reveal major structural shortcomings within the CDF which are antithetical to citizen participation within the CDF program. The primary structural misnomer bedeviling the CDF program is powers (functions as the structural-functionalist approach terms it) bestowed on the MPs to unilaterally appoint the fifteen committee members. One therefore needs to revisit Sangmpam (2007) argument of institutions as products of society-rooted politics and the account given by Muriuki Karue, the architect of the CDF program, in my interview with him on the mechanics of politics in parliament which culminated in to the CDF program. It was in the interest of both the state and MPs to deliberately design a devolved institution in which they would still have significant amount of control.

There are several findings which clearly manifest the hurdles of citizen participation occasioned by the powers vested on MPs under Article 23(1) of the CDF Act to appoint committee members. First, even though in overall citizens happen to know committee members, citizen knowledge of committee members in the urban constituency is extremely low, thereby suggesting that MPs do not consult much with local citizens while appointing the committee members. This in essence means that committee members do not necessarily represent interests of citizens as stipulated in the Act. Even where some form of citizen-committee member discussion exists, it is extremely low more so in the urban constituency. Most importantly however, is the fact that such discussions fall below the desirable qualities of meaningful deliberation.

Another salient manifestation of a structural shortcoming is on the idea of the CDF Act making MPs as patrons of the program. Findings from the question on whether respondents discuss CDF related issues with the MPs show that only 17% discuss with MPs. Moreover, even among the few who “discuss” with the MPs, not all do so directly, to those who do, the power
relations cause an inferiority complex which hinders deliberation. The power dynamics within
the Kenyan polity as it is now makes MPs inherently antithetical to any meaningful horizontal
participatory arrangement. Finally, the response supplied by the 27% of respondents who did not
approve of local CDF projects attest to the structural shortcomings hindering citizen
participation. Such reasons stemming from concerns with how exactly the funds are allocated
and used, how project priorities are aggregated and location decided to almost total absence of
local citizens in the decision making process on projects that directly concern them point to
serious flaws in the organization of the participatory arena. In fact, the reservations suggest a
top-down flow of decisions which are then forced down the throat of local citizens. It is also
important to note that whereas the structural weaknesses of the program are widespread, they are
more pronounced in the urban settings where the social fabric is not as clearly defined.

I now turn to the second sub question of whether there are alternative structural models
upon which the CDF program can be anchored in order to realize meaningful citizen
participation and hence deepen democratic norms. My conclusion attempts to bring together both
the research findings and literature review on the issue of participatory democracy in a realistic
manner. The research findings have indicated several observations: in general the quality of
participation in the CDF is not commensurate both with the level of mass enthusiasm at the
beginning of the program and the spaces provided in the CDF Act; participation is relatively
higher in the rural than urban regions, there is very little deliberation between citizens and both
MPs and committee members and where such deliberations occur they are characterized by
hegemonic arrangements which intimidate regular citizens. Savini’s concept of empowerment
which implies the significance of the role of the citizen in public decision making is the bare
minimum yardstick of participation. The ideal participatory arena is captured under Savini’s
concept of endowment in which the emphasis is on the participatory structures, procedures and
the citizen rights to access decision making. Both Savini’s ideas are consistent with Pateman’s
tenets emphasizing that the capacity and skills that individuals have are contingent upon the
existing forms of authority structures with which they interact and that the changes required for
meaningful participation must be structural in nature. Goldfrank’s concepts of micro-level and
meso-level prerequisites of a participatory system are also handy here. According to Goldfrank,
micro-level conditions refer to the trust and solidarity that is built among local communities.
This is the same concept Abers terms as associationalism and which Almond and Verba’s
seminal work on civil culture refer to as social capital. Meso-level conditions imply the role of
political parties and the organization strategies that such parties create within the participatory
arena.

The question therefore is whether it is too soon to push the CDF program in Kenya
towards the participatory concepts above. I argue that if we take the past ten years of existence of
the CDF program in Kenya as the “teething” period then a push in this direction is not naïve.
First, the state needs to restructure the program in a manner that allows citizens to elect local
representatives in the CDF committee on top of increasing the number from fifteen to a
reasonable number depending on local populations. Although politicians are likely to interfere in
such elections at the beginning, the long term effect will be a spread of representation and
accountability mechanisms. Locally elected CDF representatives will also mitigate the power
relations which hinder the quality of deliberations. Second, in a structured manner, the state
needs to clip the powers of the MPs within the program and re-direct such powers in
strengthening local civic organizations by giving them a bigger role in the organization and the
day-to-day running of the CDF program. From the argument of primacy of politics which create
institutions, one might wonder where the state can get the incentive to undertake such structural changes to the CDF. I argue that the wrestling for control of the CDF by citizens over the past ten years coupled with an increasing legitimacy pressure on the state should yield such structural innovations.

Finally, I turn to the speculative question of whether encouraging citizen participation in local political processes (deepening democracy) has a potential of creating a robust national democratic culture. In order to draw a comprehensive conclusion, I approach this question at three levels. The beginning point of this question is the theoretical debate raised by scholars like Putnam, Tocqueville, Almond & Verba and Inglehart stemming from the acquisition of civic skills to effect of such skills on democracy. Whereas how citizens acquire initial civic culture skills is debatable, the scholars agree that meaningful citizen participation in such political spaces offered at local levels improves democracy. Secondly, empirical evidence from similar experiments in Latin America which indicate increased associationalism skills strengthened civic organizations and social movements as well as a more active citizenry which engages the state in serious debate on government policies.

Against the above background, it is possible to answer the question by looking at some of my research findings. The first indicator of improved associationalism skills within the CDF is from a general observation that I made during the research. After nine years of existence, the general rhetoric about CDF and the influence that such rhetoric is gradually asserting within local political calculus is promising. Even though the exact impact of this rhetoric still needs to be verified, one clear implication is that because local citizens do know how CDF projects are improving their lives, the program will increasingly inform judgments made on local political leaders. Second, the justification supplied by the 27% of respondents who either do not approve
or do not care about local CDF projects suggest that at least some small percentage of citizens are demonstrating civic culture skills which will generally improve democracy. It is unclear whether such citizens have acquired the skills within the program but that should not be the point, instead the 27% who are more critical in their evaluation of the program should be viewed in terms of how much they can influence the ability of other citizens to develop a sophisticated view of political representatives and their role in the CDF. If this happens over time, one clear outcome will be an improvement in the quality of elected leaders and by extension that of democracy.

The findings on my research question on whether CDF concerns would influence the voting decisions of citizens in local civic and parliamentary elections should be the clearest indicator of the potential that participation in such state devolved funds have on nurturing a thriving national democratic culture. The findings show that just after about nine years since the beginning of the CDF, 35% of citizens believe that their decisions on local political leaders is entirely influenced by concerns on CDF program. Another 32% hold that CDF concerns somewhat affect their voting decisions at local levels. This presents a total of over two thirds of respondents whose voting behavior is in a way influenced by the CDF program. This huge percentage resonates with the observable rhetoric surrounding the CDF program and day to day politics among citizens. If one is cautious enough not to romanticize about the much the CDF program has been able to contribute to the national democratic culture through influence at local levels, then it is it fairly accurate to predict a gradual but significant contribution of the CDF program to the national democratic arena through the voting of leaders who are more likely to be both responsive to citizen demands and also more willing to tolerate meaningful deliberations on local concerns.
It is also imperative for the conclusion to evaluate the CDF program within the theoretical framework. There are clearly demarcated structures within the CDF program, each with its distinct functions. The program however has failed to facilitate the expected degree of citizen participation. By merely looking at the structures, one only establishes the fact that the structures e.g. powers vested in the MPs and CDF committees are antithetical to genuine participation and not why this is so. One then has to look at Sangmpam’s concept of society-rooted politics as the primary determinant of institutional outcomes. In the case of the CDF program, there are two related observations. First MPs wield tremendous power within the society. Second, with such powers, MPs have created a patronage network that pervades institutions. The way the society-rooted politics has shaped the society therefore has made them inherently undemocratic. The CDF as an institutional outcome of society-rooted politics in which the MPs are so powerful thus reflects the undemocratic nature of the politics. Pateman’s participatory democracy, which is dependent among other things on structural changes within the society which enable meaningful participation, will work only to the extent to which the society challenges the MPs powers.

In conclusion therefore, the CDF program should be viewed as a nascent participatory space which is still shrouded in intense struggles for control, a struggle pitting citizens on the one side, and on the other side the political elite and the state. The trigger for Almond and Verba’s participatory explosion in this particular case is an intersection of a long history of exclusion under the neopatrimonial state and a rejuvenated citizen consciousness to raise legitimacy concerns especially after the 2002 landmark elections that brought into power a regime with a relatively keener ear to the citizenry. The CDF program as a space in which a thriving citizen participation will be enhanced, leading to deepened democratic norms among citizens and thus a
robust national democratic culture will depend much on how much of the battle for meaningful
decentralization of authority the citizens can win. Both my research findings and the literature
have pointed that for the citizens to win this battle the already numerous local civic
organizations, social movements and welfare organizations will have to work closely with local
professional organizations in order to mount a formidable force that the political elite and the
state are able to negotiate with horizontally. The findings on democratization through the CDF
program also show that the evolution and maturity of democratic institutions is not a linear,
problem-free process.
Appendix

Research Questionnaire (Constituents)

NB

The CDF here refers to Constituency Development Fund, a program which was introduced in Kenya in 2003 and in which legislators and local citizens are supposed to make decisions on local development projects.

1. Gender

   Male ___________ Female ___________

2. Age

   Between 18-25
   Between 26-35
   Between 36-45
   Above 45

3. Where do you come from within the constituency? (Location/Ward)

   ____________________________

4. Choose which one of the following options which describe your educational level.

   Primary
   High School
   Middle Level College
   University
   Other ____________________________

5. a) Do you know any CDF Committe member from your constituency?

   YES ___________ NO ____________
b) If YES (above), how do you know him/her?

Personal Friend __________
Comes from my village __________
Through a Third Party __________

c) How often do you discuss CDF related issues with him/her?

Very Often __________
Less Often __________
Never At All __________

6. a) Do you discuss CDF issues with your MP?

Yes _______ No _______

b) If Yes (above), describe the structure and nature of such discussions

__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________

7. a) Do you know of any recent CDF project carried out around your village/location/ward?

Yes _______ NO _______

b) If Yes (above), where exactly and what is the project?

__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________

c) Choose one of the following options which best describes your opinion about the CDF project above?
I approve of it __________
I dont approve of it ____________
I don’t Care ____________

d) Please briefly justify your answer above


8. a) Have you ever attended any public CDF forums in your constituency?

        Yes ________  No ____________

b) If Yes (above), how did you know about the meeting?


c) If No (above), why?


9. Choose one of the following options which best represents your level of satisfaction with the
decision making process of CDF program.

        Very Satisfied ________
        Satisfied __________
        Somehow Satisfied ____________
        Not Satisfied __________
10. Other than a political party, do you belong to any local civic organization/group within the constituency?

    Yes ________  No ___________

11. Choose one of the following options which best describes your voting decision in civic and constituency elections.

    CDF concerns will ENTIRELY inform my voting decision
    CDF concerns will SOMEHOW inform my voting decision
    CDF concerns will NOT inform my voting decision
    None of the above.
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Dixon


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Education

M.A Thesis: “Deepening Democracy at the Grassroots Level: Citizen Participation in State Devolved Funds (CDF) in Kenya.” (Distinction)

Graduate School: M.A Pan African Studies (Political Science Concentration), Syracuse University, August 2011 to May, 2013

Graduate School: Non Degree International Affairs, Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, Yale University, August 2010 to June 2011.

Bachelors: Education Arts, Kiswahili, History & Political Studies, Kenyatta University, 2008, (Second Class Honors Upper Division).

Diploma: Public Relations Management, Kenya Institute of Management, 2009, (Upper Credit)

Research Interests

- Democratization and Governance in Africa
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- International Organizations and Actors’ Influence on African Foreign Policy
- Participatory Budgeting, Decentralization and Democracy

Teaching Interests

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- Non State Actors in Global Politics
- Themes in Contemporary African Politics
- Citizen Participation, Civil Society and the State in Developing Countries
• Governance Policy Analysis
• Comparative Politics in the Developing World
• International Political Economy of the Developing World
• Strategic Management, Implementation and Evaluation of NGOs
• African-Americans Politics
• Pan African International Relations in the 21st Century
• The Practice of Public Relations
• Social Science Research Methods
• Quantitative Political Science Analysis (Introduction)

Summary of Qualifications

• Commitment to the practice of democracy promotion
• Theoretical and practical knowledge on democracy promotion in Developing countries
• Conversant with Third Sector management: grant writing, monitoring & evaluation, donor relations
• Certified EC-UNDP on Effective Electoral Assistance (eLearning Course)
• Conducted field research in Kenya on local citizen participation in political processes
• Mastered qualitative & quantitative research and application of STATA and SPSS
• Trained in Participatory Budgeting process

Relevant Work Experience

Awarded Certificate of University Teaching (CUT) through Syracuse University’s Future Professoriate Program (FPP)

Teaching Assistant, Syracuse University: African Politics, Third World Politics, African American Politics, Comparative Third World Politics

Fulbright Language Teaching Assistant, Yale University, August 2010- June 2011, Responsibilities include: Teaching Kiswahili, Assisting in Teaching, Grading Papers, Assisting in designing relevant teaching materials, Conducting Language Tables and Researching.


Grants and Awards

Fulbright Language Teaching Assistant at Yale University from August 2010 to June 2011
Best overall student in Four Secondary School Subjects (English, Commerce, History & Government and Social Ethics Education) in Rachuonyo District Comprehensive Exams (known as Mocks)

Second Best overall student in Two Primary School Subjects (English, Geography, History & Civics - GHCR) in Pala Zone’s National Examination Results

Awarded the joint top GPA student summer research grant $700 for 2012 in the African American Studies Department

**Conference Presentations & Talks**

The 2nd International Conference on Participatory Budgeting in the US and Canada-in Chicago, presented a paper on “Participatory Budgeting: Promises and Challenges from the CDF program in Kenya” May, 2013

Underwent a Participatory Budgeting Training at The Great Cities Institute at University of Illinois Chicago’s College of Urban Planning and Public Affairs – May, 2013

Master’s Level Research Conference at SUNY Brockport College; presented a research paper on “Deepening Democracy: Local Citizen Participation through Devolved Funds in Kenya.” April, 2012


ALTA/NCOCLCTL University of Wisconsin Madison Conference, presented a paper titled: “Non Verbal Communication in a Foreign Language Classroom: Cultural Barriers” April, 2011

**Other Experience**


Jointly translated a Business Teaching Module from English to Kiswahili for WISE (a Minnesota based Organization) August 2006

Volunteer Translator and Teacher, Fair Haven High School under ORIS Program, Responsibilities include: Interviewing new arriving refugees from Africa and translating to their teachers, teaching the refugees and assisting them adjust to their new environment.

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