"Transcendence" is an inheritance from Kant, who displaces transcendent concepts, or the transcendent use of concepts, by writing of transcendental knowledge. Twentieth-century philosophers have, however, repeatedly modified the rhetoric of transcendence to suit their particular ends. Edmund Husserl "reduces" the transcendent and implicitly bases his phenomenology on an experiential, immanent monologue, while Martin Heidegger turns back toward a preexperiential, ontological transcendence. In consequence, phenomenology has wavered between epistemological and metaphysical projects. Husserl's phenomenological method primarily seeks to secure a field of absolute certainty by grounding its theses in the immanence of monadic consciousness, but Heidegger's ontology questions all assumed philosophies of immanence, from Descartes to the neo-Kantians, and points to the essential transcendence of Dasein.

Jacques Derrida carries Heidegger's deconstructive project further and attempts to show that Husserl relies on an unexamined notion of monologue. *La voix et le phénomène* and *De la grammaïologie* represent the crux of his project to deconstruct the monological "metaphysics of presence." From his analysis of Husserl to his readings of Rousseau, Derrida systematically shows that voice, monologue and autoaffection are infiltrated by writing and difference. Derrida questions the effort of Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* to ground consciousness in the supposedly pure presence of monologue or undifferen-
tiated autoaffection. Analysis of Rousseau’s *Confessions* further reveals the absence that haunts even the most intimate passion for immediacy.

Heidegger’s later works implicitly restore the transcendent meaning of monologue. No longer the interiority of a subject, *mono-logos* becomes the ultimate reality of language. Heidegger’s later philosophy grants special status to poetry, as an “authentic” response to the essence of language. In a sense, then, Heidegger strives to recover ancient origins by reclaiming a spiritual Logos as transcendent genius.

Husserl and the Immanence of Consciousness

The role of immanence in Husserl’s philosophic method may be understood in connection with Kant’s distinction between the transcendental and the transcendent. Explaining the character of transcendental knowledge, Kant asserts, “Not every a priori cognition should be called transcendental, but rather only that through which we recognize that and how certain ideas (intuitions or concepts) are employed solely or are possible a priori” (A56/B80). Knowledge is “transcendental” when it concerns the possibility or modes of cognition, our “manner of cognition [Erkenntnisart] of objects insofar as this should be possible a priori” (A11/B25). The error of “transcendent use” involves a faulty application of concepts, which seeks to “step beyond [überschreiten]” the bounds of experience (A296/B352–53). In contrast to the transcendent use of concepts, then, immanent use “limits itself solely to possible experience” (A327/B383). Immanent use of reason refers to nature only through possible experience: transcendent use of reason involves a “connection [Verknüpfung] of the objects of experience, which transcends [übersteigt] all experience” (A845/B873).

Kant expresses his scorn for the transcendent use of principles by means of an image. Both transcendental and transcendent principles “transcend” experience; but while the former are grounded a priori, the latter deceptively pretend to ground themselves only by denying

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that they step beyond the evidence of experience. *Transcendent* principles are those "that encourage us to tear down all those boundary-posts and claim for ourselves a completely new ground, which nowhere recognizes demarcation" (A296/B352). The transcendent use of principles threatens rational boundaries and fraudulently annexes a new territory.² Enemy of adventure, Kant clings to his island of pure reason and warns against false hopes aroused by the illusion of new lands.

In his lecture at a Kant Festival in 1924, Husserl directly acknowledges his debt: during the development of phenomenology, Husserl has recognized "a manifest, essential relationship between this phenomenology and the transcendental philosophy of Kant."³ He discusses "metaphysical transcendence" and finds a similarity between the Kantian "transcendental attitude" and the "natural attitude" spoken of by phenomenology (ibid., 248, 254). Husserl neglects to mention his equal debt to Kant's conception of the transcendent, which phenomenological method will attempt to "bracket out."⁴

In his *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Husserl uses the words "transcendent" and "immanent"

²This anarchic rejection of property rights is especially distasteful to Kant, who describes his own work by means of the figure of colonization: "We have now not merely traveled through the territory of pure understanding, and carefully observed every part of it, but have also measured it across, and determined the place of every thing on it. But this territory is an island, and enclosed by nature itself in unchangeable boundaries. It is the territory of truth (an enticing name), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the real place of illusion, where many a fog-bank and many a quickly melting iceberg give the appearance of new lands, which ceaselessly deceive the fanatical sea-traveler with empty hopes, and involve him in adventures, which he can neither desist from nor bring to an end" (A235-36/B294-95).


to describe different types of perceptions, or intentional acts. Rather than speak of "outer" and "inner" perception, Husserl cautiously notes two modes of directedness. Immanently directed acts "have as their essence, that their intentional objects, if they exist at all, belong to the same stream of experience as they themselves. That is therefore always the case, e.g., where an act is related to another act (a cogitatio to a cogitatio) of the same I" (Ideen 68). The intentional objects of an immanently directed act belong to the same experiential unity as the intentional act, for "consciousness and its object form an individual unity, produced purely through experiences [Erlebnisse]" (ibid.). Immanent acts constitute a unity of perceiver and perceived, as when a speaker asserts, "I speak." How far this realm of immanence extends is a difficult problem of Husserlian phenomenology. Thus the delimitation of transcendent acts, as those which exceed immanence, is equally problematic: "intentional experiences for which that is not the case are transcendentally directed; as, e.g., for all acts directed to essences, or to intentional experiences of other I's with other streams of experience; and equally for all acts directed to things" (Ideen 68). "Transcendence" and "immanence" characterize two kinds of intentional acts or modes of "givenness" to consciousness (Ideen 77). While Husserl does at times discuss the "transcendence of the thing," his distinction is essentially epistemological rather than ontological.

Husserl's later discussion of transcendence and immanence emphasizes the certainty of the immanent and the doubtfulness of the transcendent perception. Immanence is the foundation of Husserl's phenomenology, because "every immanent perception necessarily guarantees the existence of its object" (Ideen 85). Husserl's discussion of immanent perception leads, however, to the transcendental ego.

5Here words associated with "intentionality" are used in the technical sense, referring to the directedness by which consciousness constitutes, or "intends," an object.

6J.-P. Sartre's "Une idée fondamentale de la phénoménologie de Husserl: L'intentionalité," in Situations 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1947), 29–30, misconstrues Husserl's discussion of transcendence and immanence in the Ideen. Thus, according to Sartre, the idea of intentionality should put an end to philosophies of immanence. In Sartre's version, a philosophy of immanence conceives knowledge in terms of "contents of consciousness," whereas Husserl views knowing as a going out toward (s'éclater vers) its object. Sartre misrepresents Husserl by suggesting that the idea of intentionality implies a "philosophy of transcendence" at odds with all "philosophy of immanence." Intentionality is indeed central to Sartre's philosophy of transcendence, but Husserl deals with both immanence and transcendence in an epistemological context that is virtually unrelated to Sartre's usage.
The unique evidence of the *cogito* means that "only for the I and for the stream of experience in relation to itself does this distinguished state of affairs exist, only here is there something like immanent perception" (Ideen 85–86). Husserl describes this pure "I" as "a peculiar, nonconstituted transcendence, a transcendence in immanence" (Ideen 110). According to Husserl, all other forms of transcendence must, as unreliable constructs, be "bracketed out"; Husserl conceives only the transcendental ego to be immanent.

In one sense, then, Husserl sets up a philosophy of transcendence: in relation to the transcendental ego. The *Cartesiana Meditationen* are not directly concerned with the distinction between transcendence and immanence, yet Husserl's discussion of the transcendental ego proceeds from one interpretation of this opposition. An experienced "transcendence in immanence" suggests that the pure "I" of the *cogito* is transcendental: "I am no longer the one who finds himself in the natural attitude as a human being. . . . Through the phenomenological *epoché* I reduce my natural human I and my inner life—the realm of my psychological self-experience—to my transcendental-phenomenological I, the realm of the transcendental-phenomenological self-experience."7 In the *Pariser Vorträge* and *Cartesiana Meditationen*, however, Husserl subordinates even this transcendence to immanence: "Transcendence is an immanent character of being, which constitutes itself inside the ego" (CM 32; cf. CM 117). Husserl does develop a philosophy of transcendental subjectivity, but it involves a methodological reduction to the sphere of immanence in which both the transcendence of the world and of other egos are constituted in the immanence of transcendental subjectivity. As a skeptic in relation to the transcendent, and in support of a philosophy of monadic consciousness, Husserl asserts that we should accept nothing except "what we can make essentially visible to ourselves in consciousness itself, in pure immanence" (Ideen 113). The unsettling consequence of Husserl's philosophy of immanence finds expression in the repeated question, "How do I escape from my island of consciousness?" (CM 32,

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The Transcendence of Monologue

116). The secure island of Kantian reason turns into a prison for consciousness when phenomenology constructs a transcendental theory of knowledge by reduction to the “sphere” of immanence.

Derrida and the Impossibility of Monologue

*La voix et le phénomène* marks both Derrida’s turn away from phenomenology and his development toward deconstructive method in the traditions of Heidegger and Nietzsche. Derrida argues that Husserl’s theory of language privileges voiced speech and relies on an impossible ideal of monologue: the meanings “given” to the phenomenologist in an originary presence allegedly occur as, or are secured by, internalized discourse.

Derrida focuses on the *Logische Untersuchungen*, section 8, entitled “The Expressions in the Solitary Inner Life.” Determined to lay bare Husserl’s hidden metaphysical presuppositions, Derrida makes this incidental passage stand for the broader tendencies in Husserl’s philosophy. According to Derrida, this section reverts to an internalized voice in order to preserve both the bodily and ideal aspects of sound linked to meaning. Derrida’s third chapter, then, entitled “Meaning as Soliloquy” (*Le vouloir-dire comme soliloque*), implies that Husserl’s theory of meaning is grounded on monologue. As Derrida recognizes, Husserl’s discussion denies the creative power of monologue and assumes an undifferentiated presence to oneself. Husserl concludes his discussion of solitary speech with a scenario in which someone says to himself: You did that badly, you can’t go on like that. But in the genuine, communicative sense one does not speak in such

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8 Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit*, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1977), 60, clearly responds to Husserl’s mode of questioning. I shall henceforth cite *Sein und Zeit* as *SZ*.

9 To some extent, Derrida discloses a hidden metaphysical assumption only by exaggerating the monological aspect of Husserl’s theory of signs. Rather than exalt monologue to a position of supreme importance, Husserl dismisses it from the domain of truly significant communication. Yet while Husserl repudiates “expressions in the solitary inner life” (*Ausdrücke im einsamen Seelenleben*), he implicitly depends on a monological level of thought as the basis of phenomenological evidence.

10 But Husserl argues the reverse: monologue has meaning only because meanings are intuited prior to their linguistic expression. Husserl bases his phenomenology on a prethematic meaning-intention; monologue appears pointless to him, because it communicates nothing new to the speaker.
cases, nor does one tell oneself anything; one merely imagines oneself as speaking and communicating. In monological speech, words cannot perform the function of indicating the existence of mental acts, because such indication would be completely purposeless here. For the acts in question are experienced by us in the same moment.11

Monologue is futile if its meaning is simultaneously experienced and if no real communication occurs because the speaker always already knows what he "means." Husserl consequently discredits the signifying function of dreams and other unconscious bearers of meaning, and further excludes gestures, in order to focus on expressions with "intended" meanings. According to Husserl's analysis, which denies that solitary discourse produces anything new, monological speech falls short of the realm of genuine communication. Yet Husserl underestimates the role of "expressions in the solitary inner life" because he assumes that a prelinguistic level of meaning precedes whatever we tell ourselves. The generative function of monologue fades in the light of logical meanings that are supposed to ground linguistic utterances.

Derrida paraphrases Husserl's statement of the limits of monologue: "If the subject indicates nothing to himself, it is because he cannot do this, and he cannot do this because he does not need to. As the lived [le vécu] is immediately present to oneself in the mode of certitude and of absolute necessity, the manifestation of oneself to oneself through the delegation or representation of an indicator is impossible because it is superfluous."12 Husserl grants the possibility of solitary speech but denies that it exerts a significant communicative function. Derrida questions the supposed presence to oneself and thus takes a more radical step toward the undoing of monologue. Reading the Logische Untersuchungen, section 8, in conjunction with the Cartesianische Meditationen, Derrida suggests that monologue is


impossible, just as no ultimate reduction to the monadic sphere can be performed.

At issue is not whether one can talk to oneself but whether the self of such a conversation is ever truly monadic. In other words, can a solitary speaker retain a coherent and pristine realm of immanence? Husserl denies that inner voice is the last resort of his reduction of the “immanent sphere” by asserting the primacy of prelinguistic intuitions. But Derrida recognizes that Husserl requires the fiction of a monological voice, in order to assure the existence of a “mental corporality” (geistige Leiblichkeit).

Derrida's subversion of the supposedly monadic phenomenological voice ensues from an awareness of difference within language. Conceived as a stream of language, consciousness can never insulate itself against otherness: monadic consciousness turns nomadic. Derrida notes that “the sign is originarily wrought by [travaillé par] fiction” (VP 63/56). The fictionality or rhetoricity of signs introduces difference where previously a solitary sameness was assumed. Derrida consequently disturbs the facile distinction between internal and external language. He maintains that solitary speech is never entirely pure, purged of the shared language of others. The conventional occurrences of dialogue are preconditions of monologue; the “I” observes and questions “itself” in the medium of the “they.”

Thus Derrida perceives a “non-identity to oneself of the supposedly originary presence” (VP 76/68). Solitary speech shows itself as a dubious autoaffection that denies its inevitable reference beyond itself. “Autoaffection” is the particular object of Derrida’s attack against self-originatory myths: “Is not the concept of pure solitude—and of a monad in the phenomenological sense—impaired by its own origin, by the very condition of its presence to itself: ‘time’ reconceived starting from the différance within autoaffection?” (VP 77/168). To indicate the internal difference within language, Derrida alters the spelling of this key word: différence strikes at the illusion of a stable, unchanging self. Derrida further undermines the phenomenological monad by

showing the impossibility, not only of monologue, but of autoaffec­tion in general.

"Voice" appears as a kind of autoaffection that establishes presence, "a medium which at once preserves the presence of the object before the intuition and the presence to itself" (VP 85/76). Thus the illusion of an isolated subject arises. Without leaving the immanent sphere, a subject appears to affect itself through language: "the subject can hear itself or speak to itself, allow itself to be affected by the signifier which it produces without any detour through the instance of exte­riority, of the world, or of what is not one's own in general" (VP 88/78). This monological autoaffection commands a privileged position: "Every other form of autoaffection must either pass through what is not one's own or renounce universality. When I see myself, whether this is because a limited region of my body offers itself to my look or because it is reflected in a mirror, what is not my own has already entered into the field of this autoaffection which from then on is no longer pure" (VP 88/78–79). Only the internal voice is experienced as "absolutely pure autoaffection," such that "the operation of hearing oneself speak," the autoaffection of the voice, gives rise to subjectiv­ity. Derrida pushes this analysis one step further and concludes that, according to the tradition, "voice is consciousness" (VP 89/79).

Derrida undoes this statement of the "metaphysics of presence" by reference to problematics of repetition and inscription. He finds a tension within Husserl's work, because "the possibility of writing inhabited the inside of speech" (VP 92/82). Difference, which pro­duces the transcendental subject, asserts itself despite Husserl's wish to preserve a pure presence: "Autoaffection is not a modality of ex­perience characterizing a being that would be already itself (autos). It produces sameness as a relation to itself in the différance from itself, the same as the non-identical" (ibid.). Both monologue and autoaf­fection thus reveal their illusory character, erroneously posited as prior to what in fact produces them. Passing through Heidegger's use of the related term Selbstaffektion, in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (especially section 34), Derrida arrives at a statement of the impos­sibility of pure autoaffection, as a result of the movement of temporal difference: "The theme of a pure interiority of speech or of 'hearing oneself speak' is radically contradicted by 'time' itself. The going-out 'into the world' is also, itself, originarily implied by the movement
of temporalization" (VP 96/86). Derrida interprets Husserl, then, by following the lead of Heidegger's revision.

Just as there are dramatic soliloquies and scenes of writing, there is necessarily a scene of monologue. The supposedly pure inner voice is infected by rhetoricity; "the 'presence' of sense and of speech has already begun to be missing from itself" (VP 97/87). Derrida generalizes from a linguistic observation—that all "mono-logos" is permeated by dialogue—to the argument that the subject or "I" is incapable of pure presence to itself, even in the form of a self-addressed proposition of self-knowledge. The supposedly pure autoaffection of monological voice is already divided by différence or writing (VP, chaps. 6–7). The incursion of writing, associated with the indicator (Anzeichen), thus pronounces the death of all idealized monological purity.

Derrida continues his subversion of monologue by interpreting the scene of autoaffection in Les confessions. The text of Rousseau represents an autoeroticism that undergoes an analogous play of presence and absence. Even more intricate than phenomenological efforts to secure the presence of an object to a subject by means of voice, Les confessions constitute a scene in which Rousseau manipulates the presence and absence of his love object by means of masturbation. While the phenomenological autoaffection supposedly ensures the self-presence of the "intended" object to the subject, Rousseau's autoeroticism similarly aims at the imaginary presencing of an absent other. Derrida finds a connection in the shared futility of these projects, for voice is as much a phantom as is the imagined object of autoeroticism.

Thus De la gramma matologie describes "the age of Rousseau" in familiar terms. Consciousness is grasped as an experience of autoaffection: "The logos can be infinite and present to itself, it can produce itself as autoaffection, only through voice: an order of the signifier by which the subject goes out from itself in itself, does not borrow outside of itself the signifier which it emits and which affects it at the same time. Such at least is the experience—or consciousness—of voice: of hearing oneself speak." Husserl appears as a latecomer in the era of metaphysics

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15 Gram. 146. In English, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chak-
since Descartes, characterized by "phonologism." With Rousseau the situation is more complex, however; for him, "this motif composes and organizes itself with its opposite: a ceaselessly reanimated mistrust with respect to speech that is called full." For Rousseau knows the failure of voice, inasmuch as "we are dispossessed of the coveted presence in the gesture of language by which we seek to seize it" (Gram. 203-4/141); he both condemns "writing as the destruction of presence" and gives priority to "writing as the restoration, by a certain absence and by a sort of calculated effacement, of the disappointed presence of oneself in speech" (Gram. 204/142).

Writing thus emerges as a "dangerous supplement" that both adds and supplants. Rousseau's Confessions represent this supplement as a writing parallel to masturbation; Rousseau himself refers to "that dangerous supplement which deceives nature."16 According to Derrida, this deception of nature is like the operation of writing, because it turns away from nature into the imaginary. Whereas Husserl requires monologue to assure self-presence, Rousseau needs masturbation to secure desired, absent feminine presences. But like the voice that suffers contamination by writing, autoeroticism must acknowledge its self-delusion: "The presence that is thus delivered to us in the present is a chimera. Autoaffection is a pure speculation" (Gram. 221/154).

Masturbation and monologue share in the effort to obtain illusory presence. But autoaffection extends beyond the activity of masturbation and includes other attempts to procure an absent presence. Since the immediacy of jouissance appears unattainable, pure presence must cede to differentiated absence, the play of transference or chain of supplements. As monologue is infected by meaningless indicators and writing, severed from the "meaning-intention" of the subject, so masturbation is plagued by the absence it must posit while seeking to overcome distance. Derrida's reading of Rousseau retrospectively demonstrates the impossibility of pure monologue.

Derrida traces a path from voice and autoaffection, impossible dreams of pure presence, through autoeroticism and writing, as ges-

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tures toward a recuperated presence in confrontation with inevitable absence. The ultimate undoing of the voice/writing dichotomy means that not only monologue but also writing appears in an autoerotic light: "within the chain of supplements, it was difficult to separate writing from onanism" (Gram. 235/165). And voice remains a form of autoaffection that denies its internal contradiction and difference: "Voice and consciousness of voice—that is to say in short, consciousness as presence to oneself—are the phenomenon of an autoaffection lived as suppression of difféance" (Gram. 236/166).

While monologue affords a delusion of presence by suppression of absence, writing is the delusory making-present in absence. Derrida’s "preference" for writing reflects his choice of explicit mediation as opposed to pretended immediacy. Monologue seeks to elude the inevitable play of presence and absence, of difféance; masturbation enters into this play; writing sets up the conditions of possibility for presence and absence, "transcendental" conditions of mediated immediacy. In a way that requires further scrutiny, Derrida's writing aims toward a new transcendentalism. Language, or figuration, becomes the precondition of all possible experience. Heidegger chooses a different turn on the same path.

Heidegger and the Transcendence of Dasein

Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Kant is most apparent in his use of the word "transcendence" (Transzendenz). Many critics have questioned Heidegger’s discussion of transcendental philosophy as fundamental ontology, and even Heidegger admits that Kant became an "advocate for the question of Being I had raised." But apart from the immediate problems relating to the interpretation of Kant’s first Kritik as a grounding of metaphysics rather than as a theory of knowledge, Heidegger clearly projects the terminology of Sein und Zeit onto Kant’s text.

In Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Heidegger’s exposition of transcendental knowledge begins by subtly replacing the adjectival

form "transcendental" by the substantive form "transcendence":
"transcendental cognition investigates not beings themselves but rather
the possibility of the prior understanding of Being, i.e. at the same
time: the constitution of the Being of beings. It concerns the stepping
beyond (transcendence) of pure reason to beings, so that reason can
now in the first instance take on experience as a possible object" (KPM 16).
Heidegger initiates his ontological turn away from Kant's in-
quiry into a mode of cognition (Erkenntnis) by substituting "transcen-
dence" for the Kantian "transcendental." That is, he subsumes the
epistemological terms of transcendental cognition and transcendental
use of ideas under an ontology involving transcendence. The Kantian
schematism becomes inseparable from "the most inner happening
[Geschehen] of transcendence," and transcendental philosophy be-
comes equivalent to an "essential uncovering [Wesensenthüllung] of
transcendence" (KPM 105, 120). Heidegger concludes that "if Kant
calls this mode of cognition 'transcendental,' from this may be inferred
that it has transcendence as its theme" (KPM 128). Heidegger argues
that Kant was concerned to make transcendence visible (KPM 159),
but contrary to Heidegger's claim, Kant never abstracts from "tran-
scendental cognition" to thematize transcendence. Without marking
any discontinuity between the exposition of Kant's thought and his
own philosophical work, Heidegger grafts the language of Sein und
Zeit onto Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft: "The existential analytic of
everydayness...should show that and how transcendence—being-in-the-world—is already at the basis of all intercourse with beings" (KPM 228). As in Heidegger's other works of this period, transcen-
dence appears as the ontological essence of Dasein.

After the publication of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger writes several
works that give special emphasis to transcendence. As if to provide
a previously neglected key to his thought, "Was ist Metaphysik?" and
"Vom Wesen des Grundes" insistently return to this term. Fur-
thermore, the Marburg lectures of 1928 culminate in a discussion of
"the transcendence of Dasein." What roles does transcendence play
in Heidegger's philosophy?

18Despite reservations, I follow the usual translation of Sein and Seiende as "Being" and "beings." Because the distinction has more to do with temporality than with a difference in number, "Being" and "the existing" (or "the existent") are in some cases preferable.
19In tracing the uses of "transcendence" from Sein und Zeit to "Vom Wesen des
"Transcendence" is seldom named by *Sein und Zeit*, but it functions under various guises throughout. A footnote to "Vom Wesen des Grundes" can thus assert that "what has until now been published of the researches concerning *Sein und Zeit* has as its task nothing other than a concretely disclosing project [Entwurf] of transcendence (cp. sections 12–83, especially section 69)." Heidegger's note refers to virtually all of *Sein und Zeit*, from section 12 to the end. In other words, *Sein und Zeit* deals with transcendence insofar as it explicates "being-in-the-world," the necessary precondition or ground of experience. Because only section 69 explicitly discusses transcendence, Heidegger indicates that it appears in diverse forms without being named.

A substantial footnote in "Vom Wesen des Grundes" further explains the centrality of transcendence by recalling the title of what was then the "First Part" of *Sein und Zeit*: "The Interpretation of Dasein in terms of Temporality and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question of Being." Spatial metaphors proliferate. According to the footnote, the transcendence of Dasein indicates that Dasein exists "ec-statically" or "ec-centrically" (ekstatisch, 'exzentrisch'). This interpretation recurs at several stages of the analysis of Dasein. As Heidegger shows in the Marburg lectures, then, the ontological difference repeats itself within transcendence. In addition to the transcendence that must always already have taken place, as a precondition of existence, another transcendence continues to occur, as in the form of intentionality. *Sein und Zeit* never acknowledges this doubleness of transcendence, and Heidegger's unresolved relationship to Husserlian phenomenology complicates its disparate uses.

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Grundes," the essential problem is not to establish definitions but to clarify the functioning of this key word in Heidegger's texts. From this point of view the Marburg lectures are especially instructive because they make explicit the role Heidegger gives transcendence in his revision of the philosophical tradition.

20Martin Heidegger, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," in *Wegmarken*, 2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 160on (henceforth cited as "WG").

21KPM makes clear that Heidegger regards his writings as constituting a fundamental ontology in the sense that they deal with "conditions of possibility": "the ontological, i.e. here always pre-ontological cognition is the condition of the possibility that something like the existing itself [Seiendes selbst] can stand opposite a finite being in general" (p. 67).

After section 12 of *Sein und Zeit* establishes being-in-the-world as the ground of all encounter with beings in space, section 13 begins the redefinition of transcendence. This revision follows from Heidegger's overcoming of the epistemological tradition of subject-object relation. False questions arise from the traditional approach, for example: "how does this cognizing subject come out of its inner 'sphere' into an 'other, external one,' how can cognition in general have an object, how must the object itself be thought, so that finally the subject knows it, without needing to risk a leap into another sphere?" (SZ 60). In contrast, his version of phenomenological method strives to raise the more fundamental question by understanding cognition as "a mode of being of Dasein as being-in-the-world" (SZ 61).

*Sein und Zeit* attempts to ground the presumed "transcending of the subject" in a more fundamental, ontological transcendence. Heidegger argues that "being-there" (*Da-sein*) is always already being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*):

In directedness to... and comprehending, Dasein does not first go beyond its inner sphere, so to speak, in which it first is encapsulated, rather it is in its primary mode of being always already "out there" with an existent [Seienden] that encounters it in an already discovered world. And the determinative openness for beings to be cognized is not anything like a departure from the inner sphere, but rather Dasein is, in this "being-out-there" with the object, in the rightly understood sense, "inside," i.e., it is itself as being-in-the-world, that cognizes. [SZ 62]

Heidegger writes in reaction against contemporary works of epistemology, such as Nicolai Hartman's *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1921). Yet his interpretation of transcendence also involves a radicalization or revision of Husserl's phenomenology. If the terms "directedness to" and "comprehending" replace Husserlian intentionality, the question arises: to what extent does Heidegger ground intentionality as described by Husserl, and to what extent does he modify it?

Heidegger's analysis of discourse (*Rede*) repeats the inner-outer problematic of transcendence. Heidegger argues that Dasein is always already "in the world," and in regard to expression Heidegger maintains that Dasein is always already "outside," beyond itself: "All speech concerning... , which communicates in that of which it speaks
[in ihrem Geredeten], has at the same time the character of a speaking-itself-out [Sichaussprechen]. Speaking, Dasein speaks itself out, not because it first of all is encapsulated as something 'inner' in opposition to something outer, but because it is already 'out there' as being-in-the-world" (SZ 162). At this stage of the work, Heidegger has characterized Dasein as "being-in-the-world" in the mode of Verstehen. Thus language, as the expression (or as the actuality) of understanding, is another form of transcendence. To the extent that it takes part in the constitution of "world," then, language is implicitly another aspect of transcendence, or of the transcendental horizon of experience (SZ 160–61).

In section 69, Sein und Zeit explicitly grounds the "transcendence of Dasein" in the "transcendence of the world": "In order for the thematization of the present-at-hand . . . to be possible, Dasein must transcend the thematized existent [das thematisierte Seiende]" (SZ 363). A footnote to this passage hints at Heidegger's relationship to Husserl: "That and how the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the ec-static temporality of Dasein, the following section will show" (SZ 363n). Without contradicting his teacher, Heidegger puts "intentionality" in its place, derivative in relation to Heidegger's own "transcendence."

Section 69c contains the fullest reinterpretation of transcendence, in connection with certain directional modes of Dasein (Um-zu, Wozu, Dazu, Um-wollen). Without considering the relationship between these terms and intentionality, Heidegger turns to an ontological interpretation of temporality. Again, ontological transcendence serves to displace the subject-object model: "The 'problem of transcendence' cannot be brought down to the question: how does a subject come out to an object, whereby the totality of objects is identified with the idea of the world. It is to be asked: what makes it ontologically possible for a being to be encountered in the world and objectified as such? The return to the ec-static, horizontally founded transcendence gives the answer" (SZ 366). Later texts show, however, that Heidegger cannot strictly maintain the ontological difference within transcendence.

Until the recent publication of the Marburg lectures, "Vom Wesen des Grundes" was the seminal explication of Heidegger's "transcendence." In its condensed restatement of the problematics of Sein und
Zeit, as of the ontological difference, this text employs “transcendence” to mark the difference between Being and beings (Sein and Seiendes). Heidegger refers to the ground of the ontological difference as the transcendence of Dasein, and his search for the essence of rational grounds becomes a study in transcendence: “If the essence of the ground has an inner connection to the essence of truth, then the problem of the ground can also only have its home where the essence of truth creates its inner possibility, in the essence of transcendence.”

At the same time that he points to a truth founded in transcendence, Heidegger enacts a gentle philosophical Desstruktion by asserting that his project is more fundamental than Husserl’s: “If one characterizes all conduct in relation to beings as intentional, then intentionality is only possible on the ground of transcendence, but neither identical with this nor, on the other hand, that which makes transcendence possible” (WG 31/29).

Heidegger accepts the traditional meaning of transcendence as “a step beyond,” but he tries to avoid describing it as something that can happen. Nevertheless, he initially explains transcendence in terms of its inherent spatial metaphor: “The step beyond may be formally grasped as a ‘relation’ that reaches ‘from’ something ‘to’ something. That to which the step beyond accedes, which for the most part is inappropriately called the ‘transcendent’, is included in the step beyond. And finally, in the step beyond, something is always stepped beyond” (WG 33/35). Taking the etymological origins of the word as his pre-text, Heidegger seeks to rule out aspects that are inappropriate for his purposes. “Stepping beyond” retains a disturbing residue of spatial imagery, and Heidegger tries to eliminate what he considers its unsuitable metaphorical content. He concedes that “the human Dasein” has the possibility of going beyond concrete spatial limitations, but he hopes to keep this “step beyond” separate from his purportedly more fundamental transcendence as the step beyond that makes existence possible (WG 34/37).

After Heidegger purges transcendence of its spatio-temporal meanings, he suggests paradoxically that it is a going beyond that neither “goes” nor goes “beyond.” Heidegger’s transcendence cannot occur but rather must always already be: “With the fact of Da-sein the step
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beyond is already there.” Thus “beings themselves” (das Seiende selbst) must be transcended, which means defining Dasein as an ontological being and linking transcendence with “being-in-the-world” (WG 35/39–41). But “transcendence” functions in Heidegger’s texts as more than a synonym for “being-in-the-world,” although in some contexts the terms appear to be interchangeable. In fact, ontological transcendence is the more fundamental term, without which there could be no construction of “world.”

The Marburg lectures of 1928 further reveal the strategic place of transcendence in Heidegger’s overcoming (Überwindung) of the tradition. As in Sein und Zeit and “Vom Wesen des Grundes,” Heidegger employs “transcendence” both to undermine the epistemological tradition based on a subject-object dichotomy and to distinguish his philosophical project from that of Husserl. The text is contained in volume 26 of the Gesamtausgabe. Entitled by Heidegger’s editors “The Transcendence of Dasein,” section 11 is apparently an earlier version of the text that became section 2 of “Vom Wesen des Grundes” and begins similarly, with an interpretation of the word “transcendence.”

Heidegger observes that the philosophical tradition has viewed the transcendent in opposition to the immanent. The immanent, then, “is that which remains within, meaning: what remains in the subject, in the soul, in consciousness,—the transcendent is then that which does not remain within but is rather outside: that which lies outside of the soul and of consciousness” (MAL 204). Heidegger caricatures the “capsule-conception of the subject” (Kapselvorstellung des Subjekts) that is implied by this version of transcendence: “What thus lies outside the barriers and the enclosing wall of consciousness therefore has, when one speaks from the most intimate court of this consciousness, stepped beyond the enclosing wall and stands outside” (ibid.). Consciousness appears as a fortress, perceiving the world as if from inside a walled courtyard. Heidegger believes that this transcendence involves a false ontology of the subject, in which “the subject is represented as if it were a capsule, with an inside, a capsule-wall, and an outside . . . a barrier between inner and outer must be stepped

Heidegger calls this the "epistemological concept of transcendence" because it raises questions about the knowledge a subject can have of a transcendent object.

At a safe distance from Freiburg, Heidegger argues that Husserl’s phenomenology also relies on this "ontic transcendence." Heidegger maintains that Husserl did not understand intentionality radically enough, and in consequence his intentionality is "a narrow conception, insofar as it is understood to mean a relation to what is present at hand" (MAL 168). Heidegger insists that Husserl’s conception is less fundamental than his own: "The problem of transcendence in general is not identical with the problem of intentionality. This is, as ontic transcendence, only possible on the ground of the original transcendence: being-in-the-world" (MAL 170). In Heidegger’s view, the problem of transcendence points beyond theories of knowledge to an ontological inquiry. A passing comment suggests that "the vulgar phenomenon of transcendence is the transcendence in which Dasein essentially and immediately moves" (MAL 169).

Heidegger can thus assert that his more fundamental transcendence is "the original constitution of the subjectivity of a subject" (MAL 211). This transcendence must always already be, as a precondition for subjective existence: "The subject transcends as subject; it would not be a subject if it did not transcend. Being a subject means transcending" (ibid.). Dasein does not occasionally involve itself in a movement of going beyond; rather, Dasein itself is the step beyond. If transcendence is not a particular behavior of Dasein in which a mundane obstacle is exceeded, then "what is stepped beyond is rather the existent itself, which can become manifest to the subject, and indeed on the ground of its transcendence" (MAL 212). Dasein transcends, not by perceiving objects, but through its "being-in-the-world" that grounds all potential experience.

Heidegger employs "transcendence" in his overcoming of the epistemological tradition. He displaces the subject-object model of cognition by reference to a transcendence that undermines the "capsule-conception of the subject," and even the intentionality of Husserl appears derivative in relation to Heidegger’s ontological transcendence. But a contrary interpretation has tacitly intervened. Heidegger cannot entirely purge transcendence of the spatial metaphor it contains. Ontic transcendence reasserts itself when Heidegger writes of "the transcendence, in which Dasein essentially and immediately
moves" (MAL 169). While Husserl does not write fundamental ontology, Heidegger grants that he does account for the transcendence familiar to everyday Dasein. From a Heideggerian standpoint, Husserl perhaps deals with an inauthentic transcendence or with a transcendence of Dasein in the mode of inauthenticity.25

Logos as Genius

Early in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger anticipates his subsequent turn toward the logos. Section 7B translates logos as discourse (Rede), a "letting see" (Sehenlassen) (SZ 33). In turn, understanding is seeing "something as something" (Etwas als Etwas) (SZ 149). Metaphoric "seeing-as" combines with metonymic "seeing-for." Though Heidegger does not explicate the modes of understanding in rhetorical terms, several of his texts reencounter the logos.

Heidegger's early philosophy culminates in silence because the call of conscience does not open up a "conversation with oneself" (Selbstgespräch) (SZ 273), while "in anxiety words fail us" (die Angst verschlägt uns das Wort).26 Skeptical of everyday language, Heidegger refers to an ontological level of "discourse" (Rede); Heidegger believes that discussions of signs generally neglect the grounding of language in ontological modes of Dasein. In contrast, Heidegger asserts that discourse is "existentially equiprimordial with finding oneself and understanding" and the basis of language: "That only now language becomes a theme, shall indicate, that this phenomenon has its roots in the existential constitution of the resoluteness of Dasein. The existential-ontological foundation of language is discourse" (SZ 60). An earlier passage similarly discusses the foundation of meaning and language in the "resoluteness" of Dasein involved in understanding (SZ 87). But Heidegger later questions this approach that places the understanding of Dasein at the origin of language. In a marginal comment


26"Was ist Metaphysik?" in Wegmarken, 2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), 111.
to this passage, supplied by the fourteenth edition of *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger writes that Dasein and language are equally fundamental: the earlier statement is “untrue. Language is not layered [aufgestockt], but rather *is* the originary essence of truth as *There* [Da]” (SZ 442). This self-correction nevertheless conceals the shift in Heidegger’s terminology. Whereas *Sein und Zeit* distinguishes everyday “language” (Sprache) from ontological “discourse” (Rede), some kind of meaningful articulation prior to explicit verbalization, Heidegger’s later works refer to language and “the essence of language” that may be approached through poetry.

*Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* and “Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung” (1936) initiate Heidegger’s later reflection on language. As the essence of language, poetry “precedes” ordinary usage: “Poetry never takes up language as a raw material that is present at hand, rather poetry itself makes language possible....the essence of language must be understood out of the essence of poetry.”

27 Heidegger gestures toward “the conversation as an authentic happening of language” (HWD 40); Hölderlin’s poetry inspires Heidegger to write of the divine mission of a poet, who stands “between these—the gods, and those—the people” (HWD 43). Like ancient daimones and malachim, poets mediate between god(s) and men. Through poetry, the divine Word becomes accessible; the danger is that essential language may become perverted in becoming common: “inauthenticity” of language is linked to its daily “chatter” (Gerade), while “authenticity” is the metaphysical capacity to create a world out of the essence of language.

Heidegger reflects on language by responding to previous authors in a “repetition and destruction” (Wiederholung und Destruktion) of the tradition. His reading of Novalis is one of the most surprising and, indirectly, one of the most decisive for his development “on the way to language.” The essay entitled “Der Weg zur Sprache,” in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, begins with a contemplation on the metaphysical meaning of language as monologue. Without expressing any interest in the mundane phenomenon of a subject’s inner speech, Heidegger approaches the sense in which language carries on its own monologue. Novalis is another source of the idea that “language speaks,”


28 At the start of Novalis’ “Lehrlinge zu Sais,” a mysterious voice pronounces (in
Heidegger’s discussion of Novalis’ “Monolog” gives meaning to this phrase.\(^29\) The opening lines of “Der Weg zur Sprache” cite Novalis approvingly: “To start with, let us hear an expression by Novalis. It stands in a text which he entitled Monolog. The title points to the secret of language: it speaks solely \([\text{einzig}]\) and solitary \([\text{einsam}]\) with itself. One sentence of the text reads: ‘Precisely what is peculiar about language, that it is concerned merely with itself, no one knows.’”\(^30\)

\(^{29}\)The original version of the obscure and profound aphorism entitled “Monolog” is contained in Novalis: Werke, Tagebücher, und Briefe Friedrich von Hardenbergs, ed. Hans-Joachim Mähl and Richard Samuel (Munich: Carl Hanser, 1978): “There is a really crazy \([\text{närrische}]\) thing about speaking and writing; the correct conversation is a mere wordplay. The laughable error is only to be wondered at, that people think—they speak for the sake of things. Precisely what is peculiar about language, that it is merely concerned with itself, no one knows. For this reason it is such a wonderful and fruitful secret—that when one merely speaks, in order to speak, he expresses exactly the most magnificent and original truths. But if he wants to speak of something definite, moody language lets him say only the most laughable and perverse rubbish. Hence arises the hatred, which so many serious people have against language. They note its mischievousness but do not notice that the despicable chatter \([\text{das verächtliche Schwatzen}]\) is the infinitely serious side of language. If one could only make comprehensible to people that it is with language as with mathematical formulae—they constitute a world for themselves—they play only with themselves, express nothing but their wonderful nature, and just for this reason are they so expressive—just for this reason do they mirror the strange play of relations of things. Only through their freedom are they parts of nature and only in their free movements does the world soul express itself and make them into a gentle measure and groundplan of things. So it is also with language— whoever has a fine feeling of its fingering \([\text{Applicatur}]\), its beat, its musical spirit, whoever perceives in himself the gentle working of its inner nature, and thereafter moves his tongue or his hand, he will be a prophet; on the other hand, whoever knows it well but does not have enough of an ear and a sense for it will write truths like these but will be bested by language and mocked by men, like Cassandra by the Trojans. If I believe that I have thus indicated most clearly the essence and office of poetry, yet I know that no one can understand it and that I have said something completely absurd because I wanted to say it, and thus no poetry comes into existence. How would it be, however, if I had to speak? and if this drive to speak were the sign of the inspiration of language, of the efficacy of language in me? and if my will only willed everything that I had to, then this could after all be poetry, without my knowledge and belief, and make a secret of language comprehensible? and so I would be a writer with a calling \([\text{ein berufener Schriftsteller}]\), for a writer is indeed only one inspired by language \([\text{ein Sprachbegeisteter}]\)?” (vol. 2, p. 438; translation mine).

In opposition to all subjective interpretations of speech, Heidegger accedes that language speaks, not men; men speak "authentically" by letting language speak. But what can it mean that language speaks with itself? How does this seemingly divine autoaffection interact with human languages?

Heidegger's discussion of "the way to language" parallels Novalis' statements, which Heidegger ultimately summarizes: "Language is monologue. Now this implies two things: it is language alone [allein] that authentically speaks. And it speaks solitarily" (US 265/134). Despite his diffidence in relation to Novalis' version of "Monologue," Heidegger unmistakably stands in the tradition that asserts: "Man does not speak alone—the universe also speaks—everything speaks—infinit languages." Heidegger faults his precursor "because Novalis, in the field of vision of absolute idealism, imagines language dialectically from the standpoint of subjectivity" (US 265/134), but Heidegger's writings merge phenomenological discourse with the antisubjectivist tendency already evident in Novalis' texts. Heidegger's later thoughts on language rejoin the powerful pathways of "pure" poetry that follow inherent possibilities of language.

Through the musical grammar of thought, Heidegger exemplifies ways in which speech responds to language: "Language speaks. Man speaks, in so far as he corresponds to language. Corresponding is hearing. It hears, insofar as it belongs to the bidding of silence." Human "speaking" (sprechen) becomes "corresponding" (entsprechen) and "hearing" (hören) becomes "belonging-to" (gehören), following clues already provided by language. A further, personifying trope occurs with the mysterious "it hears" (es hört), in which "the corresponding" (das Entsprechen) seems to hear, not man. The peculiarly passive agent in this process seems to be the "bidding of silence" (Geheiss der Stille). In conjunction with his antisubjectivist views of language, Heidegger allows free play to the inner music, correspondences, and hidden palimpsest of language. Because the true problem is to correspond to language, Heidegger denies all effort to achieve originality: "Nothing rests on bringing forth a new view of language.

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1 I shall henceforth cite this work as US. Page numbers in the English edition appear after the slash.

31 Novalis, Werke, II, 500.

Everything rests on learning to live in the speaking of language" (US 33).

Heidegger works more profoundly through traditions of the logos in the recently published Freiburg lectures on Heraklitus (1943-44). Heidegger’s analyses focus on Heraklitus’ Fragment B50:

ouk emou alla tou Logon akousantas
homologein sophon estin Hen Panta.

Not listening to me, but to the Logos,
it is wise to agree that the All is One.

English editions of Heraklitus’ fragments generally do not capitalize Logos, but Heidegger recapitulates the ontological difference (suggested by the English translations of “Being” and “beings”) by distinguishing between Logos and logos. This distinction allows him to write that Fragment 50 deals with the “homological relationship of the human logos to the Logos.” The single Logos “is the originary, origin-granting collection that holds itself at the origin, as the essence of Being itself” (Hera. 292). For Heidegger, then, the homology of being-there (Da-sein) and Being (Sein), or of human logos and divine Logos, means that “man can be related through his logos to the Logos in the homologein, but this he is not always and perhaps only seldom” (Hera. 306). Although man is only seldom capable of correspondence, the possibilities for this privileged moment suggest Heidegger’s late revision of existentialist authenticity. The “agreement” spoken of by Heraklitus is not conformity in the opinions of men but a relationship to the Logos. Because man is generally “turned away from the Logos,” the presence of human logos conceals the absence of the divine Logos:

33Martin Heidegger, *Heraklit*, in the *Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979), 296 (henceforth cited as *Hera*.). Until this important volume appears in translation, English readers can only compare Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, *Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67*, trans. Charles H. Seibert (University: University of Alabama Press, 1979). The capitalization of German nouns would efface the difference between logos and Logos; as in his essay "Logos (Heraklit, Fragment 50),” Heidegger distinguishes these forms by referring to them in Greek.

34Heidegger continues with an unusual reference to metaphor: “Accordingly it looks as if Heraklitus had read off the essence of reading and gathering from human doing and from there carried it over to the Being of beings in general. Such a carryover is called, in Greek, *metapherein*. The characterization of the Being of beings as Logos would then be a metaphor. In this metaphor would lie the often practiced, partly conscious and partly unconscious but perhaps unavoidable procedure of carrying over the lines and forms of human manner and human conduct onto the world totality” (Hera. 292). If this is the case, then “divine Logos” is necessarily an anthropomorphizing trope.
"That, therefore, which authentically and essentially concerns the human soul in its ground, i.e., in its proper logos, the Logos as Being, just this would indeed be present for man and his dispersion on the self-seeking path, but yet at the same time absent and set aside and therefore foreign" (Hera. 307). Heidegger wavers between a universalized ontological assertion and a discussion of rare moments. The transcendence of the Logos precedes human logos: "The dictum of Heraklitus says that man in his essence belongs to Being and is determined to the collection of this; and that only from it does he receive his own possibility" (Hera. 356). A special movement of human language, poetry that responds to the essence of language, suggests a form of authenticity.

Heidegger turns back from subjective monologue toward the transcendence of divine language. Like the lightning of Zeus, Logos brings the world into appearance. Heidegger rediscovers or invents a myth that unites lightning (der Blitz), a figure of Zeus, with the Logos and Hen Panta:

The lightning brings forth, at once, all that is present in the light of its presence. The lightning now named steers. It brings to each in advance the essential place that is shown to him. Such a bringing-to is at once the bringing-forth, the Logos. "Lightning" stands here as a name for Zeus. He is, as the highest of the gods, the destiny of the universe. Accordingly the Logos, the Hen Panta, would be nothing other than the supreme God. The essence of the Logos would thus give a hint into the godliness of God.35

While Heidegger does not claim that Heraklitus taught this union of Logos with Zeus, he rediscovers the meaning of transcendence in Heraklitus' Logos. Ultimately, Heidegger narrates a new myth of genius: in place of divine selection or talent, poetic creativity emerges as a "listening... to the Logos" (Hera. 371).