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<title>Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media at Syracuse University</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 Syracuse University All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://surface.syr.edu/ijpm</link>
<description>Recent documents in Institute for the Study of the Judiciary, Politics, and the Media at Syracuse University</description>
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<title>Will the Real Elena Kagan Please Stand Up?  Conflicting Public Images in the Supreme Court Confirmation Process</title>
<link>http://surface.syr.edu/ijpm/2</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jan 2013 11:00:19 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>What images of judging did the Kagan confirmation process project?</p>
<p>My response to this question begins with a brief overview of existing public perceptions of the Supreme Court. I argue that a large portion of the public sees the justices as impartial arbiters who can be trusted to rule fairly. At the same time, a large portion of the public also sees the justices as political actors who are wrapped up in partisan disputes. Given these prevailing public views, we should expect the Kagan confirmation process to transmit contradictory images of judicial decisionmaking, with a portrait of judging as a matter of reason and principle vying for attention with a picture of judging as a political enterprise.</p>
<p>Second, I identify the different appearances of judicial action actually at play in the Kagan confirmation process by assessing all confirmation-related news articles, editorials, opinion pieces, and blog posts published in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times. I find that the confirmation coverage in the three newspapers conveys a contradictory mix of images that closely corresponds to the contradictory views of the Court already held by large numbers of Americans.</p>
<p>Finally, I consider the significance of the Janus-faced public beliefs about the Supreme Court. I acknowledge the ways in which political perceptions can chip away at judicial legitimacy, but I also argue that the public’s competing views may ultimately have a stable co-existence. If we believe that individuals generally place contradictory demands on the courts, calling for an objectively fair system and at the same time seeking a guarantee that their own side will prevail, then a judiciary that appears at once to be governed by impartial principle and by partisan preference may cohere.</p>

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<author>Keith J. Bybee</author>


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<title>Open Secret: Why the Supreme Court has Nothing to Fear From the Internet</title>
<link>http://surface.syr.edu/ijpm/1</link>
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<pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2012 07:10:10 PST</pubDate>
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	<p>The United States Supreme Court has an uneasy relationship with openness:  it complies with some calls for transparency, drags its feet in response to others, and sometimes simply refuses to go along.  I argue that the Court’s position is understandable given that the internet age of fluid information and openness has often been heralded in terms that are antithetical to the Court’s operations.  Even so, I also argue the Court actually has little to fear from greater transparency.  The understanding of the Court with the greatest delegitimizing potential is the understanding that the justices render decisions on the basis of political preference rather than according to legal principle and impartial reason.  Yet this political understanding of the Court cannot be revealed by greater transparency because this understanding is already broadly held and co-exists with the popular view that the Court is an impartial arbiter.  The notion that the justices are influenced by politics is, in short, an open secret.  Rather than wondering how judicial legitimacy might survive in an era when  information continuously floods into the public sphere, I argue that the better question is how judicial legitimacy can be maintained in the first place when the judiciary is widely understood to be partisan and impartial at the same time.</p>

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<author>Keith J. Bybee</author>


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