Date of Award

5-12-2024

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Department

Political Science

Advisor(s)

Seth Jolly

Keywords

Brazil;Comparative Politics;Democracy;Hungary;Institutions;United States

Subject Categories

Political Science | Social and Behavioral Sciences

Abstract

The world has seen an increase in backsliding states in the past 15 years, with authoritarian populist leaders concentrating power through executive aggrandizement and limitations on civil liberties (Bermeo 2016). Democratic institutions are often targeted by an authoritarian populist during episodes of democratic backsliding either directly through taking away powers from the institutions or indirectly through using rhetoric to weaken public trust in the institutions. Scholars have identified patterns that suggest targeting the court and legislature first is the most common strategy of backsliders, while other institutions are targeted later. However, there is variation among these cases, with not all backsliders following this trajectory. In this dissertation, I investigate this variation to explain why institutions are targeted in the order and magnitude they are. Through an analysis of institutional threat and public opinion in relation to targeting behavior in three countries, Hungary, the United States (US), and Brazil, I find that institutional factors play an important role in backslider decisions about which institutions to target and in which order. On the other hand, contrary to what the literature would expect based on the responsiveness of populists to their voters, I do not find evidence that public trust in institutions impacts the order or type of targeting. These findings have practical applications in helping to identify and safeguard vulnerable but important institutions, as well as theoretical applications in terms of better understanding the observable patterns we see during episodes of democratic backsliding.

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Open Access

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