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Abstract

This study examines how leaders of transnational NGOs (TNGOs) across the United States understand transnational activism and the roles their organizations play in world affairs. Three roles are identified: alleviation, realization and environmentalism. Analysis suggests that scholarship in international relations focuses disproportionately on the least common and least resourceful types of TNGOs and routinely mischaracterizes a small number of highly visible organizations as exemplary. Leaders' perspectives on organizational mission, activities, autonomy, collaboration, effectiveness and obstacles reveal that the most numerous and resourceful TNGOs are technocratic agencies favoring a materialistic, ameliorative approach to transnational activism. Moreover, to the extent that TNGOs exercise ideational power to achieve sociopolitical change, this power more closely resembles technocratic managerialism than overt political contention. Insights are derived from a mixed-method analysis of over 200 hours of in-depth interviews with top leaders from a diverse sample of 152 TNGOs registered in the United States.

Keywords: transnational NGOs, transnational activism, elite interviews, mixed-method, finite mixture modeling, latent class analysis, discrete factor analysis, socially distributed conceptualizations, mission, activities, autonomy, collaboration, effectiveness, obstacles

Title page

TRANSNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: A US PERSPECTIVE[1]

By

George E. Mitchell

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate School of Syracuse University

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

What is the role of transnational NGOs (TNGOs) in world affairs? Scholars widely recognize the significance of TNGOs to global politics (Boli & Thomas, 1999b; Checkel, 1997; Martha Finnemore, 1996; Haas, 1992; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Klotz, 1995; Richard Price, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse, 2006; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). However, scholars also identify an "NGO theory deficit" as disagreement persists over the precise role TNGOs play in the world system (DeMars, 2005, p. 39).

This debate among scholars of transnational activism can be broadly regarded as a dialectic between 'proponents' and 'detractors,' as illustrated in table 1.1 (Cox, 1999; DeMars, 2005; Josselin & Wallace, 2001a). Proponents view TNGOs as agents of a grassroots global civil society harnessing the ideational power of universal principles to overtly influence political outcomes (Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999b; Florini, 2004; Glasius, 2002; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Lipschutz, 2005; P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; Richard Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse et al., 1999; Struett, 2008; Tarrow, 2005; True & Mintrom, 2001). Detractors, on the other hand, view TNGOs as agents of state and corporate power that reproduce hierarchical power relations, perpetuate patterns of beneficiary dependency and divert public attention from political solutions to ameliorative treatments (Bebbington, 2005; Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; Billon, 2006; Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Feldman, 1997; Gill, 1995; Halliday, 2001; Jaeger, 2007; Roberts, Jones III, & Frohling, 2005; Schuller, 2007).

Table 1.1: TNGO literature

	Proponents (thesis)	Detractors (antithesis)
Collaborative style	TNGOs work within civil society, achieving sociopolitical transformation	TNGOs collaborate with states and corporations, sustaining the status quo
Mission and activity	TNGOs empower constituents through grassroots mobilization and information politics	TNGOs create constituent dependency through direct service provision
Function	TNGOs politicize issues through advocacy, addressing underlying causes	TNGOs depoliticize issues, diverting attention from causes to treatments
Sectoral typicality	Human rights, environmental, and advocacy organizations are typical TNGOs	Development, relief, service delivery and contracting organizations are typical TNGOs
Examples	Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999; Florini, 2004; Glasius, 2002; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Kaldor, 2003; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Lipschutz, 2005; Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999; Struett, 2008; Tarrow, 2005; True & Mintrom, 2001; Warkentin, 2001…	Bebbington, 2005; Berkovitch and Gordon, 2008; Billon, 2006; Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Feldman 1997; Gill, 1995; Halliday, 2001; Jaeger, 2007; Roberts, Jones III, & Frohling, 2005; Schuller, 2007…

This study explores how leaders—mostly presidents and executive officers—of TNGOs across the United States understand transnational activism and the roles their organizations play in world affairs. I analyze leaders' insights about organizational mission, activity, collaboration, autonomy, effectiveness and obstacles.

To minimize prejudice introduced by conventional theoretical demarcations, I study the perspectives of leaders from a diverse sample of organizations that vary by size, sector and function (advocacy-service delivery). Leaders' organizations are generally headquartered in the United States while their operations are primarily abroad, so this study offers a US perspective.

Leaders' discussions about their organizational missions and activities reveal the specific strategies they employ to achieve their goals. The distribution of these strategies across organizations suggests that the most common mode of transnational influence is the least theorized within international relations scholarship. Leaders also discuss their collaborations with other NGOs, states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations, revealing divergent propensities toward independence and interdependence with established state and corporate interests in the international system. Analysis also discovers the specific strategies TNGO leaders employ to maintain organizational autonomy under conditions of financial dependence.

Leaders' understandings of organizational effectiveness provide additional insights into the highly routinized and managerial nature of professionalized transnational activism. Also key to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is an appreciation of the financial and political obstacles TNGOs confront as they pursue their missions. Leaders adopt an elaborate discourse

that frames politically contentious activism as technocratic manageralism, and their pragmatic concerns about funding challenge conventional understandings about the role and function of TNGOs in world politics.

Finally, a synthetic meta-analysis of leaders' organizations paints a complex portrait of the TNGO sector as informed by the perspectives of TNGO leaders in the United States. Analysis suggests that the most common and resourceful type of TNGO employs a materialistic, ameliorative approach to transnational activism and that a small number of highly visible TNGOs are incorrectly regarded as exemplary transnational actors.

Chapter organization

To understand the role of TNGOs in world affairs, I analyze data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project at Syracuse University. The data are derived from in-depth, face-to-face interviews with TNGO leaders from a diverse sample of organizations registered in the United States. Leaders provide particularly valuable insights because they are highly informed and specifically empowered to speak on behalf of their organizations. This leadership focus fills an important gap evident in the literature about organized transnational activism. Extant scholarship is permeated by observational studies relying on secondary sources (e.g. Boli & Thomas, 1999a) and in-depth case studies of either single organizations (e.g. Hopgood, 2006) or a small number of purposively selected organizations (e.g. Cooley & Ron, 2002) reflecting a tradeoff between scope and depth. By analyzing a large number of leadership perspectives, the Transnational NGO Interview Project is both in-depth and large-n. I describe the data in detail in chapter two.

The Transnational NGO Interview Project generated qualitative and quantitative datasets that reveal how TNGO leaders think about governance, goals, strategies, activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, communications, collaboration and leadership. The mixed-method research design allows statistical analysis to be grounded in qualitative evidence, facilitating interpretation and abductive reasoning (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009).

To understand how TNGO leaders 'conceptualize' transnational activism, I combine the theory-based approach to concepts and finite mixture modeling (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). This novel approach to studying 'ideas' in the context of international relations theory is developed in chapter three.

Chapter four explores how leaders understand their organizations' missions and activities. Analysis reveals four distinct 'ideologies of activism' that structure how leaders perceive and shape the world. These ideologies are material amelioration, ideational amelioration, material empowerment and ideational empowerment. While the ideology of ideational empowerment is often thought to exemplify transnational activism, among TNGO leaders this is the least common orientation. The most common ideology is material amelioration.

Chapter five investigates TNGO leaders' attitudes toward organizational collaborations and the specific strategies they employ to maintain organizational autonomy. Although most leaders exhibit a 'protective' collaborative style, others are much more 'interdependent' with states and corporations in a manner that could compromise organizational autonomy. These collaborative

styles are distributed unevenly across different sectors of transnational activism. Additionally, leaders employ a menue of specific strategies to maintain operational autonomy under conditions of financial dependence.

Chapter six examines taxonomical approaches to the study of TNGOs and derives an empirical taxonomy of TNGOs based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. There are three types of TNGO registered in the United States: humanitarian relief and development, human rights activism and environmental advocacy. Analysis suggests that scholarship in international relations focuses disproportionately on the least common and least resourceful types of TNGOs. Moreover, so-called ‘exemplary’ or ‘quintessential’ TNGOs such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace are highly unrepresentative of TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are widely thought to typify.

Chapter seven explores how TNGO leaders understand what it means to be organizationally effective. Most leaders believe that effectiveness involves demonstrating ‘outcome accountability,’ while a minority describes effectiveness as ‘overhead minimization.’ Both of these conceptualizations reveal a strong culture of managerialism among TNGOs that focuses on programmatic efficiency and upward accountability to donors with comparatively little emphasis on maintaining downward accountability to beneficiaries (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Raggo, Schmitz, & Vijfeijken, 2010; Roberts et al., 2005).

Chapter eight examines the primary challenges facing TNGO leaders. Leaders are particularly concerned about funding and surprisingly uncomfortable with politics. While theorists of

transnational activism often regard politicization as a key tactic in the strategic repertoire of TNGOs (e.g., Keck & Sikkink, 1998), most TNGO leaders view politics as an obstacle and prefer to couch their work in relatively apolitical, technocratic terms.

Finally, chapter nine summarizes and synthesizes the results of previous chapters to identify and interpret three distinct roles TNGOs play in world affairs: alleviation, realization and environmentalism. I conclude with suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER TWO: DATA

Data for this study have been obtained from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, a large-scale exploratory data collection effort undertaken by researchers affiliated with the Transnational NGO Initiative within the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. The core dataset of the Transnational NGO Interview Project is available to the public through the Transnational NGO Initiative's website.[2]

The principal investigators of this research project interviewed TNGO leaders to gain deeper insights than typically possible with observational research designs focusing on organizational attributes gleaned from secondary sources. Leaders are specifically empowered not only to direct, but also to speak on behalf of their organizations and are thus uniquely positioned and well-informed to offer detailed insights about the inner workings and strategic considerations motivating organizational behavior.

The research process involved many stages that have implications for interpreting the results of the study. Research design issues of particular importance include how the unit of analysis was defined, how potential respondents for the study were selected, how the interview protocol was developed and implemented and how the resulting qualitative data were coded to facilitate analysis. Each of these issues is addressed in this chapter.

The ultimate goal of the study was to collect baseline information about how leaders understand issues of governance, goals, strategies, activities, effectiveness, accountability, transnationalism, communications, collaboration and leadership. The study was not intended to test particular

theories or models, but to explore leaders' perspectives by allowing them to describe their views in their own words.

The first challenge of the research design was to define the unit of analysis, the TNGO, among which to identify potential respondents. This presents a number of difficulties, however, most notably the problem of defining the term 'TNGO' and identifying a suitable roster from which to select organizations.

Definition of TNGO

The problem of definition is greatly complicated by the presence of multiple overlapping research programs in international relations, within which NGOs tend to be defined differently for different purposes. These multitudinous programs examine global civil society (Lipschutz, 1992), global social change organizations (Gale, 1998), global society (Shaw, 1994), international society (Halliday, 1992; Peterson, 1992; Shaw, 1992), social movements (Tarrow, 1998), transnational activism (Tarrow, 2005), transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), transnational politics (Tarrow, 2001), transnational relations (Keohane & Nye, 1970; Risse-Kappen, 1995; Risse, 2006), transnational social movement organizations (Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997; Warkentin, 2001), world civic politics (Wapner, 1995) and world polity (Boli & Thomas, 1999a), to name a few. As O'Brien et al. (2000, p. 12) noted: "Each term refers to a slightly different subject of study with a wider or narrower scope and is selected in response to a specific research question."

The core term 'NGO' emerged around 1945 when the United Nations (UN) found it necessary to make legal distinctions between different types of participants (Willetts, 2002). The UN recognized two main types of actors: governments and non-governmental organizations. Formal UN recognition was achieved through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which awarded consultative status to NGOs that met certain criteria. Over time, the term 'NGO' came to denote organizations recognized by the UN and embodying six general principles. NGOs were organizations that (1) supported the mission of the UN, (2) were representative of publics, (3) had identifiable headquarters, (4) were nonprofit, (5) respected state-sovereignty and (6) were not established by governments (Willetts, 2001). Since the UN is an international body, the term also connoted, at least initially, international in scope.

The legalistic characterization of NGOs that evolved from ECOSOC recognition may be contrasted with sociological definitions of NGO (Martens, 2002). More commonly today, NGOs are appreciated less for their legal status as for their social roles and functions. Thus, NGOs are typically regarded as components of 'civil society' and 'social movements' (Willetts, 2002). Within the context of civil society NGOs are said to exist in "the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals that are based on civility, located *between* the family, the state, and the market and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities and economies" (Anheier, 2007, pp. 10-11).

The location of NGOs in this abstract sociological conceptual space makes definition somewhat more difficult. Struggling to advance a positive, rather than negative definition of NGO, Martens (2002, p. 282) defines NGOs as "*formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations*

whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or the international level." Here, Martins emphasizes a number of important qualities. First, she defines NGOs as legally recognized organizations with professional staff. Second, she describes NGOs as independent societal organizations, referring to their operational independence from government and location within civil society. Third, she recognizes that NGOs exist to promote common or universal goals as a means of distinguishing NGOs from organizations that pursue particularistic ends such as economic rents. Finally, Martens' definition makes clear that NGOs may exist at the national or international levels to take note that in common usage the term NGO has evolved from its original context to refer not only to international organizations but domestic organizations as well.

Willetts (2002) offers a similar definition of an NGO as an "independent voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities." This definition emphasizes similar qualities. First, NGOs are again independent of governments. Second, they constitute a "voluntary association of people acting together on a continuous basis," which indicates that NGOs are ongoing concerns in the sense of formal, legally recognized organizations. Willetts also affirms that NGOs exist to serve a common purpose, again consistent with Martens' definition emphasizing common goals. Willetts goes slightly further than Martens, however, by offering three specific stipulations. First, NGOs do not seek to achieve government office, distinguishing them from lobbying organizations and political action committees. Second, NGOs do not seek to make money, distinguishing them from for-profit corporations. And finally, NGOs

do not engage in illegal activities, differentiating them from criminal organizations, guerilla groups or other violent actors.

Other scholars wrestling with the definition problem tend to offer variations on these main themes. Vakil (1997, p. 2059), for instance, noting similarities between kindred terms such as NGO, nonprofit organization and private voluntary organization, defined NGOs as "self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people." Here again, the qualities of independence from government (self-governing, private), not primarily seeking to make money (not-for-profit) and pursuing common aims (improving the quality of life) all appertain.

In sum, most scholars would agree that NGOs are (1) professional organizations that are (2) independent of governments, (3) noncommercial and (4) pursuant of public goals. Josselin and Wallace (2001a, p. 3), for example, define NGOs as "largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control…," while DeMars (2005, p. 41) states simply that they are private actors pursuing public purposes." Halliday (2001) notes that NGOs may seek to advance particularistic or universalistic goals, but most would agree with Boli and Thomas (1999a) that NGOs by construction pursue more public or universalistic aims.

To the four main criteria listed above, we must further specify that a *transnational* NGO is an NGO that operates across national boundaries. Thus, *a TNGO is professional organization, noncommercial and independent of governments, that pursues public goals across national boundaries*.

This definition has specific implications for the choice of a sampling frame. First, TNGOs are legally recognized organizations, which could be formally registered with ECOSOC, the Union of International Associations (UIA) or recognized by national bureaus or research centers such as, in the United States, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). However, NGOs listed on such rosters may receive the bulk of their funding from governments, violating the requirement of government independence. Additionally, many NGOs could receive substantial revenues through fees for services, violating the noncommercial criterion. Finally, these rosters often contain inactive organizations and organizations such as labor unions, hospitals and food banks not normally considered NGOs. A suitable sampling frame must filter out such organizations.

Moreover, as a practical matter, conducting an interview study with TNGO leaders selected from an international roster from ECOSOC or the UIA is costly. A more practicable approach is to focus on TNGO leaders located in a single country, such as United States. While this strategy does represent a limitation, the population of TNGOs registered in the United States is nevertheless a particularly large and influential population of organizations worthy of study in its own right.

Sampling[3]

The Transnational NGO Interview Study is based on interviews with top leaders from transnational NGOs registered in the United States and so offers a Northern, US-centric perspective on transnational activism. According to the UIA, the United States itself is home to

13 percent of TNGO headquarters, more than any other country. Worldwide, more than half of TNGO headquarters are located in the United States and Europe ("Yearbook of International Associations: Statistics, visualizations and patterns," 2003/2004, pp. 61-84, 87). Although TNGOs located in the United States are not necessarily representative of TNGOs worldwide, they nevertheless constitute a large and resourceful population with far-reaching global impact.

Within the United States, TNGOs are typically regarded as international nonprofits. The IRS requires 501(c)(3) tax-exempt nonprofits with more than $25,000 in annual revenues to file IRS Forms 990, which are available for public inspection. Based on these forms, the NCCS identified 6,500 international nonprofits in the United States in 2007. According to their data, these organizations spent almost $30 billion combined (nominally) during their most recent fiscal years.[4] The combined average expenditures for organizations sampled for the Transnational NGO Interview Project over the period 2001-2006 was about $20 billion (nominally).[5] Roughly speaking, the final sample accounts for about two-thirds of all US TNGO expenditures.

The principal investigators chose to sample TNGOs from a database of international nonprofits maintained by Charity Navigator, an online rating agency in the United States. Charity Navigator evaluates organizations with 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), at least four consecutive years of IRS Forms 990 available and public support greater than $500,000 during their most recent fiscal years. Organizations that report zero fundraising costs or that are overwhelmingly funded through government grants or fees for services are excluded, along with private foundations, hospitals, hospital foundations, private universities, colleges, community foundations and public broadcasting stations.

These criteria comport nicely with the definition of TNGO provided above. Organizations with 501(c)(3) status are noncommercial and have a declared charitable purpose or public benefit, meaning that they exist to promote common goals. They are also severely restricted from lobbying and are expressly prohibited from supporting political candidates for government office. Charity Navigator's own selection criteria help to further delineate the desired population. Organizations that are primarily funded by governments are excluded, enforcing the independence criterion. Additionally, organizations that receive the bulk of their funding through fees for services are excluded, reinforcing the noncommercial criterion. Finally, organizations that are technically 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations but which scholars widely agree should not be considered NGOs—such as hospitals and universities—are specifically excluded.

Charity Navigator's criteria also exclude new organizations and very small or inactive organizations with low levels of public support. The size criterion is significant since it introduces a small bias that has the effect of attenuating the extreme inequality observed within the US nonprofit sector.[6]

Based on total revenue data from the 2007 NCCS database, fewer than 10 percent of organizations control over 90 percent of the revenues. On a scale of zero, indicating perfect equality, to one, meaning perfect inequality, the Gini coefficient for international nonprofits in the United States was 0.94 in 2007, indicating extreme inequality. This effect is mitigated in the sample, which is a subset of organizations from the NCCS dataset. Among sampled organizations, roughly 20 percent control about 90 percent of the revenues. Sampled

organizations' average revenues over this period ranged from about $100,000 to over $3 billion. The median TNGO had about $11 million in revenues. The smaller Gini coefficient of 0.87 indicates slightly less inequality within the sample as compared to the larger Gini coefficient of 0.94 in the population.[7]

To identify leaders for the interview study, researchers initially sampled 182 organizations from the database of 334 international nonprofits rated by Charity Navigator in 2005.[8] Stratified random sampling was employed to ensure representation by size, sector and financial characteristics.[9] One-hundred twenty-three interviews were completed with leaders from the initial sample and 29 replacements were added for a total sample size of 152 cases. Table 2.1 indicates that the sample statistics closely match those of the population.

Table 2.1: Sampling

		Population		Sample	
		%	N	%	n
Sector	Environment	15%	49	14%	22
	Human Rights	14%	48	14%	21
	Humanitarian Relief	21%	69	21%	32
	Sustainable Development	42%	141	42%	64
	Conflict Resolution	8%	27	9%	13
	Total	100%	334	100%	152
Size	Small	40%	132	37%	56
	Medium	40%	135	42%	64
	Large	20%	67	21%	32
	Total	100%	334	100%	152
Financial rating	Low Efficiency/Low Capacity	12%	40	14%	22
	Low Efficiency/High Capacity	11%	38	9%	13
	High Efficiency/Low Capacity	27%	90	23%	35
	High Efficiency/High Capacity	50%	166	54%	82
	Total	100%	334	100%	152

The overall response rate was 68 percent.[10] In the final sample, 81 percent of respondents were the CEOs, presidents or executive directors of their organizations, 12 percent were vice presidents, and only 7 percent were below the level of vice-president.

Interview protocol

The interview protocol was not designed to test specific models or theories. It was designed to collect baseline information about how leaders understand governance, goals, strategies, activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, collaboration, communications and leadership. Nearly all of the interview questions solicited open-ended responses where leaders were free to speak in the own words. Specific protocol questions were developed in consultation with practitioners and pilot tested during workshops in the United States and India throughout 2005 and 2006.

Interviews took place between 2006 and 2008 and were conducted at leaders' preferred locations, usually their offices. Leaders were guaranteed confidentiality to promote candor. The interviews averaged 82.5 minutes; the shortest was 32 minutes and the longest was 153 minutes. Interviewers ultimately collected about 209 hours of digital recording. All the interviews were recorded with the permission of the interviewees and subsequently transcribed.

Interviewers were asked to complete debriefing forms at the end of each interview in which they assessed respondent candor and other issues that could conceivably affect data quality. Where available, data from these debriefing forms show that 86% of respondents were perceived as very

candid, 14% to have evinced occasional lack of candor, and none to have displayed prolonged lack of candor. Instances of occasional lack of candor involved hesitation at discussing issues that were currently confidential within organizations (such as succession planning), delayed recall, pacing, and telephone and staff interruptions. In no instance was occasional lack of candor judged to warrant discarding data.

A team of five graduate students manually coded the complete interview transcripts using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). An initial codebook was created by an interdisciplinary team of researchers and thoroughly revised based on inductive readings of initial transcripts for emergent themes. During initial coding exercises with out-of-sample transcripts, the content and number of codes were adjusted to conform to the interview data. The codebook was finalized in the fall of 2007 after extensive deliberations among the principal investigators and members of the coding team. To facilitate manual coding, the codebook was hierarchically organized into nine major sections, 38 subsections, 91 code families and 413 individual codes.

To measure the overall degree of intercoder agreement across all 413 codes, ten complete in-sample interviews were each coded twice by separate coders. Scores were calculated measuring the percentage of agreement between the two coders of each interview transcript. The ten scores were then averaged. A value of zero indicates complete disagreement, while a value of one indicates complete agreement. The overall intercoder agreement score is 0.80, indicating satisfactory intercoder agreement.

Data structure

The coding process generated a qualitative dataset located in the CAQDAS that exported a raw data table consisting of frequency counts for each code by transcript. The raw statistical output from the CAQDAS is a table 152 cases by 413 codes. Additional information from secondary sources such as Charity Navigator and organizations' websites and annual reports was subsequently merged with the table. After merging the data, eliminating qualitative codes with no meaningful quantitative interpretation and converting the remaining codes into response variables, the final dataset is 152 cases by 327 variables. To facilitate analysis and interpretation, and to eliminate a possible source of coder bias, response variables have been binarized. Additionally, null observations in empty response vectors have been declared missing.

The quantification process brings with it a discursive change. Codes become response variables and code families become sets of response variables. Thus, just as a leader's qualitative response to a particular interview question can be represented by a string of qualitative codes, so too can his or her response be represented by a set of values on a set of response variables. The ability to represent leaders' responses quantitatively as response vectors, or more informally, response patterns, enables useful statistical procedures to be undertaken to structure and discipline qualitative inquiry. This is explained in detail in the next chapter.

Information poverty is a principal problem in the interpretation of statistical results. The mixed-method design of the Transnational NGO Interview Project greatly facilitates interpretation.

Every nonzero valid datum from the primary interview data is linked to an actual qualitative quotation organized in the CAQDAS for efficient in-context analysis.

Summary

I use data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, a large-scale exploratory data collection effort undertaken by researchers affiliated with the Transnational NGO Initiative within the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. A TNGO is defined as a professional organization, noncommercial and independent of governments, that pursues public goals across national boundaries. Based on this definition, as well as resource limitations, a suitable sampling frame was identified in Charity Navigator, an online nonprofit rating agency in the United States. Leaders interviewed for the study were selected from a representative sample of 152 TNGOs from Charity Navigator's database of 334 international nonprofits. The United States hosts more TNGOs than any other country and sampled organizations account for about two-thirds of all US TNGO expenditures.

The interview protocol was developed in collaboration with TNGO practitioners to collect baseline information about how TNGO leaders understand governance, goals, strategies, activities, transnationalism, effectiveness, accountability, communications, collaboration and leadership. Interview transcripts were manually coded using CAQDAS and the codebook was deliberately tailored to conform to the interview data. The coding process generated complementary qualitative and quantitative datasets that enable efficient mixed-method inquiry.

CHAPTER THREE: METHOD

This study examines how TNGO leaders conceptualize constructs such as organizational mission, collaborations and effectiveness. In understanding leaders' perspectives, we gain valuable insights about how they view their organizations' roles in world affairs. However, this focus on leaders' conceptualizations requires some ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of concepts and conceptual structures.

Conceptual structure

Over several decades cognitive psychologists' thinking about concepts and conceptual structures has undergone a number of shifts (Medin, 1989). The so-called 'classical view' holds that concepts are categories with membership determined by the satisfaction of necessary and sufficient conditions. However, sets of conditions often have exceptions, and a 'modified classical view' allows necessary and sufficient conditions as well as exceptions (Duffy). Critiques of the strict classical view also gave rise to a 'probabilistic view' in which category membership depends upon proportions of attributes. According to Medin (1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985), the classical and probabilistic views (as well as prototype and exemplary views) assume that concepts are organized around a notion of 'similarity.' This notion simply posits that objects with similar attributes belong in the same category. According to the similarity-based view, attributes therefore define categories. However, this has been disconfirmed by a significant body of empirical research including many carefully designed experiments (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Medin and others thus differentiate between similarly-based views and a theory-based approach.

According to the theory-based approach, attribute correlations do not define categories but reflect them (Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985). Under this view, categories are associated not only with lists of attributes, but more importantly, with underlying explanatory principles that determine which attributes are salient. Categories are thus defined by a latent "explanatory principle common to category members," not merely attribute lists per se (Murphy & Medin, 1985, p. 298).

Attempts to uncover the latent explanatory principles underlying empirically observed attribute correlations adduced by human respondents necessarily involve significant interpretive or abductive inference (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). The methodological challenges are substantial, but not insurmountable.

The aggregation problem: shared beliefs as socially distributed conceptualizations

The theory-based approach has been implemented to study social conceptualizations empirically within a methodological framework known as the cultural consensus model (Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986). Atran, Medin and Ross (2005) formally modeled cultural consensus in social networks using instruments that asked respondents to draw relations between inductively derived lists of objects. This method has a philosophical affinity with Q-sorting, which Dryzek, Clark and McKenzie (1989) notably advanced as a response to Wendt's (1987) articulation of the agent-structure problem in international relations theory (Brown, 1980; Stephenson, 1953). Q-sorting similarly models social attributes as an emergent property of individual attributes, a

useful approach for identifying social conceptualizations or shared beliefs. Whether modeling 'consensus' or 'concourse' both of these techniques assume cultural homogeneity.

Although the terms 'shared idea' and 'shared belief' are common in international relations, while the term 'ideology' is common in American politics, I introduce the more precise term 'socially distributed conceptualizations' to describe my view of shared ideas, beliefs or ideologies. I say that conceptualizations are socially distributed to emphasize my understanding of the aggregation problem when dealing with shared beliefs. I view social attributes—ideas, beliefs, ideologies, conceptualizations, etc.—as emergent properties of attributed individuals existing in social contexts.

Individuals may influence society and society may influence individuals, a dynamic property commonly understood as the mutual constitution of agents and structure (Adler, 2002; M. Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Guzzini, 2000; Hopf, 1998; Kubalkova, Onuf, & Kowert, 1998; Onuf, 1998; R. Price & Reus-Smit, 1998; Wendt, 1987, 1992, 1999; Zehfuss, 2002). However, although I recognize the reality of mutual influence, I do not regard individual agents and social structures as ontologically independent entities. Individuals are part of the societies they collectively constitute and societies are necessarily constituted by individuals. I agree that from the point of view of an individual agent his or her social structure may seem immutable, but also allow that a sea change in individual attitudes would likely bring about a corresponding change in the social structure. Individuals collectively construct their social structure just as any one individual may be socialized by it. I therefore view conceptualizations as socially distributed

across individuals. One cannot recognize social beliefs without acknowledging, at least implicitly, the underlying beliefs held by individuals.

The framework of socially distributed conceptualizations combines the associative network model of memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969; Minsky, 1975; Taber, 2003), the theory-based approach to concepts (Medin, 1989), the distributional view of culture (R. Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2002) and compositional aggregation (Page & Shapiro, 1992). The distributional view of culture holds that conceptualizations shared among individuals constitute social conceptualizations. Compositional aggregation acknowledges population heterogeneity in processes of social aggregation. A helpful formulation of the compositional framework is Huckfeldt, Johnson and Sprague's (2002) social network approach, consistent with the approaches of many agent-based modelers across the social sciences (Atran et al., 2005; e.g. Axelrod, 1976; Bertie, Himmelweit, & Trigg, 2006; Bonham, Sergeev, & Parshin, 1997; Epstein, 2007; Hoffmann, 2006; Shapiro, Bonham, & Heradstveit, 1988; Taber, n.d.; Tesfatsion, 2003). Compositional aggregation recognizes the possibility of multiple socially distributed conceptualizations within populations. Some recent empirical scholarship in this vein examines discord and contention within social networks of heterogeneous agents (Robert Huckfeldt, 2001, 2007; Robert Huckfeldt, Ikeda, & Pappi, 2005; R. Huckfeldt et al., 2002; Robert Huckfeldt & Mendez, 2008; Robert Huckfeldt, Mendez, & Osborn, 2004).

As a matter of clarification, socially distributed conceptualizations differ fundamentally from the dominant convention in much public opinion research that models belief system structure in terms of ideological consistency. Following Converse's (1964) seminal article on the nature of

belief systems in mass publics relative to elites, ideological constraint has typically been defined and measured by the variance in people's scaled responses to issue questions (Barton & Parsons, 1977). Response categories for issue questions typically range along a seven point scale from very conservative to very liberal. Respondents demonstrating evidence of ideological constraint answer as either consistent liberals or conservatives, yielding a small overall variance. However, this approach neglects the possibility that respondents may be constrained by ideologies other than those chosen by the researcher. For example, using cluster analysis, Fleishman (1986) discovered that the American electorate was empirically divided into six categories of political ideology: liberals, quasi-liberals, pro-labors, laissez-faire advocates, conservatives and economic moderates. A highly constrained laissez-faire advocate may incorrectly appear to be ideologically unconstrained according to the conventional liberal-conservative continuum.

Present methodological approach

The empirical approach I employ to understand how leaders of transnational NGOs conceptualize constructs involves an open-ended interviewing process. I infer leaders' conceptualizations on the empirical basis of their salient conceptual associations. Rather than be asked to choose among predetermined responses, leaders respond to questions however they deem appropriate in a face-to-face, open-ended interview setting. A question designed to infer how leaders conceptualize organizational effectiveness, for instance, asks: "Let me ask you about the concept of effectiveness, which is something we all have trouble defining. How does your organization define effectiveness?" Leaders respond by, in effect, revealing their salient associations. Leaders' responses are observed but the underlying explanatory principles or

‘conceptualizations’ that explain their conceptual associations are unobserved. Analysis thus requires abductively inferring the underlying conceptualizations that explain their observed response patterns. Figure 3.1 illustrates the theorized process.

Figure 3.1: Theorized process



A tenet of compositional aggregation allows that different groups of individuals may hold different conceptualizations. The variety of latent conceptualizations can be inferred from the manifest heterogeneity observed among individuals' response patterns. An illustration is provided below.

Figure 3.2 displays parameters that have been estimated with a technique called latent class analysis (LCA). The results, which are only partially reported for convenience of display, indicate that TNGO leaders tend to define organizational effectiveness in one of two ways (see chapter seven). The principle explaining the first response pattern has been labeled 'outcome accountability' following a thorough in-context review of leaders' underlying statements. The other conceptualization has been labeled 'overhead minimization' following the same procedure.

Figure 3.2: Illustrative example of the theorized process



The parameter estimates for ‘outcome accountability’ and ‘overhead minimization’ are latent class probabilities, which may be interpreted as the proportions of leaders subscribing to each conceptualization (a small group of outliers is excluded from the figure). The parameter estimates for the salient associations (in this illustration, only *goal achievement*, *evaluation* and *resources*) are conditional probabilities, which may be interpreted as the salience of particular associations given the latent conceptualization. Hence, roughly speaking, most leaders understand organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability, which involves *goal achievement* and *evaluation*, but not *resources*, while a much smaller number of leaders define effectiveness as overhead minimization, which involves *resources* and *evaluation*, but not *goal achievement*. Consistent with the theory-based approach to concepts, the salient associations (or alternatively, attributes) do not—strictly speaking—define the conceptualizations; rather the two different latent conceptualizations make the two corresponding observed response patterns more likely. The meanings of the underlying conceptualizations are inferred from both the statistical results and the underlying qualitative evidence.

This empirical approach implements the theory-based approach to concepts to study socially distributed conceptualizations. A key contribution of the method developed in this study is the ability to interpret underlying principles based on observed response patterns. Each leader’s response pattern is linked to his or her underlying in-context qualitative statements and the use of finite mixture modeling (discussed below) provides certain parameters that help focus interpretation on exemplary qualitative evidence. Moreover, the statistical results are replicable and since qualitative interpretation is grounded in specific qualitative evidence through a structured procedure, qualitative interpretation is also replicable. Throughout the substantive

chapters that follow, wherever possible I present the quantitative and qualitative evidence from which I have derived my interpretations.

Finite mixture modeling

Finite mixture modeling is a category of statistical techniques developed to model latent heterogeneity in populations. To discover conceptual heterogeneity among TNGO leaders, I employ two finite mixture modeling techniques: latent class analysis and discrete factor analysis.

Latent class analysis (LCA) was first formalized by American sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld in a study of soldiers' attitudes toward the US Army that was published in 1950, but as a concept is traceable as far back as 1884 to an article written by American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce concerning the measurement of predictive success (Goodman, n.d.; Lazarsfeld, 1950; Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Peirce, 1884). Although the technique enjoys a long and impressive lineage, it was not until more recent developments in computer hardware and software that LCA became practicable for mainstream social science research.

In common social science parlance, traditional LCA can be understood as discovering an unobserved or latent categorical variable that accounts for spurious association among observed or manifest response variables (Goodman, n.d.). A key assumption of LCA is that the manifest variables are statistically independent within the categories of the latent variable, a condition called local independence (Lazarsfeld & Henry, 1968; Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987).

Discrete factor analysis (DFA) is another type of finite mixture modeling that evolved as an offshoot of latent class analysis. Magidson and Vermunt (2003; n.d.) have shown that a latent class model consisting of four clusters is analogous to a discrete factor model consisting of two dichotomous latent factors, with the added benefit that the discrete factor model requires fewer parameters and is therefore more parsimonious. Both LCA and DFA share the same basic procedures, statistics and interpretations.

A model that provides adequate fit to the data can be said to explain the association among a set of response variables. Model fit is quantified by the L^2 statistic, which follows a chi-squared distribution when multi-way tables are well populated. However, when tables are sparse the L^2 statistic p-value is unreliable. Since there are typically many more possible response patterns than respondents, tables are sparse and I use a parametric bootstrap procedure to obtain more reliable p-values (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003). The bootstrap procedure uses the probability distribution given by the maximum likelihood estimates for a model to generate replication bootstrap samples. The bootstrap p-value is the proportion of bootstrap samples with an L^2 greater than the original (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). A well-fitting model will predict cell frequencies statistically similar to the observed cell frequencies; thus a larger p-value indicates better model fit.

Unlike distance-based clustering techniques such as hierarchical cluster analysis and k-means cluster analysis, latent class analysis begins with a formal hypothesis test by assessing the fit of a null 1-class model. If the null model provides adequate fit then its log-likelihood ratio chi-

squared statistic will be close to the degrees of freedom and the associated bootstrap p-value will exceed a conventional threshold such as 0.05. Under this condition it could be said that TNGO leaders' responses are homogenous or random. However, it is also useful to inspect the model's bivariate residuals (BVRs), which quantify the level of statistical association between each pair of response variables. Large BVRs (greater than 3.84 at the 95 percent confidence level) indicate significant unexplained association in the data. Since the L^2 statistic quantifies overall model fit, the inclusion of response variables with insignificant effects alongside response variables with significant effects dilutes the L^2 statistic.[11] Thus a model's BVRs provide a more robust indication of model fit than the overall L^2 statistic.

When comparing models, it is helpful to test whether increasing the number of latent classes significantly improves (reduces) the L^2 statistic. This is performed with a -2 log-likelihood difference test between the unrestricted model and a model in which one class is restricted to zero. If the difference is not significant, then the more parsimonious model may be retained. If the difference is significant, the unrestricted model is preferred. Again, p-values are estimated using a parametric bootstrap procedure (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). This procedure uses the probability distribution given by the maximum likelihood estimates for the restricted model to generate replication bootstrap samples and log-likelihood values. The log-likelihood value of the unrestricted model is subtracted from those of the bootstrap samples and multiplied by -2 to obtain -2LL differences. The bootstrap p-value is the proportion of bootstrap samples with a -2 log-likelihood difference higher than the that of the unrestricted model (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). At the 95 percent confidence level, a bootstrap p-value less than 0.05 indicates that the unrestricted model is preferred. The same procedure is used to test for other restrictions, notably

the contributions of individual response variables to overall model fit (by setting response variable effects individually to zero).

One important assumption of LCA and DFA is that the response variables are locally independent or statistically independent within each category of the latent variable. The validity of this assumption can be evaluated by reviewing the BVRs for an estimated model. The nature of this assumption is illustrated in figure 3.3.

Figure 3.3: Local independence



In the diagram on the left, the response variables are locally independent. The latent variable explains the association among the response variables within the latent class. In the diagram on the right, the response variables are locally dependent. The latent variable leaves significant association between the response variables unexplained. Since the goal of exploratory LCA is explanation, acceptable models must explain all the associations among the response variables (BVRs < 3.84). This can be accomplished by increasing the number of latent classes, adding parameters for direct effects between response variables or deleting redundant variables (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003).

To identify the best model, I increase the number of latent classes until (1) local independence is attained and (2) increasing the number of classes further does not result in statistically significant improvement in model fit. The change in L^2 associated with an increase in the number of latent classes is denoted ΔL^2. The ΔL^2 p-value indicates whether increasing the number of latent classes by one significantly improves model fit. The total L^2 reduction indicates the overall amount of association explained by each model.

After a suitable model is chosen, each respondent is assigned to the latent class to which he or she most likely belongs based on his or her posterior membership probabilities (PMPs). This procedure is called modal assignment (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). Each leader's PMPs are determined by his or her response pattern and the model's parameter estimates. The classification errors introduced by modal assignment are displayed for models along with various model fit statistics.

Qualitative analysis

To discipline qualitative inquiry and facilitate interpretation of statistical results, qualitative quotations illustrating particular conceptualizations are selected from leaders with high PMPs for their modal assignments. This selection procedure, which I call structured information retrieval, helps ensure that in-context qualitative analysis focuses on exemplary textual evidence. Mean PMPs are also reported for each latent class. A mean PMP close to one indicates low classification error within the latent class, while a mean PMP close to zero indicates high classification error within the latent class.

Interview excerpts are selected for their exemplarity and clarity, and to illustrate specific conceptual distinctions and nuances. Out of consideration for the reader, they have been edited for punctuation, grammar, continuity and appropriate delimitation. In all cases alterations have been securely inferred in-context to preserve the obvious intents of the speakers. Brackets indicate where words or phrases have been added or omitted, usually to protect respondent confidentiality, but occasionally to spell out esoteric acronyms or general reasons of clarity. Ellipses indicate where stuttering or interruption occurred or where speakers trailed off, although in some circumstances ellipses have been introduced during transcription and left intact.

Discussion

The substantive analyses presented throughout the chapters that follow demonstrate that latent class analysis (LCA) and discrete factor analysis (DFA) can be used effectively to identify

socially distributed conceptualizations within a large corpus of coded interview data. To assess technical validity, all finite mixture model results have been cross-validated with results derived from traditional hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA). Independence tests in confusion matrices between assignment solutions from finite mixture modeling and HCA consistently show high concordance, suggesting both that assignment is consistent across the different techniques and that substantive discovery and abduction are robust to technique choice.[12]

Model-based clustering has distinct advantages over traditional HCA. These advantages include greater stability and the ability to formally test for specific model restrictions. Also model-based clustering provides more helpful information to guide model choice, particularly regarding the number of latent classes. Model-based clustering also allows for the measurement of classification error and perhaps most importantly, the calculation of PMPs, which provide invaluable guidance for focusing qualitative analysis on exemplary evidence.

Possibly the most difficult and likely the most contentious aspect of exploratory cluster analysis, regardless of the technique employed, concerns the ascription of labels to the latent segments. To explicitly ground analysis in underlying evidence and facilitate replication, profiles identified through finite mixture modeling are presented in tables and corresponding exemplary qualitative evidence is discussed throughout the text. This structured disclosure offers a level of interpretive transparency rare in exploratory qualitative research and often absent in quantitative studies employing analogous techniques such as confirmatory factor analysis.

A common critique of classificatory analysis of any kind involves the dependence of the results on the chosen input variables. As in any analysis, quantitative and qualitative conclusions derived through finite mixture modeling depend on the response variables included in the model. The larger point here, however, is whether different sets of response variables would generate substantively different results, which would suggest that conclusions are unduly sensitive to arbitrary variations in coding schemes. Analyses presented in chapters six and seven strongly suggest that, under specific conditions, this is not a problem.

Chapter six identifies three types of TNGO on the empirical basis of six input variables. Fearing this result may have been induced by the inclusion of the categorical variable *sector*, I re-estimated analogous models with *sector* included as an inactive covariate. The analogous 3-class model is nevertheless preferred and all parameter estimates are identical in relative direction, although of course not in exact magnitude. Both sets of results generate a nearly identical assignment solution and lead to the same substantive interpretation, strongly suggesting that substantive conclusions are insensitive to input variable choice.[13]

Chapter seven examines how TNGO leaders understand the construct of organizational effectiveness. Here the coding scheme included a general code for *evaluation*, but failed to differentiate between financial evaluation and program evaluation, which proves to be a highly salient distinction. However, the generality of the code does not impose an interpretive problem. Due to the inclusion of an adequate number of relevant input variables, a meaningful latent structure nevertheless emerges. The variable *evaluation* simply fails to significantly discriminate among the latent segments. Quantitative analysts often eliminate variables with insignificant

effects, but in this case a detailed in-context qualitative analysis disciplined by PMPs easily recovers the underlying qualitative nuance obscured by the simplistic coding scheme. Although leaders from both of the main latent segments mentioned *evaluation* during their interviews, it nevertheless becomes clear that they were referring to different types of evaluation. The interpretive conclusion proves robust to deficiencies in the coding scheme.

These analyses imply four conditions that contribute to robustness, by which I mean the insensitivity of substantive conclusions to arbitrary variations in coding schemes. First, the identification of input variables must be grounded in the evidence and therefore be relevant. Qualitative codes were extracted from the evidence being coded and not exclusively deduced from prior speculation. Second, a suitable range of input variables or codes must be chosen to capture the underlying heterogeneity of responses. To continue with the organizational effectiveness example, a set of codes all pertaining to ‘overhead minimization’ would be unlikely to uncover the existence of the ‘outcome accountability’ conceptualization. Codes were deliberately added to the Transnational NGO Interview Project codebook to ensure such heterogeneity would be captured. Here it is not necessary to already know the latent conceptualizations, only to observe and acknowledge common responses for which no codes yet exist. Third, an adequate number of variables must be employed to mitigate the effects of omitted variable bias. There is no rule of thumb to follow, but more may be better, provided of course that the variables are relevant and reflect concepts respondents actually mention in the interviews. Committed variable bias, as it might be termed, is not particularly problematic. Redundant codes within the Transnational NGO Interview Project codebook were condensed or eliminated prior to in-sample coding, but even if such codes remained they could be easily

handled by combining them ex post or adding direct effect parameters to relax the local independence condition for finite mixture modeling. Naturally, an entirely irrelevant code or input variable would have never been applied and thus have no impact on analysis. Finally, interpretations of latent variables must be grounded in the underlying qualitative evidence. As in the organizational effectiveness example, this was necessary to recover nuance obscured by the coding scheme. In sum, a coding scheme and concomitant analytical process that is adequate in relevance, range, number and evidence contributes to high interpretive robustness.

It is important to consider that analytical results are driven not only by variable choice but more importantly by respondents' patterns of conceptual associations. Even results driven by poorly labeled or delimited codes can still recover meaningful latent structure on the basis of the associative patterns identified through finite mixture modeling and interpreted through structured qualitative inquiry.

The ultimate value of finite mixture modeling may be judged according to whether the latent structures identified in the data are meaningful. On this score, the techniques applied prove highly successful. Only in the context of organizational obstacles, discussed in chapter eight, are leaders' response patterns statistically homogenous. The results presented in chapters four, five, six and seven all identify intuitive latent structures with high face validity.

Conclusion

The theory-based approach to concepts is a useful framework for studying socially distributed conceptualizations empirically. Finite mixture modeling, including latent class analysis and discrete factor analysis, aids in the discovery of latent conceptualizations that explain observed associations among response variables. This type of modeling also generates statistics that can be used to focus qualitative analysis on exemplary qualitative evidence. The combination of finite mixture modeling with structured information retrieval disciplines and facilitates qualitative inquiry to generate robust and empirically grounded interpretations.

In the next chapter, I employ finite mixture modeling and structured information retrieval to explore how TNGO leaders conceptualize their organizations' missions and activities. I call their conceptualizations 'ideologies of activism.'

CHAPTER FOUR: IDEOLOGIES OF ACTIVISM

How do professional transnational activists conceptualize transnational activism? Do activists believe in empowering communities to demand sociopolitical transformation or do they prefer less contentious strategies focused on mitigating the detrimental effects of structural poverty and humanitarian disaster? How exactly do transnational activists pursue their goals? Do they leverage rules and norms derived from universal principles, deliver physical goods and services or both? In short, do distinct ideologies of activism exist that describe how professional transnational activists prefer to approach global challenges?

To address these questions, I analyze TNGO leaders' perspectives on their organizational missions. This reveals four ideological orientations toward transnational activism. The highly uneven distribution of these ideologies suggests that scholars in international relations disproportionately focus on the most visible but least common modes of transnational activism.

Background

Scholars of transnational activism generally agree that to the extent transnational NGOs (TNGOs) influence political and social outcomes they do so primarily with ideational tactics, since they lack the material powers of states (Florini, 2004; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Richard Price, 1998; Risse, 2006; Risse et al., 1999; True & Mintrom, 2001). The "ability to convert moral authority and excellent knowledge of the issue-area into ideational power explains to a large degree why transnational advocacy networks sometimes win against materially more powerful actors such as MNCs and national governments," writes Risse (2006, p. 268), adding

that international NGOs “rely on social mobilization, protest and pressure” using tactics like reframing and shaming to mobilize the public and influence targets. Similarly, Florini (2004, p. 76) affirms that “NGOs are powerful to the degree they can persuade others (government officials, corporate leaders, voters, consumers) to act. They are primarily conveyers of information and opinions.” Many scholars incorporating this view accord organizations like Amnesty International and Greenpeace exemplary status, since these organizations are well-known to employ such strategies (DeMars, 2005; Halliday, 2001; Wapner, 1995; Warkentin, 2001). Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, for example, in a study of Amnesty International assert that both proponents and critics of transnational activism “agree on the central role of information politics” (2007, p. 558), while others, like Hafner-Burton (2008), examine how NGOs like Amnesty International employ such tactics to influence state policies.

Transnational NGOs are frequently discussed within different research traditions employing different assumptions and terminology (Vakil, 1997). Within the context of a Global Civil Society, for instance, NGOs are often central players, although scholars disagree over a precise understanding of the concept and its implications (Anheier, 2007; Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Glasius, 2002; Kaldor, 2003; Lipschutz, 2005). Transnational NGOs may also emerge as transnational social movement organizations grounded in grassroots social movements and constituting a New Transnational Activism (Tarrow, 2005). Other scholars identify a New Rights Advocacy embodied in the activities of human rights and development NGOs (P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007). Within these perspectives TNGOs are generally regarded as agents of a grassroots civil society seeking broader sociopolitical transformation.

However, scholars also distinguish between ‘bottom-up’ and top-down’ perspectives of global civil society and the role of TNGOs in world politics (Cox, 1999). Josselin and Wallace, for instance, differentiate between idealists, who view TNGOs as the “vanguard of an emerging global civil society” and realists, who see TNGOs as “front-organizations thinly disguising the interests of particular states” (2001a, pp. 1, 14). Similarly, DeMars (2005) divides NGO scholarship into three camps. Pluralists view NGOs as emancipatory agents of a grassroots global civil society; globalists view them as vehicles for global norms; and realists dismiss the significance of NGOs. These various dimensions imply several combinatory models of TNGO influence in world affairs. A structuralist view, for instance, might characterize TNGOs as part of the US-dominated post-WWII system of global governance in which power emanates from Northern institutions and TNGOs (Josselin & Wallace, 2001a).

Most scholars acknowledge a structural or ideological divide between Northern and Southern NGOs (Demirovic, 2003; Kaldor, 2003; McCormick, 1999; Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002). Rohrschneider and Dalton (2002), for example, argue that a North-South power asymmetry enables Northern NGOs to influence their Southern counterparts.

Competing perspectives on the role of TNGOs in world affairs can thus be loosely categorized into two main categories, as discussed in the introduction. Proponents maintain that TNGOs are components of grassroots social movements that help constitute an emergent global civil society (Warkentin, 2001). Transnational NGOs seek to change the status quo using ideational strategies such as research and advocacy and specific tactics such as framing and naming and shaming. Whether TNGOs are themselves norm entrepreneurs or simply vehicles for the transmission of

global norms to local contexts, TNGOs represent a bottom-up force challenging the conventional state system with principled ideas. Under this view, the constructivist research program figures prominently as agents and structures contest discursive frames and role identities to transform world politics.

Detractors, on the other hand, often assume a top-down perspective. This approach takes many forms. Edwards and Hulme speculate about the New Policy Agenda and its emphasis on increasing official aid to NGOs. They worry that NGOs could transmogrify into state contractors, leading to "cooptation: the abandonment of a mission for social transformation to become the implementer of the policy agendas of northern governments" (Edwards & Hulme, 1996, p. 970). Similarly, Feldman (1997, p. 63) noted that once:

> NGOs looked skeptically upon donor assistance that would employ them as vehicles for development projects. But, by the early 1980s, donor assistance had turned private voluntary organizations into development agencies, recasting their challenge and raising anew the question of the meaning of civil society.

In light of the New Policy Agenda, Cooley and Ron (2002) portray TNGOs as subcontractors responding to requests for proposals, not as authentic agents of social change. Others simply admit that "Many NGOs are in effect, contractors for states" (Halliday, 2001, p. 26).

Another version of this argument is that TNGOs are embedded in a Western neoliberal order that guarantees their subservience. "Most non-state actors," argue Josselin and Wallace (2001b, p.

258), "even among the most subversive, work within the framework provided by Western international institutions and regimes, criticizing government policies but not challenging the state system or its component states…"

Those assuming critical orientations, often citing Foucaultian and neo-Gramscian influences, implicate global civil society in a transnational neoliberal project of governmentality and hegemony (Gill, 1995; Jaeger, 2007). Some criticize TNGOs' representations of the poor and question their authenticity as agents of the world's marginalized (Bebbington, 2005; Billon, 2006; Rothmyer, 2011). According to Feldman (1997, p. 46), instead of grassroots empowerment NGOs merely "provide a venue for privatization and…liberalization" largely controlled by donors. NGOs are either unduly influenced by, or otherwise functionally interdependent with, traditionally powerful commercial and governmental institutions. Berkovitch and Gordon (2008) describe such an interdependence in which states condition donor preferences, which in turn impact the programs and strategies of NGOs, which potentially compromises the constructively critical position NGOs are supposed occupy in the world system.

Jaeger (2007) provides one of the most sophisticated theoretical critiques along these lines, concluding that during the 1990s NGOs depoliticized issues and became functionally interdependent with states (2007, p. 272):

> Instead of genuinely political challenges or solutions [global civil society] offered humanitarian intervention and relief; and instead of tackling the political questions of the effects of markets or of redistribution, it offered a neo-liberal governmentality of human

> resource development and individual self-realization …[T]he emerging international public sphere operated as a subsystem of world politics rather than opposing the system from outside. NGOs, as the presumed chief embodiment of global civil society, operated within a "trifurcated" political system of states, international institutions, and a public sphere. Putting both movements together means that depoliticization itself is part of a political logic of international governance, whereby global civil society relieves the states system and international institutions from making fundamental political decisions by offering "world opinion" as well as ambulance and police services in their stead.

Similarly, DeMars (2005, p. 53) describes scenarios in which "the 'apolitical' NGO—claiming to do development anywhere regardless of politics—inadvertently made itself available to absorb and reinforce the existing political context, whatever it was." NGOs were used "first, to assist in the government's assumption of responsibility for general welfare; second, to legitimize the government's relinquishing of welfare responsibility; and third, to support and legitimize…anti-development, predatory political economy" (DeMars, 2005, p. 53). In short, "the net effect of NGO networks may be to protect the status quo by neutralizing both the idealists and the manipulators" (DeMars, 2005, p. 58).

From this perspective, TNGOs convert political contention into technical 'managerialism,' substituting humanitarian aid and relief for meaningful policy reform (Roberts et al., 2005). Thus TNGOs further support and legitimize states by ameliorating their failures without resolving underlying problems. Advocacy takes the form of public education, a supplementary activity with the effect of instilling the neoliberal ideas that sustain governmentality. NGOs are

participants in the circulation or diffusion of expert managerial knowledge, within which neoliberal values and practices are disseminated globally (Ebrahim, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005). While TNGO leaders themselves may view their organizations' work in managerial and technical terms—'delivering services' to 'beneficiaries' as opposed to 'mobilizing' and 'empowering constituents'—they are nonetheless participants in a neoliberal project that sustains and replicates problematic power structures.

This scholarly dissensus provides a challenging puzzle for international relations scholars. What role do TNGOs play in world affairs? Are TNGOs vehicles for ideational and discursive power that amplify the demands of grassroots activists to influence states (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Struett, 2008) or agents of neoliberal governmentality legitimizing the status quo and extending states' traditional prerogatives of power (DeMars, 2005; Feldman, 1997; Jaeger, 2007)? Or do TNGOs simultaneously play both roles in the world system (H. Katz, 2006)?

Underlying this debate is a deeper question largely unaddressed within the international relations literature. How do TNGO leaders approach transnational activism? To answer this question, I identify 'ideologies of activism' based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. By identifying the ideological orientations of TNGO leaders it is possible to gain deeper understanding of the roles their organizations play in world affairs.

There are many definitions of ideology. Erikson and Tedin (2003, p. 64) define an ideology as a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved," while Denzau and North (1994, p. 24) define ideology as "the shared framework of mental models that groups of

individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured." Moreover, Jost et al (2009, p. 309) note that "specific ideologies crystallize and communicate…widely shared beliefs, opinions, and values…endeavor to describe or interpret the world as it is…to envision the world as it should be…[and] represent socially shared but competing philosophies of life and how it should be lived." When TNGO leaders discuss their organizational missions, they reveal their beliefs about appropriate strategies for addressing social and political challenges. It is in this latter sense that leaders evince ideologies of activism that condition how they perceive their sociopolitical environment and choose to act within it.

Data

To understand how leaders conceptualize transnational activism, leaders were asked about their organizational missions and activities. Interviewers asked TNGO leaders across the United States the following question: "In general, what would you say your organization is trying to accomplish?" After a thorough review of initial interview transcripts for emergent themes, eight substantive codes were developed to capture leaders' open-ended responses. These include *capacity building* (for example, improvement of nonprofits, institutions, sectors, targets, media sector, civil society), *service delivery* (for example, direct implementation), *education* (for example, public awareness education), *advocacy* (for example, advocating policy change, lobbying institutional targets), *fundraising or grant management*, *grassroots mobilization* (for example, working in communities, organizing protests, getting people to act), *research* and

compliance monitoring (for example, enforcing compliance primarily through monitoring). Leaders' responses are distributed across 151 valid cases.

The eight codes may be alternatively regarded as eight binary response variables. Because these variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 2^8 possible response patterns corresponding to 256 different ways in which leaders could have described their organizations' missions. Since a typical human analyst can only consider about seven of these patterns simultaneously, quantification and automated classification analysis must be employed to facilitate exploratory analysis (Grimmer & King, 2009). In the following section, I use discrete factor analysis (DFA) to search for underlying structure in leaders' response patterns.

Respondents were also asked how much their organizations were engaged in specific activities. Leaders were asked the following question:

> We're interested in how your organization pursues its mission and on which activities it focuses. I'm going to mention several different kinds of activities and I would like you to rank them from 1 to 5 (with 1 being low and 5 being high) according to how much time your organization is engaged in each. In addition, we would like to know what kinds of things you do within these domains. Here is a sheet that lists the categories.

Leaders may also have been prompted with the following probe. "So would you say this is a primary activity, a secondary activity, something you do on an as needed or in an ad hoc fashion, or that you rarely, if at all, engage in?" Regardless of how leaders chose to respond to the

question—some rated each activity, some ranked the activities, others discussed them more qualitatively—each activity was coded as either 'primary,' 'secondary' or respondent's organization 'does not do.' As the question implies, the five categories of activities were predetermined by the interviewer, who handed respondents a sheet of paper listing the activities. The activities are *direct aid and services*, *research and public education*, *mobilization of the public* (for example, grassroots political campaigns, organizing public protests), *advocacy* and *monitoring* (for example, monitoring compliance with policies, international agreements and commitments). Leaders' responses to this complete series of questions are distributed across 116 valid cases.

The five categories of organizational activities may be alternatively regarded as five trichotomous response variables. Because these variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 3^5 possible response patterns corresponding to 243 different ways in which leaders could have described their organizations' activities. Again, discrete factor analysis will be used to identify latent structure in the data.

I assume that leaders' understandings of their organizational missions and activities are derived from their ideologies of activism. These ideologies describe how leaders choose to approach the global challenges their organizations confront. In the next section, I use DFA to identify underlying ideological dimensions that explain leaders' response patterns. These dimensions yield a typology, which is introduced and discussed in the sections that follow.

Analysis

Magidson and Vermunt (2003; n.d.) have shown that a latent class model consisting of four clusters is analogous to a discrete factor model consisting of two dichotomous latent factors, with the added benefit that the discrete factor model requires fewer parameters and is therefore more parsimonious. Since a discrete factor model offers greater explanatory power than a latent class model with the same number of parameters, I estimate discrete factor models to understand leaders' ideologies toward transnational activism. The models estimated to explain how leaders understand their organizational missions are summarized in table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Models for organizational mission

Model name	Model type	LL	L^2	p-value	ΔL^2	% ΔL^2	p-value	Class. Error	BVRs
Model_M0	1-Cluster	-657.24	175.95	0.01	.	.	.	0.00	Fail
Model_M1	1-DFactor(2)	-634.05	129.59	0.33	46.36	26	.	0.08	Fail
Model_M2	2-DFactor(2,2)	-627.00	115.47	0.47	14.12	34	0.40	0.09	Pass

Model_M0 tests the hypotheses that there is no statistical association among the eight response variables for organizational mission. This model may also be regarded as the model of homogeneous or random response patterns. This hypothesis is rejected since the L^2 p-value for Model_M0 is well below the conventional threshold.[14] Model_M1 tests for the presence of a single discrete factor and provides adequate model fit according to the L^2 p-value. However, this model contains an unacceptable local dependency and therefore fails to explain the association in the data. Model_M2 tests for the presence of two discrete factors. This is the most parsimonious model that successfully explains the association among the response variables and is therefore the preferred model.

The results for Model_M2 are displayed in table 4.2. Level1 of *DFactor1* describes about 66 percent of respondents. Based on (nominal) average expenditure data for sampled organizations over the period 2001 to 2006, these leaders direct about 71 percent of US TNGO resources. These leaders were more likely to have discussed *service delivery* than leaders at Level2.

Level2 of *Dfactor1* describes about 34 percent of respondents directing about 29 percent of the resources. Leaders at Level2 were more likely to have mentioned *capacity building*, *education*, *advocacy*, *fundraising or grant management*, *grassroots mobilization*, *research* and *compliance monitoring*.

DFactor1 appears to measure a service delivery-advocacy or operational-campaigning dimension (Kaldor, 2003; Willetts, 2002). *DFactor1* will be tentatively labeled ‘strategy.’ Level1 will be labeled ‘amelioration’ to indicate the nearly exclusive emphasis on service delivery and

Level2 will be labeled ‘empowerment’ to indicate the greater propensities toward more empowering strategies such as *advocacy*, *education*, *capacity building* and *grassroots mobilization*.

Table 4.2: Results for Model_M2 (independent probabilities)

		DFactor1		**DFactor2**	
		Level1	Level2	Level1	Level2
Prob.(Level)		0.66	0.34	0.77	0.23
	p-value				
Capacity building	0.05	0.48	0.69	0.56	0.53
Service delivery	0.00	0.65	0.27	0.55	0.43
Education	0.25	0.44	0.61	0.46	0.60
Advocacy	0.00	0.07	0.78	0.26	0.49
Fundraising or grant management	0.14	0.20	0.43	0.32	0.12
Grassroots mobilization	0.00	0.07	0.44	0.19	0.21
Research	0.04	0.11	0.17	0.02	0.50
Compliance	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.21

n = 151

Level1 of *Dfactor2* describes about 77 percent of respondents directing about 84 percent of the sample's resources. These leaders were more likely than those at Level2 to have discussed *capacity building*, *service delivery* and *fundraising or grant management*.

Level2 of *DFactor2* describes about 23 percent of respondents directing about 16 percent of the resources. These leaders were more likely to have talked about *education*, *advocacy*, *grassroots mobilization*, *research* and *compliance monitoring*.

DFactor2 is more difficult to interpret. To facilitate interpretation, I have retrieved leaders' actual statements about their organizational missions from the interview transcripts for those assigned to Level2 of *DFactor2* (mean PMP = 0.89). To discipline analysis and mitigate the risk of misinterpreting atypical evidence as typical, I focus analysis on exemplary qualitative evidence. The exemplarity of a leader's qualitative evidence for Level2 of *DFactor2* is defined as the probability that the he or she belongs at Level2 of *DFactor2*. This probability is the leader's PMP for the modal assignment. A PMP close to zero indicates that a leader's statements are not likely to provide good qualitative evidence to facilitation interpretation, while PMP close to one indicates that a leader's statements are very likely to provide good qualitative evidence to aid interpretation. Leader's statements have been interpreted within the contexts of the complete interview transcripts, which are organized in the CAQDAS for efficient querying. Interview dates for quotations are provided in the appendix.

One typical leader (ID = 7, PMP = 1.00) at Level2 of *DFactor2* emphasized awareness-raising. The respondent said that "the main thing that we're trying to do is to promote environmental

protection by [increasing] attention to—and promoting—environmental law, better environmental policies and… environmental management." Another respondent (ID = 17, PMP = 1.00), whose organization focuses on environmental issues such as overfishing, said his or her organization uses a scorecard system to name and shame transgressors—a classic example of the use of information politics to enforce compliance with international norms (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). "Overfishing has been an issue that has existed for decades at this point," the respondent said.

> We focused on one, a score card to show who is doing the best on what practices we have in hand. And that actually takes the data provided by the government, sorts it out according to which [entities] are actually implementing practices that are better than others. It applies a grade based on publicly available data and says one is better or worse than another.

"Name and shame technique?" the interviewer asked. "That's right," the respondent confirmed, "and then to monitor over-fishing." Level2 of *DFactor2* appears to account for whether leaders are amenable to information politics, especially involving *research*, *advocacy* and *compliance monitoring*, as commonly cited in the international relations literature on transnational activism (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). However, it may seem surprising that less than a quarter of leaders seem to favor this approach. The strategic use of ideas, considered a major tool in the repertoire of TNGOs, appears surprisingly rare given the emphasis it often receives in scholarly work (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Ron et al., 2007; Sell & Prakash, 2004).

DFactor2 will be labeled ‘mode’ to indicate leaders’ preferred mode of influence. Since leaders at Level2 of *DFactor2* are more likely to employ ideational tactics involving *education*, *advocacy*, *research* and *compliance monitoring*, Level2 will be labeled ‘ideational,’ and by contrast, Level1 will be labeled ‘material.’

This discrete factor model with two dichotomous factors may also be interpreted as a 4-cluster latent class model. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of Model_M2 by displaying the joint probabilities for the two factors. This table implies that there are four ideologies of activism held by TNGO leaders. Each of these ideologies is discussed in turn using the PMPs for leaders’ modal assignments to retrieve exemplary qualitative evidence to discipline interpretation.

Table 4.3: Results for Model_M2 (joint probabilities)

		Cluster1	**Cluster2**	**Cluster3**	**Cluster4**
DFactor1		Level1	Level1	Level2	Level2
DFactor2		Level1	Level2	Level1	Level2
Prob.(Cluster)		0.51	0.15	0.26	0.08
	p-value				
Capacity building	0.05	0.49	0.46	0.69	0.67
Service delivery	0.00	0.68	0.55	0.29	0.19
Education	0.25	0.40	0.55	0.58	0.71
Advocacy	0.00	0.02	0.23	0.72	0.98
Fundraising or grant management	0.14	0.23	0.08	0.50	0.22
Grassroots mobilization	0.00	0.06	0.07	0.43	0.46
Research	0.04	0.02	0.43	0.04	0.62
Compliance	0.01	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.43

n = 151

Cluster1: Material amelioration

Overall, about half of TNGO leaders are oriented toward material amelioration (mean PMP = 0.81). This ideology is most prevalent among leaders from relief and development TNGOs. These leaders characterize their missions primarily in terms of *service delivery*, representing a relatively traditional, charitable role conceptualization for transnational NGO leaders.

An example of the material amelioration ideology is provided by a leader (ID = 60, PMP = 0.94) who said “Our role, our real expertise or core capability is processing medical analysis supplies. We can take large, bulk, mixed truckloads of medical supplies, process them, refine them to usable products, and that's what we try to do.” Further emphasizing the charitable, service delivery aspect of his or her organization’s mission, the respondent added that “we're trying to improve the delivery of healthcare, and we do that by gathering, processing and distributing medical and other health supplies to other charities.” Clearly, this leader is interested in the charitable distribution of material, not organizing public protests or engaging in contentious information politics.

Another leader (ID = 97, PMP = 0.94) emphasized the ameliorative aspect of the orientation. “The bottom line is the alleviation of poverty,” he or she said. “That is really through supporting microfinance organizations around the world that are really trying to do what [DELETED] did, in terms of creating a large, self-sufficient organization that is able to reach massive numbers of poor people.” Here the product, credit, is more abstract but similarly conceptualized as a means for ameliorating social problems with resources such as money rather than contentious advocacy.

Cluster2: Ideational amelioration

The mission orientation of ideational amelioration tends to involve *service delivery* and *education*, followed by *capacity building* and *research* (mean PMP = 0.79) This role conceptualization appears to place about equal emphasis on *service delivery* and *education*, suggesting that neither strategy is substantially privileged. Interestingly, Jaeger (2007, pp. 266, 272) suggests that TNGOs specifically utilize "public awareness, information and education campaigns" to promote "neo-liberal governmentality," although leaders tend to regard public education as means of augmenting service delivery.

Ideational amelioration is most prevalent among environmental TNGOs. A leader (ID = 9, PMP = 0.95) from an environmental TNGO said that his or her organization is "…trying to protect the great ecological systems of the planet that enable us to live." Moreover, "we are wrestling, we want to run global campaigns on these global ecological threats, global warming, protection of the oceans, stuff that spreads, genetically modified organisms, nuclear proliferation, toxic chemicals, and ancient forests." He or she also thought that "…if we get that stuff right, then the planet, and the humanity lives to fight all these good fights, a woman's right to choose, gays to marry, whatever it may be, right?" Such a mission orientation is difficult to categorize, but it appears that the crux of the approach involves leveraging ideology and information to achieve material change.

Another leader, also from the environmental sector (ID = 21, PMP = 0.94), appeared to favor a demand-driven approach. The respondent saw his or her organization as providing direct services in the water sector, coupled with hygiene education and local capacity building, all as mutually reinforcing components of a broader strategy. The leader also stressed that they "work with people in, in local environments who are likewise ready, willing and able to take the initiative on their own behalf." The respondent elaborated on a specific project as a "demand-driven enterprise:"

> …the community's investment was not just a psychic one, it was the people in communities [who] demonstrated that they had the demand for this, it was a demand driven enterprise because they came forward with labor and materials and actual cash contributions to make this thing work. And um, we had assumed I think early on we were very good about finding the right kind of local partners.

In its fuller context, it is clear that the leader prefers a participatory approach to development in which *service delivery*, *education* and *capacity building* concatenate to generate sustainable outcomes. This contrasts with the more common approach of material amelioration, which chiefly involves *service delivery*.

A leader (ID = 23, PMP = 0.90) from a struggling human rights organization brings another perspective to ideational amelioration. The respondent candidly admitted that his or her organization's mission was:

> well until recently I think it was to, to sort of keep the lights, on, get us paid our salaries and, and just you know, keep the shell in place. And ah, be available to receive funding and to answer inquiries at a very sort of modest level. And we thought that was preferable than nothing at all because um, where would people go…

Substantively, his or her organization generates and disseminates information to achieve arms reductions. Given their difficult financial position, the respondent clarified that "mainly the objective then right now is to disseminate information… but in a, in a passive [manner] and I mean that in a neutral sense." The term ideational amelioration should not be taken to mean 'making people feel better,' but rather indicates that some leaders view information dissemination as a form of service delivery. The four most prevalent indicators for this view, *service delivery*, *education*, *capacity building* and *research*, when contrasted with the profiles for the other ideologies, collectively emphasize the ideational aspects of delivering services. Again this also contrasts with the most prominent role conceptualization of material amelioration, which focuses primarily on *service delivery*.

Cluster3: Material empowerment

About a quarter of TNGO leaders subscribe to an ideology of material empowerment (mean PMP = 0.82). Material empowerment is most likely to involve *advocacy*, *capacity building* and *education*. This orientation aims at providing beneficiaries with the resources they need to live more engaged and empowered lives. It is most common among conflict resolution and human

rights organizations. A leader (ID = 118, PMP = 0.97) holding this view described the evolution of his or her organization's goals and strategies as follows.

> …in the very beginning we started out being in an organization working for peace that um, was doing political work. And…this is all political what we do, but somewhere after the first year or two um, people over there started asking, they need help. And um, we continued some of the…political work but we changed our focus to doing projects over there to help children, and that's the main focus of this organization is to you know, give hope and…make the lives of children a little bit easier and to work for justice.

More concretely, the leader offered that, "we built playgrounds, parks and playgrounds. And we support women's projects and embroidery projects and we also um, support, we set up a computer lab at the [DELETED] refugee camp…" The respondent seems to believe that providing the right materials and infrastructure can help instill an empowering sense of hope among beneficiaries. Although his or her organization initially focused on political engagement, it eventually adopted more materialistic programming.

Scholars have observed trends among NGOs that have been interpreted as a convergence between development and human rights programming and a shift toward increased politicization in the humanitarian sector (Barnett, 2009; P. J. Nelson & Dorsey, 2003). As a possible illustration of this trend, another leader (ID = 139, PMP = 0.96) described how his or her organization had "been growing into advocacy." He or she identified fundraising, awareness-raising and public education as core organizational foci.

> Well, I think that the primary function of the US office is to generate funding for projects all over the world, raising money from various sources—corporations, governments, private individuals, foundations. We also do advocacy in the United States and public awareness…we want poverty and justice issues to become more important to American citizens so that they put pressure on their elected officials for just and effective policies that are friendly to the poor.

This respondent also emphasized that his or her organization strove to have a "transforming impact" not only on beneficiaries, but also on donors. The leader's organization uses fundraising as an opportunity to influence donors. "We are trying to deepen the relationships that donors have—not to just send us a check every month, but to become a volunteer, to become engaged in advocacy, to email a congressman," the leader said. The conceptualization of material empowerment involves leveraging physical and financial resources to promote social or political empowerment.

Cluster4: Ideational empowerment

The orientation of ideational empowerment is potentially the most transformative ideology and is most common among human rights organizations (mean PMP = 0.88). It is dominated by *advocacy*, as well as *education*, *capacity building* and *research*, and it is the least likely to involve *service delivery*. The conjunction of *research* and *compliance monitoring* implies an affinity for information or accountability politics (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). One of these

uncommon leaders (ID = 29, PMP = 0.98) described his or her organization as “an incubator for activists.” His or her organization seeks “peace” by holding states accountable to international human rights norms.

> …our kind of founding principles are the UN declaration of human rights. We would like to have that adopted internationally. We would like our government to respect the UN declaration of human rights, which includes both political rights and economic rights. And so we have concentrated a lot on the economic rights because we think they, they are ignored or have been ignored in the past by a lot of the larger [NGOs], human rights organizations.

Another leader (ID = 11, PMP = 1.00) said that his or her organization is trying to achieve:

> a world where the rights of people [who] live along rivers are respected and where the, those people have a say in decision making…and where ecological values of rivers are respected. And beyond that, that's the sort of narrower range, beyond that, a world where in general development decision making is much more participative and democratic and environmentally conscious and there's more say for communities and civil society in decision-making to try and to counteract the power of the state and corporations.

Notably, this leader also acknowledged that his or her organization frequently produced reports and organized events as tactics for achieving sociopolitical change. From the leader’s discussion it is clear that he or she believes that environmental issues persist in the context of broader social

and political power structures. For leaders holding such views transnational engagement may involve overt political contention.

This ideology of ideational empowerment is most starkly contrasted with the much more common and traditional ideology of material amelioration. Whereas material amelioration mainly involves traditional service delivery, ideational empowerment involves strategies that are likely to be more contentious and sociopolitically transformative.

Discussion

Overall, most leaders (about 51 percent) believe that the best way to approach global challenges is with traditional, charitable strategies consistent with material amelioration. Based on (nominal) average expenditure data for the period 2001-2006, leaders holding this ideology direct about 56 percent of the sample's resources. Slightly more than a quarter of leaders (about 26 percent) believe in material empowerment or the leveraging of physical and financial resources to achieve sociopolitical empowerment. These leaders direct about 15 percent of the resources. About 15 percent of leaders directing about 28 percent of the resources favor ideational amelioration. They employ ideational strategies to achieve material results. Comparatively few (about 8 percent) leaders directing only about one percent of the resources appear to subscribe to a transformative ideology of ideational empowerment.

As described above, leaders' ideologies are unevenly distributed within different sectors. Their organizations were classified into five sectors (human rights, conflict resolution, sustainable

development, environment and humanitarian relief) by Charity Navigator, the nonprofit ratings agency in the United States from which the sample was drawn. Table 4.4 summarizes the relationship between *ideology* and *sector*.

Table 4.4: Ideological orientation by sector

		Sector				
		Environment	Human Rights	Humanitarian Relief	Sustainable Development	Conflict Resolution
Ideological orientation	Material amelioration	41%	14%	81%	77%	25%
		9	3	26	49	3
		1.3	7.2	2.5	3.1	2.4
	Ideational amelioration	36%	5%	3%	5%	8%
		8	1	1	3	1
		17.4	0.5	1.3	1.5	0
	Material empowerment	9%	62%	16%	17%	67%
		2	13	5	11	8
		2.4	10.6	1.3	1.8	7.7
	Ideational empowerment	14%	19%	0%	2%	0%
		3	4	0	1	0
		2.9	7.5	1.7	1.7	0.6
	Percentage total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Count total	22	21	32	64	12
	Chi2 contribution total	24	25.8	6.8	8.1	10.8

n = 151, Chi2(12) = 75.44, p = 0.00

According to the chi-squared decomposition, ideational amelioration is unexpectedly common in the environmental sector, while material empowerment is unexpectedly common in the human rights sector. Material amelioration is unexpectedly predominant in the sustainable development and humanitarian relief sectors, while material empowerment is unexpectedly predominant in the conflict resolution sector. Confrontational ideational tactics like naming and shaming may be seen as too contentious or counterproductive for leaders in the conflict resolution sector.

The distributions of ideologies within the humanitarian relief and sustainable development sectors are strikingly similar. This indicates that leaders of these two types of organizations appear to think similarly about the appropriate way to approach global challenges. This may be unsurprising given that some scholars have argued that the distinction between humanitarianism and development is increasingly a false dichotomy (Slim, 2000).

Leaders' ideologies are intuitively distributed across the service delivery-advocacy divide. Using secondary data from organizations' websites and annual reports, an independent coder classified each TNGO as 'service-oriented,' 'advocacy-oriented' or 'both.' Table 4.5 summarizes the relationship between *ideology* and *function*.

Table 4.5: Ideological orientation by function

		Function		
		Advocacy	Service	Both
Ideological orientation	Material amelioration	15% 5 10.9	84% 59 7.2	54% 26 0.2
	Ideational amelioration	15% 5 1.2	4% 3 1.9	13% 6 0.5
	Material empowerment	55% 18 10.5	10% 7 6.8	29% 14 0.2
	Ideational empowerment	15% 5 6	1% 1 2	4% 2 0.1
	Percentage total	100%	100%	100%
	Count total	33	70	48
	Chi2 contribution total	28.8	17.8	1.1

n = 151, Chi2(6) = 47.66, p = 0.00

Organizations coded as service-oriented tend to be headed by leaders holding ideologies of material amelioration, while those regarded as advocacy-oriented are most likely to be headed by leaders adhering to strategies of material empowerment. The chi-squared decomposition shows that material amelioration is unexpectedly common among service organizations and unexpectedly uncommon among advocacy organizations. Additionally, empowering orientations are unexpectedly predominant among advocacy organizations and unexpectedly uncommon among service organizations.

Independently, *DFactor1* (strategy) is strongly associated with *function* (n = 151, chi2(1) = 35.68, p = 0.00). About 70 percent of leaders from advocacy organizations favor empowerment while about 89 percent of leaders from service organizations favor amelioration. This suggests that in the context of TNGOs' missions, 'service' is bound up with 'amelioration' and 'advocacy' with 'empowerment,' independently of whether leaders' organizations employ ideational tactics (as this has been 'factored out'). Given the similarities in the coding schemes for *mission* and *function*, this result may also be interpreted as a form of cross-validation.

The relationship between *DFactor2* (mode) and *function* is also significant (n = 151, chi2(1) = 11.14, p = 0.00). Respondents from all types of organizations prefer material over ideational modes of engagement, even though leaders from advocacy TNGOs are about five times more likely to employ ideational tactics.

Cross-validation

As discussed above, leaders were also handed a sheet of paper listing five activities and asked to rate how much time their organizations spent engaged with each category of activity. The existence if these data as well as the data from the interview question about organizational mission introduces the possibility of cross-validation between the two areas of the interview protocol. We expect a similar factor or factors to emerge within the context of organizational activities as in the context of organizational mission.

Table 4.6: Models for organizational activities

Model name	Model type	LL	L^2	p-value	ΔL^2	$\%\Delta L^2$	p-value	Class. Error	BVRs
Model_A0	1-Cluster	-561.73	234.77	0.00	.	.	.	0.00	Fail
Model_A1	1-DFactor(2)	-515.48	142.28	0.07	92.49	39	.	0.06	Pass
Model_A2	2-DFactor(2,2)	-500.78	112.88	0.20	29.40	52	0.03	0.05	Pass

Table 4.6 summarizes the models for organizational activities. The first model, Model_A0, is the null model. The low L^2 p-value indicates that unexplained association exists among the five trichotomous response variables. Model_A1 provides adequate fit according to the L^2 p-value and successfully explains the bivariate associations among the response variables. However, Model_A2 provides a statistically significant improvement in model fit over Model_A1 as measured by the $\mathbf{\Delta}L^2$ p-value. Since Model_A2 provides significantly better fit than Model_A1, Model_A2 is the preferred model. The results of Model_A2 are presented in table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Results for Model_A2 (independent probabilities)

			DFactor1		DFactor2	
			Level1	Level2	Level1	Level2
Prob.(Level)			0.68	0.32	0.65	0.35
	p-value					
Direct aid and service	0.00	Primary	0.81	0.49	0.72	0.69
		Secondary	0.08	0.11	0.05	0.16
		Does not do	0.11	0.41	0.23	0.15
Research and public education	0.00	Primary	0.24	0.72	0.43	0.33
		Secondary	0.59	0.28	0.42	0.63
		Does not do	0.17	0.00	0.15	0.04
Mobilization	0.00	Primary	0.05	0.53	0.31	0.01
		Secondary	0.32	0.34	0.06	0.83
		Does not do	0.62	0.14	0.63	0.16
Advocacy	0.00	Primary	0.08	0.71	0.32	0.22
		Secondary	0.53	0.29	0.30	0.74
		Does not do	0.39	0.01	0.39	0.05
Monitoring	0.00	Primary	0.00	0.39	0.07	0.24
		Secondary	0.31	0.52	0.37	0.39
		Does not do	0.69	0.09	0.56	0.37

n = 116

Level1 of *DFactor1* appears to capture the ameliorative orientation centered on *direct aid and services* and supplemented by *research and public education*. Level2 of this factor seems to reflect a multidimensional approach to empowerment in which leaders believe that their organizations are primarily engaged in *research and public education*, *advocacy* and *mobilization*, and secondarily involved in *monitoring*. This factor will be labeled 'strategy,' as before, Level1 labeled 'amelioration' and Level2 labeled 'empowerment.'

Whereas the first factor discriminates between an ameliorative conception of organizational activities based on *direct aid and services* and an empowering conception based on *research and public education*, *advocacy* and *mobilization*, the second factor appears to distinguish between strategies of focus versus supplementation.

The profile for Level1 of *DFactor2* appears to describe leaders who would rather do something wholeheartedly or not at all. The activities have relatively low probabilities of being secondary. Leaders holding this view report that their organizations are engaged in *direct aid and services* as well as *research and public education*. However, they tend to avoid *mobilization* and *monitoring* altogether and seem ambivalent on the appropriate role of *advocacy*. Overall, these leaders appear more willing to avoid activities toward which they are not prepared to commit significant time and resources. Leaders at Level2 of *DFactor2*, by contrast, believe that their organizations are engaged in many activities secondarily. Thus, *DFactor2* will be labeled 'scope,' Level1 'focus' and Level2 'supplementation.'

The discrete factor models estimated for organizational mission and organizational activities may be assessed for concordant validity. In both contexts factors emerged appearing to measure an amelioration-empowerment dimension. Table 4.8 displays a confusion matrix showing the concordance between the assignment solutions for mission *DFactor1* (strategy) and activities *DFactor1* (strategy).

Table 4.8: Confusion matrix

		Mission Strategy (DFactor1)	
		Amelioration (Level1)	Empowerment (Level2)
Activities Strategy (DFactor1)	Amelioration (Level1)	64	17
	Empowerment (Level2)	13	21

n = 115, chi2(1) = 18.00, p = 0.00

As shown in table 4.8, there are 85 concordant pairs relative to 30 discordant pairs, yielding concurrence of about 74 percent. Additionally, a chi-squared test for independence reveals that these two factors are statistically associated. Transnational NGO leaders appear to be about twice as likely to hold an ameliorative orientation toward transnational activism as an empowering orientation. This result is consistent within the contexts of both organizational mission and activities.

Analysis of coder and interviewer biases

With data of this nature it is important to determine whether the results described above are truly reflective of leaders' ideologies toward transnational activism and not mere artifacts of interviewer baiting or coder bias. The results of tests for these influences are provided in table 4.9.

Table 4.9: Tests for bias

	Test	Variable	n	Chi2	d.f.	p-value
Mission	Coder ID	Strategy (DF1)	151	6.90	4	0.14
		Mode (DF2)	151	2.38	4	0.67
	Interviewer ID	Strategy (DF1)	151	16.41	6	0.01
		Mode (DF2)	151	4.48	6	0.61
Activities	Coder ID	Strategy (DF1)	116	4.90	4	0.30
		Scope (DF2)	116	12.26	4	0.02
	Interviewer ID	Strategy (DF1)	116	8.22	6	0.22
		Scope (DF2)	116	2.46	6	0.87

There is no evidence that coder bias is driving the result for organizational mission, as indicated by the high p-value for the respective independence test. However, the variable for interviewer identification (ID) is statistically related to the first discrete factor describing mission strategy. The explanation is twofold. First, this evidence is not unexpected since interviewers were nonrandomly assigned to respondents to facilitate rapport and maximize respondent candor. The effect then may not be bias in the undesirable sense, but simply an effect of the assignment procedure. To further assess the nature and extent of interviewer bias, the two primary interviewers were contacted and asked to discuss their recollections about the interview processes. Both interviewers effectively indicated that the association is spurious. Interviewers were assigned to undertake multiple interviews in particular geographic areas where various functional or sectoral foci tended to predominate among organizations. For example, both interviewers commented that Washington, DC tended to host more sustainable development, humanitarian relief and service delivery TNGOs, while New York, NY tended to host more human rights, conflict resolution and advocacy TNGOs. One interviewer conducted a cluster of interviews in Washington, DC, while the other conducted a cluster of interviews in New York, NY.

As a result of their recollections, I performed additional tests between *interviewer ID* and mission *DFactor1* (strategy), controlling for the geographic location of the interview. The results indicate that there are no independent interviewer bias effects (all p-values > 0.05). Caution is still warranted, however, due to poorly populated tables, but within the best populated cells the observed counts are very close to the expected counts, mitigating this concern.

Although there is no evidence of interviewer bias regarding the types of activities respondents believe their organizations are engaged in, there does appear to be some coder bias with respect to the scope of such activities. This is most likely due to individual differences in how coders interpreted whether specific activities were primary, secondary or not engaged in at all. Figure 1 shows that coders are spread vertically along the factor for activities *DFactor2* (scope). The two lines inside the graph intersect with the graph's axes to indicate the probabilities of being at Level2 of each discrete factor.

Figure 4.1: Coder bias



Coder 3 is the furthest vertically from the intersection, revealing a propensity toward supplementation (Level2 of *DFactor2*), while coder 4 has a propensity toward focus (Level1 of *DFactor2*). An independence test and chi-squared decomposition confirms that coder 3's propensity toward supplementation alone accounts for more than half of the chi-squared statistic's magnitude.[15] These tests suggest that activities *DFactor2* (scope) may be a trivial factor generated by coder bias. This factor should be interpreted cautiously.

Overall, tests for interviewer and coder biases do not reveal significant threats to the validity of the main results presented in table 3.1.

Conclusion

It is often taken for granted that TNGO leaders are contentious activists who employ information politics to influence targets and mobilize support to achieve sociopolitical transformation. But proponents expounding the potential of professionalized transnational activism to transform world politics typically focus on the least common types of TNGOs. According to data gathered in the United States, most professional transnational activists directing most of the resources appear to subscribe to an ideology of material amelioration, not ideational empowerment, as summarized in table 4.10.

Table 4.10: Ideological efficacy

		Strategy	
		Amelioration	Empowerment
Mode	Material	51% of leaders 56% of expenditures	26% of leaders 15% of expenditures
	Ideational	15% of leaders 28% of expenditures	8% of leaders 1% of expenditures

Of course more research is needed to understand the perspectives of TNGO leaders outside of the United States. Future research might also attempt to identify differences between professional and amateur transnational activists.

CHAPTER FIVE: AUTOMOMY AND COLLABORATION

Do TNGOs contest states from the outside or are they part and parcel of the international system? Scholars question whether transnational NGOs are authentic norm entrepreneurs, vehicles for global norms and ideas or merely state subcontractors (Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; Cooley & Ron, 2002; DeMars, 2005; Martha Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Halliday, 2001; Josselin & Wallace, 2001c). In the first instance, TNGOs originate norms which they propagate within global civil society and among powerful actors like corporations and governments. However, TNGOs may also be viewed as vehicles for global norms. In this view, norms emerge organically within civil society and eventually become institutionalized in the mandates of TNGOs. Transnational NGOs represent the values of grassroots civil society and leverage information politics to hold actors accountable to universal principles. Finally, in a critical view TNGOs are simply subcontractors paid to enact the foreign policies of states and promote the public relations interests of corporations.

Many variations exist on these perspectives. For instance, Josselin and Wallace (2001b, p. 252) maintain that "…the arrival of think-tanks and NGOs on the international stage as vehicles for expertise and agenda-setters can hardly be overstated," while later they cautiously note that "Many non-state actors further remain dependent (at least in part) on the state for funding their activities, and are willing to serve as conduits for the foreign policy of their government." (2001b, p. 258) Others question (Halliday, 2001) or simply assume (Cooley & Ron, 2002) that TNGOs are basically subcontractors rather than autonomous actors in their own rights. Still other scholars, such as Berkovitch and Gordon (2008), argue that the situation is more complex: states influence donors who influence TNGO programming. But in most cases TNGO subordination is

understood as undesirable on the presumption that the proper role of TNGOs in world affairs is to challenge states and corporations rather than collaborate with them.

Normative implications are often premised upon unstated assumptions about what TNGOs are supposed to be doing. If TNGOs are independent watchdogs keeping states and corporations in check, then TNGO subservience to donors and powerful institutions is undesirable. If however TNGOs are supposed to be well-behaved fiduciary agents duly executing their contracts with donors, then TNGO subservience is a desirable condition.

Scholars disagree over the implications of TNGO subservience. Sanyal (1997, p. 31) decries the "autonomy fetish" and argues that decoupling TNGOs from state and market institutions is self-defeating, whilc Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that TNGOs need to diversify funding sources to preserve autonomy since the fiercely competitive marketplace for contracts undermines TNGOs' missions. Such arguments for and against TNGO autonomy vis-à-vis states and corporations are premised upon different assumptions about the appropriate role of TNGOs in world affairs.

Regardless of the desirability of organizational autonomy, scholars seem to underestimate the nature and degree of autonomy-preserving strategic behavior among TNGOs. Further complicating matters, TNGO leaders exhibit qualitatively different collaborative styles. Some TNGOs refuse to accept corporate or government support, while others routinely receive corporate donations and coordinate with government ministries. Leaders also report various benefits and obstacles to collaborations that are not well known. Each of these topics is discussed in the sections that follow.

Financial autonomy

When interviewers with the Transnational NGO Interview Project asked leaders if there were any additional topics they would like to discuss that were not covered by the protocol, respondents reported that more attention could have been paid to discussing the impact of funding. Acknowledging this insight, two related questions were added to the interview protocol. The first question asked: "Can you describe how you secure funders and resources for your organization?" Responses were captured with a general qualitative code, *description of how funders and resources are secured*, to facilitate information retrieval for qualitative analysis. The follow-up question asked "How does the need to secure funding affect your goals, strategies and the organization internally?" Again, responses were captured with a general qualitative code, *effect of the need to secure funding*, to assist with information retrieval for qualitative analysis. Because these codes have no meaningful quantitative interpretations, they are not included in the quantitative dataset as variables. Additionally, from a statistical standpoint there is no possibility for structured, facilitated inquiry using finite mixture modeling since leaders' response vectors contain a maximum of one response variable.

However, the qualitative data are quite rich. To proceed with analysis, all quotations coded with *effect of the need to secure funding* were extracted and reviewed. These quotations contain about 29,000 words. Particularly insightful quotations have been selected discretionarily.

A large part of the debate over TNGO autonomy turns upon a chicken-or-the-egg problem: does funding drive programming or does programming drive funding? "There's always that tension..."

one leader said, “do you pursue your own vision and mission or do you get driven by the agendas of your donors” (ID = 4)? If money principally determines where organizations work, what they do and how they do it, then transnational NGOs are essentially subcontractors; if they are mission-driven organizations that rely upon the trust and generosity of altruistic donors, then they exercise considerable discretion and autonomy to influence world politics in ways that may run counter to the interests of states and corporations.

Many organizations appear to zealously guard their missions even at the expense of losing donors or turning down potentially lucrative contracts. However, these same organizations also express a broad willingness to adapt their strategies and programs to accommodate the demands of funders, as long as donor requirements fall within the general contours of their supervening goals and principles.

At least two alternative characterizations of TNGOs are possible. A naïve view implies that TNGOs are authentic representatives of global civil society that raise resources on the basis of their programs (e.g. Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Warkentin, 2001), while a cynical view suspects that TNGOs are merely subcontractors competing for contracts issued by states and other resourseful institutions (e.g. Cooley & Ron, 2002).

These two perspectives should be understood within the context of a conceptual distinction that many TNGO leaders articulated. Respondents consistently distinguished between their organizations’ general missions and their specific programs, tending to be fiercely protective of the former and strategically accommodating with respect to the latter. The mission-program

distinction is subtle but important. For example, one respondent (ID = 144) said that "by in large, foundations are determining—much like big money determining candidates and…politics in the United States—foundations determine quite often the direction of programs," whereas another (ID = 32) flatly stated, "We never have created a goal to match a foundation's requirement." The naïve-cynical distinction can be reformulated in part as a question of how deeply donor demands influence TNGO behavior.

Transnational NGOs may not necessarily reformulate their missions in response to donor pressure, but they do seem to be highly opportunistic at a programmatic level when lucrative funding opportunities materialize. "There's been a couple of programs that we've taken on," one respondent said, "that with hindsight, I think we were too influenced by the fact that the money was available, and it really wasn't a big priority for us, but because the money was there, we did it." He or she continued that "usually those don't turn out very well because we don't have the capacity or skills or interest to really do them well. But those were specific programs rather than broad policy or goals" (ID = 11). Another respondent explained how a malaria education program began "because [a corporation]…put out a call for proposals…dealing with malaria in…Africa and we responded to that…There was a funding opportunity to do something that we probably wouldn't have done otherwise." Continuing, "Similarly, [another corporation] has um…pushed us into an area that we probably wouldn't have gone into otherwise" (ID = 59).

Organizations face strong incentives to adopt a subcontracting model that can bring in large amounts of funds more efficiently than soliciting thousands of small individual contributors. One small service delivery TNGO encountered such persistent fundraising difficulties with its "tin

cup approach" that it eventually merged with a much larger organization to better secure its financial future (ID = 128). "We've gone from being a mission-driven organization to a contract-driven organization or a client-driven organization, which means the client is the person who issues a contract, so a client-driven organization," the respondent said. The strategy enabled his or her organization to take part in a multiyear, multimillion dollar project funded by USAID.

A respondent from a faith-based service delivery TNGO described a similarly contract-driven strategy (ID = 101).

> And so what we try to do is we try to match what we're doing with what foundations are interested in. And we often frequently end up writing unsolicited proposals and some of those get funded. Same thing is true of government sources. I mentioned USAID. You just have to keep your ear the ground to find out what, what it is that they're interested in funding…you basically have to figure out, okay, what is it that the donor is interested in and then you try to tailor your requests around that, but always keeping in mind what you're trying to accomplish with the poor.

Funding can be an important driver of programs and subcontracting can be an effective fundraising strategy. However, the subcontracting model may undermine organizational autonomy.

Powerful benefactors capable of influencing TNGO behavior include governments, activist donors, corporations and foundations. Of these four, governments are generally the most

controversial and draw the greatest interest from international relations scholars. If TNGOs are subcontractors to states then their role in world politics is effectively determined by national interests. Indeed, in one respondent's words, "sometimes you gotta do the bidding of the United States government and you don't have the freedom to do what you want to do. You know they basically look upon the use of government money as an extension of US government policy." When governments are major funders and TNGOs act as subcontractors, the "tendency is always to follow the money and to be dominated by accountability to the US government" (ID = 77).

Reflecting strongly upon the political character of what TNGOs do, many leaders implicated government money as a singularly compromising force to transnational activism. A respondent from an animal rights TNGO noted that minimizing government funding was organizational policy "because we're an advocate organization. We [want] to stay away from, from large government grants because it…inhibits our ability to speak out" (ID = 10). The primary concern, presumably, is that government agencies will strategically withhold or fail to renew funding on key contracts if a TNGO refuses to cooperate.

A respondent (ID = 28) from a human rights TNGO offered his or her assessment of the risk involved when challenging government policy on the one hand while receiving government funding on the other.

> We've considered having [to finesse relationships with government funders] and decided not to. I mean, that's kind of the way…what it came down to was we do get money from the State Department, from USAID, Office of Refugees…but it's very straightforward

> contract work, and we made the decision early on that we weren't going to change any of our principles or the way that we do our work, or not speak out on those things and that we would, you know, 'God help us,' you know, try to deal with, you know any potential repercussions later. And we haven't had those. It was the same piece when we decided, again I keep coming back to [DELETED], testifying 'cause that was a very public thing to do. Very you know, kind of an edgy time, and the decision was made that we would do it, and we you know, we certainly heard back from that in support and others who thought maybe we shouldn't have, but we did not see any negative impact for development work or from our contract work.

However, most leaders did not describe government funding as a strategic lever of state control. Instead, government contracts are often seen as providing bridge money that can be useful for covering expenses while organizations search for less restrictive contributions. "We try not to be donor driven," a typical respondent said. "In fact, that is a dirty word in [DELETED]. We'll even, I mean, a lot of NGOs will seek government grants that they don't really want or need but they feel like they have to have them because they need cash" (ID = 139). Overall, large grants from powerful institutions like states, corporations and foundations can be pursued very selectively. Leaders accept disproportionately large contracts on the precondition that donor priorities already cohere with their missions.

> We only um, pursue those projects and that funding if it is very, very closely aligned to what our priorities and what our strategies already are. And I think…it can be very tempting, right to…to sort of be staring at this five million dollar potential grant—'Oh

> but that's going to require us to, to do this and that; well we really weren't thinking about that, but hey it's five million dollars'—you know? I think that we've been very good so far, in not going there (ID = 14).

The threat of eroding organizational autonomy with big contracts and large individual contributions is salient among respondents, and most leaders implement strategies to mitigate this vulnerability. These strategies include raising unrestricted funds, diversifying funding sources, educating donors and strategically structuring their organizations transnationally. Theoretical perspectives that view TNGOs as subcontractors probably apply much more narrowly to organizations that receive at least a majority of their funding in restricted form and predominantly from a single source. "We've really striven to, to try to maintain a very high percentage of unrestricted money, and non-governmental [money] so we're not encumbered by government regulations, government procurement policy, all the USAID you know, architecture that comes with that," a respondent from a large TNGO said, "so we're not chasing that money and…we don't chase major donors who want to be highly engaged in restricting and directing their funding…we'll walk away" (ID = 69).

Another respondent said that his or her organization targeted unrestricting funding specifically to avoid the "whole mission creep thing" that often occurs "when you're running around chasing USAID dollars." The leader continued, "that was the whole reason behind having a grassroots independent funding base—to give us that freedom, that flexibility, those unrestricted resources…" (ID = 136). This was echoed by several other respondents, one of whom declared that moving to a ninety percent unrestricted funding base had "been extremely effective" and had

“allowed [their] programs to grow tremendously, and it allowed [them] to get away from government funding…” This despite acknowledging that the pursuit of “unrestricted multiyear commitments…goes a little bit against the grain of fundraising strategies” (ID = 56).

In addition to promoting organizational autonomy, unrestricted funding is valuable to TNGOs because it can be used to fund administrative and fundraising expenses—essential for organizational growth and survival—widely disparaged by donors and nonprofit ratings agencies.

Leaders unable to secure such large proportions of unrestricted funding necessarily adopt mixed strategies, pursuing unrestricted funds when they can and accepting restricted contributions when they must. One such respondent said the following (ID = 97):

> Several years ago we found that we were a bit too donor driven...we're less that way, but it still affects us…we are still confined by the interest of our donors, being able to support certain areas. We can use unrestricted funds for certain things and, of course, we typically try to raise money as unrestricted, but often the donor will say, ‘Well, it's four packets to X’ or ‘It's for the Philippines.’

It is natural to assume that donors influence TNGOs with restricted money, but less common to acknowledge that TNGOs influence donors about what they should be funding. Concerted efforts at donor education constitute another key strategy for supporting TNGO autonomy. Many

TNGO leaders discover this strategy through experience, such as the following respondent (ID = 17):

> RESPONDENT: When we got to [a large number of] projects a handful of years ago, before the strategic plan, it was because we chased the money. That's the phrase that's often used. Chasing the money. It's very hard and often very tempting to do it, especially when resources are scarce, like all the time. But we really try to stick to our knitting, be extremely rigorous. Funders approaching us, more often a foundation—because the individuals, more often than not, trust in us to make the decision as to how the program should lay out—foundations come at us with a specific thing. We try to educate them around what our programs are and why we're pursuing them compared to anything else…For our priorities that we're focusing on, we just have to tell people [that] out of all the things, out of all the recommendations, we feel that these are the top…recommendations…the most urgent, and we either convince them or we don't.
>
> INTERVIEWER: And if you don't then you…you let that funder go?
>
> RESPONDENT: We let the funder go.

Transnational NGOs and donors actively influence one another and the transnational activism 'market' evinces a similar symmetry. Much is made of the theory that TNGOs are like for-profit subcontractors that fiercely compete for large contracts in a market for donor resources (e. g. Cooley & Ron, 2002), but the reverse tends to be underemphasized, that donors compete against

one another to fund and influence certain TNGOs.

Donors, like TNGOs, have limited resources. Donors presumably attempt to allocate their contributions among organizations so as to maximize the expected benefits. The numbers of competent TNGOs that work in specific areas are limited and in many instances TNGOs do enjoy the luxury of choosing their funders. Transnational NGOs have the most leverage when they are reputable, offer highly differentiated services and are already funded to scale. One respondent enjoying this position said the following (ID = 5):

> If a donor wants to give us money for something that is not part of what [DELTED] does, we attempt to educate them as to what [DELETED] is really doing and how it's effective in helping, and how unique [DELETED] is, in the sense that…there isn't another organization [that] does what [DELETED] does…and if there still is not consensus on that then we do not accept their funds. But we're very good at the…it is a very, it is a very marketable thing…

Funding is a prevalent challenge for TNGOs and identifying worthy organizations to support is a challenge for donors. Scarcity influences both parties to the transactions, not just TNGOs searching for contributions but also donors looking for efficacious organizations that match their values. Both the naïve and cynical views of TNGOs fail to fully appreciate this reciprocity.

Transnational NGOs raise unrestricted funds from diverse sources and attempt to carve niches and educate donors as strategies for maintaining organizational autonomy. Some also have found

ways of capitalizing on their transnational organizational structures to the same effect. In the contemporary funding environment, donors place increasing value on supporting TNGOs based in the developing 'South' instead of the developed 'North.' Some leaders of US-based transnational NGOs explained how they were adapting their organizations to meet this new reality.

> Legally speaking we are a [nonprofit corporation], not a partnership, not an individual, so as an American based organization well we are not eligible for ECHO [European Commission Humanitarian Aid] money or EU money of any sort and probably even less from others, maybe Canada, maybe Australia, but not really. So we are going to, we are creating a sister agency in India that will be…an Indian Society, a nonprofit, that we will work very closely with, to be able to receive funds from…[non-] US sources (ID = 8).

Another respondent (ID = 132) inasmuch as confirmed this strategy, declaring: "that's one of the objectives of setting up these [kinds] of [independent] affiliates is that they can tap into funding as Central American organizations that we cannot tap into [as a] US-based organization." This particular strategy risks undermining the intent of donors since some US-based TNGOs seem to be effectively exploiting technical loopholes to access funding intended for Southern NGOs.

Additionally, some TNGOs join formal confederations that allow them to exploit the financial benefits of transnationalism. This structural strategy enables TNGOs to fundraise globally through other member organizations, transforming the restrictions that governmental donors

often place on funds from obstacles into assets. One respondent explained the strategy as follows (ID = 48):

> Different nations have different geographic areas of interest and so one of the strengths of being in a confederation is that, as a country director, if, for example, the US government isn't particularly interested in your country—but the Dutch could be interested or the Danes could be interested or the Brits could be interested—you can work with those particular national members to get some of the funding that's coming from those governments.

Transnational NGOs act strategically to mitigate and circumvent donor requirements and safeguard organizational autonomy. Donors also act strategically by imposing conditionalities on their contributions. These contrary propensities collide in negotiations between donors and TNGOs. Government agencies, activist donors and large foundations demand specific commitments from TNGOs as conditions for disbursement. Transnational NGO leaders admit that they occasionally adjust their programs to meet donor requirements, but assert that such accommodations occur squarely within the contexts of their missions. Transnational NGO leaders also persuade donors to adopt their own priorities and appear to be adept at leveraging large contracts to fund ongoing expenses while pursuing more desirable funding sources. Leaders can structure their organizations transnationally to exploit national preferences and technical loopholes and ultimately many can exercise their prerogative to walk away if they feel their missions are being threatened.

Neither the naïve nor cynical view of transnational activism appears to hold up very well empirically. Rather than favoring one over the other, data suggest that donors and TNGOs strategically influence one another in a reciprocal, ongoing process of negotiation that primarily influences the direction of projects, not missions. Overall, organizational autonomy does not appear to be an all or nothing proposition and evidence suggests that independence is a function of reputation, specialization, funding diversification and the proportion of unrestricted funds.

Transnational activism achieves a balance between the desire of TNGOs to raise money for programs and the occasional need to modify programs to conform to donor expectations. Whether the proverbial funding ‘cart’ drives the programming ‘horse’ seems less important than whether they are both headed in the same direction. As one leader said (ID = 138):

> The interesting thing is—this is the chicken and the egg—you have to have the vision and the program to get the funding. Money follows vision. It isn't, ‘I want to raise all of this money and then we'll go do this’ There's that fine line that you have to almost promise, ‘Yes, we will do this, and I'll go find the money.’ But you have to be very careful or you're going to get yourself out there on thin ice and then you don't find the money. I wish that I could say that there's a wonderful formula. I'm sure somebody has a wonderful formula. But it just sort of works out of my gut in this way.

And another leader said the following (ID = 30):

> It’s a combination of you trying to influence the funders to be interested in the things

> you're interested [in], but in the end, you also get interested in the things that the funders will fund. And it's…I think for every organization, there's a fine line of trying to hone to your values. I think there are plenty of things [DELETED] will not do even if given money to do…I could even give you examples of that but within your set of values and the general areas that you're interested in, do you skew a little one way or the other because that's where the funding is? Sure.

TNGO leaders constantly negotiate the operational priorities their own organizations identify with those their donors are willing to fund. Organizations face different types of funding challenges and tend to adapt pragmatically to their circumstances. For most TNGOs this means developing a funded activism model with the flexibility to accommodate a certain level of conflict between donor demands and organizational priorities. This involves a certain level of "compromise," as one leader termed it, with the commonplace caveat that the outcome be consistent with the organization's overarching mission (ID = 137):

> You often have to compromise because funding agencies—be they governments or individuals or foundations—have a particular point of view. The trick is to obviously never take money when you don't believe in their point of view, but…sometimes their point of view and yours overlap but not 100 percent. So how you balance what the donor wants to get out of it with what you want to get out of it takes a lot of time and effort and skill.

Collaborative style

The notion of TNGO autonomy can also be understood in relation to collaborative behavior, namely the extent to which TNGOs collaborate with powerful entities like states and corporations. Truly independent and autonomous TNGO challenge the status quo by confronting states and corporations, not partnering with them. If TNGOs restrict their collaborative behavior only to other NGOs, then TNGOs might be more accurately regarded as agents of an authentic grassroots global civil society than subservient state subcontractors. To discover how TNGO leaders understand organizational collaborations, I again analyze data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project.

Data

Transnational NGO leaders were asked a series of questions about their organizations' collaborative relationships. They were first asked about their collaborations with other NGOs and were then asked "Do you collaborate with other types of organizations or institutions? Why or why not?" Leaders may also have been prompted as to whether they collaborate with "NGOs, international organizations, governments or corporations." Accordingly, four substantive codes were developed to capture their open-ended responses: *NGOs*, *states*, *corporations* and *intergovernmental organizations*. Leaders responses are distributed across 141 valid cases.

Several latent class cluster models were estimated to explore leaders' collaborative styles. The results are presented in table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Models for collaborative style

	Model type	LL	L^2	L^2 p-value	ΔL^2	ΔL^2 p-value	$\%\Delta L^2$	Class. Error	BVRs
Model1	1-Cluster	-345.51	24.15	0.03	.	.	.	.	Fail
Model2	2-Cluster	-335.68	4.49	0.77	0.81	0.00	81	0.14	Pass
Model3	3-Cluster	-335.27	3.68	0.97	0.18	0.97	85	0.34	Pass

The null of homogenous or random response patterns is rejected since the L^2 p-value for Model1 is within the conventional limit. Model2 contains no local dependencies, provides adequate model fit, represents a statistically significant improvement over the null model and explains most of the association among the indicator variables. Model3 offers virtually no improvement over Model2, so Model2 is the preferred model. The latent class and conditional probabilities are presented in table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Results for Model2 (collaborative style)

		Cluster1	**Cluster2**
Prob.(Cluster)		0.63	0.37
	p-value		
Intergovernmental organizations	0.01	0.23	0.60
Corporations	0.00	0.38	0.76
States	0.00	0.29	0.92
NGOs	0.11	0.81	0.95

n = 141

About 63 percent of leaders vastly prefer to partner with other NGOs than with corporations, states or intergovernmental organizations. This collaborative style is labeled ‘protective’ because favoring partnerships with other NGOs likely serves to protect organizational autonomy.

The remaining 37 percent of leaders describe collaborative relationships not only with other NGOs, but also with states in almost equal likelihood, followed by corporations and intergovernmental organizations. This collaborative style is labeled ‘interdependent’ because leaders are more likely to partner with a wider range of actors, potentially engendering relationships of dependence that could threaten organizational autonomy.

Crosstabs between *collaborative style*, *coder ID* and *interviewer ID* did not present strong evidence of coder bias ($n = 141$, $chi2(4) = 8.18$, $p = 0.09$) or interviewer bias ($n = 141$, $chi2(6) = 5.65$, $p = 0.46$).

Cluster1: The protective collaborative style

This collaborative style (mean PMP = 0.90) describes TNGOs that actively refuse to partner with states and corporations as a matter of principle as well as organizations that are more passively selective. In one discussion typical of the protective collaborative style (ID = 9, PMP = 0.98), the respondent said that his or her organization would only partner with other NGOs:

> in a extremely minimal way. Never with governments. And corporations, again, extremely limited. Always stuff that can be really isolated…if you know, if 3M or GE or

> whomever said, “We’ve got a plan,” we would not touch it; we just would not touch it. We could be in an economic crisis and we would not touch it, just would not touch it.

However, most leaders do not harbor this strong distaste, but are nevertheless disinclined to partner with governments and corporations. One such leader (ID = 24, PMP = 0.98) said that “there are times when we have friendly conversations with, or conversations that are at least not unfriendly, or at least they're interested in listening to us with the, you know, government offices. It's not too often…” His or her organization is “not so much in partnership” with governments as merely in acquaintance with them. “And with corporations,” the respondent continued, “no. In fact at the [DELETED] we are not supposed to take money from any corporation or government…”

Other leaders are simply highly selective about the types of organizations with which they collaborate. For example, one leader (ID = 95, PMP = 0.93) admitted that “we work with a lot of corporations but we don't work with the U.N., don't work with the World Bank, don't work with USAID.” The respondent added that he or she does not have much faith in the ability of governments to address social problems, saying that “we have some very interesting thoughts about the role of government in, I mean, I do personally, on social services for the poor…I tend to be, I'm not sure governments are very effective.”

Still for other leaders other types of organizations are simply not as relevant to them as other NGOs. One such respondent’s organization (ID = 31, PMP = 0.99) collaborates with “labor

groups" and "HIV groups" but the respondent seems to be more focused on his or her interpersonal relationships with activists in other NGOs:

> we clearly collaborate a lot with feminist and women's rights organizations. Because the issues of sexuality have such crossover, and frankly there are a lot of lesbians in each community doing work, and so there is just this crossover in terms of just our colleagues, and our long-term colleagues, and some of us have been around if not doing work internationally, have been around and known people, known each other for a very long time.

The protective collaborative style favors partnerships with other NGOs, often to the deliberate exclusion of states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. Respondents vary in the intensity of their convictions that organizations other than NGOs should be avoided, but otherwise the style is straightforward.

Cluster2: The interdependent collaborative style

This collaborative style (mean PMP = 0.79) includes TNGOs that partner with both corporations and governments, as well as those that partner with corporations but not governments. Many organizations exhibiting this collaborative style work within the environmental, humanitarian relief and sustainable development sectors.

One environmental TNGO, for example, regularly collaborates with governments and partners with major corporations to certify their products (ID = 14, PMP = 0.92):

> We have substantial relationships with companies like [DELETED], and [DELETED], and [DELETED], and some of the larger [DELETED] companies, beyond just being certification clients, or whatever, we have our, at our gala every year, we recognize our corporate partners, they're part of the whole thing, the recognition thing. We call attention to some of those companies each year, so corporate, and then governments, I mean we have, you know, formal, like MOU's [memorandums of understanding] with, you know, ministries, government ministries in various countries, just as sort of, to work toward similar purposes in the environmental sector, or the tourism sector for example

A leader from another environmental TNGO (ID = 20, PMP = 0.69) candidly explained that his or her organization works “with governments, not for governments:”

> since it's anonymous, I will say this…my strategy is that we work with governments, not for governments. Working for governments is suicide in terms of your money, in terms of your project, in terms of them stealing everything from you…but that doesn't mean that we don't work with them. Purposely, we create a program where we don't have to ask for permission. We don't go and say, "Oh, we're going to be working in this country," because then they want to get more involved and get more of a little bita—that's a Spanish word for "little bite"—they want their part. We try to avoid that.

A leader from a humanitarian relief organization (ID = 45, PMP = 0.69) explained how his or her organization collaborates intimately with corporations, governments and NGOs. Adopting a corporate idiom, the respondent said:

> In the global humanitarian assistance program, we basically operate as an intermediary between the wealth and the capacity of pharmaceutical and medical equipment companies and resource starved communities. And we systematically cover those companies. We seek to establish a strategic connection to their corporate philanthropy and their corporate sustainability and responsibility programs to service their intermediaries for product donations…
>
> We work with local healthcare providers and intermediaries like the ministries of health and clinic operators to be our in-country partners and so our objective is to supply them and strengthen them…
>
> We have some places in which the government is an in-country partner, the Minister of Health…and to the extent that you're working in any of these countries, you at least have to have a relationship with the Ministry of Health. But, it would be relatively unusual for us to have a program partnership with the Ministry of Health…

The respondent also mentioned several "great partnerships" with prominent TNGOs. A leader from another humanitarian relief organization (ID = 60, PMP = 0.69) said that in addition to their

corporate partners, “we have partners that are governments,” but they are chosen very selectively:

> You either have to be a nonprofit NGO group to be a partner with us or a government. Now, it's not every government. Domestically we work with a lot of different governments, like an aging services department of a county or something like that. We do a lot of that kind of stuff to help them get product and supplies to help their groups, because they have very limited budgets, so we feel like that fits. Some governments and some countries we would never work with, because of the worry about it getting resold or used for something else is too great. So, we would rather find and NGO to work with, but we will work with governments.

A leader from a sustainable development TNGO (ID = 133, PMP = 0.92) described partnerships with NGOs, corporations and governments. For instance, their relationship with:

> “[CORPORATION 1] goes back to about 1990. And actually goes back to when it was [DELETED]. It's had several mergers. So we now have a very close relationship with them. And we have two [CORPORATION 1] executives on our board. We just got a fifty thousand dollar grant for our work in India from them. [CORPORATION 2] became a donor several years ago. There is a [CORPORATION 2] executive who is on our board as well. There are others, but those would be the two biggest.

They also “get funding from the…bilaterals and multilaterals” and “have a small grant from the World Band through [DELETED] to do a test pilot program in India.” Interestingly, the respondent claimed that “we don't work with governments,” but added “with one exception: [COUNTRY]. One of our local partners is the ministry of health. It just happened that way. They're able to deliver service at a high level.”

Overall, the interdependent collaborative style is more likely than the protective style to involve loose collaborations or formal partnerships with governments, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. Relationships with governments can take many forms, as one respondent remarked that his or her organization works with, but not for governments. Corporate partnerships are also varied, as some TNGOs receive donated goods from corporations while others certify corporate products. Collaborations with intergovernmental organizations typically place TNGOs in the role of funding recipient, although some leaders mentioned that they benefited from the research and other work of intergovernmental organizations including UN agencies.

Discussion

Theorization about the role of TNGOs in world affairs is often driven by purposive case studies of single sectors or individual organizations, and inconsistent generalizations are difficult to reconcile and contextualize. This is also true in debates over TNGO autonomy and independence from states. Compare, for instance, McCormick’s (1999, pp. 56, 53) favorable view of *environmental* TNGOs on the grounds that these organizations “function outside the rule-making

process" of governments and "contribute to the development of a global civil society" with Cooley and Ron's (2002, pp. 5, 36) disapproving assessment of *humanitarian aid* TNGOs in which they find widespread evidence of "subverted nominal agendas," "inhibit[ed] cooperation" and "dysfunctional results."

The TNGO data reveal a more nuanced picture. The interdependent collaborative style is most common among sustainable development, environmental and humanitarian relief organizations, based on classifications provided by Charity Navigator. The protective style is most common among conflict resolution and human rights organizations, as shown in table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Collaborative style by sector

		Sector				
		Environment	Human Rights	Humanitarian Relief	Sustainable Development	Conflict Resolution
Collaborative style	Protective	52% 11	81% 17	64% 18	51% 30	83% 10
	Interdependent	48% 10	19% 4	36% 10	49% 29	17% 2
	Percentage total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Count total	21	21	28	59	12

N = 141, chi2(4) = 9.37, p = 0.05

Benefits and obstacles to collaborations

Transnational NGO leaders were also asked about the benefits and obstacles to collaborations. Regarding the benefits, leaders were asked: "What kinds of benefits, if any, do you see resulting from networks and the formation of partnerships?" Ten substantive codes were developed to capture their open-ended responses: *better results* (for example, increased effectiveness, increased efficiency), *broader programs* (for example, can help more people, make a larger impact), *increased funding*, *better understanding*, (for example, better understanding of substantive issues), *local capabilities*, *learning*, *enhanced visibility*, *better access* (for example, registration, government requirements, accreditation, invitations to delegations, etc.), *legitimacy or credibility* (for example, with donors, policy makers and peers), and *legal*. The results are presented in figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: Benefits of collaborations



n = 129, error bars represent the 95% confidence interval

Overall, better results was the most frequently mentioned benefit of partnerships or collaborations, while about 40 percent of leaders mentioned increased funding. Leaders from TNGOs with an interdependent collaborative style were more likely to have mentioned increased funding as a benefit of collaboration (54 percent versus 34 percent, $n = 126$, $chi2(1) = 5.04$, $p = 0.03$).

Regarding obstacles to partnerships and collaborations, leaders were asked: "Are there obstacles or challenges that arise in the formation of partnerships and networks?" Seven substantive codes were developed to capture their open-ended responses: *incompatibility of missions* (for example, concerns about compatibility of missions or agendas), *muddled management* (for example, roles and responsibility, accountability, uncertainty about leadership, no partnership experience, 'too many cooks in the kitchen,' etc.), *reduction of resources* (for example, loss of resources to partners, less funding individually or for the field, etc.), *time* (for example, too time consuming in comparison to going at it alone), *organizational cultures* (for example, conflicts about how to manage the collaboration), *loss of control* (for example, too many concessions, concerns over intellectual capital/ownership of ideas, etc.), and *lack of confidence* (for example, concerns about reliability and trustworthiness). The results are shown in figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: Obstacles to Collaborations



n = 130, error bars represent the 95% confidence interval

Incompatibility of missions was the most commonly mentioned obstacle, which suggests that TNGO leaders are relatively concerned about safeguarding their missions and prefer to partner with likeminded organizations.

Conclusion

In sum, transnational NGOs are strategic in their own rights and appear to be highly protective of their overarching missions even though they may strategically adjust their programs in response to donor preferences. On balance, neither TNGOs nor donors appear to be clearly dominant and both parties seem to be engaged in a reciprocal relationship of mutual negotiation. Transnational NGOs with strong brand recognition, diversified funding sources and a high proportion of unrestricted funds can walk away from pushy donors rather than compromise their missions. When financial pressures become more intense, TNGOs can secure government or other large grants to serve as bridge funding. Finally, transnational organization gives TNGOs additional autonomy-preserving efficiencies since organizations can acquire funds internationally that may be unavailable domestically and can use Southern partners to secure resources ostensibly unavailable to Northern organizations.

The debate over the desirability and implications of TNGO autonomy is confounded by heterogeneity in TNGOs' organizational types and collaborative styles. Protective TNGOs are most likely to work in the conflict resolution and human rights sectors, where neutrality and distance from government, corporate and intergovernmental interests is presumably an asset. For these organizations, autonomy enhances organizational effectiveness by maintaining independence and neutrality. Interdependent TNGOs are most likely to work in the sustainable

development, environment and humanitarian relief sectors, where corporations, governments and intergovernmental organizations are major players whose complicity and support may be necessary for organizational effectiveness. These TNGOs may receive donated medical supplies from corporations to distribute to beneficiaries, while collaborating with ministries of health to streamline service delivery, for example. For such organizations, maintaining independence from important institutions may significantly hinder service delivery and ultimately prove counterproductive. The normative desirability of TNGO autonomy, in short, is contingent upon organizational type.

CHAPTER SIX: TAXONOMY

The possibility that different types of TNGOs serve different roles in the international system may be regarded by now as self-evident. Unfortunately, agreement is lacking as to the specification of any one taxonomy of TNGOs specifically relevant for international relations theorists. This chapter presents a taxonomical meta-analysis of criteria commonly used to differentiate among different types of TNGO. The result is a synthetic taxonomy of TNGOs.

Transnational NGOs are difficult to define and distinguish from other types of organizations using formal criteria. Many established taxonomies include TNGOs as a type of nongovernmental organization, international organization or nonprofit organization. Within these taxonomies, TNGOs are rarely a clearly distinguished subset. More commonly, TNGOs are placed into broad categories or are distributed across multiple subcategories. Moreover, the most established classificatory systems generally do not correspond with the classification criteria implicitly used by academics in international relations, which generally exclude lobbying organizations and interest groups, for example (Willetts, 2002).

Salamon and Anheier (1992) reviewed several taxonomies that have been adopted at the international level. The United Nations offers an International Standard Industrial Classification System (ISIC) that contains three categories that could be used to identify NGOs: organizations that are engaged in education, health and social work or other community, social and personal activities. The Eurostat General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) system goes further by distinguishing between research and development and recreation and cultural organizations within the ISIC's latter residual category.

The Union of International Associations (UIA) provides a comprehensive inventory of international organizations. The UIA's taxonomy includes 15 categories of organizations further classified into five main clusters, each of which is divided into intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. They counted 10,399 international nongovernmental organizations in 2002, although this category includes trade unions and trade associations, which might be considered lobbying groups, not TNGOs. Caution is warranted since UIA numbers can vary widely depending upon whether one refers to international organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations or various combinations or subsets ("Yearbook of International Associations: Statistics, visualizations and patterns," 2003/2004, p. 3).

Within the United States, the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) produces the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE), which offers several hundred detailed categories organized into 26 major groups (Lampkin, Romeo, & Finnin, 2001; Salamon & Anheier, 1992). The closest NTEE category to TNGOs is labeled "international, foreign affairs, and national security." The 2007 NCCS dataset contains 6,500 such entities filing IRS Forms 990, which are required for 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations with revenues greater than $25,000. Figure 6.1 shows that nearly half of all these international organizations were classified as either international development or international relief agencies. Note that some categories are missing labels in the NCCS codebook.

Figure 6.1: NTEE classification (international, foreign affairs and national security)



Filers are asked to apply up to three IRS activity codes to their organizations. However, almost half of organizations have nothing coded as their first activity, and still less data are available for secondary and tertiary activities. Among those reporting primary activities, the most common is qualified state-sponsored tuition (9 percent), followed by other related school activities (4 percent), gifts, grants or loans to other organizations (3 percent), discussion groups, forums, panels, lectures, etc. (3 percent), supplying money, goods or services to the poor (2 percent), 501(k) childcare (2 percent), cultural exchanges with foreign countries (2 percent), boy scouts, girl scouts, etc. (2 percent) and missionary activities (2 percent). Clearly, the NTEE system is designed for legal and tax purposes, not international relations theorization.

Researchers working with the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, after having intensively reviewed the most prominent classification systems, created the International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations (ICNPO) containing 12 major categories each with several detailed subcategories tailored to the nonprofit sector. This was propounded around 1992 and by 2006 had reportedly attracted some interest (Tice & Salamon, 2006). Other classificatory schemes include the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and AIRS/INFO LINE Taxonomy of Human Services, but neither of these is well suited for researching nonprofits (Lampkin et al., 2001). For these reasons, yet another system was created, the Nonprofit Program Classification system (NPC), to augment the NTEE system with a menu of 26 major categories and about 1,000 subcategories.

Current taxonomies generally do not contain categories that correspond well with what scholars commonly consider to be transnational NGOs. Instead, most established classification systems

have been created for arcane legal and tax purposes, such as for facilitating taxation, regulation or representation to international bodies. None of the current systems is capable of intuitively differentiating TNGOs by their goals, strategies and activities, which would be much more useful to scholars of international relations who often subdivide organizations by function or sector to promote theoretical clarity.

A few international relations scholars have attacked the classificatory problem directly. After an extensive review of attempts by numerous scholars and experts to produce general and specific taxonomies of NGOs, Vakil (1997) recommended that a general framework be adopted for developing a taxonomy in the future. The recommended framework involves identifying "essential" and "specific" criteria for sorting NGOs. Essential criteria could include orientation and level of operation, while specific descriptors could include sectoral foci and evaluative attributes. Orientation here refers to organizations' main area of activity, potentially "welfare, development, advocacy, development education networking and research" (Vakil, 1997, p. 2063). Sectoral foci might include the environment, healthcare or other substantive fields.

Vakil's distinction between activity and sector is more permeable for other taxonomists, however. For example, Spar and Dail (2002) identify ten types of NGOs: health services, infrastructural services, development assistance, education, commercial services, refugee assistance, basic needs, social development, environmental concerns and human rights. Spar and Dail's scheme apparently collapses Vakil's multiple criteria into a single categorical variable.

Naturally additional taxonomies are possible and can be created to suit specific purposes. Scholars differentiate organizations according to systemic location (Northern or Southern), scope (global or local), function (service or advocacy), sector or issue-area (environment, human rights, etc.), social purpose (solidarity or mutual benefit), form (formal or informal, network or federation, etc.) and so forth (DeMars, 2005; Kaldor, 2003). Many of these distinctions imply or operationalize particular theoretical perspectives. For instance, the North-South distinction is often employed in discussions of systemic power asymmetries between Northern and Southern organizations, while others use the service-advocacy distinction as proxy indication of whether NGOs partner with or challenge governments (e.g. DeMars, 2005).

Taxonomies of TNGOs are often created for tax and legal purposes, but they are also applied within particular research programs to explore certain theoretical relationships. The categories and distinctions employed by researchers determine what questions can be asked and what answers are possible. As heuristic devices, they structure empirical and theoretical inquiry and sustain distinct research programs emphasizing particular units of analysis and theoretical approaches.

Common taxonomic criteria

Scholars commonly recognize distinctions by sector, function, degree of autonomy, mode of influence and strategic repertoire (DeMars, 2005; Kaldor, 2003; Vakil, 1997). Organizational sector or issue-areas often include categories such as environment, human rights, humanitarian relief, sustainable development and conflict resolution. The functional classification generally

includes service delivery-advocacy or equivalently, operational-campaigning organizations (Willetts, 2002). This functional distinction can have important theoretical implications for theories of NGOs and world politics. For example, Lecy et al. (2010) caution that service and advocacy organizations exhibit different characteristics which impose scope conditions for grafting theories of the firm or collective action onto NGOs. Moreover, DeMars (2005) asserts that service NGOs tend to cooperate with states whereas advocacy NGOs are more confrontational. Incidentally, an independence test between *collaborative style* and *function* reveals that although there is a small effect along these lines it is not statistically significant ($n = 141$, $chi2(2) = 0.72$, $p = 0.70$).

Scholars discuss the primary mode of TNGO influence in world affairs, with most affirming that TNGOs wield some form of ideational, cultural, normative or discursive power, as distinctly opposed to material or coercive influence (Boli & Thomas, 1999a; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 2006; Struett, 2008). Many analyze the strategic repertories of TNGOs, generally focusing on ideational rather than material tactics (Hafner-Burton, 2008; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ron et al., 2007; Sell & Prakash, 2004). Finally, at the broadest level scholars study the overall significance of TNGOs to world affairs, debating the extent to which they empower grassroots civil society to challenge the status quo or simply alleviate failures of the international system (DeMars, 2005; Jaeger, 2007; Josselin & Wallace, 2001a; Warkentin, 2001).

As such, classifications of TNGOs according to sector, function, autonomy, mode of influence and strategy appear to be among the most useful and relevant to international relations theorists seeking to understand the role of TNGOs in world affairs. These classificatory criteria speak to

the principal theoretical differences between TNGOs that appear to have the most significant implications for many research programs pertaining to transnational activism across various subfields.

The following section addresses the problem of TNGO taxonomy empirically by analyzing information about leaders' organizations derived from both primary interview data and secondary sources. While any empirical inquiry necessarily rests upon prior theory and categorization, great pains have been taken to substitute inductive learning for deductive categorization. This is reflected in the largely inductive development of the protocol questions and codebook categories of the Transnational NGO Interview Project. Additionally, I favor exploratory over confirmatory statistical analysis. Finally, by incorporating a large number of classificatory criteria into a meta-analysis, coverage of the conceptual space is relatively thorough and the effect of any one factor is unlikely to dominate the results.

Taxonomy

Taxonomical analysis is based on variables representing the five key criteria mentioned above: sector, function, autonomy, mode of influence and strategy. The variable *sector* was obtained from Charity Navigator while the variable *function* was obtained from information found on organizations' websites and annual reports. Variables derived from the interviews include mission *DFactor1* (strategy), mission *DFactor2* (mode), activities *DFactor1* (strategy) and *collaborative style*. Activities *DFactor2* (scope) is excluded because it likely reflects coder bias. Incidentally, the biased factor does not contribute significantly to model fit.[16]

Two variables are included to describe the missions and activities of TNGOs. Mission *DFactor1* (strategy) indicates whether TNGO leaders direct their organizations according to an ideology of amelioration or empowerment. Activities *DFactor1* (strategy) indicates whether leaders believe their organizations are actually engaged in ameliorative or empowering activities.

Much is written about the ideational nature of transnational activism and the central role of information politics. Mission *DFactor2* (mode) indicates whether leaders' organizations employ more materialistic or ideational modes of influence.

Finally, *collaborative style* indicates whether leaders' organizations are protective or interdependent in terms of their propensities to collaborate with entities other than NGOs, such as governments and corporations. The latent variable *collaborative style* may be roughly interpreted as a proxy for organizational autonomy.

Several latent class models have been estimated, as indicated in table 6.1. The null of homogenous or randomly distributed attribute profiles is rejected since the L^2 p-value for the Model1 is well within the conventional limit. Model2 is similarly rejected since it also fails to account for the observed association in the data and contains local dependencies. Model3 provides adequate model fit. Increasing the number of latent classes from three to four provides an ambiguous improvement in model fit since the associated ΔL^2 p-value only barely transgresses the traditional threshold ($p = 0.054$). In the interest of parsimony, Model3 is preferred.

Table 6.1: Models for TNGO taxonomy

	Model type	LL	L^2	L^2 p-value	ΔL^2	ΔL^2 p-value	$\%\Delta L^2$	Class. error	BVRs
Model1	1-Cluster	-527.94	262.01	0.00	.	.	.	.	Fail
Model2	2-Cluster	-474.80	155.73	0.03	0.41	0.00	41	0.03	Fail
Model3	3-Cluster	-458.69	123.51	0.16	0.21	0.00	53	0.03	Pass
Model4	4-Cluster	-448.14	102.42	0.29	0.17	0.05	61	0.02	Pass

To ensure the solution represented by Model3 is robust and does not simply reproduce the sectoral classification, another model was estimated with *sector* specified as an inactive covariate, as discussed in chapter three. This analysis yielded an interpretively identical solution, strongly indicating that the results are robust to indicator choice.[17] The latent class and conditional probabilities for Model3 are presented in table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Results for Model3 (TNGO Taxonomy)

	p-value		Cluster1	Cluster2	Cluster3
Prob.(Cluster)			0.67	0.26	0.08
Sector	0.00	Environment	0.17	0.00	0.72
		Human Rights	0.03	0.58	0.13
		Humanitarian Relief	0.26	0.03	0.01
		Sustainable Development	0.54	0.06	0.02
		Conflict Resolution	0.00	0.33	0.12
Function	0.00	Advocacy	0.05	0.61	0.86
		Service	0.60	0.03	0.13
		Both	0.36	0.35	0.02
Mission: Strategy (DFactor1)	0.00	Amelioration	0.85	0.16	0.51
		Empowerment	0.15	0.84	0.49
Mission: Mode (DFactor2)	0.00	Material	0.90	0.89	0.04
		Ideational	0.10	0.11	0.96
Activities: Strategy (DFactor1)	0.00	Amelioration	0.87	0.45	0.04
		Empowerment	0.13	0.55	0.96
Collaborative Style	0.00	Protective	0.53	0.84	0.17
		Interdependent	0.47	0.16	0.83

n = 106

Cluster1: Charitable relief and development TNGOs

The emergent taxonomy reveals that there are three types of TNGO. About two-thirds of TNGOs are charitable development and relief organizations. This type of TNGO is most likely to be classified as sustainable development and to be regarded as a service organization. Its strategies and activities are overwhelmingly ameliorative (rather than empowering) and its mode of influence is unequivocally materialistic (rather than ideational). Finally, charitable development and relief organizations are more likely than not to partner with powerful actors like governments and corporations. Based on average expenditure data for sampled organizations over the period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about 85 percent of US TNGO resources.

Cluster2: Human rights activism TNGOs

About a quarter of organizations are human rights activism TNGOs. They are most likely to be classified as human rights organizations and are more likely than not to be regarded as advocacy TNGOs. Leaders from this type of TNGO describe missions emphasizing empowerment, but when it comes to their organizations' actual activities this emphasis is much less pronounced. Interestingly, human rights activists appear to eschew ideational tactics like information politics. However, they are the most fiercely protective type of TNGO, avoiding partnerships with powerful entities that could compromise autonomy. Based on average expenditure data for the period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about 14 percent of US TNGO resources.

Cluster3: Environmental advocacy organizations

Finally, only about eight percent of TNGOs are environmental advocacy organizations. This type of TNGO is most likely to be classified as environmental and engaged in advocacy. Leaders of these organizations describe their missions in terms of amelioration and empowerment almost evenly, but their organizations' actual activities are summarily empowering. This is the only type of organization that is overwhelming likely to employ ideational tactics like information politics. However, environmental advocacy TNGOs are also the most interdependent organizations as they are very likely to collaborate with partners like states and corporations in ways that could erode autonomy. Based on average expenditure data for the period 2001 to 2006, this type of TNGO controls about one percent of US TNGO resources.

Discussion

Scholars of transnational activism often identify Amnesty International and Greenpeace as quintessential or exemplary TNGOs (DeMars, 2005; Halliday, 2001; Wapner, 1995; Warkentin, 2001). As human rights and environmental advocates, respectively, these organizations are regarded as exemplifying the research-oriented information politics and occasionally contentious activism thought typical of TNGOs generally. But these so-called exemplary or quintessential TNGOs are neither representative of US TNGOs nor even of their own categories. As a human rights activism organization, Amnesty International is renowned for its research and documentation (Hopgood, 2006). But such tactics are empirically uncharacteristic of human rights activism organizations, which are unlikely to employ ideational tactics. Greenpeace, as an environmental advocacy organization, is also highly atypical. Greenpeace is most famous for its

contentious politics that publicly challenge states and corporations, not its collaborations with them, as is typical among environmental advocacy TNGOs. Even as a composite category, human rights and environmental organizations together only account for about one-third of US TNGOs, which together control only about 15 percent of total US TNGO resources. These types of organizations are unrepresentative of their categories and far less common and less resourceful than charitable development and relief organizations. So-called exemplary transnational actors like Amnesty International and Greenpeace are outliers.

This taxonomical result largely comports with that derived by Boli and Thomas (1999a), who organized 5,983 TNGOs into 13 sectors using comprehensive UIA data. They concluded that about 60 percent of organizations (a percentage they estimated was increasing) "concentrate on economic or technical rationalization," not contentious human rights activism or environmental advocacy. Only about 14 percent were "individual rights/welfare" or "world-polity oriented," by contrast, categories which include "many of the most prominent [T]NGOs, especially environment and human rights organizations" specifically including Amnesty International and Greenpeace (Boli & Thomas, 1999a, pp. 41-45).

Comprehensive 2007 NCCS data for 6,500 international nonprofits filing Forms 990 in the United States show 1,642 "international relief" organizations and 1,590 "international development" organizations relative to only 57 "alliances and advocacy" organizations (see figure 6.1). Relief and development TNGOs dominate the US TNGO sector, while advocacy organizations, though commonly the focus of TNGO scholarship, are rare.

This implies that international relations scholarship focuses disproportionately on the least common and least resourceful types of TNGO: human rights activism (e.g. Berkovitch & Gordon, 2008; Hafner-Burton, 2008; Hagel & Peretz, 2005; P. Nelson & Dorsey, 2007; Richard Price, 1998; Ron et al., 2007; True & Mintrom, 2001) and environmental advocacy (e.g. McCormick, 1999; Raustiala, 1997; Rohrschneider & Dalton, 2002; Wapner, 1995, 1996). Accounting for this phenomenon (although employing a slightly different taxonomy), Boli and Thomas (1999a, p. 46) noted:

> oppositional or emergency-catalyzed activity of human rights, environmental, and relief organizations makes them especially prominent in the world polity, while the more central rationalizing sectors are much less well known…[the latter's] highly rationalized universalism (especially in scientific and technical areas) is considered "neutral" and therefore unremarkable, despite the enormous effects they have on definitions of reality, infrastructure, household products, school texts, and much more.

In other words, even though charitable development and relief organizations are the most numerous and resourceful TNGOs in world affairs, they are the least visible and presumably the least studied because their work is perceived as less interesting. However, their relative invisibility does not imply their relative unimportance. To the contrary, sociological institutionalists such as Boli (1999) assert that the rational-voluntaristic form of authority common to relief and development TNGOs is manifestly powerful. Similarly, critical scholars such as Jaeger (2007) consider their managerialism a key vehicle of neoliberal power in world politics.

Conclusion

Since TNGOs are a heterogeneous class, scholars often employ taxonomies of TNGOs and focus on specific subsets of organizations. While this is useful for promoting theoretical clarity, differences in classificatory criteria combined with an abundance of intra-category studies that lack an explicit treatment of context and proportion hinder theorization about the roles of TNGOs in world affairs. Moreover, a disproportionate emphasis on highly visible and uncommonly interesting organizations (for example, organizations purposively selected for their role in successful campaigns) apparently leads scholars to incorrectly identify organizations like Amnesty International and Greenpeace as exemplary or quintessential TNGOs. However, taxonomical analysis suggests that these organizations are highly uncharacteristic of both TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are commonly thought to typify.

Broadly, international relations research seems to focus disproportionately on human rights activism and environmental advocacy TNGOs. While few scholars of transnational activism would deny the significance of these organizations, combined they probably compose less than a third of all US TNGOs and control as little as 14 percent of all US TNGO resources. These findings are consistent with data on global TNGOs as well (Boli & Thomas, 1999b).

Much more significant are the charitable development and relief organizations that dominate the US TNGO sector in both numbers and resources. However, their ameliorative orientation and material mode of influence are not as well understood by international relations theorists in comparison to the voluminous studies examining TNGOs involved in contentious advocacy.

Theories of transnational politics based on extrapolations from the experiences of highly unrepresentative and uncommon organizations are likely to mischaracterize the true significance of TNGOs to world politics. More research is needed to better understand the role of charitable development and relief TNGOs.

CHAPTER SEVEN: ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

How to define a TNGO's organizational effectiveness is among the most important but also most difficult challenges of the nonprofit sector. Transnational NGO leaders struggle to demonstrate their effectiveness in order to obtain resources and maintain accountability.

Over the last half century, scholars have proposed various definitions or 'models' of organizational effectiveness. Much of this research is based on conceptual analyses and stakeholder surveys. Largely absent from this rich academic literature, however, are systematic efforts to directly understand how TNGOs define effectiveness empirically. Thus, this chapter addresses a simple research question: how do leaders of TNGOs in the United States—as an important subset of US nonprofits—define organizational effectiveness?

Background

Within the academic literature on nonprofit management, scholars have proposed various models of organizational effectiveness. One model, generally known as the goal attainment model of effectiveness, has served as a conceptual anchor in organizational effectiveness scholarship (Campbell, 1977; Etzioni, 1964; J. L. Price, 1972; Sheehan Jr, 1996; Spar & Dail, 2002). Herman and Renz (1997, 1998, 2004, 2008) have consistently characterized the research program as mostly working out alternatives to, or modifications of, the goal attainment model. But many scholars argue that this model, which simply posits that organizations are effective to the extent to which they achieve their goals, is untenable. For example, goals necessarily reflect values and priorities and are therefore not objective (Mohr, 1982). Goals are identified through

processes of negotiation within organizations and are therefore political (Murray & Tassie, 1994). Goals are too difficult to concretely specify, precluding measurement (Fowler, 1996; Herman & Renz, 1999; Mohr, 1982; Murray & Tassie, 1994; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). Even if meaningful measurement was possible within an organization, differences in goal specification would invalidate comparisons between organizations (Mohr, 1982). Finally, even if all these difficulties could be surmounted, it is often too difficult, if not impossible, to satisfactorily address the fundamental problem of causal attribution (Herman & Renz, 1999; Mohr, 1982; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001).

In light of the many difficulties with the goal attainment model of effectiveness, scholars have proposed a variety of alternatives. Etzioni (1960) proposed effectiveness be defined in terms of well-functioning bureaucratic systems; Katz and Kahn (1966) proposed it be a ratio of an organization's inputs to its outputs; Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), borrowing from ecological theory, proposed it be a nonprofit's ability to exploit its environment through fundraising; Price (1986) equated organizational effectiveness with a nonprofit's financial viability; and more recently, Herman and Renz (1997, p. 188) have proposed effectiveness be understood as "a set of judgments by various stakeholders" rather than "a real property" of organizations. Scholarship in this most recent vein has generally sought to identify the implicit criteria stakeholders employ when judging the effectiveness of specific organizations, as distinct from identifying how nonprofits define effectiveness per se (Herman & Renz, 1997; Packard, 2010; Shilbury & Moore, 2006; Tassie, Murray, & Cutt, 1998).

Forbes (1998) reviewed the literature on nonprofit effectiveness from 1977 to 1997 and concluded that treatments of the topic initially attempted to *evaluate* organizational effectiveness, then to *identify correlates* of effectiveness and finally to focus on *processes*. However, this impressive body of academic research has generally not focused on *how nonprofits define* organizational effectiveness.

More recently, Herman and Renz (2008) aptly summarized the state of the art of organizational effectiveness research in "nine theses." Among their theses, they conclude that organizational effectiveness is always comparative, multidimensional and socially constructed, and offer "stakeholder responsiveness" as "a useful organizational-level effectiveness measure" (Herman & Renz, 2008, p. 399). They note that a "measure that leaves to the respondent just what criteria are to be used might offer a way [of] recognizing the social construction of effectiveness but still allow for aggregating stakeholders' judgments of effectiveness" (Herman & Renz, 2008, p. 405).

Such conclusions have encouraged scholars to consider increasingly complex perceptual, multiple stakeholder and multidimensional models, often emphasizing stakeholder perceptions and judgments (Herman & Renz, 1997; Lecy, Schmitz, & Swedlund, 2010; Packard, 2010; Shilbury & Moore, 2006; Sowa, Selden, & Sandfort, 2004; Tassie et al., 1998). Meanwhile, the practical challenge of measuring organizational effectiveness persists. Nonprofit rating and designation agencies have emerged in the United States offering evaluations of nonprofit effectiveness and efficiency based primarily or exclusively on financial data. Such assessments take neither stakeholders' perceptions nor organizations' programmatic achievements into account, and although these ratings are widely consulted, they are also considered to be deeply

flawed (Hager, Pollak, Wing, & Rooney, 2004a, 2004b; Hager, Pollak, Wing, Rooney, & Flack, 2004; Lowell, Trelstad, & Meehan, 2005; Ogden et al., 2009). Although scholars have even recommended the construct be dropped (Kahn, 1977), the quest for a workable definition of organizational effectiveness is simply too important to abandon. Despite the "conceptual disarray and contradictions of organizational effectiveness…," Murray and Tassie (1994, p. 322) remind us, "managers still must manage, and various stakeholders still make judgments…" Much hangs in the balance, but without a workable definition of what it means for a nonprofit to be effective the problem of appropriately evaluating organizational effectiveness must remain.

A good place to look for a workable definition of organizational effectiveness is within nonprofit organizations themselves. The following sections describe how leaders of TNGOs in the United States understand the construct of organizational effectiveness.

The following section describes the data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project. The section after that introduces the results of an exploratory latent class analysis of leaders' open-ended responses to an interview question asking them to define organizational effectiveness. This analysis discovers that leaders tended to define organizational effectiveness in one of two distinct ways. The two sections after that correspondingly provide structured qualitative analyses of these two definitions of effectiveness. In the final two sections I offer some further discussion and concluding remarks.

Data

Among several questions in the interview protocol related to organizational effectiveness, interviewers asked leaders: “Let me ask you about the concept of effectiveness, which is something we all have trouble defining. How does your organization define effectiveness?” Nine substantive codes were developed to capture leaders’ open-ended responses to this question. These codes were designed to conform to the interview data and were not created to test for the presence of any preexisting theories or models of effectiveness. The nine codes, which were organized into a single code family, are *resources* (for example, material resources such as money), *flexibility* (for example, nimbleness and adaptability), *innovation* (for example, innovative thinking), *expertise* (for example, expertise in an issue area or established credibility), *contacts* (for example, making contacts for networking and collaboration), *staff or associate competencies* (for example, a well-trained staff), *stakeholder satisfaction* (for example, donors, members and other constituents), *goal achievement* (for example, achievement of own goals, loyalty to own mission and meeting of own standards) and *evaluation* (for example, project evaluations, evaluations for donors, global assessments and certifications). Leaders’ responses are distributed across 150 valid cases.

The nine codes may be alternatively regarded as nine binary response variables. Because these variables are not mutually exclusive, mathematically there are 2^9 possible response patterns corresponding to 512 different ways in which leaders could have defined organizational effectiveness. Since a typical human analyst can only consider about seven patterns simultaneously, quantification and cluster analysis must be employed to facilitate exploratory analysis (Grimmer & King, 2009). In the following section, I use latent class analysis to determine the number of ways in which leaders understand organizational effectiveness

empirically. In the two sections after that, I use structured information retrieval to help interpret leaders' response patterns.

Latent class analysis

Four exploratory latent class models have been estimated, each including all of the nine response variables listed above. The models differ only according to the number of categories of the posited latent variable. Model1, Model2, Model3 and Model4 test the hypotheses that there are one, two, three, and four definitions of organizational effectiveness present in the data, respectively. The models are summarized in table 7.1.

Table 7.1: Models for organizational effectiveness

	Model type	LL	L^2	L^2 p-value	ΔL^2	ΔL^2 p-value	$\%\Delta L^2$	Class. Error	BVRs
Model1	1-Cluster	-596.63	153.62	0.07	.	.	.	.	Fail
Model2	2-Cluster	-586.70	133.75	0.14	13%	0.12	13	0.12	Fail
Model3	3-Cluster	-575.53	111.41	0.31	17%	0.02	27	0.09	Pass
Model4	4-Cluster	-571.63	103.62	0.20	7%	0.90	33	0.14	Pass

The retention of all nine response variables regardless of statistical significance complicates formal hypothesis testing. The null hypothesis that all leaders think alike is initially accepted according to the usual rule since the L^2 bootstrap p-value for the baseline model, Model1, 0.07 > 0.05. However, significant unexplained association nevertheless exists among four pairs of response variables (see appendix), suggesting that the L^2 statistic is simply diluted by the inclusion of many variables that fail to significantly discriminate between the clusters.[18]

Model2 does not provide a significant improvement in model fit over Model1 according to the ΔL^2 bootstrap p-value and contains three local dependencies, again violating the local independence assumption required of latent class analysis (see appendix). This means that Model2 fails to explain significant association among the response variables and is therefore unacceptable. Model3 provides a significant improvement in model fit over Model2 and contains no local dependencies (see appendix), meaning that Model3 successfully explains the observed association among the response variables. According to the ΔL^2 bootstrap p-value Model4 does not significantly improve upon Model3, indicating that Model3 is the preferred model.

Each leader is subsequently classified into the latent class to which he or she most likely belongs based on his or her PMPs, a procedure known as modal assignment (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). Each leader's PMPs are determined by his or her response pattern and Model3's parameter estimates. The classification errors introduced by modal assignment are displayed for each model in table 7.1. Model3 has the lowest classification error.

An important consideration when analyzing data of this nature is whether the three ways of defining effectiveness are truly the result of respondents' conceptualizations or merely artifacts of coder bias or interviewer baiting. A chi-squared test for independence performed between Model3's assignment solution and the variable *interviewer identification* indicates no evidence of interviewer bias (n = 150, chi2(12) = 13.63, p = 0.33), but a similar test with the variable *coder identification* implies the presence of coder bias (n = 150, chi2(8) = 28.38, p = 0.00). This coder bias is illustrated in figure 1, which indicates Coder 4's divergent propensities relative to the other coders.[19] Coder 4 is entirely responsible for the existence of the third latent class and a chi-squared decomposition reveals that coder 4 accounts for an overwhelming 81 percent of the statistic's magnitude.[20]

Figure 7.1: Coder bias



Conveniently, the 3-class solution perfectly identifies the small outlier group generated by coder 4, isolating the bias. Removing the four outliers introduced by coder 4 has a negligible effect on sample size and results in a statistically significant reduction in coder bias as measured by the difference in chi-squared statistics [n = 150, (chi2(8) = 28.38) – (chi2(4) = 9.75) = (chi2(4) = 18.63, p = 0.00)].[21] As an artifact of coder bias, the third latent class will be ignored.[22] To test for the robustness of this strategy, a 2-class model was estimated with the outliers deleted ex ante and the assignment solution was compared against that of Model3 with the outliers deleted ex post. The assignments are identical, indicating that outlier deletion has no effect on the composition of the two main latent classes. For convenience of exposition, the original solution from Model3 is preserved.

The key quantities of LCA are the latent class and conditional probabilities (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; McCutcheon, 1987). The latent class probabilities provide estimates of the size of each class and the conditional probabilities describe the profiles of each class. These quantities for Model3 are indicated in table 7.2.[23] The profile for Cluster1 describes about 82 percent of respondents while the profile for Cluster2 describes about 15 percent of respondents. The other values in the columns labeled Cluster1 and Cluster2 are the probabilities that respondents in those clusters mentioned the corresponding items during the interviews, given their latent class assignments.[24] As can be seen in table 7.2, the definition of effectiveness indicated by the profile for Cluster1 involves *goal achievement* and *evaluation*, while the definition indicated by the profile for Cluster2 emphasizes *resources*, and to a lesser extent, *evaluation*.

Table 7.2: Results for Model3 (organizational effectiveness)

		Cluster1	Cluster2	Cluster3
Prob.(Cluster)		0.82	0.15	0.03
	p-value			
Goal achievement	0.08	0.68	0.29	0.94
Evaluation	0.34	0.56	0.67	0.96
Resources	0.01	0.25	0.97	0.70
Stakeholder satisfaction	0.28	0.23	0.18	0.70
Contacts	0.02	0.18	0.01	0.92
Staff or associates	0.01	0.09	0.04	0.66
Expertise	0.03	0.04	0.19	0.45
Flexibility	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.44
Innovation	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.44

n = 150

While latent class analysis is very useful for discovering latent structure in data, quantitative results alone are seldom adequate for interpretation. How do we interpret the definitions of organizational effectiveness implied by the profiles for Cluster1 and Cluster2 in table 7.2?

In the next two sections, I have retrieved leaders' actual statements about organizational effectiveness from the interview transcripts separately for those assigned to Cluster1 and to Cluster2. To discipline analysis and mitigate the risk of misinterpreting atypical evidence as typical, I interpret each definition of organizational effectiveness based on exemplary qualitative evidence. The exemplarity of a leader's statements about organizational effectiveness is defined as the probability that the leader belongs to the cluster to which he or she was assigned. This probability is the leader's PMP for the modal assignment. A PMP close to zero indicates that a leader's statements are not likely to provide good qualitative evidence to facilitation interpretation, while PMP close to one indicates that a leader's statements are very likely to provide good qualitative evidence to aid interpretation. Leader's statements about organizational effectiveness have been interpreted within the contexts of their complete interview transcripts, which are organized in the CAQDAS for efficient querying. Interview dates for quotations are provided in the appendix.

Cluster1: Organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability

The most prevalent way leaders think about organizational effectiveness is indicated by the profile for Cluster1 in table 7.2 and may be labeled outcome accountability (Kearns, 1996). The strongest theme underlying this conceptualization (mean PMP = 0.94) is the notion that

effectiveness involves achieving measurable progress toward specific outcomes. “Well I mean ah, for us to be effective,” one such leader noted (ID = 34, PMP = 1.00), “is to achieve the programmatic or strategic goals that we’ve identified.” Another phrased it slightly differently (ID = 7, PMP = 0.99). “We define it as whether or not we are sort of getting the tasks achieved that we set for ourselves.” And another put it even more simply (ID = 22, PMP = 0.94). “We set important goals and, and we achieve them.” Whatever phrasing they chose, most leaders seem to agree that effectiveness involves goal attainment.

Another common theme is that of promise-keeping. Leaders routinely promise donors to use their resources to achieve specific outcomes, such as is commonly exemplified in formal contracts. One leader who conceptualized effectiveness in this way argued that “if we’ve done the work that we’ve said we would do, that’s...that should be one level of effectiveness” (ID = 147, PMP = 0.73). Other respondents characterized effectiveness more mission-centrically. “I mean, to me,” the leader asserted (ID = 136, PMP = 1.00), “it’s when you are doing what you’re saying you’re doing, that you’re serving your mission...and that you’re able to show that you’re serving your mission…” To be effective involves not only goal attainment, but demonstrable goal attainment.

Another widespread theme involves the use of detailed frameworks and timelines for outcome evaluation (Poole, Davis, Reisman, & Nelson, 2001). A typical leader responded to the question about effectiveness by first emphasizing the goal attainment and promise-keeping aspects of organizational effectiveness, then describing sometimes very elaborate evaluation frameworks and providing examples of recent program evaluations. Leaders frequently discussed mixed-

methods and multiple indicators and defined broad evaluative frameworks encompassing both outputs and outcomes. One leader said as follows (ID = 115, PMP = 1.00):

> Well, very simply we set out in the logical frameworks, where our goals and objectives are, and then through our [monitoring and evaluation], in monitoring those goals that we've set out, and objectives, we measure outputs and outcomes and we, I mean it's easy to measure the outputs, and that's one measurement of effectiveness, but the outcome is of course in the goals and objectives we've set out.

The precise delimitation of the output-outcome distinction is not always crystal clear, but respondents are generally adept at distinguishing between notions like inputs and outputs on the one hand, and outcomes and impacts on the other—consistent with the well-known logical framework approach (Rosenberg & Posner, 1979). This despite inherent measurement challenges. Another leader said as follows (ID = 112, PMP = 0.73).

> On the education part, that’s the part that’s hard, that’s the part I talked about just a little while ago, and you can’t just measure…you can just measure how many people show up for a lecture, but that’s not going to do it. That’ll give you your output; it won’t give you your impact. And so we’re struggling right now to make sure that all of our measuring and evaluation instruments look at…what are the three? There’s output, impact—I guess result, output and impact.

Generally, leaders at least implicitly acknowledge potential disconnections in the causal chain between upstream output indicators and downstream outcome and impact indicators. They distinguish between inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts. Inputs involve the resources necessary for producing goods and services, such as money. Outputs generally refer to the goods and services organizations provide, whereas outcomes are the presumed effects of these services on beneficiaries. Finally, impacts are effects that are causally attributable to an organization's activities (White, 2009). As might be expected, outputs are often associated with short-term objectives, while outcomes are associated with longer-term goals, again consistent with a logical framework approach (Thomas, 1994).

Although leaders affirm the primacy of achieving meaningful results, their organizations do not necessarily take the additional steps to systematically evaluate outcomes and impacts (Berger, 2009; Poole et al., 2001; Sawhill & Williamson, 2001; Sheehan Jr, 1996). Many organizations are held accountable for inputs, such as functional expenses, and outputs, such as quantities delivered, but not necessarily outcomes or impacts. One leader remarked that (ID = 125, PMP = 1.00):

> …there has been a tendency in the organization in the past and there's tendency for a lot of organizations just to measure outputs. I am opposed, personally, to measuring output because I think you have to measure outcomes, and so we don't count—I've already told you that we don't pay attention to the fact that we did 50 missions in a year or that we saw 10,000 patients. What we're all about is changing behaviors, changing capabilities…

Measuring goal attainment on an ongoing basis usually involves complex systems. Leaders expound “matrix” (ID = 17, PMP = 1.00) systems and assess progress quarterly, annually and even according to “five-year plans” (ID = 98, PMP = 0.98). “Well we have a strategic plan,” a respondent (ID = 98, PMP = 0.98) said, “we have certain goals that evolve annually, and we, at least quarterly, we measure what is happening against what our goals for the year are, our five-year plan.” Another leader’s account illustrates a concern about the practical difficulty of operationalizing abstract outcome variables with proxy measures (ID = 36, PMP = 0.81):

> Yeah, so effectiveness for us is, is really seeing concrete positive change on the ground for the displaced people that we’re concerned about. So you know, that’s really the only measure. Ultimately, I mean, there are many; you try to make those changes through a variety of means. So yeah for example getting, you know, an op-ed article in a newspaper or getting an important meeting or you know, having someone publicly acknowledge the importance of a report that we’ve put out. But unless you see actual change, you know, unless the recommendations are adopted and you see actual change for…among the people that we’re concerned about, you know, those other things don’t really add up to very much.

Moreover, just as leaders differentiate between outputs and outcomes, they also distinguish between short-term, intermediate and long-term goals in a variety of ways. For example, one leader said as follows (ID = 143, PMP = 0.99):

> The way we broke it down is that we have goals, and then we have objectives, and then we have performance indicators. And my expectation of my staff is that they are attempting to determine whether we are hitting our performance indicators, which are leading to our objectives, which, long term, will lead to our goals. Or whether we need to constantly reevaluate and determine whether or not we're aiming for the right things, whether we have the right performance indicators, whether we have the right objectives, and ultimately, whether we have the right goals.

Leaders also differentiate between long-term abstract missions and short-term programmatic goals. When pressed, respondents often discussed effectiveness at the programmatic level rather than the more abstract level of their organizational missions. Outcome accountability involves the demonstrable achievement of measurable goals, not necessarily the complete fulfillment of overarching missions. As Sawhill and Williamson (2001, p. 380) found, nonprofits need "specific, actionable, and, most critical, *measurable* goals to bridge the gap between their lofty missions and their near-term operating objectives." While some scholars criticize the conceptualization of organizational level effectiveness as a function of program effectiveness (for example, Herman & Renz, 2008), many nonprofit leaders appear to make precisely this connection.

In sum, outcome accountability involves goal attainment, promise-keeping, complex intertemporal evaluation frameworks and multiple levels of analysis. Many leaders adhere to a logical framework approach, whether explicitly or implicitly. Leaders subscribing to this general view believe that effectiveness means being accountable for achieving their promised outcomes.

Cluster2: Organizational effectiveness as overhead minimization

The second latent class is indicated by the profile for cluster2 in table 7.2 and may be labeled overhead minimization (mean PMP = 0.72). This conceptualization involves themes that include financial efficiency, cost minimization, functional expense ratios and accounting. One leader described organizational effectiveness as whether programs achieve "bang for the buck," emphasizing financial efficiency (ID = 144, PMP = 1.00). Another respondent from a traditional service delivery organization explained that his or her "way of thinking about a nonprofit is that you want to at least strive to do what you do for less until you can do it for free" (ID = 103, PMP = 0.90). Organizational effectiveness, in other words, is cost minimization.

A particularly succinct definition of effectiveness as overhead minimization came from a respondent who simply stated that "to be effective in [DELETED] is to deliver services and assistance to the people of [DELETED] at low cost" (ID = 78, PMP = 0.53). Other leaders included both conceptualizations of effectiveness in their definitions, simply prioritizing overhead minimization over outcome accountability. One defined effectiveness in "two ways. The amount of money that's actually getting to the field dedicated to the programs…and secondarily the actual impact of projects that you can quantify" (ID = 44, PMP = 0.65). Another respondent offered a slightly more detailed explanation (ID = 40, PMP = 0.89).

> I think we define effectiveness in three ways. In terms of fundraising we consider ourselves effective if we meet our fundraising goals and if we turn over a substantial

> amount, obviously an overwhelming amount of that to [DELETED]. And if we keep the administrative costs on that low. So right now we say we have…about ninety-two cents on the dollar are used for programs.

The leader continued to describe his or her organization's second and third ways of defining effectiveness, one of which was also financial and the other of which was programmatic. However, achieving fundraising goals and minimizing overhead were the respondent's most immediate associations with effectiveness.

There are many possible explanations as to why some leaders would understand effectiveness more as overhead minimization than outcome accountability. Leaders may be responding to external pressures from donors and nonprofit ratings agencies in the United States evaluating and comparing nonprofits based on publicly available financial information. Indeed, many leaders touted their organizations' low overhead ratios during the interviews and some explicitly commented that low overhead is an important selling point for fundraising. One such leader volunteered that "our best ace card is our efficiency in terms of how we have a low overhead," and subsequently explained how he or she measured effectiveness in the context of disaster relief, where the construct is possibly easier to define (ID = 63, PMP = 1.00). How to measure effectiveness "depends on what kind of program it is. In disaster relief…it's the number of people you treat, the injuries you've come in contact with, the number of patient contacts and the amount of medicines you've dispensed…" (ID = 63, PMP = 1.00).

That low overhead is an “ace card” and that effectiveness can be measured by counting outputs are more typical of the overhead minimization perspective than the outcome accountability view. Measuring effectiveness, another leader admitted (ID = 74, PMP = 0.65):

> Well that’s very difficult for the international programs…we can’t determine the outcomes, so we measure products. We, we measure outputs. What is sent over you know, what its purpose is, where it goes. We don’t necessarily know how many people it will affect. If it’s a missionary group that we’re equipping, they can say well we treated you know, two-thousand people within a two week time period. This is what you gave us, this is what you know, we did with it, and these were the outcomes. I mean you can do that. But when you’re dealing with, let’s say a clinic or a hospital…you can measure success primarily by your outputs.

Financial and output reporting constitute two broad themes that contrast with those of goal attainment, promise-keeping and program evaluation that characterize outcome accountability. While evaluation is also a prevalent theme of overhead minimization, evaluation tends to focus on financial reporting and outputs rather than promise-keeping and goal attainment.

Discussion

These two definitions of organizational effectiveness observed among TNGO leaders pose a challenge to the academic literature summarized earlier. Most leaders define organizational effectiveness as outcome accountability, which clearly subsumes the embattled goal attainment

model. Given the strong emphasis on evaluation within the outcome accountability model, contemporary practitioners clearly are wrestling with the well-known evaluation challenges associated with goal attainment model (Fowler, 1996; Herman & Renz, 1999; Hoefer, 2000; Mohr, 1982; Murray, 2005; Stone & Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2001).

The overhead minimization model of effectiveness may have emerged among practitioners as an expedient alternative to the outcome accountability model. Within the academic literature this is analogous to the emergence of financial models of effectiveness in response to the measurement difficulties associated with the goal attainment model. Consider Price, for example, who first defined organizational effectiveness as "the degree to which a social system achieves its goals" (1972, p. 101), but who in a later edition of the same work changed this definition to "the financial viability of an organization" (1986, p. 128). His reasons for this change are instructive. Financial viability is easier to measure, is "correlated with traditional views of effectiveness" (although he notes that "systematic evidence for this view does not exist"), is conducive to identifying "determinants of effectiveness" and has wide application (J. L. Price, 1986, pp. 129-130, 135). Similarly, we might attribute the existence of the overhead minimization model among practitioners to evaluative expediency, or perhaps to donor pressure, but more research is needed to better understand how these views emerge.

It is worth reiterating that leaders interviewed for this study were based in the United States, where we might suspect a cultural bias favoring financial accountability and the use of business metrics. It is very possible that leaders of domestic nonprofits in the United States may be more susceptible to the overhead minimization model, while leaders of international nonprofits located

in other countries may be less so. Here again more research is needed.

Leaders' conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness do not vary based on *sector*, *function*, Charity Navigator *efficiency rating* or *capacity rating*, *headquarters location*, respondent's *gender*, *tenure at organization* or *country of residence*.[25] They do however vary based on *organizational size*. This association (n = 150, chi2(2) = 9.11, p = 0.01) is driven by the larger than expected number of 'overhead minimizers' within large organizations (annual budget greater than $10 million), an effect that accounts for 67 percent of the chi-squared statistic's magnitude.[26] This may be the result of larger organizations being more likely to hire financial professionals, but more research is needed to reach a firm conclusion.

Finally, there is reason to suspect that the proportion of leaders holding the overhead minimization view may be overstated due to Charity Navigator's selection criteria, which exclude nonprofits with revenues less than $500,000. The data suggest that leaders from smaller organizations may be less likely to define effectiveness as overhead minimization.

Conclusion

Leaders of TNGOs in the United States tend to conceptualize the construct of organizational effectiveness in one of two ways (see table 7.2). Most leaders (about 82 percent) conceptualize it as outcome accountability. They focus on achieving substantive outcomes, not just maximizing outputs, and believe that their organizations are effective when they keep their promises to stakeholders, particularly donors (Raggo et al., 2010).[27] Only a minority (about 15 percent)

subscribe to an overhead minimization model of effectiveness that focuses on financial evaluation and output reporting. A small group of outliers also emerged from the analysis. These leaders appear to hold an extraordinarily complex conceptualization of organizational effectiveness (see table 7.2), but subsequent analysis revealed this to be a result of coder bias. Future scholarship may seek to test this finding more directly.

This research reveals that there are at least two major strategies with which organizational effectiveness is measured within the TNGO sector in the United States. One strategy involves evaluating the extent to which an organization achieves its goals; the other involves the proportion of an organization's total expenses allocated to programs. It is not uncommon for financial metrics of the latter type to be taken as proxies for the former. Future research may wish to ascertain whether this substitution is empirically warranted.

Finally, leaders' sophisticated conceptualizations of organizational effectiveness involving complex logical frameworks and financial accountability reveal a technocratic managerial discourse presumably quite foreign to their beneficiaries. As Roberts et al. (2005, p. 1849) found:

> Managerialism of a distinctly northern type—marked by concepts like accountability, transparency, participation, and efficiency, as well as practices like double-entry bookkeeping, strategic planning, Logical Framework Analysis, project evaluation, and organizational self-assessment—has been shown to be pervasive in NGO's operations (Edwards & Fowler, 2002; Lewis, 2001).

This would be an unremarkable statement, except that they go on to note that "research has also shown how managerialism has transformed the form and day-to-day operations of even the smallest NGOs in the global south (Crewe & Harrison, 1998; Mawdsley, Porter, & Townsend, 2000; Mawdsley, Townsend, Porter, & Oakley, 2002; Robinson, 1997)" (Roberts et al., 2005, p. 1849). Northern discourses of outcome accountability and overhead minimization may transmit Western values and organizational forms in addition to pervasive managerial practices. More research is needed to determine the nature and extent of these influences.

CHAPTER EIGHT: OBSTACLES TO GOALS

Most TNGO leaders subscribe to a traditional ideology of material amelioration and believe their organizations are effective when they demonstrate outcome accountability, particularly to donors. To understand TNGO behavior, it is not enough to identify how organizational leaders approach transnational activism and understand their effectiveness. Leaders are also constrained by their environments and must attempt to be effective within the context of these constraints. Chief among the challenges TNGO leaders perceive is the need to secure funding, and to a lesser extent, political context. When asked to discuss the obstacles they believe their organizations face, leaders reveal a highly pragmatic orientation toward the intricacies of funding and a surprising distaste for political contention. The combination of these factors portrays TNGO leaders more as technocratic managers than sociopolitical change agents, although as discussed in the final chapter, these roles may not be mutually exclusive.

The challenges of transnational activism

The challenges that TNGO leaders experience appear to reflect the multidimensionality of transnational NGOs as both charitable nonprofit organizations and sociopolitical actors in world affairs. To better understand these challenges, the interview protocol for the Transnational NGO Interview Project asked leaders about the obstacles they believed their organizations faced. Leaders were asked the question: “What are the major obstacles, if any, to reaching your objectives?” After inductive readings of initial transcripts for emergent themes, eleven codes were developed to capture their open-ended responses: *funding*, *political context*, *staff or associate competencies* (for example, human capital issues, expertise), *local resistance* (home

country public awareness, target area public opinion, cultural issues), *bureaucratic and legal*, *lack of coordination* (for example, organizations working at cross-purposes, inefficiencies, poor communications, etc.), *programs* (for example, inadequate programs), *time*, *founder* (for example, the founder of the organization poses challenges), *access* (for example, access to officials, leaders, etc.) and *technology*. Figure 8.1 displays the overall results.

Figure 8.1: Obstacles to goals (proportions)



The most widely mentioned obstacle was funding, followed somewhat distantly by political context. Figure 8.2 shows how often leaders mentioned each obstacle. The distribution of mean counts suggests that funding issues are significantly more salient than political context. Leaders mentioned funding as a challenge on average one and a half times per interview, while political context was mentioned less than once per interview. Other obstacles were less salient.

Figure 8.2: Obstacles to goals (mean counts)



n = 149, error bars represent Poisson 95% confidence intervals

Latent class analysis did not identify significant association in the data, suggesting that leaders tend to think similarly about their obstacles.[28] As such, the discussions below focus on the two most common challenges, funding and political context. In the absence of LCA, PMPs are unavailable to structure inquiry. Instead, complete quotation reports for each of the two codes were separately retrieved from ATLAS.ti and fully reviewed. Quotations coded for *funding* contain about 13,000 words, while quotations coded for *political context* contain about 11,000 words. In the following sections quotations have been selected discretionarily.

The challenge of funding

When asked about obstacles facing their organizations, most respondents immediately replied "money" or "funding." Often leaders repeated this several times, occasionally amidst lighthearted laughter acknowledging the apparent ineluctability of their replies. Other interviewees were more matter-of-fact. "The major thing is funding," said one respondent (ID = 146), "the other major obstacle of course is simply funding," said another (ID = 27). These comments were often followed by more detailed explanations elaborating upon specific aspects of their financial challenges.

Some leaders characterized the funding problem as an omnipresent component of transnational activism. "The problem of humanitarianism," one such respondent quipped (ID = 129), "is that we're trying to solve a hundred billion dollar a year problem with twenty-five billion dollars a year." Many leaders acknowledged this fundamental asymmetry between the scope of global problems and the comparatively modest capacity of TNGOs to achieve commensurate impact.

This asymmetry underscores the imperative of organizational growth and implies a frustrating limitation as to what TNGOs can realistically accomplish.

For many respondents financial problems were intimately bound up with growth issues. “There is never enough money,” lamented such a respondent (ID = 70), “even though we've—in our own small way—we've grown a lot. But there is never enough money and so fundraising is a constant challenge.” It would be misleading to formulate resource inadequacy exclusively as a fundraising problem, however. For most transnational NGOs funding shortfalls would likely persist regardless of fundraising efficacy because of the immense scale of the challenges they confront.

Not only does funding availability for transnational activism seem perpetually inadequate, but the structure of funds is often incongruent with what TNGOs need. “Our biggest obstacle is the fact that it’s so hard to get unrestricted funds,” a respondent remarked (ID = 22). “I'll tell you our real challenge is non-earmarked funds,” noted another (ID = 40). A general distaste pervades the donor community for funding general operating expenses through unrestricted or non-earmarked funds. This presents a particularly frustrating problem for transnational NGOs embarking on growth strategies that require increased fundraising and administrative costs. Internal investments to expand organizational capacity increase overhead and reduce the program expense ratio closely monitored by donors and nonprofit ratings agencies. From the perspectives of many stakeholders, higher overhead implies that an organization is wasting resources.

Moreover, many leaders identify a myopic orientation within the donor community. For example, one leader (ID = 48) commented that “the biggest obstacle is the aid architecture, the global aid architecture, the way aid is delivered by those who give aid and, in particular, people tend to think about it in short-term time frames.”

External pressures to keep overhead low explains another respondent’s comment, which illustrates how organizational growth was being retarded by structural forces (ID = 60).

> We're trying to ramp up—how do you, with limited resources, how do you do that? How do you—it's sort of like there are some individuals—like I would love to have a COO right now. I would love that, so that I could deal with some other things and they could focus more on the operations. But at what point can you afford to have a COO and at what point can you afford not to have one? Those are some—those growth issues are kind of hard, because you have to do everything incrementally and we don't have a big investor that comes in and says, ‘Here's five million dollars. Go ahead and set the whole thing up and we'll run with it.’ We have to earn it little by little. You can't issue stock.

The term overhead has starkly negative connotations within the discourse of charitable giving, which frustrates and annoys many professional transnational activists. One such leader described the problem as follows (ID = 48):

> RESPONDENT: So, hopefully we can take some of this data back out and share it with donors and try to convince them that if you really want to do this—I'm going to sound

like a broken record—but if you really want to do some of this long-term change, you need more than a two or three year project. You can't ask country offices to write a new proposal every six months, which is what happens in some countries. Donors only will commit at six month periods. You know? That's not good enough if you really want to take a long journey and really see change.

INTERVIEWER: You are echoing a lot of the things that people say also about the foundation world where they fund a lot of project grants but not operating support and very not often multi-year funding.

RESPONDENT: Not often multi-year funding, and, you know, people seem to be very allergic to operating costs and yet, if you don't have people in an organization actually attending to the details of making the operations happen, you cut yourself off at the knees at the get-go. It's a real frustration that we have, too, in talking to donors. So, that's part of what we need. Either we need to be better in explaining operational costs and what the efficiency is in the overall equation and that overhead is not quote-unquote ‘bad’—it seems to be this, you know, it's a synonym: ‘overhead’ equals ‘bad.’ I agree everybody can get too fat and you have to be very careful. One of the things that we have to constantly do is step back and reassess. Have we allowed ourselves to get too off-kilter and do we need to re-tinker and get ourselves focused? And I think that's true of any large organization. It's important to do that from time to time without question. But that doesn't mean that overhead is bad. It's how you use that money; everybody's being focused on the same thing and pulling in the same direction.

Donor aversion to long-term commitments and general antipathy toward funding overhead may actually contribute to the very inefficiencies these norms are presumably intended to mitigate. An important study from Indiana University and the Urban Institute, for example, found that "to deal with the inadequate funding for administration, organizations resort to the strategies of *low pay*, *make do*, and *do without* that diminish organizational effectiveness" (Hager, Pollak et al., 2004a, p. 3).

Since interviews took place in the United States many respondents offered comments specifically pertaining to the US fundraising environment. These touched upon domestic legislation such as the USA Patriot Act, cultural provinciality, public suspicion toward internationalism and a general reluctance among Americans to spend money overseas when it could be spent at home. For example, one interviewee (ID = 101) claimed that "there is no question that the US has a US bias. It's easier to raise money for work in the US. It's easier to raise money here for work in the US than it is to raise money for work outside of the US." Other obstacles discussed had more palpable political overtones, and are discussed below.

The challenge of political context

Even a cursory examination of the obstacles mentioned relating to political context reveals how politicized yet operationally pragmatic TNGO leaders seem to be. Leaders reported a broad range of political obstacles, including general ignorance among the public and elites, various foreign cultural and political obstacles, US militarism, the USA Patriot Act, the administration of President George W. Bush and the general post-9/11 political climate.

Some organizations exclusively pursue strategies of public education to achieve their objectives, and many TNGOs employ these strategies secondarily. Some of this activity is focused on influencing political elites beyond just the general public. In the context of transnational politics this is an unremarkable statement, but in the US context it is somewhat controversial because of domestic tax regulations that limit nonprofit lobbying behavior. Regardless, transnational NGO leaders discussed at length their difficulties attempting to influence policymakers. Some leaders expressed frustration trying to reorient the strategic thinking of key officials. "Well there I think it's um, again, resources," one leader reiterated (ID = 124), referring again to funding as a chief obstacle, "but also a lack of awareness around, among a lot of policymakers about the importance of behavior change as a critical element of programming." Other leaders indicted policymakers more harshly. A respondent from a human rights organization dealing with immigration issues said the following (ID = 33):

> I think one of the biggest obstacles is politicians, people who serve in the law making bodies who do not understand the issues. That is an obligation for us to do teaching but the job is so big. I think that the politicization of these issues is really very disturbing and the idea that a group can decide by demonizing an entire group of people who I really hesitate to use the term 'vulnerable' but vulnerable in terms of not having access to all parts of our society and who they view as not a threat to them, because so many immigrants are not citizens yet and so they do not vote. And the fact that these are public policymakers and they do not see the real impact on real human beings to what they did and even the hateful discourse that is created. So it is a huge obstacle just having public

> policymakers who do not understand and who are so politicized that we have policies and laws that make no sense.

Here the respondent explicitly criticizes the politicization of immigration issues, preferring instead to view immigration as a managerial problem. Another leader (ID = 52) whose organization works to promote religious freedom offered a more conciliatory characterization of the problem. “It is very difficult because there are, you know, major concerns that policymakers have to deal with. And religious persecution is probably the last thing on the list. And so to get the attention of policymakers and everything is very difficult.”

Other political obstacles that leaders discussed were more concrete. In one extraordinary interview the respondent recounted a number of rather spectacular, if not fantastic anecdotes that included the following (ID = 12):

> I was in the upper, working in the upper Amazon and there was a—a charity sent a group of three people into a tribal village. And they didn’t know anything about the customs or culture, it was a real primitive tribe and ah, they heard that the tribe was hospitable, which they were, very hospitable. And ah you know by custom, you know a stranger comes to the village and you know you get a meal and a place to sleep. With that tribe they also practice wife hospitality. And these three guys declined, not knowing that was a declaration of war and they were decapitated within a few minutes.

In addition to direct mortal challenges, longstanding domestic and international political disputes often yield similarly hostile environments for transnational activism. Examples abound the world over, but especially since 9/11 the Middle East has received increased attention. “I hate to keep coming back to the word Israel,” said one respondent apologetically (ID = 118), “but the fact is that we could probably do ten times the amount of aid work, not just the project stuff but the aid work in Palestine, if it wasn’t locked down the way it is.” In the wake of Israel’s 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon another leader mentioned the following (ID = 117):

> At the implementation side there are the usual barriers of unforeseen conflicts arising or the myriad of things that go on in the world. And we have been working in southern Lebanon for five years and that work has just been not only interrupted but probably eliminated. A lot of the things we have worked on have been bombed now, so that is a barrier.

The respondent’s understated manner seems to suggest such challenges are commonplace. In the post-9/11 context during which the interviews took place, many respondents noted that US foreign policy itself had rendered transnational humanitarianism considerably more difficult. More specifically, some leaders observed increased foreign suspicion toward US TNGOs. One such leader explained how he or she thought NGO neutrality had been brought into question (ID =56):

> …in the context of this…especially in the last five years of course, with post 9/11, there is this, a new or stronger trend towards having Western military intervention alongside

> with aid and other activities accompanying that. That has polarized and made it more difficult I think for independent aid, humanitarian aid organizations to work in certain conflict settings. There's more rejection of that, more distrust of aid groups, question whether they can be independent…

The leader quoted below would probably agree with this characterization. He or she explained the complications posed when organizations are associated with the US government, correctly or otherwise (ID = 23):

> And so, you know for example, ah, something will happen in the world where you know ah, a leader of a country will go on television and denounce our work and say this work is CIA and this organization, this person is an agent of the US government…and then we have to do sort of public relations for the next week. So in that way we are constantly sort of reacting to events, and it's very disruptive.

That association with US foreign policy would be a detriment to transnational activism suggests something unsettling about America's perceived role in the world community at that time. It is unclear whether this is specific to particular US administrations or is a more general corollary of perceived government aegis.

Many leaders found their organizations directly at odds specifically with the policies of the Republican administration and congress and explained their political obstacles in no uncertain terms. One such leader construed the challenges quite broadly (ID = 145):

> It certainly is a major obstacle to reaching our objectives, which would be to establish a new global world order that's a civil world order and based on civil institutions whereas right now, the direction of US policy appears to us to be one that relies very much on military force and seeks to create a global network of military alliances to maintain order. In that setting, the idea of creating peaceful security through rule of law is challenged a lot.

Other leaders articulated their frustrations with recent US legislation. The USA Patriot Act was a singular vehicle for the expression of these criticisms (ID = 28).

> With the Patriot Act and other laws that make it frightening for us at some level even to deliver services, you know the intelligence agencies have authority now to go through files and to, you know investigate in ways that they haven't before, and the appeals around that are becoming less and less.

A leader from a Christian organization explained how the USA Patriot Act introduced increased political pressure and various practical obstacles (ID = 110).

> Obviously that, as a faith-based entity we have to be careful, of course, who we partner with. Obviously given all the Patriot Act and things that are going on, it adds a little bit more pressure, paper-work, whatever you want to call it, to [INAUDIBLE] as far as your

> partners and potential partners, you have got all this vetting names, all this kind of stuff. So yeah.

Some respondents expressed their concerns more flippantly, often not without humor. Considering the obstacles facing his or her organization, one interviewee (ID = 27) responded "oh there's lots of them. The current administration [LAUGHTER]. I don't know if I'm allowed to say that now [LAUGHTER]." Others articulated very specific criticisms. The following conversation has been truncated to protect confidentiality, but it illustrates the attitude of a leader who found his or her organization's work stymied by Bush-era policies (ID = 26).

> INTERVIEWER: If you take a step back, what are the major obstacles to reaching those objectives?
>
> RESPONDENT: One objective, well the, um, well there's the Bush Administration for one.
>
> INTERVIEWER: Right.
>
> RESPONDENT: Um, no, I, I and I'm being facetious, but not really…
>
> INTERVIEWER: Not entirely?
>
> RESPONDENT: One of the major, one of the major obstacles in achieving the expansion of [DELETED] rights has been um, the recent presidential administration.
>
> INTERVIEWER: Yeah.
>
> RESPONDENT: And the conservatism of the federal judiciary.

The leader's organization saw many of its achievements reversed by domestic legislation and court decisions. Another respondent flatly stated that the Bush administration was "absolutely closed" to civil society (ID = 150):

> It depends, if you were to talk to me during the Clinton Administration it would have been different. Because the Clinton Administration was very open to civil society, um, to their analysis, to their um, policy recommendations, and this administration is absolutely closed to that.

The Bush Administration vocally supported faith-based organizations within civil society, but even religious organizations reported political difficulties with the administration. A leader from the "more progressive" side of the religious sector expressed some disappointment with the relationship between religious organizations and the administration, choosing his words rather carefully (ID = 88).

> And that is just to say um, you know the politics of religion. And how that plays out…over the course of the last eight years, for example with a more conservative administration in the United States, the work of [DELTETED], which tend to be viewed as the, as the main line of the more, more progressive churches in the United States, has struggled to work as effectively with this administration as perhaps we would have liked.

The zeitgeist of the Bush presidency was the post-9/11 political context and subsequent US behavior. This had some obvious consequences for transnational NGOs, such as increased

scrutiny of financial transfers, especially those of faith-based organizations and NGOs working in Arab countries. But the fallout of 9/11 had other unintended consequences. Another leader explained how the terrorist attacks caused major donors and other stakeholders to orient attention toward the Middle East, which diverted resources away from other needy regions and causes (ID = 151).

> Well I think…there are a lot. I'd say the policy environment is probably one of the biggest obstacles, especially in recent years where Latin America is not on the front page of the news in a lot of cases. When we first started…doing work in [COUNTRY DELTED] it was already a public issue…and so now going from something that is a public issue and working to actually try and build up something to become a public issue is challenging. And then…since September 11th and since the focus on the Middle East, when we were working in [COUNTRY DELETED] in 2000, US, the [INITIATIVE DELETED] and US military funding, [COUNTRY DELETED] was one of the largest disbursements of money and military aid. Now it just seems like pocket change compared to what's [being spent in] Iraq and Afghanistan. So I mean that's made it challenging…I would say with good reason grassroots energy has been focused towards the Middle East so that's made it, it has been a challenge for us…

But other themes persist far beyond transitory administrations and policies to reveal more persevering relationships between transnational activism and politics. Effective service delivery, as one respondent commented, requires concomitant outreach and political support. Donor

education, fundraising, public education and service provision are all facets of a synthetic strategy that is most effective within a facilitative "political climate" (ID = 61).

> So that that kind of political climate of course translates into what happens with funding climates but also translates into how people on the ground are working and reacting. That wholly affects what we do. When we're trying to achieve a positive agenda of health for all many of us are having to dig into battles about let's get drugs to this one community, this one population. So I'd say this is very broad thing. The political climate is a real challenge to our work. When there's healthy, vibrant health-promotion going on, more work gets done, because the books and the materials that we give to people-they're really of use. Those organizations are all under extreme pressure.

The political obstacles that leaders face reveal the multidimensional character of their organizations as simultaneously technocratic and politicized. The post 9/11 context presented particular challenges to TNGO leaders both domestically and internationally.

Conclusion

Leaders' preoccupation with financial obstacles and understanding of politics as an obstacle rather than a strategy suggests important insights about how TNGO leaders view their work. In the first instance, leaders exhibit a strong sense of pragmatism in overwhelmingly declaring funding as their most salient obstacle. In the second instance, leaders discuss politics disapprovingly, preferring instead to couch their activism in relatively apolitical, technocratic and managerial terms. However, as Willetts (2002) has argued, a failure to fully appreciate the

political significance of TNGO activity does not mean that its consequences—whether intentional or unintentional—are politically neutral:

> Legal systems may classify raising money for purposes such as poverty alleviation, disaster relief or environmental conservation as non-political, but the legal distinction between charitable and political activity is always based on an arbitrary, illogical and controversial definition of politics. Many NGOs will not see themselves as engaging directly in public policy, but their activities are always a social expression of values. Hence, NGOs are very likely to be political in the broadest sense of affecting social discourse and can often have an indirect effect on politics in the narrow sense of shaping public policy.

Transnational NGO leaders in the United States walk a fine line. Domestically, their organizations are classified as charities and rewarded with a tax exemption. Their legitimacy hinges on a domestic cultural compact in which an implicit or explicit pledge to 'do good' purchases valuable legal privileges and social respect. A TNGO that takes a political side puts its legitimacy at risk and calls into question whether the organization is fighting for universalistic or particularistic values. Leaders must respect this cultural compact at home while conducting operations abroad with political consequences.

That many TNGO leaders would view political context as an obstacle second only to funding is revealing. Leaders may have so thoroughly internalized their technocratic managerialism that they fail to fully appreciate the political significance of their work both at home and abroad. The

discourse of transnational activism, with all its elaborate jargon—logical frameworks, capacity building, stakeholders, etc.—supplies a politically neutral language in which to conduct transnational public policy. Transnational NGO leaders may not conceptualize their work in overtly political terms, but an analysis of their perceived obstacles indicates that their work is no less political.

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

What is the role of TNGOs in world affairs? The heterogeneity discovered among organizations implies that this is the wrong question. The right question is: 'What are the roles of TNGOs in world affairs?' Transnational NGO leaders think differently about how to approach transnational activism and their organizations implement different types of strategies. Taking this heterogeneity into account reveals three types of TNGO: charitable relief and development, human rights activism and environmental advocacy. Each of these types of TNGO may be understood as playing a different role in the world system. Before turning to this discussion, I offer a brief summary of what has been discovered substantively so far.

Summary

Chapter four examined TNGO leaders' ideologies toward transnational activism. An exploratory discrete factor analysis found that about 66 percent of leaders described missions of amelioration, while about 34 percent described missions of empowerment. Additionally, only about 23 percent of leaders described missions involving ideational strategies or tactics, such as research and compliance monitoring, which is surprising considering that most scholars regard ideational strategies a hallmark of transnational activism. Taking these two latent factors together, about 51 percent of leaders adhere to an ideology of material amelioration, followed distantly by material empowerment (26 percent), ideational amelioration (15 percent) and ideational empowerment (8 percent). Leaders' most common attitude toward transnational engagement is that of material amelioration, not ideational empowerment, broadly suggesting

that most leaders take a materialistic, charitable approach to transnational activism rather than the approach of ideational contention thought by many scholars to epitomize TNGO behavior.

Leaders' views differed only slightly when asked about the specific activities their organizations undertake. After factoring out the influence of likely coder bias, the familiar distinction remerged between amelioration (68 percent) and empowerment (32 percent) in strikingly similar proportions. In the contexts of both mission and activities, TNGO leaders are roughly twice as likely to favor strategies of amelioration over empowerment.

Based on the sample data, leaders with an ameliorative mission orientation direct about 71 percent of total TNGO expenditures while leaders with a material orientation control about 84 percent. Leaders who described their organizations as primarily engaged in ameliorative activities direct about 93 percent of total TNGO resources. The majority of TNGO leaders in the United States directing most of the sector's resources have an ameliorative, materialistic approach to transnational activism.

Chapter five examined the questions of TNGO autonomy and collaborative style. Transnational NGOs are strategic in their own rights and appear to be highly protective of their overarching missions even though they occasionally strategically adjust their programs in response to donor preferences. On balance, neither TNGOs nor donors clearly predominate. Leaders implement specific strategies to maintain operational independence in the presence of financial dependency. Transnational NGOs protect autonomy through brand recognition, funding diversification and by maintaining high proportions of unrestricted funds. When financial pressures become more

intense, some TNGOs secure government or other large grants to serve as bridge funding. Transnational organization gives TNGOs additional autonomy-preserving efficiencies since organizations can acquire funds internationally that may be unavailable domestically. Some use Southern partners to secure resources ostensibly unavailable to Northern organizations. Transnational NGOs thus appear capable of maintaining a degree of autonomy to influence world politics despite their reliance on external financial support.

Chapter five also found that that about 63 percent of TNGOs exhibit a protective collaborative style, vastly preferring to partner with other NGOs rather than states, corporations or intergovernmental organizations. About 37 percent exhibit an interdependent collaborative style and are more likely to collaborate with other types of organizations.

TNGOs vary within each collaborative type. Some protective TNGO leaders actively refuse government and corporate funding, others simply disfavor it. Within the interdependent style, many TNGOs collaborate with other types of organizations because they believe doing so increases effectiveness. A few TNGO leaders explicitly adopt a subcontractor model, which critics of the New Policy Agenda believe may pose a systemic risk to the authenticity and autonomy of TNGOs (Edwards & Hulme, 1996).

Whether TNGO autonomy and independence from states and corporations is desirable depends upon additional factors such as function and sector, despite strong normative undercurrents pervading much scholarship. For instance, independence from government agencies may hinder service delivery in the health sector but improve the effectiveness of human rights activism.

Among the most difficult challenges to TNGO theorization is the problem of taxonomy. Scholars widely recognize TNGO heterogeneity but implement different and overlapping criteria to segment TNGOs for theoretical clarity. Chapter six developed a taxonomy of US-registered TNGOs based on the most commonly adduced taxonomic criteria: sector, function, autonomy/collaborative style, mode of influence and strategy. Consistent with the general structure of scholarship on transnational activism, there are three types of TNGO, but they are distributed in inverse proportion to the amount of scholarly attention they receive. About 67 percent of TNGOs are charitable development and relief organizations. This type of TNGO is associated with sustainable development, service delivery, ameliorative strategies and materialistic influence, and controls about 85 percent of the sample's total resources. About 26 percent of organizations are human rights activism TNGOs. They are associated with human rights, advocacy, the protective collaborative style and missions of empowerment, although they eschew ideational tactics. This type of TNGO controls about 14 percent of the sample's total resources. Finally, about 8 percent of TNGOs are environmental advocacy organizations. This type of TNGO is associated with the environment sector, advocacy, the interdependent collaborative style and empowering activities. This is the only type of organization that is very likely to employ ideational tactics such as information politics. This type of TNGO controls only about one percent of the sample's total resources.

Transnational NGO research in international relations frequently identifies organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace as exemplary or quintessential TNGOs. However, taxonomical analysis suggests that these organizations are highly uncharacteristic of both

TNGOs generally and of the subcategories they are commonly thought to typify (human rights activism and environmental advocacy, respectively). Scholars appear to focus disproportionally on the least efficacious types of TNGO in terms of their numbers and resources.

Leaders' understandings of organizational effectiveness reveal additional insights about their approaches to transnational activism. Whether they understand effectiveness as 'outcome accountability' or 'overhead minimization,' their perspectives tend to be managerial and technocratic and their accountability practices are largely oriented toward donors. The widespread uses of complex logical frameworks and the high salience of specific financial ratios are indicative of a transnational NGO culture that prizes technical evaluations and upward accountability to boards and donors rather than beneficiaries. This donor-oriented managerialism calls into question the presumption that TNGOs authentically embody the values and preferences of their beneficiaries.

Leaders do not hold heterogeneous attitudes toward all issues. When asked to discuss the obstacles their organizations face, leaders agreed on the centrality of funding, and to a lesser extent, leaders expressed concerns over the challenges posed by political context. Their nearly unanimous concern about funding reveals a pragmatic orientation that defies characterization as either strictly 'principled' or 'self-interested,' while their general discomfort with politics and use of technocratic jargon exposes a disconnection between the popular image of TNGOs as overtly contentious political activists and the considerably more mundane reality of TNGOs as professionalized managerial agencies.

Synthesis

Based on preceding analyses, TNGOs registered in the United States appear to play three roles in world affairs. These are outlined in table 9.1.

Table 9.1: Roles of TNGOs in world affairs

	Alleviation	Realization	Environmentalism
TNGO type	Charitable development and relief	Human rights activism	Environmental advocacy
Collaborative style	About equally as likely to collaborate within civil society as with states and corporations	The most independent, preferring to collaborate within civil society	The most interdependent, collaborating with states and corporations
Mission and activity	Amelioration, avoids ideational tactics	Espouse missions of empowerment, but implement ameliorative activities; avoids ideational tactics	Missions are about equally likely to be couched in terms of amelioration or empowerment; activities are the most empowering; most likely to employ ideational tactics
Function	Primarily regarded as service delivery	Primarily regarded as advocacy	Regarded as advocacy
Sectoral typicality	Primarily regarded as sustainable development, and to a lesser extent, humanitarian relief	Primarily regarded as human rights, and to a lesser extent, conflict resolution	Primarily regarded as environmental, and to much lesser extents, human rights and conflict resolution
Efficacy	67% of organizations, 85% of expenditures	26% of organizations, 14% of expenditures	8% of organizations, 1% of expenditures
Potential impact	Alleviation from poverty and disaster; reproduction of hierarchical power relations between the 'developed' and 'developing' societies	Leveraging of material resources to promote the realization of human rights, depoliticization and institutionalization of conflict	Environmental protection, whether through conservation, public mobilization or the certification of government and corporate practices

Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Alleviation

The first and most important role TNGOs play is that of 'alleviation,' the role I ascribe to charitable development and relief organizations. Alleviation refers to more than simply lessening the suffering of disadvantaged people; it also represents a form of political power that, as DeMars (2005, p. 61) writes, "goes far beyond success or failure in achieving…official goals." Alleviation may create relationships of dependency that reproduce hierarchical power relations, while the discourse with which alleviation takes place enables and promotes transnational governmentality and rational managerialism (Jaeger, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005; Schuller, 2007).

Alleviation is by far the most common role, and this role is a frequent target of critical scholarship questioning the consequences of the international relief and development community (DeMars, 2005; Jaeger, 2007; Naylor, 2011; Schuller, 2007). Scholars show how the international development discourse identifies 'beneficiaries,' often represented in disturbing imagery, who are 'vulnerable' and require 'capacity building' and 'empowerment,' suggesting that the 'targets' of alleviation are incapacitated and weak and must submit to the 'technical assistance' offered by Northern TNGOs (Billon, 2006; Naylor, 2011). Naylor (2011, p. 193) illustrates this powerfully in a detailed case study in which she characterizes the international development discourse as sustaining this 'Politics of Pity:'

> [B]ecause the current international development discourse operates through relations of power according to a Politics of Pity, which necessarily (re)constitutes subjects in an

> unequal hierarchical relation to one another, it is unable to fully address the underlying structural inequalities that are at the root of poverty.

If ideational power is indeed the primary source of TNGO influence in the world, the nature of this power is disputable. Instead of using information politics to achieve sociopolitical transformation, the most efficacious TNGOs may be sustaining a Politics of Pity articulated through technocratic managerialism that maintains and perpetuates the status quo.

Scholars have argued that development TNGOs not only help sustain the contemporary international system, but may be essential for its continued maintenance. According to Chabbott (1999), most development TNGOs are located in the North. Figures compiled from multiple sources put their numbers at more than 2,500 in North and under 300 in South (Chabbott, 1999, p. 255). These TNGOs, argues Chabbot, maintain a discourse based on science and individual welfare largely grounded in rational individualism and neoclassical economic theory. Many official donors prefer to channel development and relief funding through these TNGOs instead of giving directly to individual states as a means of preserving control and limiting corruption. To a large extent these organization have carved out a role for themselves that extends far beyond what states originally intended, and in many contexts states have come to rely upon development and relief TNGOs for the provision of the basic services.

Kaldor (2003, p. 92) has described the "NGOization of public space" in which this type of organization plays a prominent role in the international system (also see: Schuller, 2007). "Effectively, what this means," she writes:

> is that those NGOs who are northern and therefore close to the centres of power and funding, whose emphasis is service provision, who are solidaristic rather than mutual benefit, and whose organization tends to be more formal and hierarchical, have come to dominate the NGO scene. This is, in part, a consequence of the growing support of northern governments towards NGOs: they tend to favour service provision and may be nervous about advocacy; they are biased towards NGOs from their own countries and also prefer to deal with formally organized professional NGOs.

Kaldor (2003, p. 92) also argues that "growing dependence on particular donors may distort the priorities or missions of NGOs. Dependence on government funding has, in some cases, transformed NGOs into…government subcontractors" that "have become substitutes for the state." She also warns of a "damping down of the advocacy role of NGOs since," particularly American "NGOs are fearful of losing their sources of income," which "in extreme cases…are merely the 'handmaidens of capitalist change' with little serious concern for effective poverty alleviation strategies. They are seen as the 'modernizers and destroyers of local economies,' introducing Western values and bringing about 'economicide'" (Kaldor, 2003, pp. 92-93). Future scholarship would do well to examine these bold propositions empirically.

Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Realization

The second aspect to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is to understand the nature of 'realization.' Human rights activism TNGOs advance missions of empowerment by providing material support to beneficiaries. These organizations are the most independent of

states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations and therefore the best suited to challenge the status quo from the outside.

Conventional wisdom suggests that human rights realization is typically promoted through information politics, especially documentation and compliance monitoring (Hopgood, 2006; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ron et al., 2007). However, data suggest that although these organizations espouse missions of empowerment, they are largely not conducting ideational activities such as research and compliance monitoring. Instead, these TNGOs tend to deliver products and services for their beneficiaries to employ in the realization of their rights. An example provided in chapter four illustrates this role. Supporting embroidery projects, setting up computer labs and constructing playgrounds empowers beneficiaries with a sense of "hope" (ID = 118, PMP = 0.64).[29]

The role of realization performed by human rights activism TNGOs is perhaps the most common subject of academic study for scholars of transnational activism. However, more recently scholars have begun to question whether realization counterproductively serves to absorb and institutionalize political dysfunction and conflict (DeMars, 2005). Future scholarship could contribute to this already impressive research program by examining the materialistic programming more common to the sector and as well as its unintended consequences.

Roles of TNGOs in world affairs: Environmentalism

The third aspect to understanding the role of TNGOs in world affairs is to understand the nature of environmentalism. Environmental advocacy organizations are the only type of TNGO to heavily rely on ideational tactics such as information politics. However, they are also the most likely to partner with states, corporations and intergovernmental organizations. These partnerships may promote environmental sustainability through certification programs that confer legitimacy and reward corporate social responsibility. Many TNGO leaders engaged with environmentalism collaborate with governments to improve program effectiveness when ministries exercise regulatory prerogatives over environmental resources. However, the interdependence between environmental advocacy TNGOs and state and corporate interests may call into question the autonomy of TNGOs to criticize transgressors from the outside.

Interestingly, this contradicts McCormick's (1999, p. 56) view that environmental NGOs "function outside the [governmental] rule-making process, offering expert advice, undertaking research, and monitoring the application of these rules," while lending credence to Raustiala's (1997) general conclusion that environmental NGOs tend to extend the regulatory power of states.

Environmentalism is the most empowering TNGO role in the sense that it is highly likely to involve activities such as research and public education, advocacy and grassroots mobilization. These activities suggest that environmental advocacy TNGOs wield a unique combination of both carrots (certification) and sticks (grassroots mobilization) in the pursuit of their goals. Future scholarship could improve our understanding of environmental advocacy by examining how these diverse tactics promote or impede environmentalism.

Reflection

Proponents claim that TNGOs promote universal rights; detractors claim they propagate neoliberal governmentality. A normative preference appears to imbue this literature, which celebrates the empowering orientations of realization and environmentalism, while disparaging the untended consequences of alleviation (compare, for example: Jaeger, 2007; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Politicization and contention are preferred to managerialism and service delivery, and a peculiar optimism—an emancipatory faith—about the potentiality of TNGOs to transform world politics is easily detectable.

Perhaps this emancipatory aspiration has been projected onto TNGOs. Consider the idealized TNGO—a nongovernmental, noncommercial organization, an organization immune to hubris and greed, an agent of a global civil society yearning to improve its condition. It aspires for sociopolitical transformation. Untainted by violence and self-interest and imbued with the righteousness of universal principles, its potential to peaceably transform world politics seems unbounded.

Alas, leaders of TNGOs in the United States paint a different portrait. Although their organizations are noncommercial, they are preoccupied with funding. While they are relatively independent of governments, they are more concerned about demonstrating accountability to donors than to their beneficiaries (Raggo et al., 2010). Most leaders adopt a materialistic, ameliorative approach to transnational activism. Grassroots mobilization and information politics

are uncommon. This is not to assert that some TNGOs are not conducting emancipatory campaigns; on the contrary, we know them all too well. But they are in the minority.

Transnational NGOs registered in the United States may not radically transform the world system, but they do appear to offer alleviation from poverty and disaster, realization of basic human rights and environmental stewardship. But these services may be delivered with unintended consequences. Future scholarship would do well to focus greater attention on these effects. Additionally, future scholarship would benefit from more explicit treatments of empirical proportion so as to avoid theoretical mischaracterizations on the basis of irregular evidence.

Finally, as detailed in chapter two, these conclusions are based on interviews with TNGO leaders in the United States and so pertain only to a national subset of organizations, albeit the largest one. Leaders in other Northern countries may offer different perspectives, as may leaders of Southern TNGOs. It is possible that TNGOs not registered in the United States are more politically contentious and transformative. More research is needed to better understand the perspectives of TNGO leaders based in other countries.

APPENDIX: ACRONYMS

Acronym	Description
AIRS/INFO LINE	Alliance of Information and Referral Systems/Info Line
BVR	Bivariate residual
CAQDAS	Computer aided qualitative data analysis software
DFA	Discrete factor analysis
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
HCA	Hierarchical cluster analysis
ICNPO	International Classification of Nonprofit Organizations
ID	Identification
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
ISIC	International Standard Industrial Classification System
L^2	Log-likelihood ratio chi-squared statistic
LCA	Latent class analysis
LL	Log-likelihood
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
NACE	Eurostat General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities
NAICS	North American Industry Classification System
NCCS	National Center for Charitable Statistics
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NPC	Nonprofit Program Classification
NTEE	National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities
PMP	Posterior membership probability
TNGO	Transnational nongovernmental NGO
UIA	Union of International Associations
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

APPENDIX: FINITE MIXTURE MODELING

A latent class model with three response variables, y_1, y_2 and y_3, taking on values m_1, m_2 and m_3, respectively, models the probability of the *i*th leader's response pattern as follows:

$$P(y_{i1} = m_1, y_{i2} = m_2, y_{i3} = m_3) = \sum_{x=1}^{K} P(x) \prod_{t=1}^{3} P(y_{it} = m_t | x)$$

where x is a nominal latent variable of K categories and

$$\sum_{x=1}^{K} P(x)$$

represents the unconditional latent class probabilities over the *K* latent classes, which sum to one, and

$$\prod_{t=1}^{3} P(y_{it} = m_t | x)$$

represents the product of the conditional probabilities over the *t* indicator variables (Vermunt & Magidson, 2005). The conditional probabilities for the values of each indicator within each latent class sum to one and their product over the indicator variables is one.

The latent class and conditional probabilities are the key quantities in LCA because they provide estimates of class size and information for ascribing class profiles, respectively (McCutcheon, 1987). The conditional probabilities that define the profiles of the latent classes are parameterized as

$$P(y_{it} = m_t|x) = \frac{\exp(\eta^t_{m|x})}{\sum_{m=1}^{M_t} \exp(\eta^t_{m|x})}$$

where $\eta^t_{m|x}$ is a linear predictor obtained by

$$\eta^t_{m|x} = \beta^t_m + \beta^t_{mx}.$$

The intercept is β^t_m and the effect of the latent variable on the indicators is β^t_{mx}. The software automatically determines the correct logit model based on the specified scale types of the indicator and latent variables. Maximum likelihood estimates are obtained by way of the expectation maximization algorithm.[30] The software, which is specifically designed for latent class analysis, also provides the latent class and conditional probabilities.[31]

The probability structure for a latent class factor model with two discrete latent variables, w, x, and four indicators is as follows:

$$P(y_{i1} = m_1, y_{i2} = m_2, y_{i3} = m_3, y_{i4} = m_4) = \sum_{wx=1}^{JK} P(w, x) \prod_{t=1}^{4} P(y_{it} = m_t|wx),$$

which is similar to the traditional latent class model presented above except that the *i*th leader's response pattern depends upon two discrete latent variables instead of one (Magidson & Vermunt, 2003; Vermunt & Magidson, n.d.). The discrete factors are mutually independent and as with traditional LCA the meaning of each latent factor is derived from the information conveyed by the conditional probabilities.

APPENDIX: DATES OF INTERVIEWS

ID	Date	ID	Date	ID	Date	ID	Date	ID	Date
1	3/14/2007	32	1/9/2008	63	1/16/2007	94	3/13/2007	125	7/19/2006
2	12/10/2007	33	11/15/2006	64	2/18/2008	95	11/27/2006	126	3/25/2008
3	2/15/2008	34	12/10/2007	65	11/7/2007	96	11/16/2006	127	3/12/2007
4	1/2/2008	35	3/5/2008	66	4/20/2007	97	11/27/2006	128	3/13/2008
5	4/17/2008	36	7/11/2006	67	6/13/2007	98	3/7/2007	129	6/26/2006
6	4/2/2008	37	7/10/2006	68	6/12/2007	99	12/11/2007	130	3/15/2007
7	6/22/2006	38	3/16/2007	69	3/11/2008	100	6/23/2006	131	12/21/2006
8	3/19/2007	39	3/12/2008	70	12/14/2006	101	12/12/2006	132	3/24/2008
9	7/13/2006	40	12/12/2006	71	3/15/2007	102	1/10/2008	133	12/12/2006
10	3/10/2008	41	12/12/2007	72	2/21/2008	103	12/11/2006	134	9/6/2006
11	3/15/2007	42	1/7/2008	73	12/29/2006	104	6/12/2007	135	3/13/2007
12	3/12/2008	43	12/12/2007	74	11/9/2007	105	2/19/2008	136	12/12/2007
13	5/24/2007	44	11/30/2007	75	12/13/2006	106	2/22/2008	137	3/11/2008
14	5/17/2007	45	3/27/2008	76	12/13/2006	107	3/14/2007	138	12/14/2006
15	12/11/2006	46	5/22/2007	77	7/20/2006	108	12/11/2007	139	6/14/2007
16	6/12/2007	47	11/15/2006	78	12/12/2007	109	2/19/2008	140	7/12/2006
17	11/28/2006	48	4/20/2007	79	8/14/2007	110	7/14/2006	141	5/3/2008
18	3/16/2007	49	3/13/2007	80	3/13/2007	111	7/14/2006	142	6/21/2006
19	3/13/2007	50	1/18/2007	81	12/12/2007	112	2/20/2008	143	7/18/2006
20	3/14/2007	51	3/15/2007	82	6/14/2007	113	11/6/2007	144	1/8/2008
21	3/11/2008	52	12/13/2006	83	7/13/2006	114	11/5/2007	145	8/2/2006
22	1/9/2008	53	3/13/2008	84	11/16/2006	115	1/18/2007	146	6/21/2006
23	3/13/2008	54	1/7/2008	85	3/12/2007	116	3/5/2008	147	1/8/2008
24	6/20/2006	55	7/17/2006	86	4/27/2007	117	7/26/2006	148	7/26/2006
25	8/24/2006	56	12/13/2006	87	3/11/2008	118	2/21/2008	149	12/19/2007
26	2/5/2008	57	11/5/2007	88	1/23/2008	119	1/19/2007	150	3/13/2007
27	6/30/2006	58	2/15/2008	89	12/11/2006	120	4/15/2007	151	11/28/2006
28	11/17/2006	59	5/25/2007	90	2/15/2008	121	3/10/2008	152	6/27/2006
29	2/20/2008	60	4/24/2007	91	5/18/2007	122	4/1/2008		
30	12/5/2006	61	3/15/2007	92	12/29/2006	123	11/8/2007		
31	12/11/2006	62	7/12/2006	93	11/9/2007	124	6/8/2007		

APPENDIX: BIVARIATE RESIDUALS FOR EFFECTIVENESS

Model1*

Code	Resours	Flexabil	Innovati	Expertis	Contacts	Staff or	Stakehol	Goal Ach	Evaluati
Resours	.								
Flexabil	0.55	.							
Innovati	**10.42**	1.58	.						
Expertis	3.49	**3.86**	0.80	.					
Contacts	0.00	2.16	0.99	2.69	.				
Staff or	0.11	2.10	0.31	0.88	**5.43**	.			
Stakehol	0.00	0.94	0.15	0.10	0.12	**5.04**	.		
Goal Ach	3.14	0.00	0.43	0.33	0.22	0.11	0.14	.	
Evaluati	0.15	0.26	1.56	0.08	0.13	1.47	0.33	0.54	.

Model2*

Code	Resours	Flexabil	Innovati	Expertis	Contacts	Staff or	Stakehol	Goal Ach	Evaluati
Resours	.								
Flexabil	0.28	.							
Innovati	0.27	2.55	.						
Expertis	0.00	**4.71**	0.05	.					
Contacts	0.05	2.20	0.72	2.39	.				
Staff or	0.50	2.19	0.08	0.55	**5.34**	.			
Stakehol	0.06	0.96	0.26	0.05	0.12	**4.95**	.		
Goal Ach	0.00	0.01	0.20	0.02	0.29	0.23	0.09	.	
Evaluati	0.12	0.22	0.68	0.36	0.15	1.33	0.29	0.22	.

Model3*

Code	Resours	Flexabil	Innovati	Expertis	Contacts	Staff or	Stakehol	Goal Ach	Evaluati
Resours	.								
Flexabil	0.46	.							
Innovati	0.82	0.04	.						
Expertis	0.04	0.94	0.41	.					
Contacts	0.28	0.01	0.03	0.85	.				
Staff or	0.14	0.03	0.19	0.01	0.59	.			
Stakehol	0.00	0.05	0.92	0.03	0.23	1.82	.		
Goal Ach	0.01	0.57	0.00	0.05	0.31	0.13	0.63	.	
Evaluati	0.11	0.88	0.18	0.88	0.54	0.63	0.10	0.39	.

*BVR = chi2/df. A value greater than 3.84 indicates a local dependence at the 95% confidence level.

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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

George E. Mitchell currently resides in Syracuse, NY where he has been a doctoral candidate in political science and a research assistant with the Transnational NGO Initiative in the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs. He holds MAs in economics and political science from Syracuse University, a BS in economics from West Virginia University and a certificate in political psychology from Stanford University. He has been a research analyst in Dubai, UAE, a consultant in Washington, DC and New York, NY, and a teaching associate, research assistant and Goekjian scholar in Syracuse, NY. His current research, based on data from the Transnational NGO Interview Project, combines exploratory statistics and computer-aided qualitative analysis to understand how transnational NGO leaders conceptualize their organizations' roles in world affairs.

NOTES

[1] This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-0527679 (Agents of Change: Transnational NGOs as Agents of Change: Toward Understanding Their Governance, Leadership, and Effectiveness) and the Transnational NGO Initiative at the Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at Syracuse University.
[2] The dataset can be obtained by visiting http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/tngo/Data/.
[3] For more detailed information see: (Hermann et al., 2010)
[4] The NCCS cautions their data be interpreted cautiously, however, due to reporting inaccuracies and other technical issues.
[5] The calculation is based on average expenditure data from sampled organizations' IRS Forms 990 for the period 2001-2006 and raw NCCS data for the year 2007.
[6] The Gini coefficient for revenue inequality in the population of international nonprofits in the 2007 database of the National Center for Charitable Statistics is 0.94, whereas that for the transnational NGO sample is 0.84.
[7] However, it should be noted that the NCCS population contains many inactive organizations with zero or near-zero revenues, so the distribution is zero-inflated.
[8] The initial sampling n was determined to enable meaningful statistical comparisons among subgroups. The ultimate sampling n reflects this and also budgetary considerations resulting from refusals and other factors.
[9] The strata were defined by five sectoral, three size (budget) and four financial classifications derived from information provided by Charity Navigator (www.charitynavigator.org). The five sectors were human rights, sustainable development, conflict resolution, environment and humanitarian relief. The three categories of budget size were small (less than $1 million), medium ($1 million to $10 million) and large (greater than $10 million). The four financial classifications were based on Charity Navigator's organizational efficiency and capacity ratings, derived from information from IRS Forms 990.
[10] The response rate of 68 per cent is calculated as the number of successful interviews from the original sample divided by the number of cases in the original sample or 123/182=0.68.
[11] The author is grateful to Jay Magdison for confirming this interpretation.
[12] These tests were exploratory and the results of are not reported owing to path dependencies in the clustering routine that make replication difficult. I used the average linkage method and Jaccard similarity measure using identical sets of response variables as with the corresponding finite mixture models. Concordance between HCA assignment solutions and finite mixture model assignment solutions, as measured by the ratio of concordant assignments to total assignments, was generally in the neighborhood of 70 to 90 percent, indicating strong technical validity.
[13] The solutions are statistically associated (n = 106, chi2(4) = 133.89, p = 0.00) and concordance is 93/106 or 88 percent.
[14] L-squared p-values are obtained using a parametric bootstrap procedure. Delta L^2 p-values and response variable p-values are obtained from -2LL difference tests using a parametric bootstrap procedure.
[15] Coder 3's chi-squared contribution is 6.6/12.26=54%, n = 116, chi2(4) = 12.26, p = 0.02.
[16] The -2LL difference test p-value = 0.11.
[17] Analogous models Model1 and Model2 both contain local dependencies. The analogous model Model3 (L^2 = 30.57, p = 0.37) provides adequate model fit and does not contain any local dependencies. Increasing the number of latent classes to four does not significantly improve model fit (ΔL^2 p-value = 0.46). Again, a 3-class model is preferred. Profile parameter estimates are identical in direction, although not in magnitude, leading to the same substantive interpretation of the results.
[18] An examination of the p-values for Model3 reveals that evaluation least significantly contributes to model fit, indicating that most respondents associate evaluation with effectiveness regardless of latent type. Indeed, the coding did not distinguish between different types of evaluation, such as financial and programmatic, which appear to define the clusters. Eliminating the effect of this single variable immediately lowers the L-squared bootstrap p-value for the null model well below the conventional threshold (L-squared = 112.40, p = 0.01), confirming the dilution interpretation noted above. Re-estimated latent class models with evaluation included as an inactive covariate generate a virtually identical set of solutions, pointing to a virtually identical 3-class model as the preferred solution. Thus, to simplify exposition Model3 may still be regarded as the preferred model.
[19] The three lines inside the triangle intersect the three axes to indicate the latent class probabilities for outcome accountability (Cluster1), overhead minimization (Cluster2) and outliers (Cluster3). These correspond to the

estimated relative sizes of the three groups. The three lines converge at the point of zero coder bias, indicated by a small triangle toward the bottom left corner of the diagram. Coders 1, 2, 3 and 5 are all very near to this point and do not appear to be significantly biased. They are clustered along the horizontal axis with similar propensities toward outcome accountability (greater than 0.8), overhead minimization (less than 0.2) and outliers (close to 0.0). Turning to coder 4, we see the nature and direction of the bias. Coder 4 has the only significantly positive propensity toward the outlier group (close to 0.2). Coder 4's lower propensity toward outcome accountability and higher propensity toward overhead minimization can also be seen.

[20] Coder 4 accounts for 23.00/28.38 = 81 percent.

[21] Although even the reduced bias borders on significance (chi2(4) = 9.75, p = 0.045).

[22] The residual significance is due almost entirely to coder 4's relative propensity toward overhead minimization and aversion toward outcome accountability. Again, although the table is poorly populated, coder 4 appears to be responsible for about 80 percent of the chi-squared statistic's magnitude. After modal classification and outlier removal, about 85 percent of respondents are categorized as having defined effectiveness as outcome accountability and about 15 percent as having defined it as overhead minimization. If coder 4 were eliminated altogether, the proportions would adjust to about 89 percent and 11 percent respectively [146 – 22 = 124; (124 – 14)/124, (22 – 8)/124], indicating the maximum extent of coder 4's influence. Regardless of coder 4's residual bias, the substantive interpretation remains the same.

[23] Statistical significance is determined by -2LL difference tests using a parametric bootstrap procedure.

[24] More accurately, the conditional probabilities are the probabilities that the transcripts contained qualitative evidence justifying application of the corresponding codes.

[25] All tests are performed at the conventional 0.05 level. The categories of sector are environment, human rights, humanitarian relief, sustainable development and conflict resolution (chi2(4)=2.70, p=0.61). The categories Charity Navigator's efficiency ratings are low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars, chi2(1)=0.00, p=0.99). The categories of Charity Navigator's capacity ratings are low (1 and 2 stars) and high (3 and 4 stars, chi2(1)=2.68, p=0.10). The categories of function are advocacy, service and both (chi2(3)=2.85, p=0.42). The categories of headquarters location are New York, NY, Washington, DC, Boston, MA, the West, the South and the Midwest (chi2(5)=5.16, p=0.40). The categories of respondent's gender are male and female (chi2(1)=2.67, p=0.10). The categories of tenure at current organization are measured in years: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, and 10 or more (chi2(5)=8.80, p=0.12). The categories of respondent's country of citizenship are US citizen and other citizenship (chi2(1)=1.68, p=0.20).

[26] The chi-squared contribution of this cell is 6.1/9.11=0.67.

[27] When asked about accountability, leaders were most likely to feel accountable to donors.

[28] The L-squared p-value for the null model is 0.13, providing adequate model fit. Subsequent model specifications failed to discover meaningful structure in the data, as model fit actually deteriorated with additional classes.

[29] The leader's PMP is provided in chapter ten for his or her membership in the human rights activism cluster. This may differ from the leader's PMP in the material amelioration cluster from chapter four.

[30] EM switches to Newton-Raphson after a tolerance criterion is met.

[31] For an evaluation of the software's performance (Latent GOLD), see: (Haughton, Legrand, & Woolford, 2009)